2. DFAT's return of overseas Australians in response to COVID-19

Background

2.1Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) provided support to overseas Australians[1] to access a range of different flight arrangements to return to Australia.[2] The Australian National Audit Office’s (ANAO) audit report outlines two main phases in DFAT’s provision of this assistance.[3]

2.2During phase one, from January 2020 to September 2020, DFAT managed two evacuations of Australians from Wuhan on 3 and 9 February 2020, and returned Australian passengers from the Diamond Princess cruise ship anchored in Tokyo on 19 February 2020.[4] There were 27 more contracted flights from 31 March 2020 to 6June 2020, including from Peru, Argentina, South Africa, Nepal and Uruguay.[5]

2.3During phase two, from October 2020 to February 2022, DFAT established a program of facilitated commercial flights (FCFs).[6] The FCF program involved working with contracted airlines to coordinate flight schedules, managing communications with Australians registered with DFAT, and coordinating with relevant authorities to ensure testing and quarantine arrangements were in place.[7]

2.4DFAT reported that since the start of the pandemic in March 2020, it assisted with the return of 61,769 Australians, including 33,531 Australians on 227 FCFs.[8] Of the 227 FCFs, 148 were with Qantas Airways under an agreement established in October 2020, and 79 were with other airlines, including Singapore Airlines.[9]

Audit findings

2.5Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22 examined the effectiveness of DFAT’s overseas crisis management and response arrangements in meeting the Australian Government’s objectives for returning Australians from overseas in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic. To form a conclusion against the objective, the ANAO adopted the following high-level audit criteria:

• Was DFAT appropriately prepared to manage the return of overseas Australians, as part of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic?
• Has DFAT responded effectively to achieve the government’s objectives for managing the return of overseas Australians during the COVID-19 pandemic?
  6. The audit report under inquiry is one of six performance audits conducted under phase two of the ANAO’s multi-year strategy that focuses on the effective, efficient, economical and ethical delivery of the Australian Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.[10]
  7. The audit report concluded that:

DFAT adapted its crisis management arrangements and established a new program of activity to provide assistance to a large number of overseas Australians affected by COVID-19, although it did not meet key government objectives. DFAT’s underlying crisis management structures and capabilities require strengthening to ensure it is prepared to respond to future major and complex crises.[11]

2.8The ANAO made nine recommendations, seven of which were agreed to by DFAT.

Chapter overview

2.9This chapter discusses key findings from the audit and DFAT’s actions to address them, with particular focus on:

• data capability
• coordination of the crisis response
• assisting vulnerable Australians
• procurement during the crisis.

Data capability

Traveller registration system

2.10In April 2020, DFAT developed an online portal on the Smartraveller website called the Traveller Registration System (TRS).[12] Overseas Australians who had been unable to return home were advised to register their details through the portal. The TRS was supported at the backend by the COVID-19 Crisis Citizen Information (CCCI) system, which recorded individual registrant details and supported DFAT’s monitoring and reporting on the status of returning Australians. The system was closed to new registrations in November 2021 as travel restrictions were lifted.[13]

2.11The audit found shortcomings in data quality and completeness in relation to the CCCI system, including:

• over 6,000 registrations whose accounts appeared to have been created after the person had returned to Australia
• fields that were inconsistently filled. For example, 31 registrants included the term ‘elderly’ as a marker of vulnerability, the youngest of which were 69 years old. However, the ANAO identified a total of 9,295 registrants aged over 69 years and only 26 per cent of these were assessed as vulnerable
• fields that were not used or had the majority of entries left blank, including those for recording chartered flight priorities, post additional information (free-text), last attempted contact, and last successful contact
• lack of user access controls, data assurance and oversight processes, systems monitoring, and data validation to ensure data integrity.[14]
  12. The ANAO also found inconsistencies between the figures DFAT reported to government for registered and returned Australians, and those recorded in final flight manifests. This resulted in significant variance between ANAO’s analysis and DFAT’s reporting (by up to 59 per cent for some figures).
  13. The accuracy of DFAT’s monitoring and reporting of the number of registered and returned Australians was significant as it showed whether the department was able to meet a key government objective of bringing registered Australians home by Christmas 2020. On 18 September 2020, the then Prime Minister stated during a press conference in Sydney:

… I would hope that those who are looking to come home, that we’d be able to do that within months and I would hope that we can get as many people home, if not all of them by Christmas.[15]

2.14On 23 October 2020, the Prime Minister reiterated this statement as a commitment:

Now, I can confirm when we made our commitment on the 18th of September. There were registered, some 26,200 Australians. 4,100 of those were vulnerable. So far, 1,278 of that vulnerable cohort have come home. … So we continue to make good progress towards returning Australians home. And we want to do that as effectively and quickly, as safely as possible.[16]

2.15The government’s objective, to bring Australians registered with DFAT as at 18September back home by Christmas, was reaffirmed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 28 October 2020.[17]

2.16When asked whether the department had been consulted before the statement was made by the Prime Minister on 18 September 2020, DFAT informed the Committee that:

DFAT did not prepare a brief for the 18 September 2020 meeting when National Cabinet agreed that all jurisdictions would continue to work towards enabling more Australians to return home by increasing the existing caps on international passenger arrivals.[18]

2.17An interagency taskforce, led by DFAT, was established to support the return of Australians before Christmas 2020. On 25 September 2020, DFAT reported to the government that there were 26,200 Australians registered as wanting to return to Australia as at 18 September 2020, around 4,000 of whom were assessed as vulnerable. This figure differed from the ANAO’s analysis that there were 45,958 people registered as at 18 September 2020.[19] When asked about the discrepancy in DFAT’s reporting and the total number of registrations, the ANAO explained that:

When DFAT reported the number to government, it was based on who wanted to return in the immediate period going forward, rather than the total number of Australians registered.[20]

2.18DFAT also commented further on the reasons for possible discrepancies within the registration system:

When people registered to return, there wasn’t always an immediate intention to return. Because of the psychology of the pandemic—people wanted a safety net and thought they might never be able to come home—people registered just in case, which I can so easily understand. But when the time came—when a flight was available and it was offered to people—sometimes that timing was not the best timing for them, and they ended up deferring their arrival back into Australia. So the numbers don’t necessarily accurately mirror an immediate intention to return for that cohort of 26,200.[21]

2.19DFAT advised the Committee that of the 26,200 Australians registered as at 18September 2020, 24,800 had returned by Christmas. DFAT commented however that it could not say ‘the exact people who were registered on 18 September are actually the ones that returned’, as some people who registered after that date were able to return first if they were assessed as vulnerable.[22]

2.20As noted above, the ANAO was unable to verify these passenger numbers due to data quality issues. The audit concluded that:

DFAT data and reporting indicate it did not meet all of the government’s objectives. The ANAO could not verify DFAT reporting on: the number of Australians and vulnerable Australians it assisted to return to Australia; and Australians who accessed facilitated commercial flights administered by DFAT. Reporting could not be verified due to data quality issues and unclear methods underpinning its reporting on Australians registered with DFAT.[23]

2.21The ANAO made a recommendation for DFAT to ‘develop, implement and routinely test a fit-for-purpose crisis registration system that sufficiently validates registrant data to support business planning, program evaluation and reporting’.[24] DFAT disagreed with this recommendation. At the 16 December 2022 public hearing, DFAT explained that it had disagreed with the ‘framing of the recommendation’,[25] rather than the substance of it, and that enhancements have since been made to the registration system to make it fit-for-purpose:

The first registration system that was set up in the early days of the pandemic was, by its nature, very quickly done, and it was not perfect. As we have gone on through the pandemic, it has been refined. The new portal still uses Salesforce—it’s a Salesforce based system—but it is much better. It’s had more money spent on it. It’s got a team now that looks after it, which we didn’t have the luxury of during the pandemic because it was all hands to the pump just trying to get people out of the registration system and onto a plane. So we’ve had a bit more time to consolidate the gains. The registration portal we now have was tested for the first time after Russia invaded Ukraine, and it has been performing, I think, quite effectively. It’s giving us what we need.[26]

Other data quality findings

2.22The audit report made a number of other findings in relation to DFAT’s collection and use of data during its crisis response. These findings related to the management of information from DFAT’s overseas posts in the early stages of the pandemic,[27] and data collected from its engagement with the public during the pandemic.[28]

2.23The ANAO made recommendations to DFAT to:

• establish a data and information strategy and capability to strengthen its capacity to rapidly and effectively source, analyse and use data from all sources for crisis planning and response[29]
• capture and retain accurate and complete data from its engagement with clients in accordance with government information management standards, and for the purposes of monitoring its effectiveness in engaging with the public.[30]
  24. DFAT agreed to both recommendations, stating in its submission to this inquiry that its Consular and Crisis Management Division (CCD) is developing a Divisional Data Strategy which will:

… commit to stronger data practices, capability, and culture; formalise data sharing arrangements with relevant Australian Government agencies; set out data governance arrangements and identify roles that require specific data skills and ensure appropriate training.[31]

2.25The CCD has also commenced a robotics project to improve efficiency and consistency of data capture, especially during fast-moving crisis situations.[32]

Coordination of the crisis response

DFAT’s arrangements

2.26As outlined in Chapter 1, DFAT is the lead agency for response and recovery in international crises under the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF). DFAT’s efforts to return Australians stranded overseas during the pandemic involved coordination with multiple government agencies, including:

• Department of Health, which was the lead entity for managing Australia’s public health response to COVID-19
• Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), including the Australian Border Force (ABF), which managed travel restrictions at the international border and any exemptions from the inward and outward travel restrictions
• Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications (DITRDC), which was managing international arrival caps by placing conditions on airline timetables under the Air Navigation Regulation 2016
• Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), which coordinated advice to Australian governments and helped negotiate international arrival caps with states and territories (based on quarantine capacity)[33]
• other Australian Government departments, such as the Treasury and the Department of Finance, who were consulted in the development of aviation sector support measures[34]
• various state and territory government agencies, as required, to facilitate arrivals at international ports of entry.
  27. Coordination took place via various fora. At a whole-of-government level, key mechanisms for coordinating the Australian Government’s response to COVID-19 that were in place at the time were:
• Australian Government Crisis Committee (AGCC)[35]—led by Home Affairs and PM&C, responsible under the AGCMF for coordinating the Australian Government’s response to domestic crises, including public health emergencies
• National Crisis Committee (NCC)[36]—led by Home Affairs and PM&C, facilitated cooperation and coordination between the Australian Government and the relevant states and territory governments in response to domestic crises.[37]
  28. The AGCMF also listed the Inter-Departmental Emergency Taskforce (IDETF) as one of its whole-of-government coordination mechanisms. The IDETF is led by DFAT and is responsible for managing the whole-of-government response to overseas incidents or crises that impact or threaten to impact Australians or Australia’s interests overseas.[38] The IDETF was not convened for the government’s response to COVID‑19, with the whole-of-government COVID-19 response led by PM&C and Home Affairs via the two mechanisms listed above.[39]
  29. There were also inter-departmental committees (IDCs), working groups and taskforces established at different levels to coordinate crisis response efforts across government. Examples include the COVID-19 Deputies IDC, chaired by a PM&C Deputy Secretary, which assumed a lead role in coordinating the COVID-19 response across the Australian Government with a focus on international travel restrictions; and the ‘Taskforce to assist Australians to Return’ led by DFAT, which was charged with maximising opportunities for Australians, particularly vulnerable people, to return to Australia following the Prime Minister’s statement of 18September 2020.[40]
  30. DFAT had existing internal arrangements to coordinate its response to international crises. During the inquiry, the Committee conducted a site visit to examine these arrangements, which are described in Box 2.1.

2.31The ANAO noted in its audit that DFAT did not have ‘a single document which clearly explains its crisis management framework and sets out key crisis functions and accountabilities for these’,[42] and stated that ‘there would be value in DFAT consolidating its different sources of guidance to show how individual mechanisms relate to core functions and how these operate together as a system for crisis planning and response’.[43] The audit recommended that:

DFAT consolidate its policy and guidance for crisis management, drawing on the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework. The framework should set out key crisis management functions and assign clear accountability for these, and for the development and assurance of key capabilities.[44]

2.32DFAT agreed to the recommendation. In its submission to the inquiry, DFAT stated that it is ‘developing a consolidated crisis management framework with clearly articulated crisis management functions and accountability arrangements’, including integrating existing documents into ‘an improved single reference point on crisis preparedness, and governance and responsibilities during crisis response’.[45]

Coordination with states and territories

2.33DFAT’s activities to bring overseas Australians back home also required coordination with state and territory governments. This was because the states and territories led the implementation of the National Cabinet’s decision for all travellers arriving in Australia from 28 March 2020 to undertake their mandatory 14-day quarantine at ‘designated facilities’—for example, hotels.

2.34The then Prime Minister’s media release on Friday 27 March 2020 stated that, from no later than 11:59pm Saturday 28 March 2020:

• Travellers will be transported directly to designated facilities after appropriate immigration, customs and enhanced health checks.
• Designated facilities will be determined by the relevant state or territory government and will ordinarily be in the city of entry where the traveller has cleared immigration, but facilities in other areas may be used if required.
• These requirements will be implemented under state and territory legislation and will be enforced by state and territory governments, with the support of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian Border Force (ABF) where necessary.
• The Commonwealth will provide support through the ABF and ADF for these arrangements across Australia, and that states and territories would meet the costs and determine any contributions required for travellers arriving within their jurisdictions.
• Air and maritime crews will be required to continue to undertake the existing precautions they are following where they self-isolate in their accommodation if they enter Australia until their next work voyage.[46]
  35. Hotel quarantine arrangements were established by states and territories over that weekend and fully operationalised by 28 March 2020.
  36. On 10 July 2020, ‘in order to manage and maintain quarantine arrangements across the jurisdictions’, the National Cabinet agreed to impose caps on international arrivals at a number of ports of entry from 13 July, comprising:

• Perth—a cap of 525 international arrivals per week
• Brisbane—a cap of 500 international arrivals per week
• Sydney—a cap of 450 international arrivals per day (as first announced on 3July).[47]
  37. These passenger caps changed throughout the pandemic, with the lowest cap imposed in January 2021 when passenger caps in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia were temporarily halved.[48] Some jurisdictions also suspended the arrival of international flights into their ports of entry at specific times as they dealt with COVID-19 outbreaks.[49] The arrival caps remained in place until November 2021, when borders were reopened to fully vaccinated travellers and quarantine requirements transitioned from hotel to home quarantine.[50]
  38. The capping of passenger arrival numbers limited the number of people who could enter Australia and thus resulted in fewer inbound international flights. At the public hearing on 16 December 2022, DFAT commented that the passenger cap, imposed as a result of the health requirements around quarantine, was the ‘key constraint’ in DFAT’s ability to bring Australians home.[51]
  39. The Australian Government did not establish a national facility for quarantine until October 2020, when it entered into an agreement with the Northern Territory Government for the provision of quarantine arrangements at the NT Centre for National Resilience (Howard Springs) facility. The initial agreement was from 23 October 2020 to 31March 2021, at a capacity of 500 individuals per fortnight. This arrangement was extended, and capacity increased to a peak of 2,000 individuals a fortnight from May2021, until the facility closed at the end of June 2022.[52]
  40. DFAT informed the Committee that changes to the passenger caps were communicated to it through DITRDC, but that it was not consulted by relevant state agencies prior to the adjustment of the passenger cap on the potential impact of the reduced cap on its efforts to bring overseas Australians home.[53]
  41. DFAT stated that in spite of the challenges, the consultation mechanisms ‘were rigorous’ and ‘worked really well in terms of very regular engagement across Commonwealth and state governments’, noting that ‘officials [were] working around the clock to really try their best to make it work for as large a number of people as possible, weighing up risks of people being stuck overseas, overwhelmed hospitals, quarantine’.[54] DFAT further noted that at times it contacted states with requests for exemptions for vulnerable Australians who were on flights that would be above arrival caps, and that most states were ‘excellent’ on allowing compassionate exemptions on a case-by-case basis.[55]
  42. In a supplementary submission to this inquiry, DFAT noted that:

A further lesson learned by the department during the pandemic was the requirement for Australian Government, with State and Territory Governments, to collectively improve our ability to work together to respond to crises across jurisdictions (for example, entry and testing requirements during a health crisis).[56]

Assisting vulnerable Australians

Facilitated flights

2.43As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the ANAO described two phases in DFAT’s efforts to bring overseas Australians back home. During phase one, DFAT arranged early evacuation flights from Wuhan and a cruise ship in Tokyo in February2020, and managed 27 more contracted flights from 31 March 2020 to 6June 2020. The audit report noted that ‘flights activity ceased from the end of June 2020 until a standing arrangement was put in place with Qantas Airways (Qantas) in October 2020 for non-scheduled facilitated flights’.[57] This led into phase two of DFAT’s response centred on facilitated commercial flights, of which there were 227 in total.

2.44There was a gap of about four months, from the end of June to late October 2020, in which no evacuation flights were facilitated by DFAT for stranded Australians. The global environment for aviation was challenging, creating significant complexity for all governments, including issues in relation to landing rights, airline staffing, aircraft availability, and a myriad of health restrictions.

2.45The ANAO found that although DFAT appropriately advised the government in March2020 that it would not be possible to assist all Australians to return to Australia due to resourcing and other constraints in providing consular assistance to all parts of the world, further advice it provided to government at different points during the pandemic did not always have a clear evidence base.[58] In particular, the ANAO noted:

At the end of April 2020, DFAT advised the government that despite sizeable cohorts it was not planning ‘further facilitated flights from regions in which there have been numerous opportunities to leave through such flights’. DFAT did not identify these regions or provide a rationale for adopting this position. Advice did not include a supporting analysis of risks for overseas Australians still seeking to return to Australia or sensitivities for the government.[59]

2.46The audit report further commented that:

Proposals to limit or cease crisis assistance should be supported by a documented policy framework. Processes for developing advice could consider questions such as: whether all citizens should have access to crisis assistance, irrespective of the difficulty or cost of providing the service; the circumstances under which Australians may not be assisted; and how this should be communicated to the public. This would help ensure such decisions are made consistently and better enable DFAT to manage expectations of the extent of assistance it is able to provide.[60]

2.47DFAT informed the Committee that it is aware of 136 Australians (citizens and permanent residents) who died overseas with COVID-19 before 11 March 2022. Of these, 14 had been registered with DFAT, and three of these 14 registrants had been categorised as vulnerable.[61] No evidence was received with regard to the location of the registrants or what support was provided.

Identifying vulnerable Australians

2.48The ANAO noted in its audit report that DFAT identified vulnerable Australians who required assistance when they contacted posts and/or received registrations through its CCCI database.[62] Data quality issues relating to the CCCI database are outlined earlier in the chapter. The ANAO noted the following shortcomings in specific relation to recording vulnerability:

• The online registration form did not have a specific field for registrants to include information about their vulnerabilities, with some registrants providing information in an ‘additional information’ free-text field. Prior to December 2020, DFAT used key word searches in this ‘additional information’ field to identify vulnerable Australians.[63]
• In March 2021, DFAT developed a Vulnerable Client Policy which states that vulnerable Australians include individuals with no financial means to support themselves, visa issues and medical conditions. The audit found however that this policy did not make clear how assessments of vulnerability were to be documented.[64]
  49. At the public hearing on 16 December 2022, the Auditor-General explained that receiving information in free-text fields meant that ‘your ability to control and utilise the data drops in a significant crisis environment’.[65] The Auditor-General further commented that free-text information also results in poor quality data:

… ‘elderly’, for example, was a term used a number of times within the free-text field. It doesn’t give you a sense of the vulnerability for them to do a risk assessment against.[66]

2.50Once vulnerable Australians were identified, DFAT offered them an exclusive 48‑hour booking window through a priority booking weblink provided by Qantas as seats became available. The audit report outlined some complications that arose with this arrangement. This included rejections of flight offers and the sharing of these booking weblinks with other travellers, including via social media, meaning not all people who booked through the priority booking weblink had been listed as vulnerable.[67]

2.51The ANAO noted that reasons for passengers rejecting flight offers were not recorded by DFAT staff in a ‘systematic or consistent way’, making it difficult to support an analysis of key reasons for registrants not accepting these offers.[68] At the public hearing, DFAT noted that ‘some people had extremely good reasons for not being able to return on the flights. They had jobs, they had leases, they had kids in school—all the complexities of life that meant they weren’t able to travel on a particular date’.[69]

2.52According to the audit report, DFAT reported to government on 27 August 2021 that it had returned 5,598 Australians registered as vulnerable. The ANAO was not able to verify this figure against the final flight manifests and noted in the audit report that the ‘variance between ANAO findings and DFAT’s reporting ranged between 21 and 59 per cent’.[70]

2.53The ANAO recommended that DFAT ‘develop clear policies and procedures for assessing and recording vulnerability to ensure it is able to appropriately demonstrate the basis of its decision-making on the provision of benefits to the public’.[71] DFAT agreed to this recommendation. In its submission to this inquiry, DFAT informed the Committee that:

In response to the recommendation, DFAT is enhancing policies and procedures for assessing vulnerability. DFAT has strengthened procedures and guidance in its Consular Handbook to ensure we can better demonstrate the basis of decision-making during crisis response, with consideration of the specific circumstances, and scale applicable to the relevant crisis. DFAT has also reviewed and expanded the vulnerability ‘markers’ that can be recorded against clients in its consular information systems.[72]

2.54As observed earlier in the chapter, DFAT has indicated improvements in its registration system to make it more fit-for-purpose. DFAT noted at the public hearing that ‘in the new, better-fit-for-purpose registration system, there is now functionality built into the online public-facing portal, where there are vulnerability identifiers’.[73]

Overseas Financial Assistance (Hardship) Program

2.55On 2 September 2020, the Australian Government announced the COVID-19 Special Overseas Financial Assistance (Hardship) Program to assist eligible vulnerable Australians overseas. DFAT explained that it had been introduced for two reasons:

The first reason was to cover the costs of people’s airfares home if they didn’t have the means. …

The other reason was for those who were not able to return home because they couldn’t get on a commercial flight. It was sort of sustenance for those overseas. It was money designed to sustain families until they could get home. Some of those were loans, and some were grants in particular circumstances of hardship and compassion.[74]

2.56The ANAO noted in its audit that:

As at 25 January 2022, DFAT dashboard reporting indicated DFAT had received 10,316 Hardship Program applications. Of these, 5717 had been approved. The ANAO did not observe any material variance between DFAT’s reporting and the ANAO’s analysis.[75]

2.57The Hardship Program operated until the end of March 2022. DFAT informed the Committee that it had issued a total of $44.54 million under the program, comprising $35.19 million in grants and $9.35 million in loans.[76]

2.58At the 16 December 2022 public hearing, the Committee inquired about DFAT’s publicisation of the program to eligible vulnerable Australians overseas. A submission to the inquiry from Mr Robin Hornby, who had been stranded in Thailand during 2020, stated that he had not initially been made aware of available financial assistance, and that once he applied for assistance, he encountered difficulties in providing required documentation while overseas for the application process.[77] DFAT informed the Committee that:

It was on the website. It was publicised. It went out through Smartraveller, the DFAT travel advice system. It was as public as we could make it. I know it was also disseminated through some of the Facebook user groups and so on.[78]

2.59DFAT also commented that, separate to its responses to the audit report, it had been working to improve Smartraveller to better disseminate information to the travelling public:

We have a new Smartraveller campaign launching—probably in January or February next year—and we have a new Smartraveller Instagram. So we have new ways of getting out to people. We’re particularly targeting young people who don’t look at websites anymore. We think Instagram is a good way of doing that. So that’s launched. Hopefully in the next pandemic there will be more public channels of information.[79]

2.60In its supplementary submission, DFAT informed the Committee that ‘as of 31December 2022, a total of $5.475 million remains owing in hardship loans, with $3.271 million having been repaid’. DFAT stated that it is taking ‘a compassionate approach to the recovery of loans, including through repayment by instalment options and temporary payment deferrals on a case-by-case basis’. A Traveller Emergency Loan Unit was established in DFAT to manage the outstanding hardship loans.[80]

Consideration of human rights during crisis

2.61A submission to the inquiry from the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) noted that ‘crisis management frameworks in Australia, most notably the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, do not sufficiently engage with human rights considerations as an integral part of any effective emergency response’.[81] The AHRC was critical of the ANAO audit report for ‘mak[ing] no mention of human rights at all, particularly failing to consider this significant aspect of border closures when framing its nine recommendations’.[82]

2.62The AHRC’s submission commented that significant human rights impacts had resulted from the temporary ban on travel from India from 3 to 15 May 2021 during the Delta outbreak. The travel ban was first announced by the Prime Minister on 27April 2021 on advice of the Chief Medical Officer.[83] On 30 April 2021, the then Health Minister made an emergency determination under the Biosecurity Act 2015, banning a passenger from entering Australian territory ‘if the person had been in India within 14 days before the day the flight was scheduled to commence’.[84] The Health Minister’s media release stated that this decision was ‘based on advice about the worsening COVID-19 situation in India’, with the determination to come into effect from 3 May 2021, and failure to comply with it liable to ‘incur a civil penalty of 300 penalty units [$66,000], five years’ imprisonment, or both’.[85]

2.63In a supplementary submission, DFAT informed the Committee that ‘at the time of the decision to pause passenger flights from India to Australia (27 April 2021), 9,035Australian citizens, permanent residents and family members were registered with DFAT seeking assistance to return to Australia’.[86] DFAT had previously informed the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 on 7 May 2021 that around 950Australians registered with DFAT in India were classified as vulnerable.[87]

2.64Acknowledging that ‘border closures can play a necessary and significant role in upholding other human rights, such as the right to life’, the AHRC concluded that:

To improve crisis management planning it is necessary to evaluate and review existing crisis management frameworks to ensure that Australia is better prepared for future crises. Future planning must consider human rights to ensure crisis response measures that limit or restrict human rights are necessary, reasonable and proportionate.[88]

2.65As noted in Chapter 1, the AGCMF was last updated in November 2022 to reflect the updated administrative arrangements, including the establishment of the National Emergency Management Agency. DFAT advised the Committee that ‘the update [of November 2022] did not consider broader issues’, and noted that ‘the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, who administer the AGCMF, will commence a comprehensive review of the AGCMF in 2023’.[89]

Procurement during COVID-19

2.66The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) and Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) provide the framework under which government entities are required to undertake procurement activities. Paragraph 2.6 of the CPRs provides an exemption from the rules, to the extent deemed necessary by the accountable authority, in certain situations including ‘for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, to protect human health, for the protection of essential security interests, or to protect national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value’.

2.67In its audit report, the ANAO noted that ‘exempt procurements remain subject to other requirements of the CPRs, including the core principle of achieving value for money’.[90]

2.68The ANAO observed some shortcomings in DFAT’s procurement activities during the pandemic. On 28 February 2020, the Secretary of DFAT retrospectively approved the application of paragraph 2.6 of the CPRs for evacuation flights procured on 1February 2020. The approval document did not specify how DFAT would obtain value for money.[91]

2.69On 14 November 2021, after travel restrictions were removed in Australia on 1November, the Secretary noted the department’s advice on the likely need for further facilitated commercial flights and agreed to continue direct approaches to airlines to enable flexible procurements. This advice also did not set out how value for money would be achieved.[92]

2.70At the public hearing on 16 December 2022, the Auditor-General commented:

I think our concern, across a number of audits, with using paragraph 2.6 is that simply setting aside the whole framework for procurement doesn’t give you a framework for procurement. We can understand why you would set aside some of the requirements in an emergency situation, but, in doing that, you still have to demonstrate value for money. …

They go, ‘We apply 2.6 and the rules don’t apply, but what does?’ This then becomes the question. And what we’d expect to see is a brief going to the accountable authority saying, ‘We shouldn’t apply the rules, and the process for procurement we’re going to undertake is this.’ And it should say why.[93]

2.71The ANAO made a recommendation to DFAT to develop emergency procurement guidelines to support officials to meet their obligations when the procurement rules are set aside during a crisis.[94] DFAT disagreed with this recommendation. At the public hearing, it elaborated that the disagreement, as with the recommendation relating to the travel registration system, was with the framing of the recommendation, rather than its substance.[95] DFAT informed the Committee that improvements have since been made to its procurement policy:

… in June this year [2022], the DFAT procurement policy was updated and now includes instructions on compliance with record-keeping requirements in a crisis. So the justification, such as it is, is that everyone was so busy trying to do, that there wasn’t enough of recording how and why we did. I think that gap has now been rectified with these updated procurement processes. The ones that have been implemented further emphasise the importance of achieving value for money and retaining sufficient records of the considerations made during that procurement process. In September [2022], a procurement record-keeping guide was published by DFAT for DFAT staff to use, including during a crisis; they are the direct flow-on effects, essentially, from the audit.[96]

Committee comment

2.72The Committee commends the efforts of DFAT officers in assisting overseas Australians in highly complex and unpredictable circumstances of the pandemic. A crisis of this scale, the speed with which it emerged, and its truly global nature was unprecedented in our modern globalised era and required an extraordinary consular response. The Committee also acknowledges the value of DFAT’s ‘everyday’ work to support Australians overseas, dealing with various crises large and small. The extent of effort involved in providing these essential services was made clear during the site visit, where the Committee had the opportunity to speak to DFAT officers and observe the arrangements in person, including those that are staffed and closely monitored on a 24-hour basis.

2.73The Committee acknowledges DFAT’s generally excellent track record in managing major and isolated crises in many parts of the world. The pandemic however revealed some lack of preparation to manage a full global crisis in which issues erupted rapidly across the world. The Committee sees the ANAO’s audit as an opportunity for DFAT, and the Australian Government more broadly, to learn from the response to the pandemic and strengthen the arrangements in place to improve our collective response in the event of another global crisis.

2.74The Committee found it peculiar that DFAT disagreed with two recommendations due to ‘framing’, yet did not seem to disagree with the substance and in effect has acted upon them. The Committee has not been able to understand DFAT’s rationale for disagreeing with the recommendations, but nevertheless welcomes DFAT’s advice that it has largely implemented the suggested improvements identified in ANAO’s recommendations, including the two recommendations it had disagreed with.

2.75There are a number of recommendations that DFAT is still in the process of implementing, with most scheduled for completion by June 2023. The Committee considers there would be merit in monitoring the completion of these remaining recommendations to ensure all findings have been satisfactorily addressed.

2.76The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provide it with an update on the status of projects planned or commenced in response to the Australian National Audit Office’s findings, including progress of implementing the recommendations, by the end of August 2023.

2.77The audit report highlighted a number of shortcomings in DFAT’s data capability in the context of its crisis response. The Committee acknowledges the difficulties in gathering and using data in crisis situations, where rapid pace of events can make it challenging to collect and quality assure data.

2.78The availability of reliable and accurate data is critical to ensuring a robust, evidence-based crisis response. Advice to government on the status and trajectory of the response should be supported by this data. Where data indicates that achievability of a government policy objective or commitment is at risk, timely advice should be provided to relevant ministers to ensure the government and the public, including those relying on government assistance, are informed of the evolving situation. Further, where data is not available, or data quality is poor, appropriate caveats should be included in advice to government to ensure informed decision-making. The Committee acknowledges DFAT’s progress in implementing the audit recommendations relating to data capability.

2.79On a related note, the Committee also considers that government ministers have a responsibility to be as fully informed by sensible and evidence-based advice from public servants as possible before making public commitments in such sensitive areas. DFAT's evidence that no advice was provided to Ministers before these public commitments were made is deeply concerning. Furthermore, if subsequent advice suggests that a public commitment may not be able to be kept, the relevant minister should revise the commitment to ensure the ongoing reliability and transparency of government responses.

2.80During the inquiry, it became evident to the Committee the complexities involved in DFAT’s efforts to bring Australians home in the midst of various international and domestic travel restrictions and public health requirements. The Committee notes the lack of adequate quarantine facilities in Australia was one of the key constraints upon DFAT’s activities in this regard.

2.81While the Committee acknowledges that quarantine arrangements had been negotiated and established on very short notice early in the pandemic as the crisis developed, the Committee considers that more could and should have been done by the Commonwealth in this space later on to enable stranded Australians to return from overseas. This is especially the case as the pandemic progressed and the virus evolved and became more infectious. It became clear that it was not going to be possible for states to provide and manage sufficiently secure quarantine facilities in hotels, hence their imposition of arrival caps, and there were calls by independent experts that expanded standalone, purpose-built quarantine facilities were needed.

2.82The Committee notes that there had been two national reviews into hotel quarantine conducted by Adjunct Professor Jane Halton AO PSM in 2020 and 2021.[97] The 2021 review noted that the recommendations from 2020 had been largely implemented and made nine further recommendations to Australian governments.[98] A response to the 2021 review has never been provided by the government.

2.83Australia, like much of the world, has now largely transitioned into a state of ‘COVID normal’ and the Committee acknowledges that some of the recommendations were particular to the time the report was released. However, the Committee considers there would be merit in providing a formal response to the 2021 Halton review and implementing those recommendations that remain generally applicable, in order to better prepare for potential future public health crises.

2.84The Committee recommends that the Australian Government publish a formal response to the 2021 Halton review into national hotel quarantine arrangements.

2.85A key part of DFAT’s role during the pandemic was to assist vulnerable Australians seeking to return to Australia. The Committee acknowledges DFAT’s efforts to prioritise the return of registered Australians assessed as vulnerable during the pandemic and welcomes the improvements it has since made in identifying and recording vulnerability ‘markers’ in its consular information systems.

2.86The Committee believes there are a number of areas in which service of vulnerable Australians can be strengthened. In particular, the Committee notes that there was a gap of approximately four months between June and October 2020 where no evacuation flights were organised for stranded Australians, after which a contract for facilitated commercial flights was arranged with Qantas. Speaking with the benefit of hindsight, the Committee is of the view that it would have been prudent if DFAT had examined pathways to establish an agreement for facilitated flights with Qantas and other airlines earlier in the pandemic. The Committee acknowledges that the commercial environment of the airlines was complex at this time. The Committee is optimistic that the lessons learned from the pandemic will assist with a greatly improved response to any future crisis.

2.87Another key area relating to vulnerable Australians during crisis relates to the consideration of human rights. These issues relate especially, although not only, to Australians banned from returning to Australia stranded in India as the virus swept the population there. The Committee acknowledges the AHRC’s concerns that the whole-of-government crisis management framework is silent on the need to consider the protection of human rights as a key factor in a crisis response. In a public health crisis like the pandemic, certain restrictions on rights and freedoms may be necessary to ensure the protection of public health and the integrity of supporting institutions. However, these restrictions should be necessary, reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances, and decision-makers should turn their minds explicitly to these matters.

2.88The Committee notes advice from DFAT that PM&C, as the whole-of-government framework’s policy owner, is planning to commence a comprehensive review of the AGCMF in 2023.

2.89The Committee recommends that the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), in its 2023 review of the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, incorporate human rights considerations in the framework, and outline measures to ensure that any crisis response limiting or restricting human rights is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. PM&C should also require relevant entities to update their entity-level crisis management policies and plans to reflect this change.

2.90The Committee notes that the ANAO has listed under phase three of its COVID-19 audit strategy[99] a potential performance audit of the AGCMF to examine its effectiveness in facilitating the Australian Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.[100]

2.91The Committee recommends that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a performance audit of the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework and include within the audit scope whether the updated framework adequately reflects lessons learned from COVID-19.

Julian Hill MP

Chair

23 March 2023

Footnotes

[1]Consular assistance is generally only available to Australian citizens. During crisis events services may be extended to permanent residents. This report uses the term ‘Australians’ to refer to both Australian citizens and permanent residents, as they received the same services during the pandemic.

[2]Types of assistance included supporting overseas Australians with scheduled and non-scheduled commercial flights; organising sweeper flights and ground transport to transfer passengers to international airports; and securing seats for Australians on flights to Australia organised by other governments to repatriate their citizens, cargo flights, medivac flights, and RAAF flights returning from delivering humanitarian supplies: see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Annual Report 2019–20, p. 91.

[3]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22 Overseas Crisis Management and Response: The Effectiveness of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Management of the Return of Overseas Australians in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, paragraph 1.20, p. 18.

[4]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 1.22, p. 19.

[5]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.61, pages 65, 97.

[6]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 1.24, p. 20.

[7]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 2.6, pages 25–26.

[8]DFAT, Annual Report 2021–22, p. 79.

[9]Ms Lynn Bell, Assistant Secretary, Crisis Preparedness and Management Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 19.

[10]Australian National Audit Office, ANAO COVID-19 multi-year audit strategy, November 2022, https://www.anao.gov.au/work-program/covid-19, viewed 17 February 2023.

[11]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 7, p. 8.

[12]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.134, p. 80.

[13]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraphs 3.134–3.135, p. 80.

[14]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Appendix 8, pages 103–104.

[15]The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, ‘Press Conference — Sydney, NSW’, Transcript, 18 September 2020, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-43027, viewed 17 February 2023.

[16]The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, ‘Press Conference — Australian Parliament House, ACT’, Transcript, 23 October 2020, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-43100, viewed 17 February 2023.

[17]Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 28 October 2020, pages 91, 102.

[18]DFAT, Submission 1:2, Answer to Question on Notice 1, p. [1].

[19]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Appendix 9, p. 105.

[20]Mr Alex Wilkinson, Executive Director, Performance Audit Services Group, Australian National Audit Office, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 17.

[21]Ms Kate Logan, First Assistant Secretary, Crisis Preparedness and Management Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 15.

[22]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 17.

[23]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, p. 79.

[24]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Recommendation no. 9, paragraph 3.154, p. 86.

[25]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 16.

[26]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 16.

[27]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraphs 3.25–3.28, p. 57.

[28]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraphs 3.114–3.118, pages 75–76.

[29]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Recommendation no. 3, paragraph 3.29, p. 58.

[30]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Recommendation no. 7, paragraph 3.119, p. 76.

[31]DFAT, Submission 1, p. 5.

[32]DFAT, Submission 1, p. 8.

[33]Auditor-General Report No. 12 2021–22 Management of International Travel Restrictions during COVID-19, paragraph 3.13, p. 58.

[34]Auditor-General Report No. 40 2021–22 COVID-19 Support to the Aviation Sector, paragraphs 2.55–2.56, p. 42.

[35]When the AGCMF was revised in July 2021, the AGCC was replaced by the Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee.

[36]When the AGCMF was updated in July 2021, the National Coordination Mechanism (NCM) replaced the NCC as the primary committee for national coordination, communication and collaboration during a crisis response and recovery.

[37]Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, version 2.2, December 2017, p. 23.

[38]PM&C, Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, version 2.2, December 2017, p. 23.

[39]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Appendix 7, Note a, p. 102.

[40]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.34, pages 58–59.

[41]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 8.

[42]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 2.13, p. 27.

[43]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 2.18, p. 28.

[44]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Recommendation no. 1, paragraph 2.19, p. 29.

[45]DFAT, Submission 1, p. 3.

[46]The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, ‘Update on coronavirus measures’, Media Release, 27 March 2020, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-42761, viewed 17 February 2023.

[47]The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, ‘National Cabinet’, Media Statement, 10 July 2020, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-43995, viewed 17 February 2023.

[48]The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, ‘Statement—National Cabinet’, Media Statement, 8 January 2021, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-44036, viewed 17 February 2023.

[49]Flights into Melbourne were suspended on 1 July 2020 and into Adelaide on 16 November 2020. Flights resumed for both Melbourne and Adelaide airports on 7 December 2020. Flights into Melbourne were suspended again on 14 February 2021 and resumed on 9 April 2021.

[50]Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Next steps to reopen to the world’, Media Release, 1 October 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/next-steps-reopen-world, viewed 17 February 2023.

[51]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 9.

[52]Federal Financial Relations, The Provision of COVID-19 Quarantine Arrangements at the Northern Territory Centre for National Resilience for Organised National Repatriation of Australians, October 2020, https://federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/agreements/provision-covid-19-quarantine-arrangements-northern-territory-centre-national-resilience, viewed 17 February 2023.

[53]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 10.

[54]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 11.

[55]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 10.

[56]DFAT, Submission 1:2, Answer to Question on Notice 21, p. [27].

[57]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, footnote 148, p. 53.

[58]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraphs 3.8–3.9, p. 53.

[59]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.10, p. 53.

[60]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.13, p. 54.

[61]DFAT, Submission 1:2, Answer to Question on Notice 6, p. [8].

[62]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.75, p. 68.

[63]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.76, p. 68.

[64]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.78, p. 68.

[65]Mr Grant Hehir, Auditor-General, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 16.

[66]Mr Grant Hehir, Auditor-General, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 16.

[67]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraphs 3.82–3.86, p. 69.

[68]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.87, p. 70.

[69]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 18.

[70]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Appendix 9, p. 106.

[71]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Recommendation no. 6, paragraph 3.80, p. 69.

[72]DFAT, Submission 1, p. 7.

[73]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 16.

[74]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 20.

[75]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.98, p. 71.

[76]DFAT, Submission 1:2, Answer to Question on Notice 25, p. [38]. Australian pension holders and minors (children under 18 years of age) were eligible to apply for grants instead of loans: see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, COVID-19: Overseas financial assistance FAQs, September 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20200929115857/https://www.smartraveller.gov.au/COVID-19/COVID-19-overseas-financial-assistance-FAQs, viewed 22 March 2023.

[77]Mr Robin Hornby, Submission 3.

[78]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 20.

[79]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 20.

[80]DFAT, Submission 1:2, Answer to Question on Notice 17, p. [23].

[81]Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), Submission 2, p. 4.

[82]AHRC, Submission 2, p. 2.

[83]The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, ‘Flights from India now paused as Australia sends emergency medical supplies’, Media Release, 27 April 2021, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-43340, viewed 17 February 2023.

[84]Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential) (Emergency Requirements—High Risk Country Travel Pause) Determination 2021, s. 6.

[85]The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health, ‘Travel arrangements to be strengthened for people who have been in India’, Media Release, 30 April 2021, https://www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp/media/travel-arrangements-to-be-strengthened-for-people-who-have-been-in-india, viewed 17 February 2023.

[86]DFAT, Submission 1:2, Answer to Question on Notice 13, p. [18].

[87]Ms Lynette Wood, First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senate Select Committee on COVID-19, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 7 May 2021, p. 16.

[88]AHRC, Submission 2, p. 4.

[89]DFAT, Submission 1:2, Answer to Question on Notice 8, p. [11].

[90]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.59, p. 65.

[91]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.60, p. 65.

[92]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, paragraph 3.62, pages 65–66.

[93]Mr Grant Hehir, Auditor-General, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, pages 19, 21.

[94]Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22, Recommendation no. 5, paragraph 3.64, p. 66.

[95]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 20.

[96]Ms Logan, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 December 2022, p. 19.

[97]J Halton AO PSM, National Review of Hotel Quarantine, 23 October 2020, https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/national-review-of-hotel-quarantine, viewed 7 February 2023; J Halton AO PSM, National Review of Quarantine, 12 October 2021, https://www.pmc.gov.au/publications/national-review-quarantine, viewed 17 February 2023.

[98]J Halton AO PSM, National Review of Quarantine, 12 October 2021, pages 6, 8–9, https://www.pmc.gov.au/publications/national-review-quarantine, viewed 17 February 2023.

[99]ANAO, ANAO COVID-19 multi-year audit strategy, November 2022, https://www.anao.gov.au/work-program/covid-19, viewed 17 February 2023.

[100]ANAO, COVID-19: Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, 2022, https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/covid-19-australian-government-crisis-management-framework, viewed 17 February 2023.