5. Assisting emerging industries and technologies

Overview

5.1As outlined in Chapter 3, Australian Government departments and agencies are already undertaking a considerable amount of work to support Australia’s transition to a green energy superpower. This chapter summarises evidence from submitters and witnesses to the inquiry outlining how the development of emerging green energy industries and technologies, including some of those outlined in Chapter 4, could be further assisted and accelerated.

5.2This chapter summarises evidence received during the inquiry about the Australian Government’s role in assisting and accelerating emerging technologies through:

• Public funding and investment
• Enacting targets, strategies and coordination; and
• Certification, promotion and awareness building.

Public funding and investment

5.3The Committee received considerable evidence calling for the Australian Government to play a role in funding and supporting investment in emerging green industries and technologies. A range of mechanisms were put forward, including the expansion of grants, debt and equity financing traditionally provided by specialist Australian Government agencies and investment vehicles, as well as alternative approaches.

5.4The Grattan Institute described the need for public investment in emerging green industries and technologies:

First, markets do not generally provide adequate incentives for research and development of new technologies, because knowledge is often intangible, risky, and difficult to appropriate. Low-emission technologies are particularly complex and uncertain.

Second, many of the technologies that might produce large emissions reductions are expensive and high-risk. Early investors face high costs, low returns, and the risk of competitors free-rising on their initiative…For both these reasons, investment in low-emission technologies is and will remain critically inadequate.[1]

5.5Similarly, the Australian National University Zero Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative (ZCEAPI) noted that: ‘The growth rate of new industries is typically limited by the availability of low-cost credit due to higher perceived risk of novel industries.’[2]

Co-investment between the government and private sector

5.6Many stakeholders identified the need for public funding to support emerging green industries and technologies in the form of co-investment between government and the private sector.[3] A co-investment approach aims to provide initial funding support and share risk, which encourages private sector investment, in turn catalysing and accelerating the development of emerging industries.[4]

5.7The Australian Hydrogen Council (AHC) stated that: ‘In order to capture the vast opportunity presented to Australia, bold policy and significant public sector investment will be required to unlock an even greater quantum of private sector investment.’[5]

5.8In relation to the critical minerals sector, Mr Andrew Hutchinson, General Manager, Critical Minerals Office, Minerals and Resources Division at the Department of Industry Science and Resources (DISR), explained the potential role for government in supporting investment in emerging industries:

In any emerging sector there’s always the question of what is the role for government… I think there is a role for government, and it can take several different forms... Australia has always been reliant on foreign direct investment, particularly in the resources sector, because the scale of what we do is so much large than the scale of what we can finance domestically. The feedback we get from industry is that government need to think carefully about how they play a catalysing role and how they can help crowd in that private sector finance wherever possible.[6]

5.9Sun Cable emphasised in their submission that the focus for government should be to encourage greater private sector investment:

… the Commonwealth already coordinates finance for green energy projects with complementary private investment. For instance, catalysing private finance informs the Clean Energy Finance Corporation’s investment decisions. Sun Cable strongly supports an expansion of efforts to ‘crowd in’ private finance… this approach supports an increased dividend for industry and the taxpayer alike. Catalysing co-investment from the private sector should be an objective of all Commonwealth investment funds supporting the green economy…[7]

5.10Some submitters noted that in comparison to subsidies and tax incentives, co-investment mechanisms represent better value for money and provide returns to government on successful investments.[8]

Expanding Australian Government investment vehicles

5.11Stakeholders widely acknowledged the success of Australian Government agencies and investment vehicles[9] such as the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA), the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), Export Finance Australia (EFA), and the Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility (NAIF) in providing funding through grants as well as debt and equity financing for projects to accelerate the development of emerging green industries and technologies.[10] For example, the Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation (CENRIT) explained that:

The success of government grant programs to accelerate the deployment of new energy technologies is clearly evident in the portfolio of projects enabled through both ARENA and the [CEFC]. For the former, the successful leveraging of a private consortium through public funding to bridge the bankability gap of a first mover project was exemplified by Australia’s first large-scale hydrogen facility in Pilbara, Western Australia. To address the two major cost drivers of hydrogen, being electrolyser construction expenditure (‘capex’) and electricity operating expenditure (‘opex’), ARENA funding was able to step in where traditional financiers would be difficult to secure.[11]

5.12The roles of ARENA, CEFC, EFA and the NAIF are outlined in Chapter 3.

5.13Many submitters suggested that support provided by specialist Australian Government agencies and investment vehicles for emerging green energy industries and technologies could be improved by increasing funding, expanding remit, and aligning objectives with export opportunities.[12] For example, the Electric Vehicle Council (EVC) submitted: ‘To support industry development, the Government (through ARENA, the CEFC or other investment vehicles) can provide further debt and equity financing to innovative projects to accelerate the clean energy transition.’[13]

5.14Entura explained that low interest loans from the CEFC provide many projects a greater level of surety of proceeding to financial close. Entura also suggested that maintaining and broadening the access to the CEFC ‘… will further support continued growth in the sector, particularly as new, pre-commercial technologies emerge that need initial investment support and de-risking.’[14]

5.15The ZCEAPI suggested that increased funding through specialist agencies and investment vehicles could accelerate the development of the green hydrogen industry:

More emphasis should be placed on funding and supporting targeted schemes for prototyping and first-of-a-kind scale-up of new technologies. While many of the technologies required for green hydrogen scale up are relatively mature, they are not yet widely deployed. Much of the required learnings in this area will be in integration of technologies and scaling up capacity. Funding to de-risk deployment, such as those that have been run through ARENA and the CEFC, should be increased and extended to support first movers in this space.[15]

5.16Mr Leigh Heaney, Government Relations Manager at the Smart Energy Council (SEC), told the Committee that funding support could be extended to smaller projects:

The CEFC requires a $20 million minimum loan. It's an unofficial minimum, but that's what everybody understands. We would like to see that be made smaller, so that it captures some of those smaller projects, or bundled together or however they want to do it, to bring those smaller projects or keep those smaller projects that we know have an awful lot of Australian IP [intellectual property], mostly paid for out of ARENA grants. We want to keep those here, and we think that's one mechanism to do it.[16]

5.17The Grattan Institute identified gaps in the remit of specialist agencies and investment vehicles, including support to bring forward investment in low or zero carbon refurbishments of existing facilities.[17]

5.18Several submitters proposed that the remit of specialist agencies and investment vehicles be extended to provide grants and finance for domestic manufacturing, particularly for the battery sector.[18] For example, the Advanced Materials and Battery Council (AMBC) called for a bespoke investment vehicle to assist ‘… multiple battery chemistry ecosystems grow [and] streamline investment decisions for project and companies from extraction to manufacturing that are on the critical path for successful local battery supply chain development.’[19]

5.19Ms Rebecca Manen, General Manager, NRF Strategy, Manufacturing and National Reconstruction Fund Division at DISR, described the role of the $15 billion National Reconstruction Fund (NRF), which includes renewable energy and low-emissions technologies, as well as value-adding in resources as priority funding areas:

[The NRF] can really play a role in crowding-in private sector investment across the seven areas. The transformation, and developing emerging technologies and innovative processing methods and things like that, can be risky. It can take time. The NRF can play a particular role in helping to de-risk some of those investments so that were able to co-invest with more traditional lenders to really pull through those technologies, bring those to market and scale them in a way that they can go on to be commercial.[20]

Additional co-investment mechanisms and incentives

5.20The Committee received evidence suggesting that additional types of co-investment mechanisms and incentives could be introduced to attract greater investment in emerging green industries and technologies. These were often raised in the context of responding to policies adopted by other countries such as those contained in the United States (US) Inflation Reduction Act (IR Act).[21] For example, the Clean Energy Council (CEC) advised that the green energy transition will require Australia to adopt policy settings that maintain its investment attractiveness in the context of increased global competition for capital:

These superpower scenarios also demand very large amounts of capital investment, much of which will need to come from offshore. While there is no apparent shortage of clean energy finance…Australia is in competition with other markets for these funds, and we need to take active steps to ensure that our mix of policy settings and incentives provide an internationally-competitive investment environment.[22]

5.21Dr Madeline Taylor, Deputy Director of the CENRIT, explained the need to move beyond traditional support such as grants and expand measures aimed at de-risking investment:

…in order for us to actually seize upon our competitiveness we need to do more, because business and commerce and financing are now flowing to these other regions, like Canada and the US, where there is a clear multidecade framework around regulation, tax incentives, tariffs and offtaking, contracts for difference and things like this. So I think a more positive policy instrument along those lines is needed, as opposed to just banking projects, to really de-risk some of these technologies.[23]

5.22Regarding the electric vehicle value chain, the EVC indicated the need for additional government support to de-risk commercialisation and attract private investment:

Government investment must also look to move beyond research, development and trials, and actively support commercial operations across the full EV value chain. This could be via grants, tax concessions, or public investment in infrastructure. Government has a key role to play in de-risking investment in a domestic EV supply chain to attract both domestic and international private investment.[24]

5.23The Heavy Industry Low-Carbon Transition Cooperative Research Centre (HILTCRC) advised that co-investment from government is required to support the development of technologies to decarbonise heavy industry:

…given that the technologies needed for the low-carbon transition of high temperature process industries are not yet commercially available at scale, government co-investment will be required to de-risk their development and demonstration.[25]

Addressing the ‘cost gap’ and ‘chicken and egg problem’

5.24The Committee received evidence explaining that the development of emerging green industries is inhibited by the gap in the cost of production (or ‘cost gap’) between traditional products and green alternatives, which also results in what was often referred to as the ‘chicken and egg problem’.[26]

5.25The chicken and egg problem arises where there is a substantial difference between the price at which producers are willing to sell into the market and the price that buyers are willing to pay. This leads to uncertainty and creates a stalemate between supply and demand, which constrains the development of the market.[27]

5.26The ZCEAPI provided an example of the chicken and egg problem in that there is a reluctance of downstream hydrogen users to invest in the transition to hydrogen because of an uncertainty about the price and availability of green hydrogen, and explained:

…Australian project developers face challenges in obtaining investment and credit because of concerns about the extent of the downstream markets. Collaborations between governments in exporting and importing countries can provide clear signals to supply chain participants and de-risk these co-dependent investments.[28]

5.27Similarly, Professor Ken Baldwin, Fellow at the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (AATSE), told the Committee that:

You'll… remember back to the start of LNG and the whole exercise of getting a supplier that is willing to provide at a particular price, which then incentivises demand, but at the same time the customer wants to know what the price is, and therefore there's this chicken-and-egg situation to kick things off at the beginning of industry. Creating demand for these new renewable energy products is going to be the key. That's certainly true in hydrogen. The [IR Act] in the US might have kicked that off and helped to break the Gordian knot at the very beginning, in some sense. But it's demand creation that is really important for Australia. We've got to be out there on the front foot talking to industry in other countries that are going to use the export products that we'll produce using renewables.[29]

5.28Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer of the AHC, summarised the situation in the hydrogen industry, where a gap between supply and demand is constraining the development of the market:

The idea is, if you've got the demand saying, 'We're prepared to sign on the dotted line for this price, for this amount of hydrogen or its derivatives,' then that's going to kick everything back through the supply chain and we're going to have the production and the means of doing it. But no-one's prepared to lock into the sorts of significant volumes we're talking about because we're also not evolved enough, at this stage, to know how much it does cost. So much of the cost that would go into what the offtakers would agree to is, itself, dependent on how everyone sees this emerging. So we have a gap. We have a gap between people's willingness to sell and people's willingness to pay...[30]

No one at this stage is setting forth a compelling enough case as to what they're prepared to actually use and pay. That's the offtake that people are looking for. What we do know is when people do have the discussions about what people are likely to pay, it's vastly less than what it takes to make the hydrogen, which is why we're back in this world of: can we bridge the gap? What are the mechanisms to allow that to be the case?[31]

5.29Similarly, Mr Simon Corbell, Chief Executive Officer of the Clean Energy Investor Group (CEIG), described the role for governments to develop the market by providing revenue support to bridge the gap:

At the moment, the price that you can get for green hydrogen is not sufficient basically because of a lack of a market to really make that proposition commercial at any scale in the domestic economy, let alone for exports. So there is an opportunity for governments to have regard to how they provide some level of price support, in the same way that governments in Australia and overseas have done for large-scale wind and solar in the last two decades, to help bring down the cost of green hydrogen manufacture and bridge the gap between the delivery cost and what the market would pay. That revenue support is potentially quite an important role for governments to play.[32]

Contracts for difference

5.30Contracts for difference (CFDs) were identified as a co-investment mechanism to support investment in emerging green products or technologies.[33] Through CFDs the government underwrites investment by guaranteeing the seller a fixed price for their product. If the price in the market falls below an identified ‘floor’ price the government will pay the difference, and if the market price moves above a ‘ceiling’ price then the government is entitled to share in the profits.[34]

5.31CFDs support the development of emerging industries by bridging the cost gap between traditional products and new green alternatives.[35] The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) explained that CFDs offer price stability, which then attracts investment by improving the risk profile and suggested that CFDs could be used to ‘…bridge the cost gap between hydrogen produced with renewable energy and hydrogen from fossil fuels, helping support demand for the zero-carbon fuel.’[36]

5.32Some submitters noted that CFDs have been used successfully by a number of state and territory governments to underwrite renewable electricity generation, generally by awarding contracts through a competitive reverse auction process.[37]

5.33Ms Nicola Ison, Head of Direct Advocacy at Boundless Earth, explained how the CFD approach could be used in Australia beyond the electricity sector:

The idea is you could then expand it to the carbon market, say we could do a similar thing for the production of renewable ammonia or green iron and go, ‘We will provide a carbon contract for difference; what’s the carbon price you might need?’ We’re not talking about creating a whole economy wide carbon pricing; you would pick a couple of sectors you thought were really important to incentivise the decarbonisation of and do so in a way that encourages trade export competitiveness— green iron being a great example; green ammonia being another good example. It’s just a targeted way of using a semi-government lever and a semi-market lever to encourage that additional investment and create that investment certainty in the industry space.[38]

5.34Mr Eytan Lenko, Chief Executive Officer of Boundless Earth, explained further:

For a clear example, if ammonia is able to be produced normally for a dollar a kilo, say, and to do it in a decarbonised way is $1.50 a kilo, then maybe they would bid $1.60, then every time they get a price, international markets will pay a premium for decarbonised products, so if they’re getting $1.90 a kilo, they’re paying back the 30c. If there’s a flood in the market of non-decarbonised ammonia, at a dollar a kilo, and the government’s topping up that 60c, then that’s what enables that project to get off the ground.[39]

5.35Some stakeholders pointed to Germany’s introduction of CFDs to incentivise development of their green steel and chemical industries as successful approach that could be informative for Australia.[40] Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer of the AHC, explained that:

The sorts of things that we are really supportive of are subsidies through market creation mechanisms like a contract-for-difference type approach. There’s a German initiative called H2Global, for example, where they’re going out to the market and acting as an intermediary between the buyers of hydrogen derivatives in Germany and the sellers from overseas of those same hydrogen derivatives and then filling the gap, which then reduces over time as the market gets up. This is the sort of thing we need in Australia, where ideally we partner to do a shared contract-for-difference, according to certain parameters, with the Koreans or with the Germans.[41]

Tax credits and incentives

5.36The Committee received evidence that described production tax credits as a mechanism to accelerate emerging industries and technologies, often in the context of policies introduced by the US and Canada.[42] A production tax credit effectively provides a financial contribution from government towards each unit produced, lowering the cost of production.[43]

5.37Dr Maia Schweizer, Director, Western States at Fortescue Future Industries (FFI), explained the benefits of a production tax credit with regard to the green hydrogen industry:

Why do we see that as a promising way to potentially achieve this outcome? It helps to close the gap between hydrogen—green hydrogen in particular—and fossil fuels. It’s a very efficient and simple policy to implement because it’s linked directly to something that’s easily evidence based. So it’s linked to the production of hydrogen, which is ultimately what we’re aiming for, as opposed to, for example, capital grants or investment credits that would force the government to pick a winner and evaluate in detail significant numbers of projects. So we see it as a very simple and elegant policy measure to implement.[44]

5.38Mr Wayne Smith, External Affairs Manager at the SEC, explained that a production tax credit could encourage investment in advanced manufacturing by providing greater certainty:

In the US Inflation Reduction Act, there is very specific language about an advanced manufacturing tax credit, and an important bit about it is that it only provides a tax credit once something is manufactured. Once something is actually produced, you could have a tax credit that lasts, for example, for 10 years. The thing that’s really important about it is that it provides investment certainty for companies that are looking to manufacture. They know that they’re only going to get that tax credit once they start manufacturing and they’re actually producing products, but they know that it’s coming as well.[45]

5.39Beyond production tax credits, the AMBC proposed that tax concessions available to the resources sector could be extended to the manufacturing sector:

There are substantial numbers of levers for attracting finance that already exist in our economy that aren’t actually provided to manufacturers. One is exploration capital for mining and gas companies. It is not actually provided to manufacturing companies. So you can write off your whole exploration costs whereas a manufacturing company can’t when it’s looking to develop a new product. It is similar for mining as for gas. You can also, in some countries, provide a tax loss through for investors, which is what a called a flow-through tax. So when your company is not cash flow positive, which is usually the case for early stage battery companies, they can provide that tax loss through to their shareholders. Canada already has this. It means that the tax losses for the company can be given to the shareholders in a very tax effective way. It doesn’t actually increase the tax effect or the share of wallet for the government either.[46]

5.40Submitters suggested other tax-based incentives including royalty discounts to encourage downstream capabilities in the critical minerals sector,[47] tax concessions to increase uptake of new technologies such as electric vehicles,[48] tax deductions for project feasibility assessments and expenditure on pilot facilities,[49]accelerated tax depreciation for green energy assets,[50] and targeted research and development tax concessions.[51]

Local content and procurement

5.41Submitters identified local content and procurement requirements as a mechanism for governments to support the development of emerging industries and technologies by building demand.[52] Local content policies involve incentives or requirements to use domestically produced inputs or products, generally in government procurement and where public funding or finance is involved. For example, a certain percentage of green steel and aluminium could be required in publicly funded infrastructure projects.[53]

5.42Westpac Group proposed that introducing local content requirements as a component of relevant Australian Government renewable energy initiatives could accelerate the domestic solar panel manufacturing industry:

With the large-scale investments in solar panels planned by the Commonwealth Government, such as the community solar banks policy, one way to kick start the value-adding process is for those solar panels to be Australian made. Adopting a local content policy for renewable energy projects would be a key way to not only directly support Australia businesses, but also create the scale required for ancillary advanced manufacturing.[54]

5.43Star of the South advised that local content requirements have been a key component of government and industry collaboration to successfully expand local supply chains in the United Kingdom’s (UK) offshore wind industry.[55]

5.44In relation to battery storage, the University of Queensland (UQ) explained the benefit of building domestic demand through local procurement policies, whilst noting the need to consider requirements of export markets:

Although trade with international partners is the goal, access to domestic markets through beneficial procurement policies to support locally made batteries, provides valuable learnings about customer requirements and deployment challenges to become more globally competitive. Thus, procurement policies to support locally made batteries… need to consider international trade partner requirements and global market expectations.[56]

5.45Local content and procurement policies were mentioned as a mechanism to support the development of various emerging industries including electric vehicles,[57] battery storage,[58] solar power,[59] wind power,[60] and construction and building materials (e.g. aluminium, steel, cement).[61]

5.46Submitters noted that local content requirements are a key feature of the policy framework introduced by the US IR Act to support their emerging green industries, with carve outs for international trading partners such as Australia.[62]

5.47Ms Jo Evans, Deputy Secretary at the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), described the aim of the Hydrogen Headstart program announced in the 2023–24 Budget:

That’s [the cost gap] what Hydrogen Headstart is targeting…we don’t have any significant scale of hydrogen production in Australia yet. Partly, that’s because in the financial industry there’s a lack of confidence to put the money into these projects if they don’t have a proper offtake…So some form of revenue support was clearly something that was needed to try to lift it off the ground, and that’s what the Hydrogen Headstart program attempts.[63]

Shared infrastructure and industrial hubs

5.48Several submitters outlined the need for public investment and coordination in the establishment of shared infrastructure and industrial hubs as an approach to support emerging technologies and industries.[64]

5.49Beyond Zero Emissions (BZE) described the concept of Renewable Energy Industrial Precincts (REIP) as clusters of manufacturers powered by renewable energy and storage. These would provide ‘a unified and coordinated vision’ to overcome barriers to establishment and ‘enable the coordination of infrastructure, energy and skills’ required to develop green manufacturing industries.[65] BZE also suggested that the REIP model assists to develop community support and maintain economic prosperity in regional areas transitioning from traditional industrial sectors.[66]

5.50In relation to the development of green metals industries, Mr Rowan Moorey, Senior Researcher at BZE, told the Committee that:

We think a focus on certain projects like green steel–green alumina has a huge potential to pay massive dividends…We need to play to our strengths with the resources we’ve already got. We’ve had nation building exercises with iron ore. We export most of the world’s iron ore in Australia. There’s no reason why we can’t make that green ore, but there needs to be a coordinated national approach to doing that. Using our REIP model to focus on those shared co-benefits with an ecosystem industrial precinct approach means that lots of industries benefit from the manufacturing of green ore, not just one or two companies.[67]

5.51The HILT CRC outlined the need for co-investment in the establishment of low-carbon industrial hubs and explained that the approach can accelerate emerging industries by:

• Lowering the investment barrier by increasing the number of partners who can benefit and/or share in the investment and creating economies of scale;
• Generating innovation by knowledge sharing, cross-fertilisation, increased capacity and greater critical mass;
• Lowering the cost of managing industrial byproducts, to generate value from materials that are considered to be ‘byproducts’ in traditional industrial processes;
• Increasing public good by generating new jobs in the circular economy and hence greater potential for government co-investment.[68]
  52. Professor Michael Goodsite, Pro Vice-Chancellor and Director at the University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources (ISER), suggested that incentives should be used to attract nascent industries to industrial hubs and explained that: ‘If you cluster companies and cluster and import-export activities, you create a critical mass that enables trade and enables people to learn from one another.’[69]
  53. Ms Sanaya Khisty, Chief Strategy Officer at BZE, further explained the REIP model, with particular focus on the need for coordination:

That’s when we come back to the precinct [REIP] model, because we really need to think about the transformations were going to use–repurposing infrastructure, brownfield sites and transmission. We want to make sure that we are working with what we’ve got–those highly skilled workforces in those existing regions–and we want to set up those conditions so that it is really clear how we’re going to actually make this work. It can’t be left to every individual business to work that out. They want more coordination and they want that to come from the government…It needs to be federal, state and local, and its already happening in some states.[70]

So it’s happening, but the role of the federal government is really to make sure that our states don’t compete against each other–that we don’t have the Hunter and the Illawarra competing against each other–and that we are playing to our strengths and competing in an international market. That is something that only the federal government can do in setting up the architecture for a national program…it is really about making sure that the federal government leads that coordination piece that has to happen at the local level as well.[71]

5.54In their joint submission, the Australia Academy of Science (AAS) and AATSE also highlighted the need for shared and coordinated infrastructure:

It is essential that Australian green energy infrastructure is developed and utilised in a coordinated manner. Co-locating manufacturing with extraction increases efficiency…At the same time, coordinated use of infrastructure minimises duplication, both improving cost competitiveness. Previous energy projects have seen the siloing of infrastructure, resulting in unnecessary duplication…This inefficiency results in increases capital and operational costs, potentially undermining cost competitiveness and endangering future green energy projects.[72]

5.55BZE recommended that the Australian Government create a ‘REIP activation plan’ including investment to establish two first mover locations, coordinate and launch additional locations over the next decade, and work toward further locations longer-term.[73]

5.56The AAS and AATSE suggested that the Australian Government focus on ‘developing a plan to coordinate and support development of green energy and green mineral hubs across companies to ensure maximum cost competitiveness.’[74]

5.57The Committee received evidence outlining the Australian Government’s recent support for industrial hubs, including the Australian-made Battery Manufacturing Precinct, the Powering Australia Industry Growth Centre, and hydrogen hubs.[75] In relation to hydrogen hubs, DCCEEW stated that:

The Government has committed $525 million to establish hydrogen hubs and to support the growth of Australia’s clean hydrogen industry in places such as Gladstone, Townsville, the Hunter Valley, Bell Bay, and the Pilbara. Hubs will co-locate hydrogen users, producers and potential exporters.[76]

5.58Stakeholders noted that several state governments are also enacting shared infrastructure and industrial hub policies, for example, the New South Wales Clean Manufacturing Precinct Policy under which precincts are being designed in the Hunter and the Illawarra, and Queensland Government initiatives in Gladstone and Townsville.[77]

5.59The Grattan Institute proposed a more targeted approach for public funding to support large transformative industrial projects, initially focussed on the steel industry:

Australia should use the next decade to create a foothold in the emerging green steel market. The best way to do this is through direct government funding to support private investment in higher-cost, but lower-emissions, steel production – a steel ‘flagship’ project.

The government funding required to support a low-emissions steel project is not small. Government funding in the order of $500 million is likely to be necessary to underpin a multi-billion dollar modernisation of Australia’s steel industry.[78]

…

Much of the capital required to transform the sector will come from private investment. However, there will be a risk gap for first-of-a-kind and first-in-country transformation of industrial facilities. Making concessional finance available is one way to share this risk. The CEFC, provided it has access to enough funds and can prudently manage the risk, would be the ideal vehicle, and could aim to make between 5 and 10 ‘big bets’ on big net-zero industrial facilities…a green steel flagship projects would be one such opportunity.[79]

5.60Similarly, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), ACF, Business Council of Australia (BCA), and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) suggested that: ‘Government co-investment in green metal production facilities may have high upfront investment costs but are effective in catalysing development. Co investment in flagship refineries and smelters for proof-of-concept green metal production can enable the industry to grow.’[80]

Research and Development

5.61The Committee received evidence that highlighted Australia’s world class research and development (R&D) sector and emphasised the importance of R&D to Australia’s green energy superpower transition.[81]

5.62DCCEEW acknowledged in its submission the need for further investment in R&D to support the realisation of many of Australia’s green energy export opportunities:

Export industries of the future like green iron and steel production and green alumina and aluminium production require continued innovation and research into new methods of production and transportation, including the use of hydrogen. Many of these technologies are at early stages and further investment is required for development and commercial deployment.[82]

5.63Sun Cable explained the need for public investment in R&D: ‘… promising technologies such as green steel production systems, require support for earlier-stage R&D to advance through the innovation pipeline. Given the elevated risk and protracted time sale over which any return would be realised, the private sector is often reluctant to provide such support.’[83]

5.64The ZCEAPI outlined the need for public investment and noted R&D achievements in the mining and renewable energy industries:

Without research and development investments by government, Australia’s renewable-based industries will not develop at the speed required to successfully compete. While Australia’s relatively small population means it cannot match the dollar amount of R&D funding of majors such as the EU and US our track record has shown that R&D funding targeted at industries in which we have potential comparative advantage can be hugely successful. Australia is a world-leader in mining technology and Australian developed solar panels dominate global markets.[84]

5.65UQ also highlighted the success of Australia’s R&D sector and suggested that R&D spending as a proportion of gross domestic product should be increased:

An increase in national R&D spending from <2% towards the OECD’s 2020 average of 2.67% would be a powerful stimulus for research and innovation activities aligned with areas of national priority, including energy transformations. The embedded capability and quality in our national research sector provides a robust platform to support expanded priority-driven and industry-engaged R&D activities nationally.[85]

5.66In their submission, the AHC proposed that assisting business to invest in R&D would have both decarbonisation and economic benefits:

The Australian economy could benefit by supporting businesses who develop cutting edge technology. Establishing the right environment to invest in research and development will enable more enterprising Australians to make the breakthrough which will both smooth the path to decarbonisation and benefit the economy.[86]

5.67The ISER explained that there is a need to link investment into emerging green energy industries with ongoing R&D support in those industries:

Australia has the potential to become globally-leading in next generation future energy technologies and storage, as well as direct measures of generating hydrogen from photovoltaics and seawater, provided that trade and investment activities also resource research and innovation.[87]

5.68A few submitters mentioned the importance of local R&D to the development of products and technologies best suited to Australia’s green energy sector opportunities, for example, in relation to Australia’s specific mineral ores.[88] The AAS and AATSE described that: ‘… Australia’s green energy sector has unique needs and cannot rely on overseas researchers or innovations to provide our solutions, including for domestic consumption and export of green energy and green energy commodities.’[89]

5.69Public-private partnerships and models for collaboration between government, industry and research were identified as having an important role in R&D, such as through the Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) model.[90] Professor Michael Goodsite, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Energy Futures and Director at ISER, observed that: ‘CRCs are excellent examples of cooperative efforts where people who normally compete invest together to achieve and deliver for the benefit of Australia.’[91]

5.70UQ suggested the need for funding to be targeted at program rather than project-based R&D activities:

Project-by-project investment will not support the conditions required to achieve research missions that seek to bring technological developments through TRL [Technology Readiness Level] and CRL [Commercial Readiness Level] levels. Large scale programmatic efforts are more responsive to the needs of the research workforce, which is essential to deliver transformative research translation and commercialisation.

…

Programmatic R&D effort and funding is a stabilising and risk mitigating factor for both industry investments and research. Providing a policy platform for such funding would require the government…to define and set targets around the ambition to become a ‘green energy superpower.’ [92]

5.71Professor Ian Chubb, Secretary for Science Policy at the AAS, told the Committee that collaboration between government, industry and research could be improved:

The American government agencies put in three per cent of their R&D budget per annum, so it’s a lot bigger. But it’s not so much that; it’s the fact that there is the initiative to do it, and you’re changing the game by doing that. We need a game changer that says, ‘This is an opportunity to change the game and establish policies, programs and strategies that say it is worthwhile working together to do this.’ There is skill based in all of the elements–government, industry and the researching sector. How do we get it to work together better than we ever have before? It’ll take a policy drive, and it’ll take a strategy to do it. There are initiatives–we’ve had the CRC programs since 1988. Every year there are industries and academic institutions working together. But since 1988 to now, we still as the same question; how do we make it better? So there is room for improvement, and this is an opportunity to change the paradigm.[93]

5.72Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer of the AHC, described competition in the R&D sector and suggested that there would be benefit in better coordination in the sector:

I imagine it has an impact on the quality of the science and the ability for people to do things if you have many more dedicated facilities with a lot of money that are pulling in the same direction. I observe the R&D situation in Australia with some concern because of how fragmented it is and the degree to which every institution is competing with another institution for the same dollars and the same PHD students. In an environment where they are already inefficiencies and there are already channellings and where we actually need to be pulling together, that’s a pretty difficult one to overcome because everyone’s competing.[94]

Approaches to public funding and investment

Supporting demand creation

5.73Some submitters emphasised that there is a need for government support measures to be targeted at demand creation, or the uptake of emerging products and technologies.[95]For example, Mr Matthew Hingerty, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Head of Business Development at Star Scientific, told the Committee that:

A lot of government funding…is focusing on the supply side, on the creation of hydrogen, electricity, or other areas. Not enough support, in my view, is given to existing companies which want to transition themselves—particularly from what we see in the food sector and others. A bit of help on the demand side would go a long way.[96]

5.74The University of Adelaide Centre for Energy Technology (CET) observed a connection between measures to build domestic demand and the development of green export industries:

Supporting the transition of local heavy industry to operate with hydrogen will assist the establishment of a hydrogen export market. Australia’s high temperature industrial processes can be an anchor tenant in the establishment of a hydrogen supply chain at GW scale, which can underpin the investment needed to unlock an export industry.[97]

5.75Similarly, Mr Jordie Pettit, Research Assistant at the CENRIT, explained to the Committee that:

The export question is more around creating demand domestically in the first instance. Once that production – and a price, more importantly – is established for a product like renewable hydrogen, then you’re going to see offtake contracts being brokered more at the international level. But, certainly, the establishment of the market is pivotal in the first instance.[98]

Technological readiness

5.76Professor Emma Aisbett, Associate Director (Research) at the ZCEAPI, advised that certain support mechanisms are required for products and technologies at different stages of technological readiness:

Of course, the appropriate green industrial policy depends on the technology readiness of the technology involved. Because different steel technologies are at different stages, some of them will be more appropriate to support with grants because they are just very high risk at the moment. Later on, when you’re getting closer to scaling, I think government should think seriously about ways that it can de-risk upfront but also ensure that Australia gains benefits, including Australian taxpayers, from those investments as things are closer to maturity and scale. That could mean direct co-investment or it could mean equivalent things like…some sort of contingent loan for those scaling technologies.[99]

5.77Sun Cable also commented on the need for different approaches: ‘These industries are at varying stages of technical and economic maturity, and so require funding in various forms rather than a one size fits all approach.’[100]

Technological neutrality

5.78Several submitters emphasised the need for a technology neutral approach in the design of mechanisms to support emerging industries and technologies.[101] For example, Mr Arnold Jorge, Chief Executive Officer of the Export Council of Australia (ECA), explained that:

There are pros and cons with any technology, and the market can suddenly shift from one preference to another. With that perspective, we would therefore discourage the government from betting on any specific technology. That said, there is much it can do to provide support that is cross-cutting while remaining technology agnostic.[102]

5.79Mr Mark McCallum, Chief Executive Officer of Low Emission Technology Australia, told the Committee that:

…we would like to see a more technology neutral approach taken to these things. If the goal…of the Paris Agreement is emission reduction, we should be focussed on and supporting all technologies that allow us to do that as quickly and affordably as we can.

5.80Referring to the design of the US IR Act, Woodside Energy suggested that the objective of policy mechanisms should be to ‘incentivise lower carbon intensity, rather than narrowing technology options and eligibility… Focusing on carbon intensity captures a wider range of opportunities, investors and proponents.’[103]

Specific targets, one strategy and better coordination

5.81The Committee obtained evidence proposing that the Australian Government could assist emerging green industries and technologies by setting targets, developing strategies and improving coordination. These types of measures were recognised as providing clear signals and greater certainty to attract investment.

Setting targets

5.82Submitters identified setting targets as an important policy tool that could encourage the development of emerging green products and technologies.[104]

5.83In their joint submission, the WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU stated that ‘… targets will be important to galvanise industry and signal our ambition to investors.’[105] It was further explained how targets can support emerging industries:

Targets are required where reaching outcomes requires coordinated effort between stakeholders to achieve. In this case, targets serve as a coordination mechanism that signals intent and provides certainty about national priorities. This certainty helps stakeholders to work collaboratively toward the announced goal. Timebound targets allow other parties to transparently assess progress towards the goal. For a target to be effective, it must be clear and timebound, and supported by credible policies and actions.[106]

5.84In regard to the Australian Government’s targets to reduce emissions by 43 per cent on 2005 levels by 2030 and to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, DCCEEW stated that ‘legislating these targets provides certainty to Australia’s commitment to decarbonise our economy to business and the community.’[107] Similarly, the Law Council of Australia observed the importance of enshrining these targets into legislation: ‘a legislated target would provide increased certainty to policy makers, businesses, investors, and community sectors.’[108]

5.85Targets were suggested across a range of emerging industries and technologies for both domestic production and uptake of new technologies, as well as specifically for export. These included renewable electricity generation (including extending the existing Renewable Energy Target),[109] renewable energy and battery storage,[110] electric vehicles,[111] hydrogen and biomethane as substitutes for natural gas,[112] green hydrogen production and electrolyser capacity,[113] and green metals.[114]

5.86The ACF recommended: ‘Specific, measurable, and time-bound targets for electrolyser capacity underpinned by credible policies would encourage the expansion of hydrogen production capacity.’[115]

5.87The SEC and Tesla proposed the introduction of a renewable energy storage target to encourage investment in the deployment of storage capacity.[116]

5.88UQ submitted that in addition to assistance from agencies and investment vehicles ‘clearly defined targets are required to increase investment for domestic manufacturing (of batteries and renewable energy) which also align with global achievement of net-zero targets.’[117]

5.89The CET stated the need for the government to introduce ‘…a series of targets for the transformation of the production of our local materials to progressively lower levels of carbon intensity until we reach net-zero.’ It was suggested that targets be developed for all major products manufactured in Australia including construction materials such as cement and steel as well as copper, fertilisers, plastics, and glass bottles.[118]

5.90BZE specifically recommended that the Australian Government set a green commodity export target of $100 billion by 2035 covering critical minerals, green hydrogen, green steel and green aluminium.[119]

The need for one transition strategy

5.91As outlined in Chapter 3, the Australian Government has multiple existing and forthcoming strategies in green energy related industries. Stakeholders suggested further strategies be developed to support certain emerging industries and technologies such as the direct export of renewable electricity,[120] as well as for the domestic manufacturing of high voltage direct current (HVDC) cables,[121] batteries,[122] and solar panels.[123]

5.92Some submitters expressed concerns that Australia’s transition to a green energy superpower was not supported by a clearly defined, coordinated strategy.[124]

5.93The Committee received considerable evidence that called for a dedicated and overarching strategy to guide Australia’s transition to a green energy superpower, including the development of export-oriented green energy industries.[125] For example, the Western Australian Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation stated that to accelerate the transition the Australian Government could consider developing ‘a clear national roadmap to becoming a green energy superpower.’[126]

5.94Submitters also specified that an overarching strategy should include targets and policies to achieve them, including mechanisms to attract investment.[127] For example, BZE recommended that: ‘…the government develop a unified Renewable Export Strategy for Australia to ensure that we become a prosperous zero-emissions economy… This strategy should be created in association with a range of key stakeholders and include both ambitious growth targets and strong policies.’[128]

5.95Similarly, Industry Super Australia submitted that ‘…a clear national energy policy vision supported by a strategy, targets and roadmap supporting an investment pipeline would help guide the investment needed to realise Australia’s green energy ambitions.’[129]

5.96The ACF recommended that the Australian Government develop a legislated ‘Renewable Exports Strategy’ in consultation with key stakeholders to support the development of a range of export industries:

A Renewable Exports Strategy builds on domestic renewable energy and decarbonisation strategies but goes much further to unlock Australia’s massive potential to thrive in a decarbonising world. It is a comprehensive strategy to develop a wide range of renewable-powered export industries and establish international markets for renewable energy products and services and is a cooperative, unifying national approach bringing together governments, industry, unions, First Nations people, R&D and the education sector. A Renewable Export Strategy must include clear growth targets and be backed up by credible policies including co-investment and financial incentives to unlock the scale of the opportunity.[130]

5.97Similarly, Boundless Earth suggested that the Australian Government create a shared national vision through a green energy export strategy that ‘… would identify opportunities, risks, priority markets and describe a policy framework to guide government agency planning and support and incentivise private sector investment.’[131]

5.98Ms Anna Freeman, Policy Director at the CEC, emphasised the need for a comprehensive strategy to determine how Australia’s green energy superpower ambition will be achieved and outlined what it could include:

…the most important point for this committee… relates to the urgent need for a long-term strategic plan to guide Australia’s aspiration to become a green energy superpower. We can all see the potential from green hydrogen and ammonia, for steel, iron aluminium and energy-transition minerals. But, although we have now been speaking about the opportunity for a number of years, we do not as yet have an articulation by our federal government of what Australia is actually trying to do and how we intend to achieve it.

…To give you a taste of what we think should be in such a strategy, we would expect it to cover an outline of the priority markets in which we wish to compete and the market share that we would hope to capture in these markets. It should answer: What policy setting will be needed to incentivise that investment? What would the land use implications be? How much electricity generation and transmission would be required? Where would it be located? How is this co-located with value-added production? What water resources would be required? What would the supply chain needs be? What workforce scale and skills mic would be required, and have we got those workers? And, very importantly, what consultation would be required with regional communities and First Nations peoples, who will be essential partners for realising that vision?[132]

5.99Boundless Earth also suggested that a green export strategy could be utilised to better align existing funding initiatives with green energy export opportunities. This could include R&D support, grant funding, debt and equity financing through agencies such as the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, ARENA, CEFC, NRF and the NAIF.[133]

5.100Noting the implications of the transition to green energy for Australia’s national security, Mr James Bowen suggested the Australian Government ‘develop an expansive green energy superpower strategy that engages multiple portfolios and agencies’ in recognition of the mutually reinforcing outcomes of climate, energy and national security offered by the green energy transition.[134]

Better government coordination of the transition

5.101Some submitters and witnesses to the inquiry raised the need for improved coordination of Australia’s green energy transition at the Australian Government level. For example, Ms Sanaya Khisty, Chief Strategy Officer at BZE, explained to the Committee that the level of coordination and planning required can only be achieved at the Australian Government level:

The challenge for policymakers is this: realising a green energy superpower vision requires immediate support, coordination and planning. As policy shifts in the US, the EU, South Korea, China and Japan demonstrate, coordination and funding from the federal government is critical if Australia is to play a leading role as the global economy decarbonises.[135]

…

That level of coordination and planning has to be led by the federal government. There will be implications for the EPBC Act [Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)]. There will be implications for the whole of government. It's not just trade and investment; it becomes a real whole-of-government focus, and workforces and all of the planning pieces really sit at the Commonwealth level.[136]F

5.102Several submitters suggested the need for a dedicated body to coordinate, manage and oversee Australia’s green energy transition, including with regard to the transition in regional areas.[137] For example, RE-Alliance suggested a ‘National Energy Transition Authority’ with local offices to manage and support the deployment of renewable energy projects, with a focus on assisting regional communities in their transition in the green energy economy.[138]

5.103The AAS and AATSE suggested a ‘Green Energy Commissioner’ or utilising an existing body such as Infrastructure Australia to ‘coordinate investment, development, and use of green energy infrastructure and resources…’[139]

5.104The ISER submitted that Australia’s green energy transition could benefit from a dedicated green energy technology research and innovation body as well as a single government department:

Australia does not yet have a “go-to” energy transition institute that can inform, develop and demonstrate the transition and investment required across the Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) from basic research to industrial application. Such an Institute should establish an organisation responsible to Government and Industry that cohesively assembles future focused capability across the TRL, and across all domains, including social science and system design to regulation as well as STEM. The Institute would deliver the necessary innovation to effectively deliver Commonwealth hydrogen strategies. It would work together with the already-funded CRCs, hydrogen hubs, clusters and research networks, to deliver the research, development, demonstration and translation required for a green and more complex economy. Australia should also consider a dedicated agency for energy, an Australian equivalent to the Department of Energy.[140]

5.105The Coalition for Conservation put forward a new independent export focussed body that would work alongside existing government agencies and industry bodies. It was recommended that the government set up ‘… a Clean Industries Export Council that will support Australian exporters in the green transformation process and create export markets for Australian technologies, energy, resources, products and services that align with sustainable requirements, utilising funding from a Clean Industries Export Fund.’[141]

5.106As outlined in Chapter 3, the Australian Government has announced its intention to establish a National Net-Zero Authority.[142]

Collaboration with state and territory governments

5.107Throughout its inquiry the Committee heard about many activities underway in states and territories that are driving Australia’s green energy transition. Submissions to the inquiry were received from the New South Wales, Northern Territory, Tasmanian and Western Australian governments.[143]

5.108Stakeholders noted the importance of collaboration and coordination between all levels of government to support emerging industries and technologies.[144]

5.109Consistency and coordination in planning and regulations between levels of government is discussed in Chapter 6.

5.110In relation to the development of a domestic battery industry, the EVC described the coordination required between the levels of government:

In order to achieve its vision of supporting the delivery of Australian-made batteries, the Government will need to collaborate with state and territory governments to setup a national plan for a domestic battery industry. This would require jurisdictions to cooperate on developing the required infrastructure and ensuring efficiencies are achieved so that instead of competing for market share, the relative strengths of each jurisdiction are recognised and enhanced through cooperation.[145]

5.111Tesla highlighted the importance of collaboration between the Australian and state and territory governments, and with industry, ‘…to expedite projects, mobilise capital, and prepare Australian workers to make the most of [the opportunity presented by Australian lithium and nickel].’[146]

5.112Ms Rebecca Brown, Director General of the Western Australian Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation, outlined the importance of collaboration between governments:

Becoming a global leader in green energies will require coordinated action between all levels of government. The Western Australian government has welcomed the Australian [G]overnment's national hydrogen strategy and its refresh, investments through the National Reconstruction Fund, the development of energy hubs and other important initiatives.

To be successful, all levels of government will need to work collaboratively, including by setting a clear direction for industry, proactively attracting investment, establishing appropriate standards and regulations, and developing the capacity of the workforce. We welcome the ongoing engagement with the Australian government in realising our shared ambition to be a major global supplier of clean energy.[147]

5.113Additionally, Ms Brown explained the role of the WA Government and how it works with the Australian Government to develop green energy projects in the state:

The first [role that the state government plays] is in terms of attracting investment interest into the state…[that] will happen through international delegations or interest through into our department through the investment and trade network that we have established across a range of regions. We also work closely with Austrade in particular, who will be marketing globally. We will be working in partnership with them in markets or in bringing interest into Western Australia. I think that Albemarle and its presence in Kemerton is a good example where the state government worked with Austrade in facilitating Albemarle in looking at sites and options in Western Australia and then establishing.

5.114Mr David Woods, Chief Economist and First Assistant Secretary, International Economics and Green Economy Division at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), also emphasised the importance of collaboration between governments and noted measures for improvement:

Obviously, there's a rich history of over 120 years of federation of not the best coordination between different levels of government—something that we will need to do better for this purpose. One of the partial responses to that is the decision by the government to establish a new trade and investment ministerial committee—a committee chaired by the trade minister but drawing on ministerial representatives from all the state and territories. That's partly been established more broadly to respond to an appetite by the states and territories to move on from a purely competitive model around attracting investment to recognising that it can come at some cost to themselves and that there might be a role for coordination.[148]

5.115Dr Frances van Ruth, Head of EMEA Desk at the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade), told the Committee that Austrade works in close partnership with state and territory governments. Dr van Ruth explained that Austrade might lead, or alternatively the state government might lead, depending upon the issue, but she noted that the state government would lead in providing advice where regulation is state-based.’[149]

Certification, promotion and awareness building

5.116The Australian Government can assist and accelerate emerging green industries and technologies through establishing certification and guarantee of origin frameworks, as well as through the promotion and awareness building of Australia’s green products and investment opportunities.

Certification and guarantee of origin schemes

5.117Several submitters noted the importance of robust product certification frameworks to many of Australia’s green energy export opportunities.[150]

5.118The Committee received evidence that to maximise competitive advantage in the growing market for green products, Australian exporters must be able to demonstrate and provide assurance of the low or zero emissions credentials of their export products. This can be achieved through certification schemes or what are known as guarantee of origin (GO) schemes, that determine the embodied emissions of raw materials and manufactured products to provide trusted and comparable information for governments, investors, and consumers.[151]

5.119The Australian Government is currently developing GO schemes for hydrogen and renewable electricity.[152] DCCEEW explained that these schemes will ‘provide transparency and certainty over claims of renewable electricity and the emissions associated with hydrogen production.’[153]

5.120The CEIG highlighted the importance of a renewable electricity GO scheme to support investment in generation capacity in the context of the expiry of the Renewable Energy Target (RET) and Large-Scale Generation Certificate framework in 2030.[154]

5.121While some industry-led initiatives are being developed and may play a role in some sectors, the ZCEAPI explained that there are advantages to government-led certification schemes:

A high-quality government-led scheme has the advantages of:

• Reducing customer and investor confusion about which scheme to trust,
• Reducing regulatory burden for participating producers and suppliers, and
• Increasing the ability to negotiate mutual recognition agreements and interoperability with relevant schemes and regulations in the destination markets.[155]
  122. Several submitters emphasised the need to align Australia’s certification schemes with international frameworks and emerging regulation to maximise the export potential of green products.[156] The CENRIT stated that: ‘…it is critical that that robustness of GO schemes successfully interface with the important requirements of international laws such as the CBAM [Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism] and other emerging trade challenges.’[157]
  123. Similarly, the AAS and AATSE submitted that aligning certification schemes with other countries will ensure Australian exports are able to meet and even benefit from increasing requirements to demonstrate the carbon content of products in jurisdictions such as the EU:

As part of the European Green Deal, the European Union is currently examining laws that will require environmental impact information on imported goods (Centre for the Promotion of Imports 2021) and thus accounting for the carbon footprint of individual products may be necessary to engage with the global economy. This could include emissions along the entire value chain for the product, from feedstock production to delivery at the customer gate. A certification scheme developed in cooperation with Australia’s global trading partners will be able to establish the carbon content of our export products and make it easier for Australian exporters to demonstrate the comparable advantage of their products in a low-carbon economy.[158]

5.124DCCEEW advised that the hydrogen GO scheme in development ‘… aligns with the work of the IPHE (International Partnership on Hydrogen Fuel Cells in the Economy) and we are engaging with key trading partners to ensure acceptance of the scheme.’[159]

5.125Stakeholders suggested that there is scope for the expansion of certification schemes. For example, UQ suggested that verification of the emissions intensity could support export of Australia’s comparatively lower emissions gas[160] and the Australia Pipeline and Gas Association proposed the introduction of a gas certification scheme to support the use of biomethane and hydrogen in the gas supply chain.[161]

5.126The HILT CRC noted that international certification frameworks could accelerate decarbonisation of Australia’s heavy industries and support export opportunities, stating that Australia should participate in the:

… establishment of an internationally accepted framework for Green Certification program targeted to introduce progressively more stringent steps of carbon mitigation for products across the iron-ore-to-steel, alumina/aluminium and cement/lime value chains including raw material inputs for all key commodities within Australia’s balance of trade. The introduction of such certification programs could accelerate investment in the heavy industry sector to address measurable market opportunities and deliver decarbonised products, while minimising regulatory barriers for Australian industry.[162]

5.127Professor Gus Nathan, Research Director at the HILT CRC, further explained to the Committee that at the moment, while there are some industry certification frameworks, there is no international framework per se:

For example, in aluminium you can buy a certified not net zero but 4.0, which is four tonnes of CO2 per tonne of alumina. But that’s not yet an internally certified framework. Its an industry certified process. So we absolutely need to embark on that and be part of that process to make sure that we have compatible processes and we also engage to make sure that our products don’t artificially get cut out by one of those lines.[163]

5.128Beyond emerging green products and industries, the Australia China Business Council (ACBC) noted that Australia’s primary export products, including agricultural products and processed products such as wine, will increasingly benefit from being able to, or may even be required to, demonstrate embodied carbon content to customers.[164]

Promotion and awareness building of Australia’s opportunities and advantages

5.129DFAT and Austrade are actively working to promote Australia’s trade and investment opportunities and build international awareness of Australia’s competitive advantage in the green economy.[165] Austrade’s marketing plays an important role in promoting Australian export products and investment opportunities to international markets, including through initiatives such as Australia’s Nation Brand and the Global Australia website.[166] The roles of DFAT and Austrade are further outlined in Chapter 3.

5.130Submitters acknowledged the positive impact that Austrade has in promoting and facilitating export opportunities and inbound investment.[167] For example, the Australia China Business Council stated that: ‘Austrade plays an invaluable role in the promotion of Australian products and services to global markets, and the attraction of inbound investment.’[168] Likewise, Mr Matthew Hingerty, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Head of Business Development at Star Scientific, told the Committee that: ‘Australia is unbelievably well serviced by our trade officials…Austrade in particular provide an incredibly valuable service, and I cannot praise them enough.’[169]

5.131The Committee received evidence suggesting that there is scope to expand the promotion and awareness building of export products and investment opportunities in Australia’s emerging green energy industries.[170] For example, in relation to the electric vehicle supply chain, the Electric Vehicle Council noted that: ‘To attract investment, Austrade can play a central role in promoting Australia’s capabilities to accelerate the global transition to a low-carbon future…’[171] Similarly, UQ indicated that ‘… the world is well aware of Australian mineral wealth, but has little visibility of Australian metal processing and battery-tech credentials. Only with international investment and trade assistance, will todays metal processing and battery-tech start-ups evolve into a battery manufacturing ecosystem.’[172]

5.132The ECA suggested that Australia’s brand could be enhanced to better connect with green credentials: ‘Trade partners must consider Australian exporters involved in green energy as the preferred suppliers…The marketing of Australia’s credentials in green energy must be strategic and should commence immediately.’[173] Mr Arnold Jorge, Chief Executive Officer of the ECA, further explained to the Committee ‘…if Australia’s potential buyers are not aware of how great we are or do not recognise our strengths and capabilities then it will be difficult for us to compete…being a quiet achiever does not work in exporting. International marketing and promotion of Australia’s brand will, therefore, be critical.[174]

5.133ISER proposed that: ‘Austrade could expand its focus on export of green goods or targeting existing supply chains where having green goods from Australia would improve Scope 3 emissions, and thereby incentivise green products that are reliably sourced from Australian suppliers.’[175]

5.134In their joint submission DFAT, Austrade and EFA stated that Austrade’s could increase its focus on Australia’s opportunities in the global net-zero economy:

Austrade can learn from global and domestic best practice to re-focus its trade and investment effort to prioritise the most strategically significant and promising projects in support of the Government’s net-zero objective. To deliver this, Austrade could re-calibrate client portfolios, potential through a new targeting and assessment model. Austrade can also develop a comprehensive communications and branding strategy through Australia’s national Brand platform, that positions Austrade as a leader in net-zero.[176]

5.135The ACBC suggested that Austrade faces a challenge in the global green economy transition that has ‘accelerated pace of change in the investment landscape, and the depth of technical expertise required in the consideration of the solutions for promotion.’ Further, the ACBC proposed ‘that Austrade develops a global Green Economy strategic development team to identify opportunities, including through whole of government coordination of investment & trade focus.’[177]

5.136Several submitters identified that there are challenges attracting domestic investors in green energy manufacturing industries, in comparison to the resources sector. MsSanya Khisty, Chief Strategy Officer at BZE, told the Committee that:

When it comes to manufacturing, the investment community, from what we’re being told by the companies we work with, is not well versed in what that means in Australia, which is why a lot of those companies end up talking to foreign investments… There is a literacy piece that is really important to take on with the investor community in Australian about what diversifying our exports could look like and where the opportunities are.[178]

5.137In relation to the experience of two advanced manufacturing companies aiming to commercialise research, Mr Dan Tebbutt, Head, Expanding Exports at Austrade. explained that:

Both of those companies are looking to raise private financing. They’ve actually been the beneficiary of a huge amount of government funding over the years. Its fair to say that both of them said the same thing: they’re finding really strong interesting from foreign private investors but finding it hard to get traction with Australian private investors in that area. Its not a failure of government funding. Actually, the government funding has been really ample. But they’re at that point of trying to connect with Australia financiers.[179]

5.138Mr Craig Nicol, Chair of the AMBC, told the Committee that is important to attract investors that understand the nature of investment and risk in the manufacturing sector, including in relation to management of the NRF.[180]

Securing offtake agreements

5.139In their submission, FFI outlined the importance of securing offtake agreements for the development of the green hydrogen industry and emphasised the benefits of first-mover advantage in securing long-term market share:

The emerging market structure for green hydrogen appears likely to be a race to scale and offtake, similar to the Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) industry where first movers can expect to lock in significant and persistent advantages. Early years of the Australian LNG industry (e.g., North West Shelf) were dominated by projects with 20-year offtake agreements to the Japanese market – and Australia’s first mover advantage here has persisted to greater market share today… By reaching scale early and locking users into long term supply contracts, first movers can strengthen their client relationships, build a brand and track record of delivery, and credibility with investors. This will position them to capture post-2030 offtake agreements as demand starts to scale more substantially. By contrast, those who fail to move early will have to develop differentiated capabilities to challenge incumbent advantages and will be locked out of a significant share of the market.[181]

5.140As outlined earlier in this chapter, co-investment mechanisms and incentives such as CFDs may contribute to reducing the cost gap and enable producers reach a point where they are able to secure offtake agreements.

5.141BZE described a more direct role for the government to assist with securing offtake agreements: ‘In line with green hydrogen opportunities, there is also a key role for government departments such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to help secure offtake agreements with countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Europe and UK [that] are existing trade partners, are renewable poor and have strong decarbonisation targets.’[182]

5.142Mr Andrew Hutchinson, General Manager, Critical Minerals Office, Minerals and Resources Division at DISR, noted that facilitating offtake agreements is one form of assistance the Australian Government can provide in relation to critical minerals sector:

… There are also always discussions around whether there’s a role for linking the sector through to foreign markets to create offtake and pull-through, which can be very important in allowing a project to secure financing, knowing that that customer is there.[183]

5.143Mr Xavier Simonet, Chief Executive Officer of Austrade, explained that Austrade’s support in securing offtake agreements is an important element for the development of Australian projects:

… Austrade actively engages with overseas customers for both renewable energy and key inputs to the energy transition, such as critical minerals, to deliver offtake agreements and accelerate project development. A combination of equity and offtake agreements is most important for Australian project proponents to de-risk their projects and access the necessary capital for development.[184]

Committee comment

5.144The Committees agrees that there is a role for public funding and investment to support certain emerging green industries and technologies. Where appropriate, public funding and investment should seek to attract and catalyse private sector investment.

5.145The Committee acknowledges the demonstrated track record of Australian Government specialist agencies and investment vehicles such as ARENA, CEFC, EFA and the NAIF in supporting innovation and catalysing private investment in emerging industries and technologies. The Committee welcomes the establishment of the $15 billion NRF to provide targeted support in the development of industries and technologies aligned to its seven priority areas, including renewable energy and low-emissions technologies, value-adding in resources and advanced manufacturing.

5.146The Committee notes that additional co-investment mechanisms and investment attraction measures are likely required if Australia is to maximise its opportunities in the global green energy transition. This is particularly important to ensure that Australia can maintain its status as an attractive investment destination in an increasingly competitive global investment environment.

5.147The Committee welcomes the announcement of the $2 billion Hydrogen Headstart program that will provide revenue support to accelerate the development of Australia’s green hydrogen industry. The Committee considers that the approach could be a model for other emerging sectors, such as in the steel and aluminium value chains.

5.148The Committee believes that local content and procurement requirements could be an appropriate tool to ensure demand for Australian manufactured products, such as those supported by the NRF and the National Battery Strategy. Going forward, such approaches could also be important to establish demand for green construction materials and metals.

5.149The Committee agrees that some sectors of domestic industry will need support to decarbonise and notes the measures provided through the $1.9 billion Powering the Regions Fund as well as the Hon Chris Bowen MP, Minister for Climate Change and Energy’s commitment to develop six sectoral decarbonisation plans. Initiatives such as these are essential for domestic decarbonisation, maintaining export-competitiveness and developing green export opportunities.

5.150The Committee considers that greater focus on a shared infrastructure and industrial hubs approach may have considerable benefits in supporting certain emerging industries through coordination, cost-effectiveness, and knowledge sharing. The Committee believes it would be worthwhile to evaluate the effectiveness of industrial hubs, building on the development of hydrogen hubs and the planned Australian Made Battery Precinct.

5.151The Committee recognises that Australia’s domestic decarbonisation and many of its most promising green export opportunities require further R&D. Australia must continue to invest in and incentivise R&D to encourage the development of emerging technologies and realise its green energy superpower ambition.

5.152The Committee recognises the role that setting targets and implementing strategies have in providing certainty and clear signals to attract investment. The Committee notes the recently updated Critical Minerals Strategy, the Review of the National Hydrogen Strategy and forthcoming National Battery Strategy.

5.153The Committee agrees that Australia would benefit from an overarching national green energy superpower strategy to define and provide a framework to achieve Australia’s green energy superpower status. Such a strategy should focus on Australia’s green energy export opportunities, based on key strengths. However, it must have regard to domestic decarbonisation needs and ensuring that all Australians benefit from the green energy transition. It should also connect industry strategies and plans.

5.154The green energy transition cuts across all sectors of the economy and society. The Committee welcomes the announcement of the intent to establish a Net Zero Authority that will play an important role in managing and coordinating the net-zero transition across the government, the economy and regional communities.

5.155The Committee recognises that robust and internationally aligned certification and guarantee of origin schemes are important for Australian exporters to be able to maintain their competitiveness and leverage their competitive advantages in the global green energy economy. Current schemes in development should be accelerated and opportunities to cover additional green energy products and technologies should be considered.

5.156The outstanding work of both DFAT and Austrade in promoting Australia’s trade and investment interests has been observed in the positive reflections of many stakeholders during the inquiry. The Committee believes that there is further opportunity to align trade an investment promotion and awareness building efforts with Australia’s green energy superpower ambitions and net-zero commitments. This includes efforts to actively connect Australia’s international brand with the future global green economy.

Recommendations

5.157The Committee recommends that the Australian Government develop a cross-portfolio national green energy superpower strategy to:

• Define Australia’s long-term green energy superpower vision
• Identify Australia’s key opportunities with regard to strengths and competitive advantages, as well as the decarbonisation pathways of major trading partners
• Determine effective and efficient policy approaches to support priority emerging industries and technologies, with a focus on attracting private sector investment
• Connect existing and forthcoming sectoral and industry strategies.

5.158The Committee recommends that the Australian Government accelerate the development of robust certification and guarantee of origin schemes for renewable energy and products such as hydrogen to maximise Australia’s green energy export opportunities. Where relevant, these should be aligned with existing frameworks in key markets and emerging international regulations to ensure export competitiveness in a global green economy.

5.159The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Austrade formally align trade and investment promotion and awareness building functions with Australia’s green energy superpower ambitions and net-zero commitments.

Footnotes

[1]Grattan Institute, Submission 37, p. 8.

[2]Australian National University Zero Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, p. 7.

[3]See, for example: Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8; Heavy Industry Low-Carbon Transition CRC, Submission 30, pp. 5–6; Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 2; Sun Cable, Submission71, p. 12;WWF-Australia (WWF), Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), the Business Council of Australia (BCA), and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Submission 67.1, p. 100.

[4]WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 100.

[5]Australian Hydrogen Council, Submission 49, p. 3.

[6]Mr Andrew Hutchinson, General Manager, Critical Minerals Office, Minerals and Resources Division, Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 February 2023, p. 13.

[7]Sun Cable, Submission 71, p. 12.

[8]Sun Cable, Submission 71, p. 12; Australian National University Zero Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, p. 7.

[9]For more information on Australian Government investment funds and special investment vehicles see: https://www.finance.gov.au/government/australian-government-investment-funds.

[10]See, for example: Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8; RE-Alliance, Submission 43, p. 5; Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 62, p. 10; Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Submission 63, p. 6; Entura, Submission 79, p. 2; Law Council of Australia, Submission 92.1, pp. 6–7; Australian National University Zero-Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, p. 7; Industry Super Australia, Submission117, pp. 9–10.

[11]Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Transformation and Innovation, Submission125, p. 6.

[12]See, for example: Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, pp. 8–9; Australian Electric Vehicle Association, Submission 19, p. 6; The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 7; Grattan Institute, Submission 37, p.9; Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 3; Entura, Submission 79, p. 2; Australian National University Zero-Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, p. 7.

[13]Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8.

[14]Entura, Submission 79, p. 2.

[15]Australian National University Zero-Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative, Submission, 98, p. 7.

[16]Mr Leigh Heaney, Government Relations Manager, Smart Energy Council, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31March 2023, p. 27.

[17]Grattan Institute, Submission 37, p. 9.

[18]Advanced Materials and Battery Council, Submission 15, p. 3; The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p.7; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 74; Mr Shannon O’Rourke, Chief Executive Officer, Future Battery Industries CRC, Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 March 2023, p. 19.

[19]Advanced Materials and Battery Council, Submission 15, p. 3.

[20]Ms Rebecca Manen, General Manager, NRF Strategy, Manufacturing and National Reconstruction Fund Division, Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 February 2023, p. 13.

[21]See, for example: Clean Energy Council, Submission 38, p. 2; Australia Hydrogen Council, Submission 39, p. 3; Woodside Energy, Submission 47, pp. 4–5; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 74, Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 3.

[22]Clean Energy Council, Submission 38, p. 2.

[23]Dr Madeline Taylor, Deputy Director, Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Committee Hansard, Macquarie Park, 6 April 2023, p. 43.

[24]Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 9.

[25]Heavy Industry Low-Carbon Transition Cooperative Research Centre, Submission 30, p. 5.

[26]WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, pp. 93–95; Australian National University Zero Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, p. 8; Professor Ken Baldwin, Fellow, Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, CommitteeHansard, Canberra, 31 March 2023, p. 11; Ms Catherine Zerger, Acting Branch Head, Transport and Regions, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Proof Hansard, Canberra, 23June 2023, p. 3.

[27]See, for example: Australian National University Zero Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative, Submission98, p. 8; Mr Simon Corbell, Chief Executive Officer, Clean Energy Investor Group, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 March 2023, p. 18; Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Hydrogen Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, pp. 38–41; Ms Jo Evans, Deputy Secretary, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Proof Hansard, Canberra 23 June 2023, p. 2.

[28]Australian National University Zero Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, p. 8.

[29]Professor Ken Baldwin, Fellow, Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31March 2023, p. 11.

[30]Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Hydrogen Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, pp. 38–39.

[31]Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer, Australia Hydrogen Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 41.

[32]Mr Simon Corbell, Chief Executive Officer, Clean Energy Investor Group, Committee Hansard, 31 March 2023, p. 18.

[33]See, for example: Woodside Energy, Submission 47, p. 4; Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission50, p. 2; Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 3; Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Submission 125, p. 11; Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Hydrogen Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 37.

[34]Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Submission125, p. 11; Ms Nicola Ison, Head of Direct Advocacy, Boundless Earth, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 21.

[35]Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 2; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, pp. 50, 65; Mr Eytan Lenko, Chief Executive Officer, Boundless Earth, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, pp. 21–22.

[36]Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 2.

[37]Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Submission125, p. 11; Ms Nicola Ison, Head of Direct Advocacy, Boundless Earth, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 21.

[38]Ms Nicola Ison, Head of Direct Advocacy, Boundless Earth, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, pp. 21–22.

[39]Mr Eytan Lenko, Chief Executive Officer, Boundless Earth, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, pp.21–22.

[40]Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 6; Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 3; WWF-Australia, the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 67.1, p. 107; Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Submission 125, p. 11.

[41]Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Hydrogen Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5April 2023, p. 39.

[42]See, for example: Dr Maia Schweizer, Director, Western States, Fortescue Future Industries, Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 March 2023, p. 11; Mr Shannon O’Rourke, Chief Executive Officer, Future Battery Industries CRC, Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 March 2023, p. 19; Mr Wayne Smith, Smart Energy Council, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 March 2023, p. 24; Dr Madeline Taylor, Deputy Director, Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Committee Hansard, Macquarie Park, 6 April 2023, pp. 42–43.

[43]Dr Simon Bradshaw, Research Director, Projects, Climate Council, Committee Hansard, Macquarie Park, 6 April 2023, p. 10; Dr Maia Schweizer, Director, Western States, Fortescue Future Industries, Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 March 2023, p. 11.

[44]Dr Maia Schweizer, Director, Western States, Fortescue Future Industries, Committee Hansard, Perth, 17March 2023, p. 11.

[45]Mr Wayne Smith, Smart Energy Council, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 March 2023, p. 24.

[46]Mr Craig Nicol, Advanced Materials and Battery Council, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, p. 1.

[47]Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 1; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p.41.

[48]Tesla, Submission 24, pp. 3–4.

[49]Woodside Energy, Submission 47, p. 4.

[50]Woodside Energy, Submission 47, p. 4

[51]The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 6; Woodside Energy, Submission 47, p. 5; Industry Super Australia, Submission 117, p. 9.

[52]See, for example: Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8; Advanced Materials and Battery Council, Submission 15, p. 2; The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 8; University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources, Submission 33, p. 3; Star of the South Wind Farm Pty Ltd, Submission 54, p. 2; Westpac Group, Submission 57, p. 6; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p.104; Boundless Earth, Submission 76, pp. 2–3.

[53]WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 104.

[54]Westpac Group, Submission 57, p. 6.

[55]Star of the South Wind Farm Pty Ltd, Submission 54, p. 2.

[56]The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 8.

[57]Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8.

[58]Advanced Materials and Battery Council, Submission 15, p. 2; The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p.8.

[59]Westpac Group, Submission 57, p. 6.

[60]Star of the South Wind Farm Pty Ltd, Submission 54, p. 2.

[61]University of Adelaide, Submission 33, p. 3; WWF-Australia, the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 67.1, p. 104.

[62]Boundless Earth, Submission 76, pp. 2-3; Dr Maia Schweizer, Director, Western States, Fortescue Future Industries, Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 March 2023, p. 11.

[63]Mrs Jo Evans, Deputy Secretary, Climate Group, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Proof Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2023, p. 2.

[64]See, for example: Heavy Industry Low-Carbon Transition CRC, Submission 30, p. 6; Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, pp. 2–5; Queensland Conservation Council, Submission 41, p. 1; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67, p. 2; Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 4; Professor Michael Goodsite, Pro Vice-Chancellor and Director, University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, pp. 25–26.

[65]Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 3.

[66]Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, pp. 3–4.

[67]Mr Rowan Moorey, Senior Researcher, Beyond Zero Emissions, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, pp. 25–26.

[68]Heavy Industry Low-Carbon CRC, Submission 30, p. 6.

[69]Professor Michael Goodsite, Pro Vice-Chancellor and Director, University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, pp. 25–26.

[70]Ms Sanaya Khisty, Chief Strategy Officer, Beyond Zero Emissions, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 27.

[71]Beyond Zero Emissions, 5 April 2023, p. 28.

[72]Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 4.

[73]Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 3.

[74]Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 4.

[75]Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Submission 63, p. 7; Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 62, p. 11.

[76]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 62, p. 11.

[77]Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 4; Ms Sanya Khisty, Chief Strategy Officer, Beyond Zero Emissions, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 28.

[78]Grattan Institute, Submission 37, p. 8.

[79]Grattan Institute, Submission 37, p. 9.

[80]WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 65.

[81]See, for example: The University of Queensland, Submission 26, pp. 1, 10; Climate Council, Submission 36, p.10; Australian Hydrogen Council, Submission 39, p.p. 5–6; Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 2; The Next Economy, Submission 51, p. 4; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 81; Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 3; APA Group, Submission 94, pp. 4–5; Mr William Tan, Acting General Manager, National Reconstruction Fund Priorities Branch, Department of Industry, Sciences and Resources, Committee Hansard, 10 February 2023, Canberra, p. 11; Mr Wayne Smith, External Affairs Manager, Smart Energy Council, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 March 2023, p. 28.

[82]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 62, p. 3.

[83]Sun Cable, Submission 71, p. 10.

[84]Australian National University Zero Carbon Energy for the Asia Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, pp. 6–7.

[85]The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 3.

[86]Australian Hydrogen Council, Submission 39, p. 5.

[87]University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources, Submission 18, p. 1.

[88]Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 2; Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and engineering, Submission 74, p. 3; Australian National University Zero Carbon Energy for the Asia Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, pp. 6–7.

[89]Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 3.

[90]Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8; Heavy Industry Low-Carbon Transition CRC, Submission 30, p. 1; University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources, Submission 18, p. 1; MrDanTebbutt, Head, Expanding Exporters, Austrade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 November 2022, p.7.

[91]Professor Michael Goodsite, University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, p. 23.

[92]The University of Queensland, Submission 26, pp. 4–5.

[93]Professor Ian Chubb, Secretary for Science Policy, Australian Academy of Science, Committee Hansard, Canberra 31 March 2023, p. 10.

[94]Dr Fiona Simon, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Hydrogen Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne 5April 2023, p. 44.

[95]University of Adelaide Centre for Energy Technology, Submission 33, pp. 3–4; Grattan Institute, Submission 37, p. 9; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 104; Mr Matthew Hingerty, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Head of Business Development, Star Scientific, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, pp. 32–33.

[96]Mr Matthew Hingerty, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Head of Business Development, Star Scientific, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, pp. 32–33.

[97]University of Adelaide Centre for Energy Technology, Submission 33, p. 3.

[98]Mr Jordie Pettit, Research Assistant, Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Committee Hansard, Macquarie Park, 6 April 2023, p. 43.

[99]Associate Professor Emma Aisbett, Associate Director (Research), Zero-Carbon Energy for the Asia-Pacific, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 March 2023, pp. 51–52.

[100]Sun Cable, Submission 71, p. 12.

[101]Low Emissions Technology Australia, Submission 21, p. 5; Heavy Industry Low-carbon Transition Cooperative Research Centre, Submission 30, p. 6; Woodside Energy, Submission 47, p. 4.

[102]Mr Arnold Jorge, Chief Executive Officer, Export Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31March 2023, p. 61.

[103]Woodside Energy, Submission 47, p. 4.

[104]See, for example: Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 8; University of Adelaide Centre for Energy Technology, Submission 33, pp. 3–4; Woodside Energy, Submission 47, p. 4; Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 1; The Next Economy, Submission 51, p. 5.

[105]WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67,1, p. 5.

[106]WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 106.

[107]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 62, p. 2.

[108]Law Council of Australia, Submission 92.1, p. 2.

[109]Mr Eytan Lenko, Mr Eytan, Chief Executive Officer, Boundless Earth, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 19; Ms Anna Freeman, Policy Director, Decarbonisation, Clean Energy Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne 5 April 2023, p. 55.

[110]Smart Energy Council, Submission 23, p. 4; Tesla, Submission 24, pp. 6–7.

[111]Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8; Tesla, Submission 24, p. 4.

[112]Australian Pipeline and Gas Association, Submission 47, p. 7.

[113]Australian Hydrogen Council, Submission 39, p. 5; Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 2.

[114]University of Adelaide Centre for Energy Technology, Submission 33, pp. 3–4.

[115]Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 2.

[116]Smart Energy Council, Submission 23, p. 4; Tesla, Submission 24, pp. 6–7.

[117]The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 7.

[118]University of Adelaide Centre for Energy Technology, Submission 33, pp. 3–4.

[119]Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 8.

[120]Sun Cable, Submission 71, p. 8.

[121]Sun Cable, Submission 71, p. 8

[122]Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8; The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 8.

[123]Sun Cable, Submission 71, p. 8.

[124]See, for example: The Next Economy, Submission 51.1, pp. 21–22; Mr Eytan Lenko, Chief Executive Officer, Boundless Earth, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5April 2023, p. 16; Ms Anna Freeman, Policy Director, Clean Energy Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 53; Mr Craig Stallan, Executive General Manager, Delivery, Transgrid, Proof Hansard, Macquarie Park, 6 April 2023, p. 40.

[125]See, for example: Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 6; Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 1; The Next Economy, Submission 51.1, p. 27; WWF-Australia, the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission67, p. 2; Coalition for Conservation, Submission 75, p. 1; Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 2.

[126]Western Australian Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation, Submission 65, p. 7.

[127]Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 6; Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p .7; Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 3.

[128]Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 6.

[129]Industry Super Australia, Submission 117, p. 1.

[130]Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 50, p. 7.

[131]Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 2.

[132]Ms Anna Freeman, Policy Director, Decarbonisation, Clean Energy Council, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p.53.

[133]Boundless Earth, Submission 76, p. 3.

[134]Mr James Bowen, Submission 115, p. 2.

[135]Ms Sanaya Khisty, Chief Strategy Officer, Beyond Zero Emissions, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 24.

[136]Ms Sanaya Khisty, Chief Strategy Officer, Beyond Zero Emissions, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 29.

[137]Queensland Conservation Council, Submission 41, p. 1; RE-Alliance, Submission 43, p. 4; The Next Economy, Submission 51.1, pp. 34–42; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67, p. 2.

[138]RE-Alliance, Submission 43, p. 4.

[139]Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 4.

[140]University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources, Submission 18, p. 2.

[141]Coalition for Conservation, Submission 75, p. 1.

[142]The Net-Zero Authority will have responsibility for promoting the orderly and positive economic transformation associated with achieving net zero emissions by supporting workers in emissions-intensive sectors to access new employment, coordinating programs and policies across government to take advantage of new industries, and helping investors and companies to engage with net-zero transformation opportunities. See: Hon Anthony Albanese MP, Prime Minister, ‘National Net Zero Authority’, Media release, 5 May 2023.

[143]All state and territory governments were invited to make a submission to the inquiry. See: New South Wales Government, Submission 116; Northern Territory Government, Submission 56; Tasmanian Government, Submission 29; Western Australian Government, Submission65.

[144]See, for example: Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 8; Tesla, Submission 24, p. 9; RE-Alliance, Submission 43, p. 9; Export Council of Australia, Submission 72, p. 1; Dr Frances van Ruth, Head of EMEA Desk, Australian Trade and Investment Commission, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 November 2022, p.8; Ms Rebecca Brown, Director General, Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation, Western Australia, Committee Hansard, Perth, 17March 2023, pp. 1–2.

[145]Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 2.

[146]Tesla, Submission 24, p. 9.

[147]Ms Rebecca Brown, Director General, Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation, Western Australia, Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 March 2023, p. 1.

[148]Mr David Woods, Chief Economist and First Assistant Secretary, International Economics and Green Economy Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2023, p. 12.

[149]Dr Frances van Ruth, Head of EMEA Desk, Australian Trade and Investment Commission, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 November 2022, p. 8.

[150]For example: Clean Energy Investor Group, Submission 10, p. 2; Smart Energy Council, Submission 23, p.9; Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 6; Australian National University Zero-Carbon Energy for the Asia Pacific, Submission 98, p. 6; Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Submission 125, p. 7.

[151]See, for example: Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 6; Australian National University Zero-Carbon Energy for the Asia Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, p. 6; Dr Lee White, Fellow, School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31 March 2023, p. 49.

[152]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 62, p.11; Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Submission 125, p. 7.

[153]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 62, p. 11.

[154]Clean Energy Investor Group, Submission 10, p. 2.

[155]Australian National University Zero-Carbon Energy for the Asia Pacific Initiative, Submission 98, p. 6.

[156]Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 6; Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Submission 125, p. 7; Professor Gus Nathan, Research Director, Heavy Industry Low-Carbon Transition Cooperative Research Centre, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 48.

[157]Macquarie University Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Innovation and Transformation, Submission125, p. 8.

[158]Australian Academy of Science and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Submission 74, p. 6.

[159]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Submission 62, p. 11.

[160]The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 2.

[161]Australian Pipeline and Gas Association, Submission 42, p. 7.

[162]Heavy Industry Low-carbon Transition Cooperative Research Centre, Submission 30, p. 5.

[163]Professor Gus Nathan, Research Direction, Heavy Industry Low-Carbon Transition Cooperative Research Centre, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 5 April 2023, p. 48.

[164]Australia China Business Council, Submission 102, p. 7.

[165]Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT), Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade) and Export Finance Australia (EFA), Submission 31, p. 10.

[166]DFAT, Austrade and EFA, Submission 31, p. 10.

[167]See, for example: Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 4; Star Scientific, Submission 25, p. 3; Australia China Business Council, Submission 102, p. 13.

[168]Australia China Business Council, Submission 102, p. 13.

[169]Mr Matthew Hingerty, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Head of Business Development, Star Scientific, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, p. 32.

[170]See, for example: Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 9; The University of Queensland, Submission26, pp. 7, 9; Climate Council, Submission 36, pp.9–10; Western Australia Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation, Submission 65, p. 7; Export Council of Australia, Submission 72, p. 3; WWF, ACF, BCA and ACTU, Submission 67.1, p. 74.

[171]Electric Vehicle Council, Submission 14, p. 9.

[172]The University of Queensland, Submission 26, p. 7.

[173]Export Council of Australia, Submission 72, p. 3.

[174]Mr Arnold Jorge, Chief Executive Officer, Export Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 31March 2023, p. 61.

[175]University of Adelaide Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Resources, Submission 18, p. 2.

[176]DFAT, Austrade and EFA, Submission 31, p. 10.

[177]Australia China Business Council, Submission 102, p. 13.

[178]Ms Sanaya Khisty, Chief Strategy Officer, Beyond Zero Emissions, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, p. 26.

[179]Mr Dan Tebbutt, Head, Expanding Exports, Austrade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 November 2022, p.7.

[180]Mr Craig Nicol, Chair, Advanced Materials and Battery Council, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 16 May 2023, p. 6.

[181]Fortescue Future Industries, Submission 93, p. 2.

[182]Beyond Zero Emissions, Submission 32, p. 7.

[183]Mr Andrew Hutchinson, General Manager, Critical Minerals Office, Minerals and Resources Division, Department of Industry Science and Resources, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 February 2023, p. 13.

[184]Mr Xavier Simonet, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Trade and Investment Commission, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 November 2022, p.2.