Chapter 4Law enforcement response to child exploitation

4.1As well as positive commentary about the strength of Australian law enforcement's response to child abuse material (CAM), inquiry participants also highlighted a range of challenges and opportunities for law enforcement to be more effective.

4.2This chapter first provides an overview of key existing agencies and processes. It then examines key issues regarding how Australia's law enforcement responds to online CAM, as follows:

Law enforcement powers and obstacles.

Proposals to expand access to certain law enforcement databases.

Wellbeing and training of law enforcement officers.

Collaboration between law enforcement and non-government organisations(NGOs).

Collaboration with foreign law enforcement and authorities.

Improving options for reporting to law enforcement.

Overview of key agencies and processes

4.3Due to the scale and complexity of online child exploitation, there are many agencies—both Australian and international—responding to the problem. As the Office of the eSafety Commissioner (eSafety) remarked, it is 'part of a cross‑agency, cross‑sector, and multi-jurisdictional effort – one which has grown increasingly effective over recent years'.[1]

4.4In order to clarify key features of the current system, this section briefly surveys evidence about the following bodies:

Federal, state and territory police.

Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation (ACCCE).

Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC).

Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC).

Commonwealth government departments.

eSafety.

International bodies and efforts.

Federal, state and territory police

4.5Australia's law enforcement response to child exploitation is shared between federal, state and territory police. This reflects that criminal offences are in Commonwealth law as well as state and territory laws. As Victoria Police submitted regarding offences that relate to online child exploitation:

Victoria Police members are responsible for investigating these types of offences where they fall within our jurisdiction, as well as prosecuting those of a summary nature. Victoria Police members also work to identify and rescue the victims of online child exploitation.

Victoria Police conducts these functions with a range of partners, including interstate, national and international law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, victim support agencies and private organisations.[2]

4.6In New South Wales, for example, the NSW Police Force has a Child Exploitation Internet Unit 'assigned to dealing with online child exploitation cases', including investigation and coordination.[3]

4.7The Australian Federal Police (AFP) advised that it 'leads the coordination of national efforts to uncover and locate child sex offenders who engage in all forms of exploitation and abuse'.[4] Some of the AFP's priorities were outlined by the Attorney‑General's Department:

The AFP is focused on Australian offenders engaged in the sexual abuse of children offshore, by either travelling to offend or engaged in 'live online child sexual abuse' and on Australians involved in the production and supply of child abuse material.

The AFP is also focused on identifying victims depicted in child abuse material with the goal of removing them from harm and leads efforts under the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse, to bolster law enforcement capabilities in relation to child sexual abuse.[5]

4.8A key element of coordination between Australian police services is the Joint Anti Child Exploitation Teams (known as JACETs). The AFP advised that these teams are 'comprised of AFP and state and territory police, located in all capital cities across Australia' and 'establish a collaborative framework for combatting child sexual exploitation in Australia and by Australians offshore'.[6]

4.9Mr Stephen Dametto, Acting Assistant Commissioner at the AFP, confirmed that 'we work very closely with our state and territory counterparts' and referred to a 'seamless exchange of information' in the JACETs.[7] In addition, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) 'welcomed the increased collaboration and information sharing between investigative agencies in recent years' and submitted that the JACETs 'result in the development of shared expertise and resources, greater national consistency, improved standards and single points-of-focus for policy and operational liaison'.[8]

Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation (ACCCE)

4.10The AFP described the ACCCE as:

…a world-class collaborative hub, bringing together law enforcement, public and private sectors and civil society, to drive a national response to deter, disrupt and prevent child exploitation, with a specific focus on countering online child sexual exploitation.[9]

4.11The ACCCE is led by the AFP and commenced operations in 2018. The ACCCE 'does not directly investigate or charge offenders or undertake briefs of evidence, but rather supports the investigative role and remit of the AFP Child Protection Operations, and state and territory police'. The AFP advised that the AFP, state police and territory police, 'through the JACETs, retain the investigative authority in responding to child exploitation'.[10]

4.12The AFP said the ACCCE endeavours to:

…reduce economic, social and individual rewards from child exploitation; reduce harm from organised child exploitation networks; enhance capability and interoperability between public and private sectors, and civil society; and enhance community confidence.[11]

4.13The ACCCE is 'founded on a principle of partnership' and is guided by five 'strategic pillars': prepare, prevent, protect, pursue, and promote.[12] It houses 'co‑located resources' from the Queensland Police Service, Department of Home Affairs, Australian Border Force, AUSTRAC and the ACIC.[13]

Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)

4.14AUSTRAC performs both regulatory and intelligence functions, as it is Australia's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulator and Financial Intelligence Unit.[14]

4.15The value of financial intelligence in responding to CAM is reflected in evidence from the Department of Home Affairs:

Exploitation through live streaming means offenders can order, pay for and view children being abused anywhere in the world. Financial information is often a key component in fighting this horrific crime.[15]

4.16AUSTRAC's Child Sexual Exploitation Response Team is 'focused on using financial intelligence capabilities and products to support investigations and prosecutions of child exploitation and abuse, including live-streaming'.[16]

4.17AUSTRAC's Fintel Alliance is a public private partnership between government, law enforcement and large financial institutions. Established in 2017, the alliance 'has been able to increase the capability of financial institutions in Australia and internationally to detect and disrupt payments for child exploitation material'.[17] In discussing the benefits of the alliance, the Department of Home Affairs observed that '[w]hen embraced by law enforcement, financial intelligence can play an important role in identifying unknown offenders operating in the community, and present opportunities for disruption'.[18]

4.18AUSTRAC has contributed to other relevant projects, such as a joint profiling project with Home Affairs to 'identify and target travelling sex offenders, by monitoring transactional data to detect possible offending behaviours'.[19]

Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC)

4.19The ACIC contributes to the First Commonwealth Action Plan 2021-2024 under the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse. In so doing:

…the ACIC works with law enforcement and other partners to coordinate a strategic response and collect, assess and disseminate intelligence and policing information in regard to child sexual abuse and exploitation. The ACIC has a dedicated intelligence team working to target Australians who pay to watch live-streamed sexual abuse of children overseas.[20]

4.20The ACIC also administers the National Child Offender System, which 'allows Australian police to record and share child sex offender information', and manages the National Police Reference System, which 'enables Australian police agencies to share essential policing information with other police agencies'.[21] These systems are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Commonwealth government departments

4.21The division of departmental responsibilities changed during the committee's inquiry. On 1 June 2022, following the general election on 21May2022, some relevant policy areas were transferred from the Department of Home Affairs to the Attorney‑General's Department.[22] Under current arrangements, the Attorney‑General:

…has policy responsibilities for the AUS-US Data Access Agreement, and the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and its Second Additional Protocol. Similarly, the Attorney-General is now responsible for administering the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIAAct) and relevant offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), including telecommunications services and computer offences.[23]

4.22The Department of Home Affairs retained some functions relevant to this inquiry, such as a project by its Intelligence Division to 'discover previously unknown travelling child sexual exploitation offenders and those carrying child abuse material (CAM) across the border'. The Australian Border Force, which is within the Home Affairs portfolio, is also involved in this work.[24]

4.23Another relevant body, the National Office for Child Safety, was established on 1 July 2018 in response to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. The office 'provides national leadership to deliver policies and strategies that enhance children's safety and reduce future harm, with a particular focus on child sexual abuse'.[25] One key function is to oversee implementation of the National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse 2021-2030.[26] While the strategy is broader than online CAM, its first action plan incorporates measures to enhance law enforcement capabilities and disrupt child sexual abuse under theme four, 'offender prevention and intervention'.[27]

4.24In addition, the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts contains an Online Safety Branch that is 'responsible for providing online safety policy advice to the Government'.[28]

eSafety Commissioner

4.25eSafety advised that it is 'Australia's national independent regulator for online safety' and its 'core objective is to minimise harm to Australians online'. eSafety was established in 2015 as the Children's eSafety Commissioner with a focus on serious child cyberbullying, but its functions have since expanded.[29]

4.26eSafety is not a law enforcement agency; rather, it 'supports and complements law enforcement efforts to counter online sexual exploitation of children by regulating online content, and setting standards and expectations for digital platforms to provide safe and lawful online environments'. This includes exercising new powers under the Online Safety Act 2021 relating to the Online Content Scheme, Basic Online Safety Expectations, and industry codes and standards.[30]

4.27eSafety has agreed a memorandum of understanding with the AFP addressing 'how and under what circumstances eSafety will notify the ACCCE about threats to children'. This memorandum was being updated in light of the commencement of the Online Safety Act 2021, as were the memoranda that eSafety has in place with every state and territory police force.[31]

4.28In relation to online CAM, additional eSafety functions include:

administering the Online Content Scheme, which relates to regulatory investigation and removal of illegal or harmful content;

through the image-based abuse scheme, providing direct assistance to people whose intimate images have been shared, or threatened to be shared, without their consent;

promoting online safety in Australia, including by supporting and encouraging online safety education in Australia; and

promoting safety by design, which 'focuses on the ways technology companies can minimise online threats to users – especially younger users – by anticipating, detecting, and eliminating online harms before they occur'.[32]

International bodies and efforts

4.29There are many international organisations and collaborative efforts working to respond to online CAM. One key institution is the International Association of Internet Hotlines, known as INHOPE. This is a network of 50 hotlines that receives reports of online CAM and works to rapidly remove it from the internet.[33] Its members include industry associations, charities and public authorities; for example, Australia's eSafety Commissioner, the US National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children, the United Kingdom's Internet Watch Foundation, and France's Point de Contact.[34]

4.30Under the memorandum of understanding between eSafety and the AFP, eSafety reports CAM to the INHOPE network if the CAM is hosted in a country within the network. eSafety notified almost 11,000 items to INHOPE for removal in 2021-22, and almost 13,000 in 2020-21. eSafety said that referring CAM through INHOPE is its 'preferred operating method' given the 'efficacy of the INHOPE network in facilitating the rapid removal of CSEM [child sexual exploitation material]'. In 2021, 'almost 1million URLs of CSEM were reported through the INHOPE network, with 79% removed within 6 days'.[35]

4.31eSafety explained that INHOPE 'works closely with domestic, international, and European law enforcement (including INTERPOL and EUROPOL) to share intelligence and contribute to victim identification efforts'.[36] Moreover, 'INHOPE hotlines and sister agencies contribute media and metadata to victim identification image libraries, including INTERPOL's International Child Sexual Exploitation Database'.[37]

4.32Further international efforts to respond to CAM include the following:

The WeProtect Global Alliance, which the Department of Home Affairs described as 'a coalition of 98 countries, 39 of the largest companies in the global technology industry, and 41 leading civil society organisations'.[38] In June 2022, WeProtect announced a new Global Taskforce on Child Sexual Abuse Online with Australia as one of the founding members.[39]

The Virtual Global Taskforce, which the AFP described as 'an international alliance of dedicated law enforcement agencies and partners, working together to reduce the global threat from, and vulnerability of children to, online sexual abuse and other forms of transnational child sexual offending'.[40]

The Five Country Ministerial Forum, which the Attorney‑General's Department advised is 'a forum for the Five Eyes security ministers to meet and discuss opportunities for collaboration on public safety and national security issues'. Its work includes encouraging technology companies to endorse and implement the Voluntary Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.[41]

Law enforcement powers and obstacles

4.33This section reviews key evidence about the appropriateness of law enforcement's tools to combat CAM and continuing challenges, as follows:

The Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (SLAIDAct).

Law enforcement access to evidence that is password protected.

Additional obstacles facing law enforcement.

SLAID Act

4.34A key recent reform that granted new powers to law enforcement is the SLAIDAct (described in chapter3), which commenced on 4September2021. When the committee first received submissions for this inquiry, the legislation was before the Parliament; as a result, some submitters cite the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 (SLAID Bill).

4.35The Department of Home Affairs provided some context for the SLAID Bill:

Increasingly, cybercrime is committed at volume, across multiple jurisdictions, using technology which anonymises the identity of offenders, and obscures visibility of content hosted on, and facilitated by, communications platforms. Current electronic surveillance powers are not suitably adapted to identifying and disrupting serious crime where criminals rely upon an ability to obfuscate their identities and illegal activities.[42]

4.36The Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre said the SLAID Bill 'will be a game-changer in tackling the scourge of CAM'. It highlighted that the new account takeover warrants 'will mean authorities will no longer be required to ask serious criminals, including child sex offenders for permission to access online accounts, as is currently the case'. While acknowledging that the powers authorised by the SLAID Bill 'are undoubtedly extraordinary', the Centre also submitted that the bill 'contains a number of key safeguards and protections'.[43]

4.37Dr William Stoltz of the National Security College, Australian National University, also described the powers conferred on the AFP and ACIC by the SLAID Bill as 'extraordinary'. He advanced:

That the Government wants the ACIC and the AFP [to] use the same extraordinary powers to deal with child exploitation which they will use against national security threats like terrorism and organised crime, demonstrates a new commitment to regard child exploitation as similarly harmful to the national interest as those national security threats.[44]

4.38Dr Stoltz submitted that the then-proposed powers will allow law enforcement to 'more easily collect intelligence and evidence in relation to malicious criminal networks operating online and, in certain circumstances, perform offensive‑style digital disruption'. Dr Stolz also posited that the new data disruption warrant:

…marks a turning point in how Australian agencies will be able to respond to child exploitation; moving from a law enforcement-style response to one where agencies will be able to generate national security-style effects against child exploitation networks. This is because the data disruption warrant does not facilitate evidentiary or intelligence collection. Rather, it allows for the performance of offensive-style data disruption activities akin to the offensive cyber actions performed by the Australian Signals Directorate, whereby the ACIC and/or AFP will be able to delete, degrade, or modify data to prevent it being accessible or being shared.[45]

4.39Emeritus Professor Roderic Broadhurst and Mr Matthew Ball acknowledged the 'relevant tools' provided by the SLAID legislation, but suggested that law enforcement agencies 'will nevertheless encounter challenges in the darkweb'.[46] They said difficulties facing law enforcement come from 'the privacy and anonymity afforded by layered Internet technology', and quoted other researchers as saying:

"In order to successfully identify anonymous darkweb users engaging with CSAM [child sexual abuse material], federal law enforcement must rely on third-party reporting, international cooperation, and complex technical skills, making the illicit online sex market difficult to disrupt". In short most darknet investigations require resource intensive cross-jurisdictional collaborative efforts.[47]

4.40Concerns about the powers in the SLAID Act were raised by Digital Rights Watch, which said the Act 'included alarming new and intrusive surveillance powers for law enforcement'. It added that the SLAID Act:

…is on the back of a swathe of increases to law enforcement and intelligence powers, including:

Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015

Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (TOLA)

International Production Orders Act 2021.[48]

4.41Digital Rights Watch suggested that granting additional powers to law enforcement 'without requisite oversight and accountability risks those powers being misused'. It urged caution regarding any expansion of powers:

We urge the Committee to consider the broad range of powers already available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies that compel companies and organisations to collect, retain and provide access to data, undermine encryption, and conduct networked surveillance without necessary need for a warrant. These powers are deeply invasive and often operate without appropriate oversight or accountability. Before any new powers for law enforcement are considered, a comprehensive and independent review of the current powers available to law enforcement and their efficacy should be conducted.[49]

4.42In a joint submission, the Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association confirmed that their members will assist law enforcement with any legislated measures flowing from the SLAID Bill (as well as the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Act 2021).[50] Speaking before the SLAID Bill passed, the submitters also advanced:

…in our view, the nature of the existing pieces of law (and those we expect soon to exist), do not indicate that there is any need for further intrusive powers for intelligence and enforcement agencies. We are concerned that any further powers, particularly directed at encryption, will not strike an appropriate balance between preserving the technological environment that our digital societies (including our privacy) depend on and powers for intelligence and enforcement agencies.[51]

4.43Without naming any specific organisations, the Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania (Uniting Church Synod), suggested:

Organisations that campaign against effective law enforcement tools to prevent online child sexual abuse usually mount their arguments on the basis that the right to privacy overrides all other human rights, including those that require children to be protected from sexual abuse.[52]

4.44The Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman provided information about its 'new assurance role concerning the data disruption and account takeover powers' introduced by the SLAID Act.[53] Prior to the SLAID Bill's passage, the Ombudsman also emphasised the importance of compliance and oversight with any new law enforcement powers:

Insofar as the Committee might consider options or recommendations for further expansion of covert law enforcement activities related to child exploitation (particularly considering terms of reference (b) and (c)), we suggest the Committee consider the importance of effective oversight.[54]

4.45The Attorney‑General's Department explained that the AFP Commissioner and the Chief Executive Officer of the ACIC are required to report to the Attorney‑General annually about how agencies have used powers available under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Crimes Act 1914—this includes powers introduced by the SLAID Act. The reports must be tabled in both Houses of Parliament and made public.[55] The Ombudsman also reviews the use of various powers by these agencies and others, then presents reports to the Attorney‑General which must be tabled in Parliament.[56]

4.46As noted in chapter 3, the Attorney‑General's Department also advised that agencies have commenced using the powers under the SLAID Act 'including to target alleged child sexual offenders'.[57]

Access to evidence protected by a password

4.47The AFP highlighted the difficulties in obtaining evidence that is password protected where the suspect does not wish to assist law enforcement. It explained:

Section 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 enables the AFP to apply to a magistrate for an order requiring the provision of information or assistance necessary to access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device.

Recent operational experience, including in the child protection space, has demonstrated that although there is a penalty attached to this offence to encourage compliance, this does not always provide sufficient incentive for a person under investigation to comply. In the AFP's experience, persons under investigation for child exploitation offences are often more willing to accept the potential ten year imprisonment offence for failure to comply with a 3LA order, rather than provide access to the device that has evidence of serious offending as these incur more significant penalties.

This willingness to accept a penalty rather than complying with 3LA orders creates a significant gap for the AFP, as we are not only unable to gather evidence as to the full scope of that offenders criminality, but it also prevents us gathering essential intelligence on other offenders they are communicating with.[58]

4.48The AFP observed that the increase in penalty from two years to ten years, which occurred in December 2018, 'did not result in a significant shift in the level of compliance'. It suggested broader consideration of options, 'including possible presumption against bail, to ensure that orders are complied with'.[59]

4.49The Australian Border Force also referred to delays caused by encryption technology where passwords are not forthcoming. Mr James Watson of the Australian Border Force explained that:

…our officers at the border are trained to use certain electronic investigation tools. Those tools enable us to hold an electronic device until such time as we're satisfied as to the contents of what's on that particular device. Where the passwords aren't forthcoming, there's nothing that we can particularly do to compel the production of that password. And that means that our officers can be delayed whilst we look at bypass technologies that may be able to get around the requirement of that password.[60]

4.50The NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that, in contrast to Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, 'NSW police do not currently have a legislative means of compelling an individual or offender to provide access to the device or material, a situation that may lead to offending conduct remaining undiscovered and unpunished'. It said that 'implementation of such legislation in the NSW jurisdiction would greatly benefit investigations into child exploitation material'.[61]

Additional obstacles facing law enforcement

4.51Victoria Police highlighted a series of challenges it faces when responding to CAM, including the following:

While Victoria Police can 'obtain a warrant to seize a suspect's device', the alleged CAM will not be accessible to police if it is stored on a cloud‑based service instead of on the device itself. In addition, the suspect 'has the ability to delete any material on the cloud-based service if they become aware that police have seized their device'. This can cause police to 'potentially lose critical information, such as information that could identify a victim and evidence of offending'.[62]

Victoria Police expressed concern that the:

…absence of any requirement to provide identification to access the internet and set up online accounts has limited law enforcement's ability to track suspected offenders and bar recidivist offenders from being online and reoffending.[63]

Victoria Police proposed that it would be:

…valuable for Victoria Police investigators to be able to view and capture a mirror image of what an offender is viewing on their device, in real time, under warrant. This would aid investigation strategies by providing real time information and prevent intelligence and evidentiary delays associated with having to seize and download the device itself.[64]

4.52Two further concerns raised by Victoria Police related to collaboration with Commonwealth agencies. First, Victoria Police reported delays in obtaining information from Commonwealth agencies such as Medicare, Centrelink and the Australian Taxation Office. Victoria Police said that with the AFP's assistance it can receive information within 24 hours, but without that assistance it can take 'many months'.[65] It suggested that it would be 'more efficient for Victoria Police to be able to access this information directly from the relevant agency in a timely manner', and explained:

Delays in receiving information can mean that children may be accessible to offenders whereby contact offending may be occurring. By understanding if the offenders have access to children consideration can allow resourcing to be prioritised to those investigations whereby children are being harmed.[66]

4.53Victoria Police also provided examples of wait times it has faced—which can 'vary dramatically'—including the following sixmonth wait:

Male offender believed to be an administrator of a group chat where pre‑pubescent male child abuse material was exchanged amongst the group. The group was believed to have over 450 members. Investigations identified a further group was being managed by the offender. Medicare check submitted on 14 July 2020 in order to establish if offender had access to children within his home. Check serviced on the 27 January 2021 (6-month delay). This was a 6-month period. Operational decisions were made to proceed executing the warrant prior to the return of the checks. No direct access to children was identified.[67]

4.54When asked whether the NSW Police Force experiences similar challenges, Detective Superintendent Jayne Doherty said it has not, and 'I don't have any anecdotal evidence of any such issues for New South Wales'. She explained that NSW Police has certain memoranda of understanding under which Commonwealth agencies, such as Centrelink, can provide information.[68]

4.55A second concern raised by Victoria Police related to its access to Commonwealth controlled operations.[69] While Victoria Police may commence a controlled operation under Victorian legislation, that legislation operates 'where there is a reasonable belief that the offender is in Victoria'. However, 'at the outset of the operation the investigators may be unable to state whether any part of the investigation may take place outside Victoria'. In these circumstances, Commonwealth law is 'more able to support online investigations', but it 'requires collaboration with AFP'. Victoria Police explained some of the coordination challenges:

Although strong and effective partnerships are maintained between Victoria Police and the federal authorising agencies, the sheer number of investigations that are referred, or otherwise require a Commonwealth controlled operation authority, makes the authorising agency's involvement in each investigation impractical. These issues are further compounded by operational priorities and limited resources to participate in State investigations where requested and impact on timely intervention by police which can place victims at risk of unnecessary exposure to offenders.[70]

4.56Victoria Police said that a consequence of this can be that 'Victoria Police may instead use a state-based controlled operation and Commonwealth offences against a perpetrator are not pursued'.[71] It provided examples of child exploitation investigations that it was 'unable to progress due to the inability to source a COA [controlled operation authority]'.[72]

4.57The committee asked NSW Police whether it has faced obstacles in seeking to partner with the AFP on Commonwealth offences, but DetectiveSuperintendentDoherty suggested it had not:

We're not co-located with our JACET partners but we have very, very good relationships with them. I haven't experienced any difficulties with gaining assistance from AFP. As I said, we've run a number of operations with them. Whether they are short, snappy jobs or they are long, protracted ones, the AFP have always been giving in their services, their technologies and their powers with us, and we work collaboratively with them on those.[73]

4.58In response to Victoria Police's concerns about controlled operations, the AFP advised that it will continue to work with its state and territory partners to streamline procedures:

The AFP works in close partnership with state and territory law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt crime. Where appropriate, this can include the use of Commonwealth Controlled Operations (CCOs). All state and territory police may seek access to the CCO framework, and do so through our extensive collaborative arrangements. In order to apply for a CCO, states and territories must appoint an AFP assigned Principal Law Enforcement Officer to ensure compliance with the CCO framework, including reporting requirements to the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

The AFP continually works to streamline procedures where possible to maximise operational impact. This includes reviewing how the AFP supports joint taskforce arrangements and expanding these where required. While ultimately a matter for Government, rather than seeking reforms to the CCO framework, the AFP will continue work with its State and Territory partners in this regard.[74]

4.59Regarding its own controlled operations, the AFP raised a separate concern about the length of time authorities are allowed to conduct these operations. The AFP submitted that 'current legislation limits each authority period to threemonths, covering a maximum period of 24 months with extensions from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal'. After 24 months, 'the AFP is required to close the original controlled operation prior to gaining approval for a new controlled operation and transferring the existing work to the new approval'.[75]

4.60This existing legislation, the AFP explained, 'was established prior to the emergence of the dark web as a primary facilitator for child exploitation'. The AFP said 'covert infiltration of sophisticated dark web criminal syndicates requires long term strategies that require extensive resources and are conducted under the auspices of a major controlled operation'. Moreover, the requirement for quarterly extensions 'increases the administrative burden on the investigators, with significant supporting material required to gain an extension'. The AFP suggested:

A longer initial period for controlled operations, combined with greater extension period would better meet the needs for the type of long and protracted investigations conducted in the child exploitation space.[76]

Expanding access to existing law enforcement systems

4.61Government submitters proposed that it would be beneficial to expand access to two existing databases, as follows:

Enable the ACIC and AUSTRAC to access the National Child Offender System (NCOS).

Enable AUSTRAC to access the National Police Reference System (NPRS).[77]

4.62When asked about these proposals, Assistant Commissioner Lesa Gale, AFP, said:

Access to any intelligence in relation to offender data at a national level would be very useful and critical to law enforcement in order to identify and prosecute offenders in relation to accessing, possessing, sharing and distributing child abuse material. It is absolutely vital that we all have access to the same data, noting the methodologies employed by these offenders are diverse, so all Commonwealth agencies having access to that is vital.[78]

4.63The NCOS allows Australian police to record and share child sex offender information. The Department of Home Affairs said that '[w]hile the ACIC administers the NCOS, it does not currently have access to the information or data contained within the system for intelligence or investigatory purposes'. The department submitted:

This significantly limits the ACIC's ability to work with the ACCCE and other agencies to develop a coordinated national intelligence picture of child sex offending, and to share relevant information and strategic insights with law enforcement partners.[79]

4.64The Department of Home Affairs advised that granting access to the ACIC would enable the ACIC to 'undertake data analysis and matching against its criminal intelligence and national policing information holdings' with various benefits, as well as:

…leverage its specialist powers and tools, including coercive examinations and human source capabilities, to develop and disseminate strategic intelligence and break-through understandings of the methodologies, planning and motivations of child sex offender syndicates.[80]

4.65Regarding AUSTRAC, the Attorney‑General's Department cited its 'growing role in combatting child sexual exploitation' and provided case studies of AUSTRAC's financial intelligence being successfully deployed in CAM operations.[81] The Department of Home Affairs also advised that since 2015, AUSTRAC had 'experienced a 945% increase in reporting of suspected financial transactions that relate to child abuse offending'.[82] It provided a rationale for granting AUSTRAC access to the NCOS:

Direct access to NCOS would significantly enhance and complement AUSTRAC's ability to detect child abuse through matching suspicious financial payments with offending, adding an extra layer of actionable intelligence. AUSTRAC would then be able to provide more targeted intelligence reports, monitor financial activity of registered offenders and assist with prioritisation of actionable intelligence.[83]

4.66The committee heard that enabling the ACIC and AUSTRAC to access the NCOS would require approval of the ACIC Board and changes to state and territory legislation.[84] In August 2020, the Minister for Home Affairs wrote to state and territory justice, police and child protection ministers about this matter. The department described jurisdictions' responses:

A number of the responses raised complex legal issues, including legislative restrictions on the sharing of information with ACIC and AUSTRAC for intelligence purposes. For example, Western Australia and Queensland advised that their legislation (the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 (WA) and the Child Protection (Offender Reporting and Offender Prohibition Order) Act 2004 (Qld), respectively) does not permit generalised bulk data sharing with the ACIC and AUSTRAC. However, both jurisdictions provide for the disclosure of information on reportable offenders on a case-by-case basis – for example, where an investigation has identified a specific risk to children.[85]

4.67In early 2023, the Attorney‑General's Department advised that 'we are continuing to try to work with the states and territories to obtain their agreement for AUSTRAC to have access' to the NCOS, though there 'has been no significant change to the status of this work' since the update quoted above.[86]

4.68Turning to the second system, the NPRS is managed by the ACIC and 'enables Australian police agencies to share essential policing information with other police agencies'. The system provides police with 'detailed, current and accurate national police information that they can access from handheld devices, in-car terminals and desktop computers'.[87]

4.69The Department of Home Affairs submitted that AUSTRAC is seeking access to the NPRS to enhance its financial intelligence, and that '[d]irect access to the NPRS would expand AUSTRAC's capacity to efficiently respond to high‑priority detection and disruption of child exploitation activities'.[88]

4.70When asked, a representative of NSW Police explained how AUSTRAC access to the NPRS and NCOS could be beneficial:

There are two reasons why people are producing CAM: it is either for a financial gain or to receive back further child abuse material. If AUSTRAC had access to those [systems], they would have a greater understanding and more buy-in to the child abuse material. Ultimately, that's how we chase most our crimes, whether it is child abuse, drugs, firearms. The money is driving the majority of offenders some way down the line, so by tracing the money back, we can identify the head of the snake, and that's why AUSTRAC require those extraordinary powers to delve into child abuse as well as they do with other crimes.[89]

4.71It is not necessary to amend state and territory legislation to grant AUSTRAC access to the NPRS but the change does require approval from the ACIC Board, which includes all state and territory police commissioners.[90] It would also require amendments to the Australian Crime Commission Regulations 2018.[91]

4.72In March 2023, when asked about any remaining barriers to extending NPRS access to AUSTRAC, the Attorney‑General's Department reported that 'AUSTRAC and the ACIC continue to consider the system access options available and the corresponding challenges relating to each option'.[92]

Law enforcement wellbeing and training

4.73Inquiry participants discussed the burden on the officers who investigate CAM offences. Associate Professor Benoit Leclerc, Associate Professor Jesse Cale and ProfessorThomas Holt cited research indicating that 'investigators experience significant emotional, cognitive, social and behavioural consequences as a result of viewing CEM [child exploitation material]'. While 'the degree of negative consequences varies markedly', the submitters conveyed some of the harms:

…many participants reported short-term reactions of disgust and anger and long-term reactions reflecting anger as the dominant emotional response. Other symptoms reported by participants included secondary traumatic stress disorder (e.g., intrusive imagery, flashbacks, nightmares and social withdrawal), increased generalised distrust of people, over protectiveness of children and difficulty in relationships with partners and children. At the international level, investigators reported higher emotional fatigue, burnout, and secondary trauma due to their exposure to CEM content.[93]

4.74A report by UNICEF and the WeProtect Global Alliance stated that '[p]sychological care and mitigation tools for law enforcement officers' health and well-being are also essential'.[94] As Associate Professor Leclerc advanced, 'since we don't have a massive workforce of very competent online investigators doing this work, we have to protect them'.[95]

4.75Associate Professor Leclerc also posited that, while it is beneficial to reduce viewing of CAM, 'I don't see viewing content as being the major cause of negative consequences to online investigators'. He explained:

This is only part of the problem. The other part of the problem and the major part of the problem is investigators portraying offenders on the internet. They have to create relationships with them to be able to identify them down the road. Working with sex offenders for five or six years, in the long term, surely, it is going to affect some of these online investigators.[96]

4.76A further stressor, cited by the Australian Institute of Criminology, is the 'staggering number' of reports for law enforcement to investigate:

According to Netclean (2020), which surveyed 470 law enforcement officers in 39 countries, in 2020 police globally were inundated with CSAM cases. This affected the mental health of officers and meant they could investigate only the most high-risk cases.[97]

4.77The AFP also recognised that, according to work it had done with the ACCCE and Virtual Global Taskforce, 'job demands such as resourcing or policies and procedures can also cause stress to members and not just exposure to child abuse material'.[98]

4.78Regarding the AFP's measures to support officers, Assistant Commissioner Gale reported that the psychological and wellbeing efforts of the ACCCE have been recognised as 'world leading'.[99] In addition, Commander Hilda Sirec advised that 'we rarely have people opting out [of roles related to CAM] because of the exposure to the material'.[100] The AFP described some of the measures the ACCCE has adopted:

The AFP and ACCCE consistently seek to employ best practice when providing psychological care and supporting the wellbeing of our people. The ACCCE building was designed as an integral part of the wellbeing plan, encouraging members to utilise the collaboration and breakout areas to interact and step away from high risk explicit material exposure areas. The building has two floors which have strict access control measures in place to minimise potential exposure to explicit material. The operational floor has physical protective measures including viewing controls, tint and strategic placement of monitors to avoid accidental exposure. Other measures include the introduction of wellbeing dogs, where members' dogs visit the ACCCE building on Fridays, and other recognised support practices.[101]

4.79The AFP separately observed that the (then prospective) introduction of account takeover warrants 'removes the need for AFP to spend lengthy periods of time creating online profiles and infiltrating online networks of offenders, which can take up to two years and significantly impact on the welfare of officers'.[102]

Technology and classification systems

4.80One key measure discussed by inquiry participants to reduce the burden on investigators is to use technology to classify CAM. As the Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre submitted, artificial intelligence and machine learning can play 'a key role…in helping shield investigators from CAM material':

Automated detection of CAM via AI [artificial intelligence] and ML [machine learning] technologies, which are currently being deployed by law enforcement agencies, mean investigators view far less traumatic content, as the materials are identified and classified automatically.[103]

4.81Associate Professor Leclerc, Associate Professor Cale, and Professor Holt discussed technologies developed by companies such as Microsoft and Facebook (now known as Meta) to proactively detect CAM on their platforms, which can 'minimize the need for human examination of content' and thereby 'help reduce the psychological and emotional stress placed on investigators to specifically examine CEM'.[104] However, AssociateProfessorLeclerc suggested that '[w]e always need the human factor':

A machine could not make judgement calls like this, I don't think. I guess AI and some of the technologies can help reduce the amount of work they have to go through or the amount of exposure to CEM and things like this, but decision-making remains a very important human factor, and I don't think you can replace that.[105]

4.82The United Kingdom (UK) National Crime Agency described how the Child Abuse Image Database (CAID) is used in the UK to record the severity of CAM that has been graded previously, and thereby reduce the need for officers, prosecutors or judges to view the same material if it arises again.[106]

4.83In an Australian context, Commander Sirec explained that when the AFP seizes CAM it uses the Australian victim identification database and a software tool to 'quickly decipher what is child abuse material and what isn't, so that we minimise the need for investigators to continually categorise material that is seized again and again'.[109]

4.84Regarding the process for informing courts about the severity of the CAM held by a suspect, the committee was advised there has been movement away from grading material into several categories of severity, and towards applying the Interpol Baseline classification system, which has two categories.[110] A representative of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP), MrMarkdeCrespigny, explained some drawbacks of the method used previously (though 'there are still bits of it in Australia'):

It was quite common for investigators to go through a person's whole collection and quantify that and say how many images were category 1 and how many were 2, 3, 4 and 5. That process had an immense toll upon investigators because it meant they had to look at the images and look at them in some detail. In addition, from a prosecution point of view, we were finding it less and less helpful because a person could set their eMule peer‑to‑peer program on overnight and download a million images and not really have—it might have been the first time they'd ever done it and they hadn't actually had any interaction with that material, and it didn't tell you that much about him. You could end up with these huge collections, but they didn't tell you much about the person. You also found courts were focusing on numbers and saying: 'Oh, well, he's got 100,000 images and only 500 of them are the worst. It's only a little bit of all of his collection which is the worst.' That sort of starts distorting things. From our point of view, that wasn't that helpful either.[111]

4.85Mr de Crespigny said the CDPP was 'very supportive' of a suggestion from police to 'move away from that categorisation and just determine whether it fell within the Interpol baseline or was otherwise illegal'.[112] The CDPP also submitted that it has worked with the Queensland Police Service, the AFP and through the ACCCE to develop:

…an approach focussing less on a quantitative classification of the material but more on informing the court of the depravity of some of the material viewed by the investigator and the offender's involvement and engagement with the material.[113]

4.86The NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) said that classification of CAM 'varies across jurisdictions' but 'remains one of the most resource-intensive aspects of the investigation stage'. In September 2017, NSW changed its classification procedures 'in response to the occupational health and safety issues that could arise from the extensive viewing of exploitation material by stakeholders' under the previous system. The new system is a two-category system drawing on the Interpol Baseline, compared to the previous six categories. The ODPP supported continued use of this system, which has 'largely eliminated the need for the staff at the ODPP to directly consider child exploitation material'.[114]

4.87The ODPP acknowledged that the Interpol Baseline system provides less gradations than other systems, but explained how this is addressed in NSW:

There is an obvious tension between the relevance of the nature and content of child exploitation material on sentence and the limited detail provided by the Interpol Baseline categories themselves, such that some direct reference to the material, either in the form of a written description or thumbnail depictions of it, may ultimately be required to be tendered on sentence. To that end, there is legislation in NSW which provides for the admissibility of random sample evidence of child abuse material, and NSW Police generally provide a limited description of the sampled material, such as was necessary for their initial categorisation to occur.[115]

4.88The ODPP concluded:

Notwithstanding the ongoing tension, the ODPP is of the view that the streamlined Interpol Baseline categorisation comes with a significant benefit in terms of minimising occupational trauma risks, whilst also increasing the efficiency and efficacy of police investigations. It appropriately places a greater emphasis on the fundamental notion that all child exploitation material is deplorable and is one that should continue to be considered as a viable investigative model.[116]

Law enforcement training and support

4.89Citing research in Australia and elsewhere, Associate Professor Leclerc, Associate Professor Cale and Professor Holt discussed the need for investigators' training to keep up with emerging technological trends in CAM offending.[117] Associate Professor Leclerc also said that his research with investigators in several Australian jurisdictions showed they were 'very keen to make a difference' but 'could have better support and better training programs to address this phenomenon'.[118] He recognised that the ACCCE is 'doing everything it can to make a difference' but suggested that 'what I heard from investigators is that there's no standardised training across Australia'.[119]

4.90Safe on Social emphasised the risk posed by offenders in online games and submitted that 'law enforcement must have the necessary resources and expertise to identify and apprehend these predators'. It proposed that this may 'require investment in advanced technologies and training to track and analyse online activity, particularly on social media and messaging apps where predators often move their activities'.[120]

4.91A representative of Victoria Police, Ms Welsh, also highlighted the importance of law enforcement training and capabilities for investigations:

Access to digital evidence can be supported by strong government interventions—be they law, regulations or influence at a policy level; ongoing training for police investigators and specialists; and technology, both hardware and software, to support investigations.[121]

4.92The AFP also referred to training provided by the ACCCE, including 'an online Victim Identification Awareness training package, which has now been accessed by more than 200 members from all policing agencies in Australia', as well as international colleagues.[122] In addition, Assistant Commissioner Gale advised:

Through the ACCCE, we undertake a number of national forums with our law enforcement counterparts—not just practitioners but also from an organisational health and wellbeing perspective. It is not just, as I said, the technology for minimising exposure; it is also about health and wellbeing. There is obviously much work still to be done to ensure consistency and standards across the country, but that is something that we see the ACCCE driving.[123]

Collaboration with non-government organisations

4.93Associate Professor Leclerc, Associate Professor Cale, and Professor Holt submitted that law enforcement's efforts 'can be enhanced by nongovernmental non-law enforcement organizations specializing in the investigation of CEM'. They said such organisations 'tend to focus on public functions, including serving as a clearinghouse for information on victimization or attempts to regulate and operate tip-lines for offenses', and gave the following examples:

In the United States, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children operates as a partially government-funded entity that is congressionally mandated to facilitate the investigation of crimes against children. They offer myriad services to law enforcement, most notably including a tip line for individuals to report suspected incidents of child abuse, and various forms of CEM. Additionally, NCMEC operates the Child Victim Identification Program, which culls through CEM to determine the identity and location of child victims. There are numerous similar entities serving domestic and international law enforcement agencies across the globe. For instance, the International Center for Missing and Exploited Children is a non-profit that operates internationally, fulfilling much of the same role as the NCMEC but on a global level. Additionally, the Internet Watch Foundation is a charitable organization located in the United Kingdom that is dedicated to removing CEM and obscene content from the Internet. They operate a tip-line to report CEM and engage in coordinated information sharing with law enforcement and ISPs [Internet Service Providers] to facilitate blocking harmful content and investigating CEM.[124]

4.94Dr Mark Zirnsak, Senior Social Justice Advocate, Uniting Church Synod, cited a published work that 'talks very positively about the role of third-party civil society organisations'. He explained that the book discusses:

…the increased role of third-party agencies in assisting law enforcement around addressing human rights abuses and the positive role that can play, particularly for a crime type or human rights abuse of this nature, where the pool is so large that law enforcement resources will never match the size of the pool. It looks at law enforcement needing to look at how to increase capabilities and bring on more allies to assist us without compromising investigations.[125]

4.95Mr Glen Hulley, Founding Chief Executive Officer of Project Karma, posited that 'NGOs play an important role connecting community and social issues to government and law enforcement. I think that's an important component when we look at this in a holistic approach, as this problem is a global problem'.[126]

4.96Project Karma is a charity that works in Australia and Southeast Asia, 'focused on combatting child sexual exploitation through investigation, education and awareness, rescue and rehabilitation, and advocacy and consultation'.[127] MrHulley said that Project Karma has 'provided information to Australian Federal Police and state police over many years, and quite often that has led to investigations by law enforcement that have led to arrests, prosecutions and also rescuing of victims'.[128] However, Project Karma expressed concern about a lack of collaboration between Australian law enforcement and NGOs, such as Project Karma, submitting that:

…legislative red-tape restrictions around obtaining information for investigations from government-based sources has led to lengthy detrimental delays in our ability to take critical action. One example of this is the 'triage' reporting system with the ACCCE, where non-government stakeholders such as [Project Karma] can only communicate with the ACCCE via a public reporting portal. This creates major limitations and inefficiencies, particularly where information is highly involved, complex and/or urgent. A perpetrator may be here today and gone tomorrow, and such hurdles can create opportunities for a perpetrator to disappear.[129]

4.97Project Karma recognised that communication between Australian law enforcement and NGOs 'is and should be subject to very strict legal regulations around information sharing and privacy'. However, it also expressed disappointment that it has been able to develop 'stronger [and] more efficient working relationships with law enforcement agencies overseas' than those in Australia.[130] While Project Karma has signed memoranda of understanding with law enforcement overseas, Mr Hulley understands that such memoranda are limited by AFP policy.[131] He suggested that the ACCCE has:

…been very selective in the organisations they've chosen to partner with, which I understand. However, I think it's only three, and most of them are focused on education and rehabilitation. When it comes to investigation, I don't believe that law enforcement here in Australia are really that interested in working with organisations that can provide detailed information in relation to this. I believe they see themselves as the be-all and end-all, which I totally understand, having been in law enforcement myself. But the reality is that a number of these organisations do hold very important information that I think would be of high benefit to organisations like the Australian Federal Police.[132]

4.98Mr Hulley also suggested there would be benefit in greater collaboration between NGOs themselves:

It's all very well to point the finger at law enforcement to say they've been operating in silos and not sharing with NGOs or other agencies, but the same can be said of NGOs. I've had these discussions at a high level with organisations like IJM, International Justice Mission. We want to set up a database where selected NGOs, which have gone through a criteria process and which law enforcement and government are willing to work with, can be in this database, and law enforcement can feed into it with whatever level of privacy is agreed upon as being necessary. Then, other NGOs can feed into that database so that there is sharing of intelligence.[133]

4.99International Justice Mission provided evidence to the committee explaining some of its substantial work in this area:

Since 2011, IJM [International Justice Mission] has worked with the Philippine Government, international law enforcement, and relevant stakeholders to combat online sexual exploitation of children (OSEC), in particular, the trafficking of children to produce new child sexual exploitation material (CSEM) especially via livestreaming video. To date, IJM has supported 338 law enforcement-led operations, leading to the safeguarding of 1,123 victims or at-risk individuals, the arrest of 355suspected traffickers, and the conviction of 195 perpetrators. Leveraging IJM Philippines' promising practices in combatting livestreaming of child sexual abuse and exploitation, IJM's Center to End Online Sexual Exploitation of Children works to strengthen the global response against this crime, including via improved indust1y detection and reporting. The Center is available for consultation to industry, government, and NGOs.[134]

4.100Another NGO that operates internationally, Destiny Rescue, submitted that it has 'strong on-the-ground partnerships with local governments and like-minded NGOs'; for instance, authorities in Cambodia and the Philippines.[135] It also advised that it has signed a memorandum of understanding 'alongside a technology partner' with the Cyber Crime Investigation Bureau of the Royal Thai Police. This agreement enables Destiny Rescue 'to formally collaborate and empower the police to respond to [online sexual exploitation of children] investigations'.[136]

4.101Destiny Rescue further explained that it 'has rescued over 12,000 individuals (mostly children) from exploitation overseas', and said:

…we are one of the few organisations internationally to conduct direct rescues via a network of trained rescue agents to support the fight against child sexual exploitation. In addition, we collaborate with prominent NGOs and local law enforcement agencies on large-scale raids.[137]

4.102Regarding potential collaboration or memoranda of understanding with NGOs, the AFP advised:

The Australian Federal Police's (AFP) ability to share information with any entity (both government and non-government) is governed by legislative frameworks, including the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and relevant secrecy and disclosure provisions. The existence (or not) of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) does not alter the AFP's legal obligations in this regard. Sharing of information is also contingent on ensuring ongoing investigations and prosecutions are not compromised.

The AFP and ACCCE have strong and ongoing relationships with a number of partners, including non-government entities, academia, law enforcement agencies, industry and international partners and shares information where necessary and permitted by law. These partners engage in a range of activities and services. Where appropriate, these relationships may be supported by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or a Letter of Exchange (LoE), however this is not essential. MOUs and LoEs are entered into on a case by case basis, with consideration given to a range of factors.[138]

4.103When asked about collaboration between eSafety and NGOs that investigate CAM matters, Mr Toby Dagg of eSafety said:

We work very closely with the Canadian Centre for Child Protection in Winnipeg. They don't perform an investigative function per se, but they certainly take reports from the public about child sexual exploitation material, and pass information to law enforcement. We've worked with them very productively on sharing information about some of the trends that they're seeing and some of the issues that they are concerned about that are manifesting on social media, and we've used those insights as a basis for our own investigative activities and have collaborated really productively. The Canadian centre is no longer a member of INHOPE, but we work very closely with our colleagues within INHOPE as well, along similar lines.[139]

Collaboration with foreign law enforcement

4.104Considering that online CAM is a borderless crime, several inquiry participants emphasised the importance of Australian authorities collaborating with foreign law enforcement and other international partners. For instance, eSafety advanced that the key challenges of this crime type:

…are not unique to Australia. It is increasingly understood that voluntary actions alone against CSEM have proven insufficient and we are seeing new legislation progress in Europe, Canada, Singapore, and the UK.[140]

4.105The National Crime Agency submitted that the response to child sexual abuse 'benefits from strong international law enforcement cooperation'. It highlighted work by both the Virtual Global Taskforce and the WeProtect Global Alliance, including a model national response published by WeProtect that can be 'used to visualise the main capabilities that a country requires to enable a comprehensive national response to preventing and tackling [child sexual abuse], with a focus on online offending'. The National Crime Agency also supported coordination between Five Eyes partners, submitting:

Making use of local arrangements, and reciprocal measures to operationally support each other globally, in locations where we each have greater capacity and capability, has greatly assisted the Five Eyes law enforcement community in progressing operational activity and providing a force multiplier effect, and it is important that these arrangements continue, and are bolstered where required.[141]

4.106ECPAT International supported continued international collaboration, with Australia as a leader:

States should enhance international cooperation and international investigative coordination. For borderless crime, a borderless response is necessary. International collaboration plays a vital role in improving the effectiveness of national law enforcement agencies by creating more efficient operational activities where police units can join forces, avoid duplication, and build regional capacities. Australian law enforcement is already recognised as a leader in this sphere, and this work should continue and expand, particularly with regional neighbours in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.[142]

4.107Associate Professor Leclerc, Associate Professor Cale and Professor Holt highlighted the benefits of international collaboration but also pointed out that assisting foreign law enforcement increases the workload on investigators providing assistance:

Multinational CEM investigations have proven successful in disrupting CEM networks that produce and distribute CEM. While it may seem complicated to have such networks in place, it is vital given the international distribution systems in place to facilitate CEM distribution. Additionally, the variations in law enforcement investigative tools, knowledge and powers available make it possible for investigators in one nation to share information with investigators in another nation they may not otherwise be able to acquire. However, collaboration and requests from police organisations internationally can present other challenges such as putting more time pressure on competent police organisations, such as in Australia.[143]

4.108Project Karma supported increased funding for the AFP internationally and submitted that Australia should 'support better training and resources in other countries, especially where it is Australian offenders exploiting their children'.[144] Destiny Rescue also highlighted the role of Australians in this crime overseas, submitting that 'Australians have been identified as the largest group of sex tourists prosecuted in Thailand (31% of the total)', and advancing:

[L]aw enforcement action needs to be taken to reduce the extent to which Australian overseas travellers, who may have been involved in OSEC [online sexual exploitation of children], are involved in the physical sexual exploitation of children in the countries which they visit.[145]

4.109Both these NGOs advised that they have worked with Southeast Asian authorities and law enforcement.[146] For example, Destiny Rescue's experience includes working with 'an online technology specialist company to develop a cyber-intelligence technology that enhances law enforcement operations to counter [online sexual exploitation of children] activities'. Destiny Rescue advised that it is 'training Thailand's local police to deploy this technology'.[147]

4.110The committee heard that Australian authorities also collaborate with international partners. Examples include the AFP's Operation Tatsuta (involving Philippine authorities) and the Child Sexual Exploitation Regional Dialogue in Siem Reap, Cambodia, which the AFP led in May2022.[148] The AFP also advised it is a key member of the Virtual Global Taskforce Board of Management, 'which comprises of a coalition of international law enforcement agencies'.[149]

4.111The Department of Home Affairs cited further international efforts involving Australia, including the Five Country Ministerial Forum, international fora on childlike sex dolls, and an AUSTRAC-led collaboration with the UK Financial Intelligence Unit and the Philippines Anti-Money Laundering Council, resulting in the report Combatting child sexual abuse and exploitation through financial intelligence.[150] A representative of the department, Ms Ciara Spencer, also advised:

The department is also establishing an international capacity-building program to work with partners in the Indo-Pacific, and that goes to policy, legislative and operational responses to child sex abuse. It involves direct assistance but also building mechanisms and opportunities to share global and regional best practice, both for online child exploitation and for travelling child sex offences.[151]

4.112The Department of Home Affairs also submitted that existing legislation 'addresses offending that takes place overseas, or victimises children overseas', including 'overseas sexual abuse of children by Australian citizens or residents' and 'possession, production, distribution and procuring of child abuse material outside Australia'. In addition, restrictions apply to travelling child sex offenders '[a]s a means of preventing these offences'.[152]

4.113The AFP acknowledged the complexity and borderless nature of child protection investigations which 'means that no agency or country can fight these threats alone', adding:

The AFP and ACCCE continue to leverage international partnerships, with the ACCCE uniquely placed to partner with the AFP's International Network and foreign law enforcement community to take the fight against online child sexual exploitation to the world.[153]

4.114The AFP reported that the recent success of Operation Bakis highlighted the 'significant outcomes that can be achieved through collaborative, international efforts'.[154] Operation Bakis was an AFP-coordinated investigation which began in 2022 when the US Federal Bureau of Investigation provided intelligence to the ACCCE about Australian members of a network allegedly sharing child abuse material on the dark web. 19 men were charged and 13 Australian children were removed from harm as a result of the joint investigation which also involved state and territory police.[155]

4.115The AFP is also involved in regional collaboration and capacity building. For example, through the AFP's International Command in the Philippines, there is close collaboration with the 'Philippine domestic and foreign law enforcement partners to detect and disrupt those engaged in the sexual abuse and exploitation of children, remove victims from harm and address the growth of Online Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children at the source'.[156]

4.116This work includes the 'continued support to the development and maturity of the Philippine Internet Crimes Against Children Centre (PICACC) jointly established by the AFP in partnership with the National Bureau of Investigation, Philippine National Police, International Justice Mission and United Kingdom (UK) National Crime Agency'. The AFP reported that since its inception in February 2019:

…the PICACC operations have resulted in 643 victims rescued and 131suspects charged. Of these, 51 of the arrests/ charges and 224 of the rescues were a direct result of AFP International Command facilitating and value adding to referrals emanating from Australia based investigations and intelligence referrals. The work undertaken by the PICACC has strengthened prosecution cases, identified further suspect offenders and generated intelligence leads and more investigations, in Australia and other foreign jurisdictions.[157]

Reporting to law enforcement

4.117Some inquiry participants highlighted barriers for the public to notify law enforcement about alleged offending and suggested potential improvements.

4.118Ms Kirra Pendergast, Chief Executive Officer of Safe on Social, reported on her discussions with certain NSW police officers, who indicated there is 'bureaucratic red tape when they go to report things up; they're not quite sure when it's eSafety Commissioner, when it's AFP or a combination of both, and the child is therefore left in the centre of all of this'.[158] Ms Pendergast highlighted that '[r]eporting is minimal, because kids are scared'.[159] She also explained that children who experience exploitation may be afraid of punishment if they report:

The reporting that I see happening to local police is that people don't understand that they're not going to get in trouble. One of the things that I make very, very clear in my talks to children is if they do have something happen and even if they have shared an image, for years and years and years they've been told that it is illegal to share an intimate image of themselves, so they do think they're breaking a law. Therefore, they're fearful. I remind them that the worst-case scenario is that they will probably get a slap on the wrist from the police and told not to do it again, and the police will go after the perpetrator. But the average child and parent doesn't know that. Neither do school staff.[160]

4.119Mrs Jen Hoey, Founder and Parent Cyber Safety Consultant at Not My Kid, recommended the establishment of a 'support to report hotline' which would be:

…specifically for victims of online child exploitation under the age of 18, where they can be supported and reassured that they won't get into trouble, and assisted in making a report if need be. Law enforcement do an incredible job in policing this crime type, but not all local police appear to understand the protocol when a parent comes to them.[161]

4.120Not My Kid explained this proposal 'could be comparable with the Kids Helpline or Lifeline' but would be 'dedicated to victims of online child exploitation under the age of 18'. Mrs Hoey, on behalf of Not My Kid, outlined the need for this service:

In my experience, many children firmly believe they are at fault and are filled with self-blame and shame. Furthermore, because this is not a crime type that is openly spoken about, they feel alone.

A support/report line may provide a safety net for these victims where they know they will receive support, reassurance, and assistance in making a report, if need be, and would provide a safe space for them to make a disclosure.[162]

4.121Mrs Hoey also gave a specific example illustrating the need for such a hotline:

I recently had a parent who reached out to me whose 12-year-old daughter had fallen prey to an online predator via Snapchat. She had sent a compromising video of herself and the perpetrator subsequently sent the video back demanding more. Even though she blocked him, he contacted her repeatedly over a 12-month period using over 20 profiles demanding more videos. She eventually went to her parents, who contacted the local police, who told them to make a note of the incident but that there was no need to report it. I think this demonstrates how local police are not always equipped to deal with these issues and further training should be considered given how serious this problem has become.[163]

4.122Ms Madeleine West described obstacles facing people who wish to report abuse they have experienced to police:

For victims ready to disclose, their first point of contact, as was my experience, is usually an officer on desk duty. A young constable is no more a psychologist than you or I, and will handle the matter like any reported crime. But disclosures of this nature are generally coupled with extreme trauma and sometimes their actions can dissuade a victim from pursuing a perpetrator. The average time it takes for a victim to disclose is 33 years. That's a lifetime of silence and shame and blame that they need to tackle before making that disclosure, and I know how that feels.[164]

4.123Ms West recommended 'creating a pre-reporting agency that provides counselling, support and advocacy for those coming forward'. She elaborated:

I think that would be absolutely invaluable and subsequently a nationwide standard could be set up where this professional agency reports directly to the relevant sexual offences criminal investigation team and they can take it up from there.[165]

4.124Ms West provided several suggestions about the proposed pre-reporting apparatus, including that its objectives include:

Work alongside victim/survivors to assist with their support system access such as reporting to police, identifying support needs, undertaking goal setting and hearing and providing a safe place of victim/survivors to disclose and be believed.[166]

4.125eSafety submitted that its website 'includes advice about unwanted contact and grooming, how to report online exploitation (including to the AFP), and how to manage hard-to-have conversations with children about online safety'.[167] In addition, the AFP submitted that '[t]hrough market research and consultation with stakeholders, the ACCCE identified that confusion still exists in the community around what constitutes online child sexual exploitation, where to report matters, and the work of the ACCCE'.[168] There is also a reporting function on the ACCCE website for online child sexual exploitation.[169] Further evidence about public awareness and education work by eSafety and the ACCCE is discussed in chapter 6.

Footnotes

[1]Office of the eSafety Commissioner (eSafety), Submission 44, p. 13.

[2]Victoria Police, Submission 30, p. 2.

[3]NSW Police Force, Submission 26, p. 2.

[4]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 2. Also see Attorney-General's Department, answers to questions on notice, 22 November 2022 (received 9December 2023), p. 2.

[5]Attorney‑General's Department, answers to questions on notice, 22 November 2022 (received 9December 2023), p. 2.

[6]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 10.

[7]Mr Stephen Dametto, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Northern Command, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2022, p. 32.

[8]Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission 23, p. 3.

[9]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 8.

[10]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 8.

[11]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 8.

[12]Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation, ACCCE Strategic Plan 2022-2026, p. 4. Also see Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 8.

[13]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 8.

[14]Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Corporate Plan 2022-26, p. 9.

[15]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 16.

[16]Attorney-General's Department, answers to questions on notice, 22 November 2022 (received 9December 2023), p. 3. Also see cases in Attorney-General's Department, Submission 43, pp.4–5.

[17]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 10. Also see Department of Home Affairs, answers to questions on notice, 10 December 2021 (received 14January 2022), [p. 4].

[18]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 10.

[19]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 13. Also see, for example, Attorney-General's Department, answers to questions on notice, 22 November 2022 (received 9December 2023), p. 3; NSW Police Force, Submission 26, p. 4.

[20]Department of Home Affairs, answers to questions on notice, 22 November 2022 (received 9December 2022), [p. 3].

[21]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, pp. 11–12.

[22]The Attorney‑General's Department (Submission 43, p. 3) said its October 2022 submission 'should be read alongside the two previous submissions provided by the Department of Home Affairs'.

[23]Attorney‑General's Department, Submission 43, p. 3.

[24]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 39, p. 1.

[25]National Office for Child Safety, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (National Office for Child Safety), Submission 14, p.2.

[26]Ms Tara Inverarity, First Assistant Secretary, International and Security Cooperation Division, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2022, p. 22; National Office for Child Safety, Submission 14, pp. 2–3.

[27]Ms Inverarity, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2022, p. 22; National Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Child Sexual Abuse 2021–2030: An initiative of the Australian, state and territory governments, October 2021, pp. 46–49.

[28]Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, Submission35, p. 1. Also see Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, Submission 12, p. 1.

[29]eSafety, Submission 44, p. 2. Also see eSafety, Submission 20, p. 2.

[30]Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, Submission 35, p. 1. Also see Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, Submission 12, p. 1.

[31]eSafety, Submission 44, p. 4.

[32]eSafety, Submission 20, pp. 2–4; eSafety, Submission 44, pp. 3–5.

[33]Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, Submission 35, p. 2. Also see INHOPE, 'Our story', Webpage, undated, https://www.inhope.org/EN/our-story (accessed 17 May 2023).

[34]eSafety, Submission 44, p. 3.

[35]eSafety, Submission 44, p. 6; eSafety, Submission 20, p. 6.

[36]eSafety, Submission 44, p. 3.

[37]eSafety, Submission 20, p. 5. Also see INTERPOL, 'International Child Sexual Exploitation database', Webpage, undated, https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Crimes-against-children/International-Child-Sexual-Exploitation-database (accessed 17May2022).

[38]Department of Home Affairs, answers to questions on notice, 20 February 2023 (received 7March2023), p. 1.

[39]WeProtect Global Alliance, 'Global Taskforce on Child Sexual Abuse Online', Media release, 2June2022. Also see eSafety, Submission 44, p. 8.

[40]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38, p. 5.

[41]Attorney-General's Department, Submission 43, p. 8. Also see Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, pp. 13–14.

[42]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 9. Also see Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p.14.

[43]Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre, Submission 1, pp. 3, 7.

[44]Dr William Stoltz, Submission 3, p. 3. Also see Dr Stoltz, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 10December2021, p. 12.

[45]Dr Stoltz, Submission 3, p. 3.

[46]Emeritus Professor Roderic Broadhurst and Mr Matthew Ball, Submission 27, p. 2.

[47]Emeritus Professor Broadhurst and Mr Ball, Submission 27, pp. 11–12 (quoting Roberta Liggett, JinR.Lee, Ariel L. Roddy and Mikaela A. Wallin, 'The Dark Web as a Platform for Crime: An Exploration of Illicit Drug, Firearm, CSAM, and Cybercrime Markets' in Thomas Holt and AdamBossler (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of International Cybercrime and Cyberdeviance, 2020).

[48]Digital Rights Watch, Submission 47, p. 7.

[49]Digital Rights Watch, Submission 47, p. 8.

[50]Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Submission13, p. 4.

[51]Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, Submission13, p. 6. Also see Ms Christiane Gillespie-Jones, Director, Program Management, Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 16.

[52]Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania (Uniting Church Synod), Submission17, p.23.

[53]Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 34, [p. 1].

[54]Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 6, [p. 1]. Terms of reference (b) and (c) relate to legislative tools and constraints. Also see Dr Ian Warren, Dr Clare Allely and Dr Sally Kennedy, Submission 5, p.5.

[55]Attorney‑General's Department, Submission 43, p. 6.

[56]This includes, for example, the Australian Federal Police and Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission's use of data disruption warrants and account takeover warrants. See Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 34, [pp. 5, 7].

[57]Attorney‑General's Department, Submission 43, p. 6.

[58]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 16. Also see Ms Anne-Louise Brown, Director of Corporate Affairs and Policy, Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre, Committee Hansard, 9December2021, p. 12.

[59]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, pp. 16–17.

[60]Mr James Watson, Assistant Commissioner South, Australian Border Force, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2023, p. 24.

[61]NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission 22, p. 2.

[62]Victoria Police, Submission 30, p. 5.

[63]Victoria Police, Submission 30, p. 5.

[64]Victoria Police, Submission 30, p. 6.

[65]Victoria Police, Submission 30, p. 6.

[66]Victoria Police, Submission 30, p. 6; Victoria Police, answers to questions on notice, 10December2021 (received 7 February 2022), p.2.

[67]Victoria Police, answers to questions on notice, 10 December 2021 (received 7 February 2022),pp.2–3.

[68]Detective Superintendent Jayne Doherty, Commander, Child Abuse and Sex Crimes Squad, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, pp. 29–30.

[69]Victoria Police, Submission 30, p. 5; Victoria Police, Submission 46, pp. 2–3; Victoria Police, answers to questions on notice, 10 December 2021 (received 7 February 2022), pp. 1–2; Ms Mary-Jane Welsh, Detective Superintendent, Cybercrime Division, Crime Command, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 9 December 2021, p. 36.

[70]Victoria Police, answers to questions on notice, 10 December 2021 (received 7 February 2022),pp.1–2.

[71]Victoria Police, Submission 30, p. 5.

[72]Victoria Police, Submission 46, pp. 2–3.

[73]Detective Superintendent Doherty, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 29.

[74]Australian Federal Police, answers to questions on notice, 10 December 2021 (received 17January2022), [pp. 1–2]. Also see Ms Lesa Gale, Assistant Commissioner, Northern Command, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 38.

[75]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 17.

[76]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 17.

[77]For example, Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, pp. 11–12; Attorney‑General's Department, Submission 43, p. 12; Ms Gale, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 10December2021, p. 36.

[78]Ms Gale, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 36.

[79]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 11.

[80]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 11. Also see Australian Federal Police, Submission18, pp. 15–16; Attorney‑General's Department, Submission 43, p. 12.

[81]Attorney‑General's Department, Submission 43, pp. 4–6, 12.

[82]This data was provided to the committee in September 2021. Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 12

[83]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 12.

[84]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 16; Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 12; Attorney‑General's Department, Submission 43, p. 12.

[85]Department of Home Affairs, answers to questions on notice, 10 December 2021 (received 14January 2022), [pp. 2–3]. Also see Ms Ciara Spencer, First Assistant Secretary, Law Enforcement Policy Division, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 36; and correspondence between the Uniting Church Synod and Victorian authorities about enabling AUSTRAC to access Victoria's sex offender register, in Uniting Church Synod, additional information received 13December2021, [pp. 1–5].

[86]Ms Inverarity, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2023, p. 23; Attorney-General's Department, answers to questions on notice, 28 February 2023 (received 14March2023), [p. 4].

[87]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 12.

[88]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 12. Also see Attorney‑General's Department, Submission43, p. 12.

[89]Detective Superintendent Doherty, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 30.

[90]Department of Home Affairs, answers to questions on notice, 10 December 2021 (received 14January2022), [p. 2].

[91]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 12; Attorney‑General's Department, Submission 43, p. 12.

[92]Attorney-General's Department, answers to questions on notice, 28 February 2023 (received 14March2023), [p. 1].

[93]Associate Professor Benoit Leclerc, Associate Professor Jesse Cale and Professor Thomas Holt, Submission 8, [p. 12] (citations omitted). Also see, for example, Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre, Submission 1, p. 8.

[94]WeProtect Global Alliance and UNICEF, Framing the future: How the Model National Response framework is supporting national efforts to end sexual exploitation and abuse online, May 2022, in UNICEF Australia, Submission 41, Attachment 2, p. 12. Also see WeProtect Global Alliance, Preventing and Tackling Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA): A Model National Response, November 2016, in National Crime Agency, United Kingdom, Submission 31, attachment 3, pp. 9–11.

[95]Associate Professor Leclerc, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 9 December 2021, p. 24; also see p.22.

[96]Associate Professor Leclerc, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 9 December 2021, p. 23–24.

[97]Australian Institute of Criminology, Submission 37, p. 3. Also see Associate Professor Leclerc, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 9 December 2021, p. 25; Associate Professor Leclerc, AssociateProfessorCale, Professor Holt, Submission 8, [p. 5].

[98]Australian Federal Police, answers to questions on notice, 15 November 2022 (received 9December2022), pp. 5–6.

[99]Ms Gale, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 41. Also see MsHildaSirec, Commander, Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation and Human Exploitation, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2022, p. 30.

[100]Ms Sirec, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2022, p. 30. Also see data on Comcare claims in Australian Federal Police, answers to questions on notice, 15November2022 (received 9December2022), p. 5.

[101]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38, p. 5. Also see Mr Dametto and Ms Sirec, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2022, pp. 29–30; Australian Federal Police, answers to questions on notice, 15November2022 (received 9December2022), pp. 5–6.

[102]Australian Federal Police, Submission 18, p. 14.

[103]Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre, Submission 1, p. 8.

[104]Associate Professor Leclerc, Associate Professor Cale, Professor Holt, Submission 8, [p. 10].

[105]Associate Professor Leclerc, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 9 December 2021, p. 26.

[106]National Crime Agency, United Kingdom, Submission 31, pp. 12–13. Also see WeProtect Global Alliance, Preventing and Tackling Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA): A Model National Response, November 2016, in National Crime Agency, United Kingdom, Submission 31, attachment3, pp. 9–11.

[107]National Crime Agency, United Kingdom, Submission 31, p. 12.

[108]National Crime Agency, United Kingdom, Submission 31, pp. 12–13 (citations omitted). Also see National Crime Agency, United Kingdom, Submission 31, attachment 4.

[109]Ms Sirec, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 15 November 2022, p. 29. Also see Ms Gale, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 41; Australian Federal Police, answers to questions on notice, 15 November 2022 (received 9December2022), p. 2.

[110]NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission 22, pp. 2–4; Mr Mark de Crespigny, Deputy Director, Illegal Imports and Exports and Human Exploitation and Border Protection Practice Groups, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Committee Hansard, 10December2021, p.27

[111]Mr de Crespigny, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Committee Hansard, 10December2021, p. 27.

[112]Mr de Crespigny, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Committee Hansard, 10December2021, p. 27.

[113]Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission 23, p. 4.

[114]NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission 22, pp. 2–3.

[115]NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission 22, p. 3.

[116]NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Submission 22, p. 4 (citations omitted).

[117]Associate Professor Leclerc, Associate Professor Cale and Professor Holt, Submission 8, [pp. 4, 7, 8].

[118]Associate Professor Leclerc, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 9 December 2021, p. 22.

[119]Associate Professor Leclerc, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 9 December 2021, p. 24.

[120]Safe on Social, Submission 50, [p. 1].

[121]Ms Welsh, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 9 December 2021, p. 36.

[122]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38, p. 4.

[123]Ms Gale, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 42.

[124]Associate Professor Leclerc, Associate Professor Cale, and Professor Holt, Submission 8, [p. 5] (citations omitted).

[125]Dr Mark Zirnsak, Senior Social Justice Advocate, Uniting Church Synod, Committee Hansard, 15November2022, pp. 3–4.

[126]Mr Glen Hulley, Founding Chief Executive Officer, Project Karma, Committee Hansard, 9December2021, p. 27.

[127]Project Karma, Submission 10, p. 1.

[128]Mr Hulley, Project Karma, Committee Hansard, 15November2022, p. 2.

[129]Project Karma, Submission 10, p. 5. Also see Mr Hulley, Project Karma, Committee Hansard, 9December2021, pp. 27–28 and 15 November 2022, p. 2.

[130]Project Karma, Submission 10, pp. 5–6. Also see Mr Hulley, Project Karma, Committee Hansard, 9December2021, pp. 27–28.

[131]Mr Hulley, Project Karma, Committee Hansard, 9December2021, p. 28.

[132]Mr Hulley, Project Karma, Committee Hansard, 15November2022, pp. 2–3.

[133]Mr Hulley, Project Karma, Committee Hansard, 9December2021, pp. 31–32.

[134]International Justice Mission, Submission 53, p. 1 (citations omitted).

[135]Destiny Rescue, Submission 52, p. 11.

[136]Destiny Rescue, Submission 52, pp. 10, 14, 19.

[137]Destiny Rescue, Submission 52, p. 5.

[138]Australian Federal Police, answers to questions on notice, 15 November 2022 (received 9December2022), p. 7.

[139]Mr Toby Dagg, Executive Manager, Investigations Branch, eSafety, Committee Hansard, 9December2021, p. 45.

[140]eSafety, Submission 44, p. 13.

[141]National Crime Agency, United Kingdom, Submission 31, pp. 10–11; also see a copy of the model national response at attachment 3.

[142]ECPAT International, Submission 9, p. 5. Also see, for example, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Submission 7, [p. 1].

[143]Associate Professor Leclerc, Associate Professor Cale and Professor Holt, Submission 8, [p. 6] (citations omitted).

[144]Project Karma, Submission 10, p. 14.

[145]Destiny Rescue, Submission 52, p. 15.

[146]Mr Hulley, Project Karma, Committee Hansard, 15November2022, p. 5; Destiny Rescue, Submission52, p. 11.

[147]Destiny Rescue, Submission 52, p. 14.

[148]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38, pp. 1–2, 5. Also see Mr Dametto, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 15November2022, p. 23; Ms Sirec, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 15November2022, p.33.

[149]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38, p. 5.

[150]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, pp. 13–18.

[151]Ms Spencer, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 10 December 2021, p. 41. Also see Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, p. 14.

[152]This includes the Passports Legislation Amendment (Overseas Travel by Child Sex Offenders) Act 2017. Department of Home Affairs, Submission 25, pp. 7–8. Also see Australian Federal Police, Submission18, p. 6.

[153]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38.1, [p. 4].

[154]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38.1, [p. 4].

[155]Australian Federal Police, 'Australian children removed from harm and 19 men charged with child abuse offences', Media release, 8 August 2023.

[156]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38.1, [p. 4].

[157]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38.1, [p. 4].

[158]Ms Kirrily (Kirra) Pendergast, Chief Executive Officer, Safe on Social, Committee Hansard, 20February 2023, p. 9.

[159]Ms Pendergast, Safe on Social, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2023, p. 9.

[160]Ms Pendergast, Safe on Social, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2023, p. 10. Also see Safe on Social, Submission50.1, [pp. 1–2].

[161]Mrs Jen Hoey, Founder and Parent Cyber Safety Consultant, Not My Kid, Committee Hansard, 20February2023, p. 9.

[162]Not My Kid, answers to questions on notice, 20 February 2023 and 24 February 2023 (received 3March2023), [pp. 1–2].

[163]Mrs Hoey, Not My Kid, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2023, p. 9.

[164]Ms West, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2023, p. 11, also see p. 14.

[165]Ms Madeleine West, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 20 February 2023, p. 11.

[166]Ms West, answers to questions on notice, 20 February 2023 and 24 February 2023 (received 10March2023), [pp. 2–3].

[167]eSafety, Submission 44, p. 4.

[168]Australian Federal Police, Submission 38, p. 3.

[169]Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation, 'Report abuse', Webpage, undated, https://www.accce.gov.au/report (accessed 3 November 2023).