Chapter 7Conclusions and committee view
7.1The committee was moved by the evidence it received during this inquiry. Child exploitation is a horrific crime that causes terrible distress and trauma. Children are owed our care and protection, and yet the sad truth is that child sexual abuse continues and child abuse material (CAM) is proliferating.
7.2The severe and potentially lifelong harms of this crime demonstrate the importance of efforts to combat it. This inquiry is by no means the first to observe that our society needs to do more to protect children, though the committee is optimistic that our community's and authorities' efforts are increasing.
7.3Child exploitation is a multifaceted crime that could be examined from a range of perspectives. Being the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, the focus of the committee's inquiry was whether law enforcement is adequately equipped to respond to child exploitation, particularly online CAM. The committee initiated the inquiry amid COVID-19 restrictions that caused people to stay at home and spend more time online. This presented risks that online child exploitation—which was already a major problem—would worsen.
7.4The committee's inquiry lasted over two years and crossed between the 46th and 47th parliaments, which also saw a change in committee membership. The length of the inquiry and diversity of members allowed the committee to pursue a range of concerns under the terms of reference. It presents a consolidated summary of key issues in this report.
7.5While the committee received a broad range of relevant evidence, its central focus was the capabilities of law enforcement to respond to child exploitation. This chapter provides the committee's views on these matters and presents 15recommendations. The chapter proceeds as follows, in a structure that mirrors the chapters of this report:
The scale of the problem facing law enforcement.
Whether the existing criminal justice framework is appropriate.
Challenges and opportunities for law enforcement responding to child exploitation.
Technological developments and the role of technology providers.
Offending, prevention, and education about child sexual abuse.
Concluding comments.
The scale of the problem facing law enforcement
7.6The evidence surveyed in chapter 2 illustrates that law enforcement, regulators, and other authorities face a tremendously large and ever-changing criminal landscape. In short: the amount of CAM online is alarmingly high, the material is becoming more severe and technological developments are being used by offenders to facilitate further offending. These problems are not just overseas, they are here in Australia too. There are Australians who perpetrate these crimes and there are children in Australia who suffer its effects.
7.7It is shocking to contemplate the amount of CAM available online, with 32million reports made to the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) in 2022 alone. The committee acknowledges evidence that the number of reports made to NCMEC is not a perfect measure of the CAM available online. There are other factors to consider, including that many reports concern the same material, some of the CAM is shared for supposedly 'non‑malicious' (though completely wrong) reasons, and the quality of efforts to detect CAM varies greatly between technology providers.
7.8These considerations provide little comfort. The Australian Institute of Criminology submitted that 'it is possible that a large proportion of CSAM [child sexual abuse material] offending remains undetected', and the committee heard about offenders' extensive use of anonymising technologies and the dark web. As the eSafety Commissioner said of the 29million reports to NCMEC in 2021, 'these reports appear to be the tip of a very large iceberg'. The committee also received very concerning evidence suggesting that CAM offending has become more egregious over time.
7.9The committee considers it incumbent on Australian law enforcement and other authorities to prioritise action against this crime type. This view is informed not only by the vast scale of the crime but also the distressing figures quoted in chapter 2 about the volume of offending by Australians. It is intolerable that, as the Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre submitted, 'Australians are some of the most prolific consumers of this material, with research indicating Australia is the third largest market for live, online child sexual abuse'.
7.10In one sense, it is positive to see large and increasing numbers of arrests and prosecutions for CAM related offences, as reflected by data from the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Attorney-General's Department. However, the data also reinforce the committee's concern about the size of this crime type and the importance of concerted action against it.
7.11A key concern is how these crimes harm children in Australia. This often takes the form of 'sextortion', a deceitful crime in which children are coerced into producing material against their will. Every month, over 100 children report to Australian law enforcement that they are a victim of sextortion and this is likely to be a small proportion of the children who experience it.
7.12As technologies have developed, offenders' have deployed them for harmful purposes. Live online child sexual abuse, also known as live streaming, is a particular concern for committee members. This technology allows people to commit horrific crimes against children from thousands of kilometres away. The offending harms children in Australia, though the Philippines has been called the 'global epicentre' of this crime type, with Australian men 'some of the most voracious consumers' of the live streams. This reinforces the need for Australian law enforcement to collaborate with international authorities against this crime.
7.13The committee heard that live online child sexual abuse is particularly challenging for law enforcement because it leaves little visual evidence; investigators must rely on session logs, data usage trails and other information. As internet speeds continue to improve and technology continues to break down international barriers, this form of offending presents a growing risk.
7.14Both sexual extortion and live online child sexual abuse are committed for offenders' gratification. However, they are also committed by organised syndicates whose interest in CAM is solely to generate a profit, often using virtual currencies which can be difficult to trace. This adds a new element to the law enforcement challenge before us.
7.15Considering the weight of the evidence discussed in chapter 2, the committee is of the view that child exploitation and CAM offences should be one of law enforcement's highest priorities. The committee is in no doubt about the enormity of the problem and the urgent need for effective action.
7.16On the evidence available to the committee, Australian authorities are already making good efforts to respond to CAM. The committee urges the Australian Government, the AFP, the eSafety Commissioner, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), and other relevant bodies to continue to prioritise serious efforts to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute CAM related offences. These bodies should also ensure that such efforts are properly resourced.
Australia's criminal justice framework
7.17Law enforcement can most effectively respond to CAM offending if it is supported by a robust criminal justice framework. The existing array of legislation surveyed in chapter 3, particularly the numerous recent amendments, reflects the close attention this crime type has received. The criminal justice framework is broad and well-developed. This is positive, but does not necessarily mean that further reforms are unwarranted.
7.18Two key elements of the framework discussed in chapter 3 are examined below: the adequacy of criminal offences and the appropriateness of sentences and penalties.
Adequacy of existing criminal offences
7.19The committee heard about potential confusion caused by a lack of legislative consistency between jurisdictions. It appears that these problems are at their greatest when an offender's conduct engages both Commonwealth and state or territory offences, or when the offending crosses borders.
7.20To some degree, these problems seem to relate to law enforcement techniques and coordination, not solely the offence framework. Law enforcement methods are discussed further in the next section.
7.21One approach to this issue contemplated by committee members of the previous parliament, especially during hearings in December 2021, was the notion of a standalone Act governing CAM offending. Such an Act might broaden and consolidate CAM offences.
7.22While the committee heard some support for this notion, it is also conscious of other evidence it received about the breadth of the existing framework. For instance, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) reported that there are approximately 51 child sex offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995, and the CDPP has not identified obvious gaps in that framework. The committee is also reassured by the Attorney‑General's Department's advice that Australia's 'world leading' criminal offence framework is intended to be technology neutral. This means it is better able to apply to child exploitation even if offenders use new technologies in the future.
7.23As discussed in chapter 3, some specific concerns were raised about the existing offence framework. These include the extent to which existing offences consider an offender's intent (in addition to the severity of the material they engaged with) and the risk that children who 'sext' consensually are caught up in the justice system. On both questions, the committee is keen to ensure that no additional barriers are put in place to prosecuting serious CAM offending. As a representative of the Department of Home Affairs pointed out, amending criminal offences by 'building in an intent may actually make it harder to prove certain offences'.
7.24The committee encourages all Australian law enforcement to take a considered approach to conduct by children that engages CAM offences. It is possible to imagine a theoretical case in which a child engages in serious CAM offending and such offenders should be dealt with by the criminal justice system. But where the child's conduct is the consensual sharing of intimate images with a peer, the committee does not judge this to warrant the same kind of treatment.
7.25Considering the above matters, the committee's position is that the criminal offence framework must enable law enforcement to take action in relation to predatory conduct. On the evidence before it, the committee is not recommending specific amendments to offences and it is satisfied with officials' evidence highlighting the breadth of the existing framework. However, considering that CAM offending is continually growing and changing, it is imperative that governments continue to monitor the adequacy of offences and promptly introduce legislation to remedy any inadequacies that are identified.
7.26The committee is aware that measure 13 of the First Commonwealth Action Plan (2021‑24) of the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse 2021-2030 provides:
The Department of Home Affairs will review existing Commonwealth child sexual abuse offences. It may look at legislative reforms to make sure offences remain current and reflect emerging trends.
7.27This measure is linked to the following recommendation made by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse:
State and territory governments should keep the interaction of:
(a)their legislation relevant to regulatory responses to institutional child sexual abuse
(b)their crimes legislation and the crimes legislation of all other Australian jurisdictions, particularly in relation to child sexual abuse offences and sex offender registration
under regular review to ensure that their regulatory responses work together effectively with their relevant crimes legislation and the relevant crimes legislation of all other Australian jurisdictions in the interests of responding effectively to institutional child sexual abuse.
7.28The committee welcomes the measure in the First Commonwealth Action Plan. However, the extent of any progress on the measure is not clear from publicly available documents. Considering the machinery of government changes in 2022, it may also now be more appropriate for the Attorney‑General's Department to conduct the review instead of the Department of Home Affairs.
7.29The committee would see benefit in a broad review that considers whether the criminal offence framework adequately captures predatory conduct towards children, as well as interaction between crimes legislation and regulatory responses to child sexual abuse. Considering the ever‑changing landscape of CAM offending, it will be necessary to regularly review and monitor the criminal justice framework.
7.30The committee recommends that the Australian Government regularly monitor whether the criminal offence framework adequately covers predatory conduct in relation to child abuse material and child exploitation, and, if inadequacies are identified, prioritise legislation to remedy them.
Appropriateness of sentences and penalties
7.31All criminal conduct relating to CAM is very serious and should be treated accordingly by the criminal justice system. The committee recognises that there is a range of severity, and sentences should properly reflect this range.
7.32The committee heard mixed evidence about whether or not sentences actually reflect community expectations. On one hand, the committee heard examples involving lengthy prison sentences. On the other, some evidence suggested that offenders have not even received a custodial sentence.
7.33The committee was not in a position to interrogate each of these cases. However, the notion that serious CAM offenders are simply getting a slap on the wrist is deeply disturbing. The committee is pleased that action was taken to address such concerns, with mandatory minimum sentences introduced in 2020 for certain serious and repeat offenders. These reforms have had an effect, with 49offenders sentenced for offences that had mandatory minimum penalties.
7.34To properly assess the adequacy of these reforms, the committee sought data on sentences handed down for CAM offences in recent years. Specifically, how many sentences handed down in the last three years exceeded 25 years imprisonment, and how many exceeded three years imprisonment. However, the Attorney‑General's Department—which consulted the Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and the Australian Bureau of Statistics—could not provide these data. It appears that the obstacle is data collection, with the Attorney-General's Department advising that the recorded sentencing data 'will often not reflect the total effective sentence given that individual offenders are often sentenced for multiple offences'.
7.35It is concerning that these data are not available. The data would be informative and enable a proper assessment of the current situation and any potential changes.
7.36While the committee accepts the Attorney-General's Department's advice, it appears the obstacle it identified could be solved by improved data collection. The committee is not aware of any other reason the data could not be ascertained. Indeed, the Department of Home Affairs submitted that before mandatory minimum sentences were introduced, 'the average length of imprisonment for a child sex offence was 18 months'—the provision of this data suggests it is possible to obtain and analyse data about sentencing for child sex offences.
7.37The government should implement procedures to ensure that data collection is improved. The recorded sentencing data should enable analysis of the total effective sentences handed down for child sex offenders.
7.38The committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure that data is recorded that reflects the total effective sentence handed down to child sex offenders, and continually monitor the appropriateness of these sentences.
7.39The committee was interested in the considered proposal from the AFP and the Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation (ACCCE) to broaden the victim impact statements that may be presented to a court.
7.40Victim impact statements are an established method of informing the court about the harm caused by the offending conduct, and granting a voice to those who have been harmed. The AFP supported permitting community impact statements, including:
statements by victim‑survivors depicted in material found in the offender's possession, including where the offender is not responsible for producing, procuring or soliciting the material from that victim‑survivor; and
community impact statements on behalf of victim‑survivors depicted in CAM online, none of whom are necessarily depicted in the material in the offender's possession.
7.41The committee understands that this proposal has some precedent in South Australia and could be implemented via Part IB of the Crimes Act 1914.
7.42The committee received limited evidence on this proposal and so has not been able to consider all its possible implications. Nonetheless, the proposal has merit—it would allow the voices of victim-survivors to be heard in criminal proceedings and would better inform courts about the harm caused by CAM offending. The proposal should be considered at a Commonwealth level.
7.43The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider permitting the submission of community impact statements to a court, including the following statements supported by the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation:
statements from victim-survivors depicted in material found in the offender's possession, including where the offender is not responsible for producing, procuring or soliciting that material directly from the victim; and
community impact statements (also known as group impact statements) on behalf of victim-survivors depicted in child abuse material available online, none of whom are necessarily depicted in the material in the offender's possession.
7.44Finally, the committee was deeply concerned by reports that child sex offenders are moving funds to superannuation accounts in order to prevent those funds being subject to court ordered compensation payments to victims and survivors.
7.45The purpose of superannuation is not to allow offenders to protect funds from payments for which they are otherwise liable. Using superannuation for that purpose not only limits the funds available to support victim-survivors, it may also undermine the community's confidence that a just outcome has been reached. The tactic appears to be a loophole that should be closed.
7.46The committee is pleased that the matter is being examined by Treasury as part of a public consultation process. The committee will observe this process with interest and strongly encourages the government to take action to prevent this method of hiding from appropriate compensation payments.
Law enforcement response to child exploitation
7.47As illustrated by the overview provided in chapter 4, there is a wide range of law enforcement and other agencies working to respond to child exploitation. The committee is pleased that preventing, detecting and responding to CAM offending is a priority among Australian agencies. The establishment of the ACCCE in 2018 stands as a key development that has improved collaboration between sectors and benefited our response to CAM. The Joint Anti Child Exploitation Teams (JACETs) also make a critical contribution by enabling federal and state or territory police to collaborate directly when investigating child exploitation matters.
7.48The committee thanks the AFP for hosting the committee at a site visit to its facility in Majura ACT in November 2022 and also AUSTRAC for hosting the committee at its Melbourne offices in March 2023. These visits were each a valuable opportunity for committee members to engage directly with officers and ask questions about their work.
Law enforcement powers and obstacles
7.49A key theme in the committee's inquiry is to ensure that law enforcement agencies have appropriate tools to enable them to respond to criminal conduct. The committee is of the view that such tools are critically important to protect children and respond to CAM, but it is also vital that appropriate safeguards and oversight are in place.
7.50The committee is pleased to see that powers recently provided by the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (SLAID Act) have already been put into use by law enforcement to combat child exploitation. The committee acknowledges evidence that these powers are extraordinary and is of the view that the staggering levels of egregious CAM offending require an extraordinary response. It is also appropriate that oversight measures are in place, such as those discussed in chapter 4. These include the requirement for public reports on how agencies have used powers available under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Crimes Act 1914, as well as the Ombudsman's review of the agencies' use of certain powers. Though the SLAID Act commenced only two years ago, it appears to be working effectively and appropriately.
7.51The committee was concerned to hear evidence from law enforcement agencies about obstacles that hinder CAM investigations, including:
difficulties obtaining password protected evidence where the suspect does not wish to assist law enforcement;
limiting the length of AFP controlled operations in ways that may not be fit for purpose;
delays in the provision of information from Commonwealth agencies to state police; and
challenges for state police to gain authority for certain controlled operations.
7.52While these challenges are of concern, the committee does not consider that it has enough evidence to recommend a specific legislative change. To take one example, the password protection issue does not appear to have a straightforward legislative solution and the maximum sentence for failure to comply with an order to assist authorities to access data has already been increased from two to 10 years. The AFP submitted that '[b]roader consideration of options could be considered, including possible presumption against bail, to ensure that orders are complied with'. The committee concurs.
7.53Some of the challenges raised in the inquiry are also complex and warrant close consideration. For instance, while the committee is concerned to hear that limits on controlled operations are presenting an administrative burden for the AFP, such limits could also be considered important safeguards.
7.54It appears that some of the obstacles could be substantially addressed through coordination and collaboration rather than legislative reform. For example, while Victoria Police cited undue delays in receiving evidence from Commonwealth agencies, a representative of the NSW Police Force was not aware of this issue in NSW and noted that memoranda of understanding are in place under which NSW Police can receive information from Commonwealth agencies. The committee encourages the AFP, the ACCCE, state police and territory police to be conscious of any collaboration concerns and to take steps to address them. This may include signing memoranda of understanding or changing certain procedures.
7.55The committee is of the view that cooperation and coordination between authorities is critical to addressing this crime. It is also important to ensure that any legislative and administrative gaps are addressed in order to assist those working in this challenging area and to ensure there are no gaps that could be exploited by perpetrators.
7.56The committee encourages law enforcement and relevant policy agencies—including the AFP, ACCCE, Attorney‑General's Department, state police and territory police—to consider options that would ameliorate the legislative, coordination and administrative challenges discussed in this report. One way forward would be for an appropriate ministerial council to regularly consider the matter so that jurisdictions can raise concerns, consider options to address them, and share best practice. The committee sees benefit in this collaborative approach, particularly where better coordination between jurisdictions would improve outcomes. An appropriate ministerial council may be the Standing Council of Attorneys‑General, which has a reporting line to National Cabinet, or the Police Ministers Council.
7.57The committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure that an appropriate ministerial council regularly considers coordination and legislative challenges facing Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement in relation to child exploitation.
Expanding access to certain databases
7.58A specific proposal arose in relation to the National Child Offender System (NCOS) and the National Police Reference System (NPRS). The committee was interested in advice from a range of agencies which indicated that law enforcement would be more effective if access to these systems were expanded as follows:
Enable the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and AUSTRAC to access the NCOS (which allows Australian police to record and share child sex offender information).
Enable AUSTRAC to access the NPRS (which enables Australian police agencies to share essential policing information with each other).
7.59As discussed in chapter 4, these agencies both make valuable intelligence contributions to Australia's response to child exploitation. Allowing access these systems would improve the agencies' capabilities as well as allow for better information sharing between law enforcement. These potential benefits are particularly attractive given the continually changing methods of offending and the increasing use of technology to mask criminal conduct.
7.60The committee recognises that it received limited evidence on this matter and there may be other implications from the proposed expansion of capabilities. However, on the evidence before it, the committee is not aware of obvious reasons that this should not be pursued.
7.61The proposal was first raised in evidence to the committee in August 2021. A more recent update from the Attorney‑General's Department suggests that the matter remains under consideration and there have been few developments in the last two years. The committee understands this is largely due to the need to coordinate with states and territories, as well as a need to amend state and territory legislation for the proposal relating to the NCOS.
7.62The committee appreciates that such reforms can take time, though encourages the Australian Government to prioritise and pursue the matter. It is vital that law enforcement has the capabilities it needs to keep up with CAM offending.
7.63The committee recommends that the Australian Government prioritise and pursue efforts, in collaboration with state and territory governments, to:
enable the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre to access the National Child Offender System; and
enable the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre to access the National Police Reference System.
Law enforcement wellbeing and training
7.64The committee wholeheartedly commends law enforcement officers for their sterling efforts to combat child exploitation. These officers, along with public prosecutors, judicial staff and others, carry a heavy burden when responding to this horrific crime type. As showed by the evidence relayed in chapter 4, it is not only the viewing of the child abuse material which can case distress—though that itself is extremely confronting—it can also be the huge volume of cases to pursue or the need to covertly investigate and infiltrate online offender networks.
7.65When visiting an AFP facility, the committee had the opportunity to meet some officers who need to view CAM in their regular work. The dedication of these officers to protecting children in Australia and abroad was extremely impressive. The committee wishes to thank those officers, and others like them, who work to combat child exploitation and CAM offences.
7.66Unfortunately, CAM related offending involves horrific material by its very nature and there will be limits in the extent to which officers can be protected from that material. Given our reliance on officers willing to investigate this crime type, it is all the more important to take whatever measures can be taken to reduce the risks they face.
7.67The committee is optimistic that existing measures will make a difference. For example, as the AFP pointed out, the introduction of account takeover warrants should reduce the need for officers to spend years infiltrating online offender networks. In addition, the use of databases to record the severity of CAM helps to reduce the need for the material to be re‑examined in subsequent cases. Emerging technologies may also be appropriate to aid officers in the classification process, though law enforcement must take care to ensure that all classifications are reliable.
7.68The committee was particularly pleased to hear that there is already change underway to simplify the classification process used when presenting evidence to a court. The committee accepts evidence from the CDPP and the NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) which indicates that these new processes reduce the toll on those involved.
7.69The committee acknowledges that there may be a desire amongst some to ensure that courts—particularly judges responsible for sentencing—are presented with the full severity of CAM in order to come to a fully informed sentence. This point was made, for example, by an advocate against child exploitation, MsMadeleineWest. On balance, the committee considers it vital that courts are well informed about the severity of an offender's conduct, and this may involve viewing CAM or descriptions of it. However, it accepts advice from the CDPP and ODPP that there are cases where courts can be appropriately informed without the need for the CAM to be wholly reproduced. This recognises the depravity of all CAM offending.
7.70The committee encourages authorities in all Australian jurisdictions to embrace measures that reduce exposure to CAM while still ensuring that the material is appropriately assessed and considered.
7.71The committee recommends that the Australian Federal Police and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions:
adopt, as far as is practicable, procedures and technologies that minimise exposure to child abuse material while still ensuring that investigations are properly conducted and courts are properly informed about the severity of offending; and
work with state and territory authorities to share best practice and improve the use of such procedures and technologies in all Australian jurisdictions.
7.72While the committee was not presented with specific concerns about inadequate support for law enforcement officers, the obvious challenges of this crime type make clear that training and wellbeing will require continued attention.
7.73The committee acknowledges the leading efforts by the ACCCE to support the psychological wellbeing of its officers, such as special consideration given to the layout of its offices. These efforts are commendable and the committee considers that it would be preferable if other officers around Australia could enjoy similar support. The committee understands that the ACCCE is already sharing its expertise though training for officers in other jurisdictions and through national fora that examine health and wellbeing. The committee is supportive of these efforts and encourages all law enforcement agencies to ensure that officers who work on child exploitation cases are provided with training and wellbeing support that recognises the extremely confronting nature of their duties.
7.74Recognising the extreme nature of the content associated with child exploitation investigations, the committee recommends that the Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation prioritise efforts to share best practice with Joint Anti Child Exploitation Teams and other law enforcement agencies regarding:
support for officers' health and wellbeing; and
training to ensure that officers are well-equipped to perform their duties.
Collaboration with non-government organisations and foreign law enforcement
7.75The committee was pleased to hear about the dedicated efforts of non‑government organisations to counter child exploitation. Evidence to this inquiry indicated that these organisations have provided valuable support and training to law enforcement agencies in Australia's region.
7.76On the question of collaboration between non-government organisation and Australian law enforcement agencies, the committee considers it appropriate that law enforcement investigations are conducted by law enforcement agencies. This recognises that such investigations can involve the use of surveillance or other police powers that should be subject to proper processes and oversight, as are in place for Australia's law enforcement agencies.
7.77The committee encourages the AFP and the ACCCE to collaborate with non‑government organisations and other partners to the extent that it supports the agencies' core objectives. The committee is conscious of advice from the AFP that the ACCCE already partners with various non-government organisations, academics and others within the constraints of privacy and other laws.
7.78The committee also agrees with inquiry participants who emphasised the importance of collaboration with foreign law enforcement agencies. CAM offending is a global problem that Australia will not be able to solve on its own. It is positive that Australia already engages internationally through various fora, such as the Virtual Global Taskforce and Five Country Ministerial Forum. The committee strongly supports the continuation of these efforts, including capacity building in our region.
Ease of reporting to law enforcement
7.79The committee agrees that there should not be obstacles that discourage reporting of child exploitation to the authorities. It acknowledges concerns raised by some inquiry participants about existing processes and encourages all law enforcement agencies to make the process as straightforward and supportive as practicable. The committee expects that this would benefit victims of many crimes, not only child exploitation.
7.80Some of the concerns raised in the inquiry relate to public awareness, particularly a fear among some children that they may get in trouble if they report their abuse to authorities. The committee of course supports efforts to dispel this notion and encourage reporting. Education initiatives by eSafety, the ACCCE and other authorities are discussed in chapter6, with the committee's views later in this chapter.
The role of technology companies
7.81The committee is in no doubt that technology platforms have a prominent role to play in countering child exploitation and CAM. Where an online platform is being used to commit crimes and harm children, those responsible for the platform are obligated to take action to address the problem.
7.82At the same time, the committee appreciates that most mainstream technology providers—including all those who gave evidence to this inquiry—prohibit CAM on their platforms. The question is whether or not they are taking adequate steps to enforce this prohibition, and in particular, support important law enforcement investigations into this horrific crime.
Engagement by technology providers
7.83To properly inform its inquiry, the committee sought evidence from technology providers and social media platforms about the steps they are taking to address CAM on their platforms. It pursued evidence from certain companies that were particularly relevant to the inquiry due to their prominence, media about CAM on their platforms, or other factors.
7.84Some of these technology companies were responsive and broadly forthcoming in their evidence, which the committee appreciated. However, the committee was frustrated at times by a lack of responsiveness from others. In the committee's view, prominent technology companies should readily engage with public inquiries, especially on vital issues such as the safety of children on their services. The committee is disappointed that gathering evidence from some technology companies proved unnecessarily difficult. Nonetheless, it is positive that each of companies pursued by the committee did provide some evidence before the inquiry concluded.
Encryption
7.85A central issue in this inquiry was the increasing use of end-to-end encryption by many online platforms, particularly Meta's plan to roll it out in 2023.
7.86The committee appreciates that encryption is a key component of many legitimate internet services that Australians use everyday. Forms of encryption, including end-to-end encryption, can provide important security and privacy protections. However, those benefits cannot be considered in isolation.
7.87The committee heard that end-to-end encryption can enable offenders to trade CAM, contact and coerce children, share tactics, and arrange live streaming of child abuse. The risks of coercion and exploitation are particularly acute when end-to-end encryption is a default setting on social media platforms. Inquiry participants described end-to-end encryption as potentially creating 'digital hiding places' and a 'haven' for offending. NCMEC estimates that if Meta proceeds with its planned expansion of end-to-end encryption, the reports it receives will reduce by half. This does not mean that child exploitation will reduce; it means that it will go undetected. Evidence also indicates that law enforcement investigations are more difficult when key evidence is end-to-end encrypted. Director-General Graeme Biggar of the United Kingdom National Crime Agency recently put this issue in stark terms:
If Facebook roll out end to end encryption their ability to spot child abuse will significantly reduce, as will the number of children we save from sexual abuse and the number of criminals we arrest on the back of their information. Let me be clear: this would be tantamount to consciously turning a blind eye to child abuse – choosing to look the other way.
7.88Considering this evidence, the committee has serious misgivings about the increasing ubiquity of end‑to‑end encryption.
7.89The committee received mixed evidence about the ability of technology companies to detect CAM even where end‑to‑end encryption is applied. While existing scanning tools do not work—because the contents of messages can only be accessed by the sender and recipient—technology companies suggested that they can detect suspicious behaviour in other ways. This includes by monitoring behavioural signals and metadata, as well as other preventative measures that seek to protect children such as higher default privacy settings.
7.90Nonetheless, the committee considers that technology companies' evidence did not demonstrate that these methods are as effective as those which work on services that are not end-to-end encrypted. Moreover, with the exception of the technology companies themselves, the committee received very little evidence supporting the need to expand end-to-end encryption.
7.91The committee accepts advice from government officials, law enforcement and others expressing concern about detecting CAM on end-to-end encrypted platforms. This includes the Virtual Global Taskforce—an international alliance of law enforcement agencies and partners—which reports that '[w]hile much can be deduced from metadata, it is usually insufficient to meet the threshold required for a search warrant'. The Department of Home Affairs also expressed concern that once Meta's expands default end-to-end encryption, 'the artificial intelligence and machine learning tools will no longer be able to detect and learn from new content, meaning their effectiveness would diminish rapidly'.
7.92While recognising the importance of private and secure communications, the committee considers this should not come at the expense of children's safety. Indeed, the committee accepts evidence that end‑to‑end encryption is not all or nothing. The committee is interested in emerging detection methods that work alongside end-to-end encryption and notes that Apple's NeuralHash appeared to be one such method, though it is now unclear whether that project will progress. The committee would also support consideration of other approaches, such as excluding children's accounts from end-to-end encryption.
7.93The committee acknowledges all technology platforms which participated in this inquiry made clear that there is no place for CAM on their platforms. In the committee's view, this adds to the rationale for technology companies to do more to detect and prevent children being harmed on the services they provide. This obligation applies to all technology companies. While Meta received particular attention due to its planned expansion of end-to-end encryption, there are other platforms which have already rolled it out. eSafety's recent reports on companies' compliance with the Basic Online Safety Expectations shows disappointingly that, despite statements about combatting CAM, there is substantial room for improvement across the industry.
7.94To find a pathway forward, it is necessary to consider what is technically feasible as well as an appropriate balance between competing priorities. Accordingly, the committee considers that eSafety is well placed to pursue this issue. Using its technical expertise and regulatory powers, it can continue to apply pressure to technology companies to ensure that children are protected as encryption technology develops. Being a government agency, eSafety will do this work in the public interest—which the committee considers preferable to having these complicated matters determined by private corporations.
7.95The committee is also conscious that this issue continues to change. Not only is technology evolving but there have been legislative developments overseas, including the United Kingdom's Online Safety Act 2023 and potential reforms by the European Commission. eSafety should be mindful of how international developments could influence the situation in Australia—and how those developments could be leveraged—to make the internet safer for Australians.
7.96The following recommendations are intended to ensure that eSafety continues to place the highest priority on this issue. The committee is also recommending that technology companies' reports to law enforcement be monitored to ensure that any decrease in reporting identified and remedied.
7.97The committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner apply pressure to technology companies to ensure that they apply robust procedures and technologies to detect child abuse material and report it to law enforcement, regardless of whether end‑to‑end encryption is used.
7.98The committee recommends that the Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation or, if necessary, another appropriate law enforcement body:
monitor the number and quality of reports of child abuse material being made by technology companies in order to identify any deficiencies in detection processes, particularly where end‑to‑end encryption may be associated with the deficiencies; and
if deficiencies are identified, liaise with the eSafety Commissioner about improving the detection processes applied by technology companies.
The age of social media users
7.99As discussed in chapter 5, most mainstream social media platforms require their users to be at least 13years old. Some also apply different settings for users under 18, such as disabling direct messaging for those aged 13 to 15. The committee see these age based restrictions as important safeguards to reduce the risk of children being contacted and harmed by offenders.
7.100A major concern for committee members is the apparent ease with which a child can claim to be older than they are and thereby circumvent these restrictions. For example, on many platforms it seems a child could simply enter a false birthday when creating their account, as was demonstrated by a committee member during committee proceedings. Some technology platforms said they use other measures to enforce the restrictions, such as estimating the user's age based on how they use the platform, but the committee remains very concerned that these measures are inadequate. TikTok alone removed almost 17million accounts in the first quarter of 2023 on suspicion they were being used by a child under 13years old. Notwithstanding TikTok's efforts, the removal of so many accounts raises concerns about just how many under13s are on social media in the first place, and about how many under 18s are circumventing age based restrictions.
7.101The committee appreciates that more stringent measures to ascertain a user's age are associated with concerns about their effectiveness, privacy and security. There may also be particular challenges in verifying the age of children (rather than verifying that a person who claims to be an adult is indeed an adult).
7.102The committee is pleased that the Government is already considering age verification and age assurance via eSafety's Roadmap for age verification and complementary measures to prevent and mitigate harms to children from online pornography. Though that roadmap is focused on access to online pornography, its principles may nonetheless apply to children circumventing age base restrictions on social media, online games or other online activities.
7.103The committee understands the government intends to await the outcomes of the industry code process for class 2 material—which includes legal content that is inappropriate for children, such as pornography—before deciding on eSafety's recommended trial of age assurance technologies. The Minister for Communications also asked the eSafety Commissioner to commence work on that process 'as soon as practicable, following the completion of the first tranche of codes' (which is underway).The government has also said it will monitor developments on age assurance requirements in other jurisdictions.
7.104The committee supports this program of work and encourages both the government and eSafety to proceed without delay. With respect to both the class2 industry code process and a potential trial of age assurance technologies, the committee recommends that the age of children using online services be considered. This is to ensure that age based restrictions are effective. In the case of social media, this would include ensuring that children under 13 cannot create accounts so easily, and those aged 13to 17 are subject to restrictions that are appropriate for their age. The committee also encourages the government to monitor international developments, as it has said it will, and ensure that lessons from overseas are applied in Australia.
7.105The committee recommends that the Australian Government and eSafety Commissioner, as part of their work on the Roadmap for age verification and complementary measures to prevent and mitigate harms to children from online pornography and industry codes for class 2 material, respectively, consider options for age assurance or age verification of children using social media, online games or other online platforms to ensure that age based protections are effective.
Cooperation and assistance provided by technology platforms
7.106Considering the serious drawbacks of the existing mutual legal assistance process, the committee is pleased about the forthcoming implementation of the Aus‑US Data Access Agreement. It is positive that this reform was supported not only by law enforcement and other authorities but also by technology platforms themselves.
7.107The committee understands that international agreements can take some time to implement and are subject to various diplomatic processes. Its most recent advice on the matter from the Attorney‑General's Department was in late 2022:
The Agreement is currently subject to consideration by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. Once the Australian Parliamentary review process is complete, the Agreement will enter into force upon exchange of diplomatic notes with the US. This will be announced by the Attorney‑General by notifiable instrument.
7.108In December 2022, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommended that binding treaty action be taken. Despite the time that has passed since then, the committee understands that diplomatic notes have not yet been exchanged with the US. The committee recognises this could be for a range of reasons. Considering the major benefits that this agreement can offer to law enforcement investigations of child exploitation, the committee supports expediting the process to the greatest extent that is diplomatically appropriate.
7.109More broadly, the committee wishes to highlight evidence from technology companies supporting the forthcoming processes. The committee therefore expects these companies to diligently cooperate with law enforcement once the new procedures are in place. The committee would also expect the government to monitor the effectiveness of the new procedures.
Action by technology companies and the eSafety Commissioner
7.110As outlined in chapter 5, the committee received evidence about some of the efforts being made by technology companies to combat child exploitation. The committee welcomes these endeavours. However, the evidence reflected variation between companies and, in the committee's view, substantial room for improvement across industry. This is consistent with recent eSafety reports on compliance with the Basic Online Safety Expectations. In the committee's view, it appears that some technology companies are not prioritising safety on their platforms as highly as other concerns.
7.111Unfortunately, the committee holds doubts about whether some companies are fulfilling their stated commitments against child exploitation. For example, a representative of X (Twitter) advised that the company:
…has zero-tolerance approaches for combatting child sexual exploitation and abuse on our service. Any content that features or promotes that content and abuse is prohibited and will be immediately removed, and their accounts permanently suspended.
7.112However, subsequent questioning showed that X may not permanently suspend an account for sharing CAM if the content was shared without malicious intent towards children (for instance, due to outrage). While X will remove all such content, it 'may, in view of the account itself, feel that permanent suspension isn't the proportionate response'.
7.113The committee is disturbed by this approach. Every time an image of child abuse is shared, the victim is retraumatised. The committee is of the view that there is no excuse for sharing CAM in any circumstances, even if it is for supposedly non-malicious reasons. If technology companies are to ensure that their platforms are safe places, it is imperative that stronger action is taken in response to those who share CAM.
7.114The committee heard a range of suggestions for strengthening the obligations placed on technology companies. While the committee is not presently recommending that all these suggestions be pursued, the ideas canvassed in chapter 5 provide a useful body of evidence to inform future regulatory work. The committee was particularly interested in suggestions about the transparency of technology companies and their detection processes; matters which it understands eSafety is pursuing (as described above).
7.115A further notable issue was whether major technology companies should be required to have staff based in Australia. The committee sees merit in this proposal, particularly given evidence from eSafety about how local staff enables better communication and collaboration between companies and the regulator. The committee received limited evidence about how to give effect to such a requirement, though it was suggested that perhaps the Basic Online Safety Expectations would be a preferable vehicle to the industry code process. These expectations are set out by the Minister for Communications, and the minister has recently announced her intention to expand the Basic Online Safety Expectations Determination, with public consultation currently underway.
7.116The committee considers it reasonable to provide that, if a large technology company wishes to operate in Australia, it must have relevant trust and safety staff based in Australia. This should not be challenging for these large companies to implement. It should also make a meaningful difference to the quality of the company's interactions with both eSafety, other important parties (such as parliamentary committees) and users. Most importantly, it should support safer outcomes for children and other users.
7.117The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider options for requiring major technology companies operating in Australia to have an appropriate number of trust and safety staff based in Australia.
7.118As discussed in chapter 5, the eSafety Commissioner has been applying the new powers granted under the Online Safety Act 2021—which commenced during this inquiry—including those relating to the Basic Online Safety Expectations and industry codes. The committee is pleased to see these powers working well and accepts advice from officials that the legislation is updated and has been effective. The committee is also conscious that there must be an independent review of the operation of the Online Safety Act within three years after its commencement (January 2022), and the government has announced that the review will commence in early 2024. On the current evidence, the committee does not consider that legislative reform to eSafety's powers is needed ahead of the scheduled review.
7.119The committee commends the eSafety Commissioner and her office for their strong efforts to counter child exploitation online. The committee is pleased that eSafety has listed responding to CAM as one of its highest priorities and supports the continuation of this approach.
7.120The committee considers that eSafety is well placed to pursue these matters and encourages it to do so. This includes by applying regulatory pressure to technology companies and appropriately exercising the powers that the Parliament has granted under the Online Safety Act. eSafety is also responding to a rapidly changing landscape, including the emergence of immersive technologies and generative artificial intelligence.
7.121On the evidence before the committee, eSafety is at the forefront of combatting online CAM and is equipped with appropriately strong powers by global standards. The committee has confidence in eSafety to continue its important work countering online child exploitation.
Offending, prevention and education
7.122The evidence reviewed in chapter 6 considered broader issues related to child exploitation, including our understanding of offending and potential prevention or treatment initiatives, as well as options to increase public awareness of child exploitation risks. Both these lines of inquiry support options for preventing child sexual abuse or responding to it more effectively.
Link between contact and non-contact offending
7.123The terms of reference for this inquiry sought evidence about our understanding of the link between accessing online child abuse material and contact offending. Developing this understanding is important as it may better inform law enforcement investigations and support more effective prevention efforts.
7.124By examining this issue, the committee is not seeking to compare the seriousness of different forms of child exploitation. All forms of this crime are horrific and cause terrible harm. CAM circulating online depicts actual abuse and trauma.
7.125The evidence to this inquiry suggests there are differences between the characteristics of CAM offenders and contact offenders. However, the committee also accepts evidence highlighting the close links between the two. This includes the way in which online CAM networks can influence their members towards committing contact offences. It also appears that technology can blur the distinction between these two types of crime, as both live online child sexual abuse and sexual coercion can involve an offender directing abuse from afar.
7.126The committee is concerned about how these two forms of offending can increase the prevalence of the other and potentially create a damaging cycle of harms.
7.127The committee is conscious that consistent with the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse 2021-2030, the Australian Child Maltreatment Study was published in April 2023. This research, and other measures in the strategy, contribute to our understanding of child sexual abuse, including its prevalence across Australia. However, the committee accepts calls from inquiry participants for further research specifically into the links between CAM offending and contact offending. It appears that gaps remain in our understanding of these issues, particularly how our understanding of CAM offending can better inform the work of law enforcement. Further research could aid law enforcement's detection of offenders, investigations, and assist with other prevention and awareness raising efforts.
7.128The committee considers that it may be appropriate for the Australian Institute of Criminology to conduct or coordinate the research recommended below.
7.129The committee recommends that the Australian Government commission further research into the links between contact and non-contact child sex offending to better inform how law enforcement and other agencies detect, investigate, and prevent this crime.
Options for offender prevention, intervention and treatment
7.130The committee received a range of evidence conveying the opportunities and need for programs that target convicted or potential offenders and aim to prevent child sexual abuse from occurring. The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse recommended 'information and help-seeking services to support people who are concerned they may be at risk of sexually abusing children', and the committee understands that similar programs that have been successfully implemented overseas.
7.131While these programs may be difficult to talk about, the committee considers that initiatives which help to prevent children from being harmed are a tool worth pursuing. Given the concerning amount of child exploitation, including in Australia, it is vital that action is taken to reduce its prevalence. Effective law enforcement responses to child sexual abuse after it occurs are important but prevention and treatment efforts are also necessary.
7.132The committee understands that a measure of the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse 2021-2030 is to '[l]aunch an offender prevention service for adults who have sexual thoughts about children or young people', which is to be similar to the United Kingdom's Stop It Now! program and use online services and a helpline. The committee was also advised that a time-limited pilot Stop It Now! program in Australia is being monitored to inform the new national service.
7.133The committee supports these efforts under the National Strategy. While offender prevention programs might not work in all cases, the committee considers it appropriate to combat child sexual abuse with a range of tools.
7.134As discussed in chapter 6, evidence suggests these programs are important but could benefit from further research. Considering the range of possible approaches to these services, this research could help ensure that the programs are targeted at the right people and are effective when they are used. The research could also contemplate options for deploying these programs; for example, some technology companies already present pop-up alerts when a user conducts a search related to CAM, and these alerts could include referrals to the prevention programs.
7.135Considering the potential benefits of these prevention services, but also the scope for more research, the committee recommends that the Australian Government commission further research on the matter and apply its findings to the service which is to be implemented under the National Strategy. The committee considers that it may be appropriate for the Australian Institute of Criminology to conduct or coordinate the research recommended below.
7.136To inform the implementation of prevention services that target adults who have sexual thoughts about children, the committee recommends that Australian Government commission research into strategies for ensuring such services are targeted and effective.
Public awareness and education
7.137The committee was pleased to hear about extensive efforts by both civil society and government agencies to increase public awareness about the risks of child exploitation. The committee commends these organisations for the valuable contribution they are making to our society.
7.138Considering the insidiousness of this crime, it is important that parents, schools and others are well equipped to identify current and emerging risks and to help prevent exploitation. While other avenues must also be pursued—such as appropriate legislative tools for law enforcement and more action by technology companies—the nature of this problem also demands that parents and wider society be informed and alert to the risk.
7.139Though there has been substantial attention given to this area by both government and non‑government organisations, the committee is of the view that there is still significant room for improved public understanding. This includes the need to keep up with the ways in which technological developments alter the child exploitation risk. The committee considers that law enforcement has a role to play in closing this awareness gap but it should not bear this responsibility alone.
7.140The committee understands that the Australian Government recently launched a $22.4 million 'One Talk at a Time' campaign, which is 'targeted at adults who play an active role in the lives of children and young people and encourages them to have ongoing, proactive and preventive conversations about child sexual abuse'. This campaign is a measure under the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse 2021-2030 and responds to a recommendation of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse.
7.141The committee strongly supports this information campaign as a means of improving public understanding about child exploitation. However, the committee does not expect that a single campaign can address the issue on its own. It is also mindful that methods of child exploitation will continue to change, driven by rapid technological change such as the emergence of end‑to‑end encryption, generative AI and immersive technologies. Given that child exploitation is likely to both persist and evolve, the committee considers that public awareness of the issue requires ongoing attention by government.
7.142Notwithstanding the current 'One Talk at a Time' public information campaign, the committee recommends that the Australian Government implement ongoing efforts to increase public awareness of the risks of child exploitation, particularly among parents, including how to reduce and respond to these risks.
Classification of online games
7.143The committee heard concerning evidence about how offenders are using popular online games to access children. These games may be intended for children and contain appropriate content but children can remain vulnerable to offenders if the game allows interaction with other players, such as through chat functions.
7.144The committee understands that the current classification framework, which evolved from the system used to classify films, classifies games based on their content. While the Classification Board provides consumer advice on games that allow interaction with others or the uploading of user-generated content, this does not affect the game's rating. It also appears this consumer advice is binary—that is, the advice states whether a game allows online interactivity but does not appear to convey the forms of interactivity enabled by the game.
7.145Though the committee received limited evidence on this question, this appears to be a gap in the classification framework. A player's experience of a game will be affected by the conduct of other players they interact with, not only the content of the game. Consumer advice would be more useful if it conveyed the forms of online interactivity enabled by a game, because this can affect the level of risk of child exploitation. For example, a game that allows players to message other players with few or no restrictions might present a higher risk than a game that restricts who players can contact and what they can say.
7.146In the committee's view, the current consumer advice of 'online interactivity' does not appear to adequately convey the risks facing players. One way to improve this would be for the 'online interactivity' consumer advice to describe the level or forms of interactivity, potentially along a spectrum. Another option would be to ensure that a minimum classification rating applies to games with certain forms of online interactivity.
7.147The committee considers that this issue is likely to become more pressing as technology continues to develop, including the emergence of immersive technologies.
7.148The committee recognises that changing the classification framework would not address the broader issue—that abuse and exploitation on these games should never occur, regardless of the classification rating. That issue should remain a focus of law enforcement. However, classification reforms may enable parents to make better informed decisions about their children's gaming.
7.149The committee is aware that the government has announced plans to reform the classification scheme, including an apparently broad 'second stage of classification reforms [that] will deliver comprehensive reform to the [Classification] Scheme, including potential changes to clarify its purpose and scope, and establish fit‑for‑purpose regulatory and governance arrangements'. The Government also recently consulted the public on a proposal to mandate minimum classifications of:
R 18+ (Restricted to adults aged 18 and over) for games containing simulated gambling; and
M(Mature — not recommended for persons under 15) for computer games containing in-game purchases linked to chance.
7.150The committee sees parallels between this proposal and potential other changes regarding online interactivity, such as more detailed consumer advice or mandatory minimum classifications. The committee considers that the government's broader reform process should consider options to better convey the risks facing children in online games, including clearer consumer advice and mandatory minimum classification ratings for computer games with certain forms of online interactivity.
7.151The committee recommends that the Australian Government, as part of its planned reforms of the Classification Scheme and in consultation with the eSafety Commissioner, consider options for the Classification Scheme to better convey the risks of computer games that allow interaction with other players or the uploading of user-generated content.
Public child sex offender register
7.152The committee understands that law enforcement already has access to a form of child sex offender register but this register is not public. Some inquiry participants expressed strong support for the publication of a child sex offender register on the basis that it would better inform the community and make it harder for offenders to exploit children.
7.153The committee is of course sympathetic to the objectives of those advocating for a public register. However, this issue formed a relatively small part of the evidence to this inquiry. The committee is not satisfied that it received adequate evidence to justify a recommendation in relation to a national public register. One reason for this is that there are various potential models of public register (as demonstrated in other jurisdictions, including Australian states). The committee was also advised of risks associated with a public register, including inadvertent identification of victims and survivors or a possible increase in recidivism by convicted sex offenders.
Conclusion
7.154As has been illustrated time and again by the evidence in this report, CAM offending is a heinous crime that causes egregious harm across our society.
7.155While recognising that child exploitation is a complex problem with many causes, the committee's inquiry has focused on the capabilities of law enforcement in responding to it. In particular, the committee was interested in opportunities for law enforcement to improve outcomes or challenges in their work that could be reduced.
7.156The committee reiterates its thanks to all those who contributed to this inquiry by providing written evidence, attending a hearing, or in any other way.
7.157The committee is optimistic that the recommendations presented in this report will contribute to our society's efforts to respond to child exploitation and, ultimately, better protect our children. These recommendations can build on existing work to protect children, such as measures under the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse 2021-2030, which itself was a key recommendation of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. The committee also intends that the body of evidence gathered in this inquiry, and the key issues summarised in this report, will provide a valuable source for those interested in pursuing these matters in future.
7.158While the vast global scale of child exploitation can be intimidating, the committee is confident that Australian authorities can make an important difference, both through domestic action and international partnerships and advocacy. Continued efforts will be vital to ensure that children are kept safe.
Senator Helen Polley
Chair