New and continuing matters
1.1
This chapter provides assessments of the human rights compatibility of:
-
bills introduced into the Parliament between 7
and 10 November 2016;[1]
-
legislative instruments received between 14 October and 3
November 2016 (consideration of nine legislative instruments from this period
has been deferred);[2]
and
-
bills and legislative instruments previously deferred.
1.2
The chapter also includes reports on matters previously raised, in
relation to which the committee seeks further information following
consideration of a response from the legislation proponent.
Instruments not raising human rights concerns
1.3
The committee has examined the legislative instruments received in the
relevant period, as listed in the Journals of the Senate.[3]
Instruments raising human rights concerns are identified in this chapter.
1.4
The committee has concluded that the remaining instruments do not raise
human rights concerns, either because they do not engage human rights, they
contain only justifiable (or marginal) limitations on human rights or because
they promote human rights and do not require additional comment.
Response required
1.5
The committee seeks a response or further information from the relevant minister
or legislation proponent with respect to the following bills and instruments.
Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (State Bodies and Other Measures)
Bill 2016
Purpose
|
Seeks to amend a range of
legislation to reflect the establishment of the Law Enforcement Conduct
Commission of New South Wales and its inspector and support its functions; to
provide the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission of Victoria
with investigative powers; and amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in
respect of the meaning of lawfully acquired property or wealth
|
Portfolio
|
Attorney-General
|
Introduced
|
House of Representatives,
19 October 2016
|
Right
|
Privacy (see Appendix 2)
|
Access to communications and telecommunications data by the NSW Law
Enforcement Conduct Commission
1.6
The bill proposes to amend Commonwealth legislation to replace
references to the New South Wales (NSW) Police Integrity Commission (PIC) with
the NSW Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC) and its Inspector.
1.7
The proposed amendments seek to include the LECC in the definition of 'eligible authority' under the
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) and thereby
permit the Attorney-General to declare the LECC to be an 'interception agency'.[4]
Additionally, proposed amendments seek to have the LECC included in the
definition of 'criminal law-enforcement agency' in the TIA Act. The effect of
being declared an 'interception agency' and inclusion as a 'criminal law
enforcement-agency' will be to permit officers of the LECC to:
-
apply for interception warrants to access the content of private
communications (such as telephone calls);[5]
-
issue preservation notices requiring a telecommunications carrier
to preserve all stored communications that relate to a named person or
telecommunications service;[6]
-
apply for a warrant to access stored communications content;[7]
and
-
seek access to telecommunications data (metadata).[8]
Compatibility of the measure with
the right to privacy
1.8
As the TIA Act was legislated prior to the establishment of the
committee, the scheme has never been required to be subject to a foundational
human rights compatibility assessment by the Attorney-General in accordance
with the terms of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.
A full human rights assessment of proposed measures which extend or amend
existing legislation requires an assessment of how such measures interact with
the existing legislation. The committee is therefore faced with the difficult
task of assessing the human rights compatibility of permitting an agency to
access powers under the TIA Act without the benefit of a foundational human
rights assessment of the TIA Act from the Attorney‑General.
1.9
The right to privacy includes the right to respect for private and
confidential information, particularly the storing, use and sharing of such
information. It also includes the right to control the dissemination of
information about one's private life. As the effect of the proposed measures
would be to permit the LECC to access an individual's private communications
and telecommunications data in a range of circumstances, the measures engage
and limit the right to privacy.
1.10
A limitation on the right to privacy will be permissible under
international human rights law where it addresses a legitimate objective, is
rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of
achieving that objective.
1.11
The statement of compatibility identifies that the measures engage the
right to privacy and states that the measures 'are designed to achieve the
legitimate objective of providing effective frameworks to identify, investigate
and punish corruption and to protect public order through enforcing the law'.[9]
This would constitute a legitimate objective for the purposes of international
human rights law. Access to telecommunications data and communications would
also appear to be rationally connected to this stated objective, in the sense
that it is likely to assist in the LECC's investigative functions.[10]
1.12
The statement of compatibility also sets out a range of further
information that addresses issues of whether the measures are proportionate to
the stated objective. The focus of this assessment is on the proposed role of
the LECC in the context of the mechanisms under the TIA Act.
1.13
The TIA Act provides a legislative framework that criminalises the
interception and accessing of telecommunications. However, as referenced in the
statement of compatibility, the TIA Act sets out exceptions that enable law
enforcement agencies and other agencies to apply for access to communications
and telecommunications data:
-
chapter 4 of the TIA Act provides for warrantless access to
telecommunications data (metadata) in respect of 'enforcement agencies'; and
-
chapters 2 and 3 of the TIA Act provide for warranted access by
an 'interception agency' to the content of communications, including both
communications passing across telecommunications services,[11] and stored communications
content.
1.14
The committee previously examined chapter 4 of the TIA Act in the
context of its consideration of the Telecommunications (Interception and
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (which amended the TIA Act). This
previous analysis considered that a scheme for accessing private or
confidential information must be sufficiently circumscribed to ensure
limitations on the right to privacy are proportionate (that is, are only as extensive
as is strictly necessary).[12]
However, the previous human rights analysis raised serious concerns regarding
whether the internal self‑authorisation process for access to
telecommunications data by 'enforcement agencies' provided sufficient
safeguards in relation to the right to privacy.
1.15
Specifically, this previous analysis noted that chapter 4 of the TIA Act
permits an 'authorised officer' of an 'enforcement agency' to authorise a
service provider to disclose existing telecommunications data where it is
'reasonably necessary' for the enforcement of, 'a law imposing a pecuniary
penalty or the protection of the public revenue'. Accordingly, there are no
significant limits on the type of investigation to which this self-approval
process may apply. This could mean that metadata is accessed in a range of circumstances
that go beyond what is strictly necessary, which extends the approach beyond
that required to amount to a permissible limitation under international human
rights law.[13]
1.16
The previous human rights analysis also raised concerns about accessed
data subsequently being used for an unrelated purpose and safeguards around the
period of retention of such data and absence of a warrant process.
1.17
Accordingly, the committee made a number of recommendations for amending
the provisions of the TIA Act so as to avoid the disproportionate
limitation on the right to privacy. These recommendations were in relation to
the purposes for which data could be accessed, safeguards relating to prior
review (such as a warrant process) and safeguards in relation to the use and retention
of such data after it was accessed.[14]
1.18
The statement of compatibility does not address these previous concerns
regarding the right to privacy, nor the committee's proposed recommendations.
Without sufficient safeguards in chapter 4 of the TIA Act to ensure the
proportionality of the limitation of the right to privacy, permitting the LECC
to be an 'enforcement agency' and accordingly access to telecommunications data
under chapter 4, raises these same concerns.
1.19
As noted above, allowing the LECC to be declared an 'interception
agency' and thereby permitting it to access the content of private
communications via warrant under chapter 2 and chapter 3 of the TIA Act, also
has implications in relation to the right to privacy. In relation to access to
the content of private communications, the warrant regime may, in key respects,
assist to ensure that access to private communications is sufficiently
circumscribed. However, the use of warrants does not provide a complete answer
as to whether chapters 2 and 3 of the TIA Act constitute a proportionate limit
on the right to privacy, as questions arise as to the proportionality of the
broad access that may be granted in relation to 'services' or 'devices' under
these chapters of the TIA Act.
1.20
The committee has not previously considered chapters 2 and 3 of the TIA
Act in detail. Accordingly, further information from the Attorney-General in
relation to the human rights compatibility of the TIA Act would assist a human
rights assessment of the proposed measures in the context of the TIA Act.
Committee comment
1.21
Providing the LECC with a range of powers to access communications
and telecommunications data under the TIA Act engages and limits the right to
privacy.
1.22
The committee notes that the previous human rights assessment of the
TIA Act in relation to telecommunications data considered that the scheme did
not impose a proportionate limit on the right to privacy and made a number of
recommendations. While the statement of compatibility has not addressed these
issues, the committee considers the bill to raise the same concerns as have
previously been identified.
1.23
In light of the human rights concerns regarding the scope of powers
under the TIA Act, the committee notes that the preceding legal analysis raises
questions as to whether permitting the LECC to access such powers constitutes a
proportionate limit on the right to privacy.
1.24
The committee therefore requests the further advice of the Attorney‑General
as to:
-
whether permitting the LECC to access such powers under the
TIA Act constitutes a proportionate limit on the right to privacy (including in
respect of matters previously raised by the committee); and
-
whether an assessment of the TIA Act could be undertaken to
determine its compatibility with the right to privacy (including in respect of
matters previously raised by the committee).
Definition of 'lawfully acquired' under the POC Act
1.25
Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POC Act) various actions
can be taken in relation to the restraint, freezing or forfeiture of property
which may have been obtained as a result, or used in the commission, of
specified offences, including a 'serious offence'. The bill proposes to amend
section 33A of the POC Act to provide that property or wealth is not to be
considered 'lawfully acquired' where it has been subject to a security or
liability that has wholly or partly been discharged using property that is not
lawfully acquired. This would have the effect of broadening the class of assets
that may be subject to being frozen, restrained or forfeited under the POC Act.
Compatibility of the measure with
the right to a fair trial and fair hearing
1.26
As the POC Act was legislated prior to the establishment of the
committee, the scheme has never been required to be subject to a foundational
human rights compatibility assessment by the Minister for Justice in accordance
with the terms of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.
1.27
The committee has previously recommended that the Minister for Justice
undertake a detailed assessment of the POC Act to determine its compatibility
with the right to a fair trial and fair hearing in light of the committee's
concerns.[15]
A full human rights assessment of proposed measures which extend or amend
existing legislation requires an assessment of how such measures interact with
the existing legislation. The committee is therefore faced with the difficult
task of assessing the human rights compatibility of an amendment to the POC Act
without the benefit of a foundational human rights assessment of the POC Act
from the Minister for Justice.
1.28
The right to a fair trial and fair hearing is protected by article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The right
applies to both criminal and civil proceedings. Specific guarantees of the
right to a fair trial in the determination of a criminal charge guaranteed by
article 14(1) are set out in article 14(2) to (7). These include the
presumption of innocence (article 14(2)) and minimum guarantees in criminal
proceedings, such as the right not to incriminate oneself (article 14(3)(g)),
and a guarantee against retrospective criminal laws (article 15(1)).
1.29
The POC Act enables a person's property to be frozen, restrained or
forfeited either where a person has been convicted or where there are reasonable
grounds to suspect a person has committed a serious offence. As set out in the
committee's Guidance Note 2, even if a penalty is classified as civil or
administrative under domestic law, its content may nevertheless be considered
'criminal' under international human rights law. The committee's reports have
previously raised concerns that parts of the POC Act may involve the
determination of a criminal charge.[16]
1.30
Given that assets may be frozen, restrained or forfeited without a
finding of criminal guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the POC Act limits the right
to be presumed innocent, which is guaranteed by article 14(2) of the
ICCPR. The forfeiture of property of a person who has already been sentenced
for an offence may also raise concerns regarding the imposition of double
punishment, contrary to article 14(7) of the ICCPR.
1.31
As the proposed measure would have the effect of broadening the class of
assets that may be subject to being frozen, restrained or forfeited under the
POC Act, this measure also engages the right to a fair trial and fair hearing.
1.32
The statement of compatibility states the objective of the measure to be
'to ensure that criminals are not able to maintain ownership over property or
wealth that is obtained, either directly or indirectly, using proceeds of
crime'.[17]
However, it does not identify the right to a fair trial and fair hearing as
engaged and limited so provides no justification for this limitation. The
committee's usual expectation is that, where a measure limits a human right, the
accompanying statement of compatibility provides a reasoned and evidence-based
explanation of how the measure supports a legitimate objective, is rationally
connected to that objective and is a proportionate way to achieve that
objective.
1.33
In assessing the proportionality of the measure against the right to a
fair trial and fair hearing, it is also relevant as to whether the POC Act
itself sets out sufficient safeguards to protect this right. As noted above,
the committee has previously raised concerns regarding the sufficiency of such
safeguards.
Committee comment
1.34
The measure engages and limits the right to a fair trial and fair
hearing.
1.35
The committee notes that the preceding legal analysis raises
questions as to whether broadening the class of assets that may be subject to
being frozen, restrained or forfeited under the POC Act is a proportionate
limit on the right to a fair trial and fair hearing.
1.36
The committee therefore seeks the advice of the minister as to:
-
whether the limitation is a reasonable and proportionate
measure for the achievement of its objective (including the sufficiency of
safeguards contained in the POC Act); and
-
whether an assessment of the POC Act could be undertaken to
determine its compatibility with the right to a fair trial and fair hearing in
light of the committee's concerns.
Migration Amendment (Visa Revalidation and Other Measures) Bill 2016
Purpose
|
Seeks to empower the
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to require that certain visa
holders complete a revalidation check; provides that certain events that
cause a visa that is held and not in effect to cease; and enables the use of
contactless technology in the immigration clearance system
|
Portfolio
|
Immigration and Border
Protection
|
Introduced
|
House of Representatives,
19 October 2016
|
Rights
|
Non-refoulement; effective
remedy and liberty; equality and non‑discrimination; privacy
(see Appendix 2)
|
Power to require revalidation check relating to a prescribed visa
1.37
The measures in Schedule 1 of the bill propose to introduce a new
revalidation check framework. As part of this framework, proposed section 96B
would provide the minister with the discretionary power to make a decision as
to whether a person who holds a visa prescribed for the purposes of new
subsections 96B(1) or 96E(1) is required to complete a revalidation check for
that visa. A 'revalidation check' is described at proposed subsection 96A(1) as
'a check as to whether there is any adverse information relating to a person
who holds a visa'. The scope, timing or nature of a revalidation check is
otherwise not provided by the bill. If a revalidation check is not completed,
or is not passed, the affected person's visa will cease.
1.38
If the minister thinks it is in the public interest to do so, the
minister is also empowered by proposed section 96E to make a determination, by
legislative instrument, for a specified class of persons who are required to
complete a revalidation check. This power is a personal non‑compellable
power and this instrument is not subject to disallowance.
1.39
Proposed subsection 96A(2) provides that a person will pass a
revalidation check if the minister is satisfied there is no 'adverse information
relating to the person'. What constitutes 'adverse information' is not defined
in the bill, and is intended to include 'any adverse information relating
to the person who holds the visa', rather than simply information that is
directly about that person.[18]
1.40
The minister therefore has the power to prescribe any type of visa as
being subject to proposed sections 96B and 96E. The bill places no limit on the
breadth of this power. The explanatory memorandum states that the measures in Schedule
1 of the bill are designed to initially apply to Chinese nationals who will be
granted a new 'longer validity Visitor visa'.[19]
However, the proposed measure is not constrained to this class of visa or to
any particular group of people.
Compatibility of the measure with multiple
rights
1.41
The proposed provisions provide a broad power for the minister to
prescribe any type of visa as being one that may be subject to a revalidation
check. A failure to complete or pass a revalidation check could lead to the
cessation and possible cancellation of the person's visa. As the power to
prescribe the type of visa is unlimited, it appears that it could enable the
minister to prescribe any type of visa, including a protection visa, spousal or
other family visa or permanent visa as subject to the revalidation check. This
measure therefore has the potential to engage a number of human rights,
including Australia's non-refoulement obligations, the right to an effective
remedy, the right to liberty and the right to protection of the family. Some of
these rights will be addressed in the following discussion.
1.42
Australia's non-refoulement obligations prevent Australia from returning
any person to a country where there is a real risk that this person would face
persecution, torture or other serious forms of harm.[20]
Non-refoulement obligations are absolute and may not be subject to any
limitations.
1.43
As noted above, it is possible that proposed sections 96B or 96E could
apply to a visa holder or class of visa holders who hold a protection visa. If
this were to apply to protection visas, this could lead to a protection visa
holder failing the revalidation check and having their visa cancelled. If this
were to occur, such individuals could, as a matter of Australian domestic law,
be subject to refoulement to their country of origin. Australia's
non-refoulement obligations are therefore engaged by this measure.
1.44
The proposed amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act)
in Schedules 1 and 2 of the bill are administrative measures that would not be
reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) under Part 5 of
the Migration Act.[21]
Part 5 of the Migration Act limits the review powers of the Migration and
Refugee Division of the AAT to certain decisions relating to the grant and cancellation
of some visas. The measure also engages the right to an effective remedy in
relation to the obligation of non-refoulement.[22]
1.45
In addition, to the extent that the proposed amendments may cause the
minister to require the revalidation of a visa and, as a result, the visa could
cease to be in effect, the visa holder or class of visa holders could be
subject to visa cancellation, and possible detention pending their deportation,
which engages the right to liberty.[23]
1.46
Furthermore, subjecting a person who holds a spousal visa or a permanent
resident's visa to a revalidation check would engage the right to protection of
the family, as if the visa were to be cancelled this could affect the rights of
close family members not to be separated.
1.47
While it is permissible for proportionate limitations to be placed on
these rights, the statement of compatibility does not address the breadth of
the power to prescribe any type of visa as one that could be subject to a
revalidation check and so does not discuss any possible engagement of a number
of human rights. Nor does the objective set out in the explanatory memorandum
explain the breadth of the proposed measure.
Committee comment
1.48
The statement of compatibility has not identified a number of human
rights that may be engaged by this measure given the breadth of the power to
prescribe any type of visa as one that could be subject to a revalidation
check. Noting the concerns raised in the preceding legal analysis, the
committee seeks the advice of the Minister for Immigration and Border
Protection as to:
-
why there is no limit on the face of the bill as to the type
of visas that may be prescribed as being subject to the possibility of a
revalidation check; and
-
whether, in light of the broad power to prescribe any kind of
visa, the measure is compatible with Australia's non‑refoulement
obligations, the right to an effective remedy, the right to liberty and the
right to protection of the family.
Compatibility of the measure with
the right to equality and non-discrimination
1.49
As discussed at paragraphs [1.39] and [1.40] above, the minister is
empowered by proposed sections 96B and 96E to require any visa holder to
complete a revalidation check. The explanatory memorandum states that the
measures in Schedule 1 of the bill are designed to manage risks to the
Australian community that may arise in the context of a 'longer validity
Visitor visa' which will initially be made available to Chinese nationals.[24]
However, contrary to the stated intended application of the provisions, there
is nothing on the face of the bill that limits the minister's powers to apply
the revalidation check to this longer class of visitor visa for Chinese
nationals. It is therefore possible that the minister could exercise this power
in such a way that would have a disproportionate effect on people on the basis
of their nationality, religion, race or sex, which engages and may limit the
right to equality and non‑discrimination.
1.50
The right to equality and non-discrimination provides that everyone is
entitled to enjoy their rights without discrimination of any kind, and that all
people are equal before the law and entitled without discrimination to the
equal and non‑discriminatory protection of the law.[25]
1.51
It is difficult to assess the compatibility of the power with the right
to equality and non-discrimination without certainty as to the visas that will
be subject to the possibility of a revalidation check. The statement of
compatibility states that the right to equality and non‑discrimination is
engaged by the proposed amendments, but that any differential treatment will be
based on objective criteria.[26]
It identifies the objective of the revalidation check as to:
...allow Australia to appropriately manage and facilitate the
travel and movement of visa holders through the provision of up to date advice
on potential risks and the application of appropriate measures to reduce the possibility
of exposure to risk.[27]
1.52
It states that the revalidation check might occur following an
assessment of an increased risk to the Australian community resulting from a
health, security or other incident in a particular location.[28]
1.53
It is noted that managing risks to the Australian community through
immigration channels may be capable of being a legitimate objective for human
rights purposes. However, the measure in its current form may not be
proportionate to achieving this objective. In respect of proposed section 96B,
the statement of compatibility provides that:
It is not the policy intention to require a visa holder to
undertake or pass a revalidation check on the basis of any of the prohibited
grounds set out in Articles 2 and 26 [right to equality], and departmental
policy guidance will be provided to ensure this policy intention is implemented
under any delegated power of the new section 96B.[29]
1.54
In respect of proposed section 96E, the statement of compatibility states
that any exercise of the minister's power to determine specified classes of
persons who are required to complete a revalidation check will be 'based on an
assessment of risk considering information and any statistical data'.[30]
The statement of compatibility states that, to the extent that the right to
equality and non‑discrimination is engaged, this is engaged indirectly as
it is intended that initially only Chinese nationals will be able to access the
10-year visa on a trial basis, and, consequentially, will be the only group
required by the minister to undertake the revalidation check.[31]
1.55
It is noted that while the statement of compatibility states that it is
intended that these powers will only be used based on objective assessments of
risk, there is nothing in the bill that would restrict the use of the power in
this way. Further, administrative safeguards, such as the departmental policy
guidance mentioned in the statement of compatibility are less reliable than the
protection statutory processes offer. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the
bill, as currently drafted, will guarantee the right to equality and non‑discrimination.
Committee comment
1.56
The committee notes that the preceding legal analysis identifies that
proposed sections 96B and 96E engage and may limit the right to equality and
non‑discrimination, and raises questions as to its compatibility with
this right.
1.57
The committee therefore seeks the advice of the Minister for
Immigration and Border Protection as to whether safeguards could be included in
the legislation, such as:
-
the minister's power to require a revalidation check be limited
to long-term visitor visas;
-
the basis upon which a revalidation check may be required be
made clear in the legislation, rather than being a matter of ministerial
discretion; and
-
a requirement that the minister's power to require a person or
classes of persons to complete a revalidation check is based on an objective
assessment of an increased risk to the Australian community.
Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing Cohort) Bill 2016
Purpose
|
Seeks to amend the Migration Act 1958 and the
Migration Regulations 1994 to prevent 'unauthorised maritime arrivals' and
'transitory persons' who were at least 18 years of age and were taken to a
regional processing country after 19 July 2013 from making a valid
application for an Australian visa
|
Portfolio
|
Immigration and Border
Protection
|
Introduced
|
House of Representatives, 8
November 2016
|
Rights
|
Protection of the family;
family reunion; children; equality and non‑discrimination (see Appendix
2)
|
Permanent lifetime visa ban for classes of asylum seekers
1.58
The bill would amend the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act) to
prevent asylum seekers who were at least 18 years of age, and were taken to a
regional processing country,[32]
after 19 July 2013 from making a valid application for an Australian visa
(referred to as the 'regional processing cohort').[33]
Such asylum seekers would accordingly face a permanent lifetime ban from
obtaining a visa to enter or remain in Australia.
1.59
The minister will have a personal, discretionary, non-compellable power
to determine, if the minister thinks that it is in the public interest, that
the proposed statutory bar to making a valid visa application does not apply to
an individual or class of persons in respect of visas specified in the
determination.[34]
Compatibility of the measure with
the right to equality and non-discrimination
1.60
The proposed lifetime visa ban would apply to the majority of
individuals currently at regional processing centres (Republic of Nauru (Nauru)
and Papua New Guinea (PNG)), those individuals who were previously held at
those centres, and also to individuals who seek asylum by boat and are sent to
regional processing centres in the future.[35]
The proposal to permanently ban a group of people who have committed no crime
and are entitled as a matter of international law to seek asylum in Australia,[36]
regardless of their mode of arrival, from making a valid Australian visa
application is a severe and exceptional step. The proposed ban would apply to
visas necessary for tourism, business or professional visits, or visiting
family. Under existing law a person who has had their Australian visa cancelled
on character grounds may be permanently excluded from Australia.[37]
However, there is no other class of persons that may be prevented in this
manner from making any valid application to enter or remain in Australia.
1.61
The bill engages the right to equality and non-discrimination by its
differential treatment of 'cohorts' or groups of people in materially similar
situations, that is, people making an application for a visa to enter or remain
in Australia. The statement of compatibility acknowledges in very general terms
that the proposed ban could amount to differential treatment on the basis of
'other status' under article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) (the right to equality and non-discrimination).
1.62
The proposed ban directly distinguishes the grant of visas between
people who fall within the 'regional processing cohort' and individuals who do
not, which may amount to direct discrimination on the basis of 'other status'.
In this regard, Article 31 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its Protocol (Refugee Convention) prohibits states from imposing a penalty
on asylum seekers who enter its territory illegally.[38]
As such, the ban would appear to apply a penalty on those who seek asylum and
are part of the 'regional processing cohort'. The right to seek asylum,
irrespective of the mode of transit, is protected under international law.
1.63
The ban may also have a disproportionate negative effect on individuals
from particular national origins; nationalities; or on the basis of race, which
gives rise to concerns regarding indirect discrimination on these grounds.
1.64
'Discrimination' under the ICCPR encompasses measures that have a
discriminatory intent (direct discrimination) and measures which have a
discriminatory effect on the enjoyment of rights (indirect discrimination).[39]
The UN Human Rights Committee has explained indirect discrimination as 'a rule
or measure that is neutral on its face or without intent to discriminate', which
exclusively or disproportionately affects people with a particular protected
attribute.[40]
1.65
The government's demographic data regarding the nationalities of
individuals at regional processing centres shows that the vast majority come
from Iran. The PNG processing centre (which only accommodates males) is largely
composed of asylum seekers from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. The Nauru
processing centre (which accommodates males, females and children) is largely
composed of asylum seekers from Iran, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and with
people who have no country of nationality.[41]
1.66
Such statistical data strongly indicates that the proposed ban will have
a disproportionate negative effect on the basis of national origin, nationality
or race, and one which endures for the lifetime of the affected persons. Where
a measure impacts on particular groups disproportionately it establishes prima
facie that there may be indirect discrimination.[42]
1.67
Differential treatment (including the differential effect of a measure
that is neutral on its face)[43]
will not constitute unlawful discrimination if the differential treatment is
based on reasonable and objective criteria such that it serves a legitimate
objective, is effective to achieve that legitimate objective and is a
proportionate means of achieving that objective.
1.68
The issue of indirect discrimination on the basis of race; nationality
or national origin is not specifically addressed in the statement of
compatibility. However, as noted above, the statement of compatibility does
address whether the differential treatment of those who fall within the
'regional processing cohort', and individuals who do not, constitutes unlawful
discrimination. In this regard, the statement of compatibility argues that the
differential treatment (that is, the visa ban):
...is for a legitimate purpose and based on relevant objective
criteria and that is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances. This
measure is a proportionate response to prevent a cohort of non-citizens who
have previously sought to circumvent Australia's managed migration program by
entering or attempting to enter Australia as a UMA from applying for a visa to
enter Australia. This measure is also aimed at further discouraging persons
from attempting hazardous boat journeys with the assistance of people smugglers
in the future and encouraging them to pursue regular migration pathways
instead.[44]
1.69
The statement of compatibility does not state that banning this cohort
of people from making a valid visa application to enter Australia is based on
any reason why these particular people should not be allowed to visit Australia
in future. There is no suggestion that they present any danger to Australia or
that a future visit would have any adverse affect on Australia. There appears
to be no evidence for such a suggestion, and, in any event, there are other
powers under the Migration Act that would allow visa applications to be
declined if the circumstances justified it in a particular case.
1.70
Instead, as stated, an objective of the lifetime visa ban appears to be
the imposition of a penalty on this cohort of people, with an intended
deterrent effect on others embarking on 'hazardous boat journeys' in future.
The bill therefore applies what is likely to be considered an unlawful penalty
for seeking asylum, in contravention of article 31 of the Refugee Convention.[45]
To penalise those who seek to enter Australia illegally for the purpose of
seeking asylum cannot be a legitimate objective under international law.
1.71
Insofar as the objective of the bill is to 'further discourag[e] persons
from attempting hazardous boat journeys with the assistance of people smugglers
in the future and encourage[e] them to pursue regular migration pathways
instead',[46]
the statement of compatibility provides no evidence as to whether the measure
would be effective in pursuing this objective. The statement of compatibility
does not engage with the reasons why persons in this cohort attempt to enter
Australia by boat and without obtaining a visa, whether this cohort of people
have access to 'regular migration pathways' nor what proportion of this cohort
have ultimately been found to be refugees entitled to protection. Each of these
reasons is important to understanding whether the lifetime visa ban is likely
to be effective in achieving the stated objective, and whether it risks
deterring those who are entitled to seek Australia's protection.
1.72
The statement of compatibility also provides no evidence or
reasoning to support its assertion that the proposed ban is proportionate. As
noted above, a visa ban on classes of asylum seekers is a severe measure and
will mean that even if a person is found to be a refugee and resettled in
another country Australian law will prevent them from making a visa application
across all visa categories. The ban is lifelong, and the class of persons
subject to the ban is open-ended as the measure extends to persons taken to a
'regional processing country' in future. The only limitation on the operation
of the ban is a ministerial power to lift the ban. However, this is a personal
and non-compellable discretion, based only on what the minister thinks is in
the public interest. The legislation thereby makes no provision, for example,
for compassionate cases, or business or professional visits, both of which are
situations in which the visa ban may have serious consequences for an affected
person.
1.73
Accordingly, on the information available, the proposed ban does
not appear to be compatible with the right to equality and non‑discrimination.
Committee comment
1.74
The proposed lifetime visa ban engages the right to equality and non‑discrimination.
1.75
This visa ban would appear to have a disproportionate negative effect
on individuals from particular national origins or nationalities. This human
rights issue was not specifically addressed in the statement of compatibility.
1.76
The committee notes that the preceding legal analysis raises
questions as to whether this disproportionate negative effect (which indicates prima
facie indirect discrimination on the basis of national origins, nationality
or race) amounts to unlawful discrimination.
1.77
The committee further notes that the proposed ban distinguishes the
grant of visas between people who fall within the 'regional processing country
cohort' and individuals who do not and the preceding legal analysis raises
questions as to whether this may amount to direct discrimination on the basis
of 'other status'.
1.78
Accordingly, in relation to the compatibility of the measure with the
right to equality and non-discrimination, the committee requests the further
advice of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection as
to whether:
-
there is a rational connection between the limitation and the
stated objective (that, is evidence that the measure will be effective); and
-
the measure is reasonable and proportionate for the
achievement of that objective, including how it is based on reasonable and
objective criteria; whether there are other less rights restrictive ways to
achieve the stated objective; whether the visa ban could be more circumscribed;
whether the measure provides sufficient flexibility to treat different cases
differently and whether affected groups are particularly vulnerable.
Right to protection of the family
and rights of the child
1.79
An important element of the right to protection of the family under
article 17 of the ICCPR is to ensure family members are not involuntarily
separated from one another.
1.80
Relatedly, under article 10 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), Australia is required to treat applications by minors for family
reunification in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. Under the CRC
Australia is also required to ensure that, in all actions concerning children,
the best interests of the child are a primary consideration.[47]
1.81
The proposed visa ban engages and limits the right to protection of the
family and rights of the child as it would foreseeably operate to separate
families. In this respect, there are a range of circumstances under the
proposed visa ban which may lead to the separation of family members. An
individual subject to the visa ban will be prevented from joining family
members in Australia (including where these family members have been granted a
visa to come to or remain in Australia or are Australian citizens). This would
include the situation where an individual subject to the visa ban has, for
example, married an Australian citizen, yet is unable to apply for a visa on
this basis.
1.82
While the proposed lifetime visa ban does not apply to children under
18 years of age at the time they were taken to a regional processing
centre, the measure may still clearly impact upon children by separating
children (who are not subject to the visa ban) from parents (who are subject to
the visa ban). It would prevent an individual subject to a visa ban from being
with a child who is an Australian citizen or child who is otherwise entitled to
reside in Australia.
1.83
The statement of compatibility acknowledges that the right to protection
of the family and rights of the child are engaged by the measure and that it
'may result in separation, or the continued separation, of a family unit'.[48]
Elsewhere in the statement of compatibility the objective of the measure is
identified as discouraging hazardous boat journeys and encouraging the use of
regular migration programs.[49]
1.84
The statement of compatibility also provides some information regarding
the role of the minister's discretionary powers in the context of the scheme in
relation to the right to protection of the family:
...the proposed legislative amendments will include flexibility
for the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection personally to 'lift' the
bar [visa ban] where the Minister thinks it is in the public interest to do so.
This consideration could occur in circumstances involving Australia's human
rights obligations towards families and children, allowing a valid application
for a visa on a case by case basis and in consideration of the individual
circumstances of the case, including the best interests of affected children.
In addition, such matters can be considered when deciding to exercise the
waiver to allow a Special Purpose Visa to be granted by operation of law, or to
allow an application for certain subclasses of visa to be deemed to have been
made.[50]
1.85
However, the statement of compatibility does not specifically address
whether the measure is a permissible limit on the right to protection of the
family or rights of the child.
1.86
The committee's usual expectation is that, where a measure limits a
human right, the accompanying statement of compatibility provides a reasoned
and evidence-based explanation of how the measure supports a legitimate
objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate way
to achieve that objective. This conforms with the committee's Guidance Note
1 and the guidance information available from the Attorney-General's
Department with respect to the preparation of statements of compatibility.
1.87
The exercise of the discretionary power by the minister, where the
minister 'thinks' it is in the 'public interest', could potentially relieve
some of the harshness of the visa ban in individual cases.[51]
However, on its own, this discretionary safeguard is unlikely to be sufficient
to ensure that the measure is a proportionate limit on the right to protection
of the family in the context of a blanket visa ban.[52] In this respect, it is
noted that the default position (without discretionary intervention by the
minister) would be for families to remain separated.
Committee comment
1.88
The proposed lifetime visa ban engages and limits the right to
protection of the family and rights of the child. The statement of
compatibility has not sufficiently justified these limitations for the purposes
of international human rights law.
1.89
The committee notes that the preceding legal analysis raises
questions as to whether the measure is rationally connected to and a
proportionate means of achieving its stated objective, so as to be compatible
with the right to protection of the family and rights of the child.
1.90
Accordingly, in relation to the limitations on the right to
protection of the family and rights of the child, the committee requests the
further advice of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection as to
whether:
-
there is a rational connection between the limitation and the
stated objective (that, is evidence that the measure will be effective); and
-
the limitation is a reasonable and proportionate measure for
the achievement of that objective (including whether there are other less
rights restrictive ways to achieve the stated objective; whether the
visa ban could be more circumscribed; whether the measure provides sufficient
flexibility to treat different cases differently; whether there are any
additional safeguards; and whether affected groups are particularly
vulnerable).
Privacy Amendment (Re-identification Offence) Bill 2016
Purpose
|
Seeks to amend the Privacy
Act 1988 to introduce provisions which prohibit conduct related to the
re-identification of de‑identified personal information published or
released by Commonwealth entities
|
Portfolio
|
Attorney-General
|
Introduced
|
Senate, 12 October 2016
|
Rights
|
Fair trial; presumption of
innocence; prohibition on retrospective criminal laws (see Appendix 2)
|
Retrospective effect of the proposed offences
1.91
The Privacy Amendment (Re-identification Offence) Bill 2016 (the bill)
would amend the Privacy Act 1988 (Privacy Act) to prohibit conduct
related to the re‑identification of de-identified personal information
that has been published or released by Commonwealth entities, acting as a
deterrent against attempts to re‑identify de-identified personal
information in published government datasets.
1.92
The bill would apply to entities, including small businesses, and
individuals.[53]
1.93
Proposed sections 16D, 16E and 16F of the bill all apply to acts that
were committed on or after 29 September 2016,[54]
this being the date following the Attorney-General's media release that stated
the government's intention to introduce a criminal offence of re-identifying
de-identified government data.[55]
This differs from the usual practice that legislation creating criminal
offences operates prospectively from or after Royal Assent is given to the
legislation.
Compatibility of the measure with
the prohibition on retrospective criminal laws
1.94
Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) prohibits retrospective criminal laws. It requires that no one can be
found guilty of a crime that was not a crime at the time it was committed. This
is an absolute right, which means that it can never be permissibly limited.
1.95
As proposed sections 16D and 16E of the bill would make the proposed
offence provisions operate retrospectively, the absolute prohibition on
retrospective criminal law is engaged.[56]
1.96
The statement of compatibility states that retrospective application of
these provisions is reasonable, necessary and proportionate.[57]
However, as an absolute right that cannot be limited, there can be no
justifiable limitation on the prohibition on retrospective criminal laws so as
to accord with human rights law.
Committee comment
1.97
The committee notes that the preceding legal analysis identifies that
the proposed offence provisions in sections 16D and 16E engage the
prohibition of retrospective criminal laws.
1.98
The committee observes that the prohibition on retrospective criminal
laws is absolute and can never be subject to permissible limitations.
1.99
The committee requests advice from the Attorney-General as to whether
consideration has been given to amending paragraphs 16D(1)(c) and 16E(1)(c)
such that the offences in these sections operate prospectively, that is, from
or after the date of Royal Assent.
Offences relating to interference with personal information
1.100
The bill seeks to introduce both civil and criminal penalty provisions.
Proposed sections 16D and 16E provide that an offence will be committed or an
entity will be liable to a civil penalty where:
-
de-identified personal information is intentionally
re-identified;[58]
and
-
re-identified personal information is intentionally disclosed,
regardless of whether or not the act that resulted in the information being
de-identified was done so intentionally.[59]
1.101
These sections also set out exceptions to the application of the
provisions. In addition, in consultation with the Australian Information
Commissioner, the Attorney-General may decide to exempt an entity from the
application of the provisions.[60]
Compatibility of the measure with
the right to the presumption of innocence
1.102
The right to a fair trial in article 14 of the ICCPR includes the right
to be presumed innocent. Generally, consistency with the presumption of
innocence requires the prosecution to prove each element of an offence beyond
reasonable doubt.[61]
1.103
Proposed sections 16D and 16E include exceptions to the application of
the offence provisions. Reliance on any of these exceptions requires entities,
including individuals, to prove that their behaviour was consistent with the
relevant defence. In effect, this means shifting the evidential burden of proof
from the prosecution to the defendant, which engages the presumption of
innocence.
1.104
The objective of these measures, as identified in the statement of
compatibility, is to appropriately respond to the deliberate re-identification
and disclosure of re-identified personal information.[62]
This stated objective, which involves the protection of an individual's
personal information published or released by Commonwealth agencies, may be
regarded as a legitimate objective for the purposes of international human
rights law.
1.105
There is limited discussion in the statement of compatibility as to why
the measures are a proportionate limitation on the presumption of innocence,
which goes to the question of whether the approach is compatible with
international human rights law. In this regard, the statement of compatibility
states that, for each of the defences set out in sections 16D and 16E, each
limb of the defence would not be difficult for an entity to prove.[63]
The statement of compatibility also provides that a prosecution will not be
pursued where it is clear to authorities that the entity (including
individuals) would be in a position to rely on one of the defences in the
relevant section.[64]
1.106
It is relevant that although the offences in sections 16D and 16E
contain a reversal of the burden of proof, the burden is evidentiary, not
legal. Section 16D requires the defendant to adduce evidence that the re-identification
of personal information was done in accordance with an Australian law or
court/tribunal order where the entity is a responsible agency; for the purposes
of meeting an obligation under a contract where the entity is a contracted
service provider for a Commonwealth contract to provide services to a
responsible agency; in accordance with an agreement to perform functions or
activities on behalf of a responsible agency; or in accordance with a
determination in force under section 16G. Pursuant to section 16E, these
defences (and accompanying evidentiary burdens) also apply to entities in the
context of the disclosure of re‑identified personal information.
1.107
In these circumstances, placing evidentiary burdens on the defendant
appears to be consistent with the right to the presumption of innocence under
international human rights law as the prosecution retains the burden of proving
the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On this basis, it is likely that
the limitation on the right to the presumption of innocence is proportionate.
Committee comment
1.108
The committee notes that the proposed reverse burden offences engage
and limit the right to the presumption of innocence.
1.109
Given the nature of the matters to be proven by the defendant
pursuant to the proposed sections, and that the sections impose an evidentiary
burden only, the committee concludes that the measures are likely to be a
proportionate limitation on the presumption of innocence.
Sex Discrimination Amendment (Exemptions) Regulation 2016 [F2016L01445]
Purpose
|
Amends the Sex
Discrimination Regulations 1984 to extend for a further 12-month period the
prescription of two Western Australian Acts under the Sex Discrimination
Act 1984, with the effect that an exemption would be provided for conduct
taken in direct compliance with these Acts that would otherwise constitute
unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity
or intersex status
|
Portfolio
|
Attorney-General
|
Authorising legislation
|
Sex Discrimination Act
1984
|
Last day to disallow
|
1 December 2016
|
Right
|
Equality and
non-discrimination (see Appendix 2)
|
Background
1.110
The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 was amended in 2013 by the Sex
Discrimination Amendment (Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex
Status) Act 2013 (SDA Amendment Act) to provide new protections against discrimination on the
basis of a person's sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex status,
and provide protections against discrimination for same-sex de facto couples.
1.111
The committee previously considered the Sex Discrimination Amendment
(Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Bill 2013 in its Sixth
report of 2013 and noted that the inclusion of these additional grounds of
prohibited discrimination would advance the right to equality and
non-discrimination and would better reflect the standards under international
human rights law.[65]
1.112
The SDA Amendment Act included an exemption for conduct that would
otherwise constitute discrimination on the basis of these additional grounds
provided that that conduct is in direct compliance with a Commonwealth, state or territory law
prescribed by regulations.
1.113
Section 5 of the Sex Discrimination Regulations 1984 provided that all
Commonwealth, state and territory laws as in force at 1 August 2013 were
initially prescribed until 31 July 2014 to allow time for jurisdictions to
review their laws and assess compliance with the new protections against
discrimination. A review of Commonwealth laws found that this legislation was
able to operate in accordance with these new protections, and consequently no
Commonwealth laws have since been prescribed past this initial prescription
period.[66]
1.114
The Sex Discrimination Amendment (Exemptions) Regulation 2014
subsequently extended the sunset date applying to the prescription of state and
territory laws for a further 12-month period to 31 July 2015. The Sex
Discrimination Amendment (Exemptions) Regulation 2015 (2015 regulation) then
extended this for a further 12‑month period until 31 July 2016.
Extension of prescription period
1.115
The Sex Discrimination Amendment (Exemptions) Regulation 2016
(the regulation) extends the prescription of two Western Australian (WA)
Acts (the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA), and Surrogacy
Act 2008 (WA)) for a further 12-month period until 31 July 2017.
Compatibility of the measure with
the right to equality and non-discrimination
1.116
As the regulation further extends the period in which actions that would
otherwise constitute unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation, gender identity or intersex status under the prescribed
legislation would be exempted from these protections, the measure engages and
limits the right to equality and non‑discrimination.
1.117
The statement of compatibility for the regulation acknowledges that the
regulation engages and limits the right to equality and non-discrimination but
states that:
The limitation is based on reasonable and objective criteria
as it only extends two prescribed laws in force at 1 August 2013, which ensures
any laws passed after that date must comply with the existing protections from
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and
intersex status. The limitation is proportionate as it is for a short time
period, and no more restrictive than required. A period of less than 12 months
may not be sufficient to allow Western Australia time to amend its laws. The
Government does not propose any further extensions of this exemption after 31
July 2017.[67]
1.118
The regulation appears to identify the objective of allowing the states
and territories adequate time in which to review their legislation and assess
compliance with the new protections, and amend relevant laws accordingly.
1.119
However, questions arise as to whether this measure is rationally
connected and/or proportionate to this stated objective. It is now three years
since the SDA Amendment Act was introduced. It is unclear from the statement of
compatibility why this period has been insufficient to implement amendments to
all relevant state and territory legislation. The initial 12-month exemption
period ended on 31 July 2014, and was then extended on two previous occasions for
a further 12-month period, until 31 July 2016. Indeed the explanatory statement
for the most recent 2015 regulation stated that '[t]he Government does not
propose any further extensions of this exemption after 31 July 2016'.[68]
1.120
The statement of compatibility does not set out reasons as to why a
further period of 12 months is necessary for WA to implement the requisite
changes to the two remaining WA Acts, given the time that has already passed
without the changes having been made. It states that 'the limitation is
proportionate as it is for a short time period'.[69]
However, at the end of this extended prescription period on 31 July 2017, the
two WA Acts will have been exempted for a total of four years since the
measures came into effect. This means that individuals may continue to be
subject to discrimination under the two Acts without any legal recourse.
Continuing to subject individuals to discriminatory laws for any length of time
is a serious issue from the perspective of the right to equality and non-discrimination.
Accordingly, it is not clear that the measure is a proportionate means of
achieving its apparent objective of giving WA sufficient time to amend the two
Acts or that a further 12 month extension represents the least rights
restrictive approach.
Committee comment
1.121
The committee notes that the exemption from protections against
discrimination on the basis of a person's sexual orientation, gender identity
and intersex status engages and limits the right to equality and
non-discrimination.
1.122
The committee observes that the regulation pursues the apparent
objective of allowing the states and territories adequate time in which to
review their legislation and assess compliance with the new protections, and
amend relevant laws accordingly.
1.123
The committee further observes that the preceding legal analysis
raises questions as to whether the measure is effective in achieving and/or a
proportionate means of achieving its apparent objective.
1.124
The committee therefore seeks the advice of the Attorney-General as
to whether the further 12-month prescription period for the Human
Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) and Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) is
effective in achieving and/or proportionate to its apparent objective, and in
particular, why the previous three-year period has been insufficient to
implement the necessary amendments to these laws to ensure compliance with the
protections against discrimination on the basis of a person's sexual
orientation, gender identity and intersex status.
Advice only
1.125
The committee draws the following bills and instruments to the attention
of the relevant minister or legislation proponent on an advice only basis. The
committee does not require a response to these comments.
Appropriation Bill (No. 1) 2016-2017
Appropriation Bill (No. 2) 2016-2017
Purpose
|
Seek to appropriate money
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the ordinary annual services of
government (No. 1) and for services that are not the ordinary annual services
of the government (No. 2)
|
Portfolio
|
Finance
|
Introduced
|
House of Representatives,
31 August 2016
|
Rights
|
Multiple rights (see Appendix
2)
|
Background
1.126
The committee has previously considered the human rights implications of
appropriations bills in a number of reports,[70]
and they have been the subject of correspondence with the Department of
Finance.[71]
Potential engagement and limitation of human rights by appropriations Acts
1.127
Proposed government expenditure to give effect to particular policies
may engage and limit and/or promote a range of human rights. This includes
rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).[72]
1.128
In concluding its previous analysis of Appropriation Bill (No. 3)
2014-2015 and Appropriation Bill (No. 4) 2014-2015 (the 2014-2015 bills), the
committee noted:
...the allocation of funds via appropriations bills is
susceptible to a human rights assessment that is directed at broader questions
of compatibility—namely, their impact on progressive realisation obligations
and on vulnerable minorities or specific groups. In particular, the committee
considers there may be specific appropriations bills or specific appropriations
where there is an evident and substantial link to the carrying out of a policy
or program under legislation that gives rise to human rights concerns.[73]
Compatibility of the bills with
multiple rights
1.129
Like the 2014-2015 bills and previous appropriations bills, the current
bills are accompanied by a brief statement of compatibility, which notes that
the High Court has stated that, beyond authorising the withdrawal of money for
broadly identified purposes, appropriations Acts 'do not create rights and nor
do they, importantly, impose any duties'.[74]
The statements of compatibility conclude that, as their legal effect is limited
in this way, the bills do not engage, or otherwise affect, human rights.[75]
They also state that '[d]etailed information on the relevant appropriations...is
contained in the portfolio [Budget] statements'.[76]
No further assessment of the human rights compatibility of the bills is
provided.
1.130
Under international human rights law, Australia has obligations to respect,
protect and fulfil human rights. These include specific obligations to
progressively realise economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights using the
maximum of resources available;[77]
and a corresponding duty to refrain from taking retrogressive measures, or
backwards steps, in relation to the realisation of these rights. This means
that any reduction in allocated government funding for measures which realise
socio‑economic rights, such as specific health and education services,
may be considered as retrogressive in respect of the attainment of ESC rights
and, accordingly, must be justified for the purposes of international human
rights law.
1.131
The cited view of the High Court that appropriations Acts do not create
rights or duties as a matter of Australian law does not address the fact that
appropriations may nevertheless engage human rights for the purposes of
international law, as specific appropriations reducing expenditure may be
regarded as retrogressive, or as limiting rights. The appropriation of funds facilitates
the taking of actions which may affect both the progressive realisation of, and
the failure to fulfil, Australia's obligations under the treaties listed in the
Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.
1.132
The committee acknowledges that such bills present particular
difficulties for human rights assessment because they generally include
high-level appropriations for a wide range of outcomes and activities across
many portfolios. A human rights assessment of appropriations bills at the level
of individual measures may therefore not be practical or possible for the
purposes of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.
1.133
Despite this, the allocation of funds via appropriations bills is
susceptible to a human rights assessment directed at broader questions of
compatibility. For example, consideration could be directed to their impact on
progressive realisation obligations and on vulnerable minorities or specific
groups, such as children; women; Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples;
persons with disabilities; and ethnic minorities. Indeed, there is some
precedent in the Australian context for assessments of this nature in relation
to appropriations bills by government, which could inform the development of an
appropriate template for the assessment of appropriations bills for the
purposes of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.[78]
There is also a range of international resources to assist in the assessment of
budgets for human rights compatibility.[79]
Committee comment
1.134
The committee notes that the statements of compatibility for the
bills provide no assessment of their compatibility with human rights on the
basis that they do not engage or otherwise create or impact on human rights.
However, while the committee acknowledges that appropriations bills present
particular challenges in terms of human rights assessments, it notes that the
preceding legal analysis indicates that the appropriation of funds may engage
and potentially limit or promote a range of human rights that fall under the
committee's mandate.
1.135
Given the difficulty of conducting measure-level assessments of
appropriations bills, the committee recommends that consideration be given to
developing alternative templates for assessing their human rights
compatibility, drawing upon existing domestic and international precedents.
Relevant factors in such an approach could include consideration of:
-
whether the bills are compatible with Australia's obligations
of progressive realisation with respect to economic, social and cultural
rights; and
-
whether any reductions in the allocation of funding are
compatible with Australia's obligations not to unjustifiably take retrogressive
or backward steps in the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.
Criminal Code Amendment (War Crimes) Bill 2016
Purpose
|
Seeks to amend the Criminal
Code Act 1995 to provide that certain war crimes offences applicable in
non-international armed conflict do not apply to members of organised armed
groups; reflect the requirements of the international law principle of
proportionality in relation to attacks on military objectives in
non-international armed conflict; and makes a minor technical amendment
|
Portfolio
|
Attorney-General
|
Introduced
|
House of Representatives,
12 October 2016
|
Right
|
Life (see Appendix 2)
|
Permissible targeting of members of organised armed groups in non‑international
armed conflicts
1.136
The Criminal Code Amendment (War Crimes) Bill 2016 (the bill) seeks to
amend war crimes contained in division 268 of the Criminal Code Act 1995
(the Criminal Code). In particular, the bill seeks to amend the war crimes of
murder, mutilation and cruel treatment to provide that the offences will not
apply in respect of acts against persons who are members of an 'organised armed
group' in a non‑international armed conflict. Currently, the offences do
not apply in respect of people 'taking an active part in hostilities'.[80]
The effect of this exception is that those 'taking an active part in
hostilities' can be permissibly targeted (and killed or injured) as those
undertaking such targeting will not be subject to a criminal sanction. The
proposed amendments would add an additional class of persons who can be
permissibly targeted (and killed or injured): members of an 'organised armed
group'. The concept of 'organised armed group' and 'non‑international
armed conflict' are described in the statement of compatibility as follows:
A non-international armed conflict is an armed conflict which
involves one or more non-State organised armed groups. Hostilities in such a
conflict may occur between government forces and organised armed groups, or
between such groups only, depending on the circumstances.
The existence of an 'organised armed group' in a
non-international armed conflict will be determined by reference to the facts
in existence at the time. The key indicia are at least a minimal degree of
organisation, some kind of command structure or hierarchy, and the existence of
a collective purpose that is related to the broader hostilities and involves
the use of force. It is also necessary that the group be 'armed' and utilising
force to achieve its purposes, and that the group have sufficient connection to
the non-international armed conflict. An organised armed group may exist within
a larger entity; only those elements that engage in hostilities qualify as an
organised armed group.[81]
Compatibility of the measure with
the right to life
1.137
The right to life includes the prohibition on arbitrary killing and
requires that force be used as a matter of last resort. The use of force by
state authorities resulting in a person's death can only be justified if the
use of force was necessary, reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances
(see Appendix 2). The measures engage and may limit the right to life because,
as explained above, the effect of the proposed amendments would add an
additional class of persons who can be permissibly targeted, and therefore
killed or injured. This is because the person undertaking such targeting would
no longer be subject to criminal sanctions in relation to this additional
class.
1.138
The statement of compatibility recognises that the right to life may be
engaged by the amendments, but states:
...in situations of armed conflict the scope and content of
rights under international human rights law may be affected as a result of the
application of international humanitarian law. The specific interrelationship
between international human rights law and international humanitarian law is
not settled as a matter of international law. The protection of international
human rights law does not cease in situations of armed conflict. Human rights
obligations will continue to apply in situations of armed conflict, although
they may be displaced to the extent necessitated by international humanitarian
law. This will depend on the particular circumstances and obligations involved.
Thus, in situations of armed conflict, the prohibition
against the arbitrary deprivation of life contained in article 6 of the ICCPR
will be displaced to the extent necessitated by international humanitarian law.[82]
1.139
International humanitarian law (IHL) identifies a minimum standard of
conduct in situations of armed conflict. IHL does not impose many of the
positive human rights obligations guaranteed by international human rights law.
For example, the positive duty to investigate, as an aspect of the right to
life under international human rights law, applies to all deaths where the
state is involved.[83]
IHL is more circumscribed and requires only that governments investigate alleged
or suspected war crimes.[84]
1.140
While the full extent to which international human rights law applies in
the context of armed conflict is not settled as a matter of international law,
human rights obligations do apply to an army acting in an overseas operation
where they are exercising jurisdiction or 'effective control'.[85]
This is accepted in the statement of compatibility.[86]
When IHL does not provide a specific rule, or the meaning of this rule is
unclear, human rights law is an appropriate source for guidance as to the
content of the law in a situation of armed conflict.[87]
In a situation of armed conflict, the prohibition on arbitrary killing
continues to apply, but the question of whether a killing is arbitrary is
generally determined by applying the rules of IHL.[88]
1.141
In the context of non‑international armed conflicts, the rules of
IHL are less clear, especially with respect to combatants. The terms
'civilian', 'armed forces' and 'organised armed group' are used in the treaties
that govern non-international armed conflicts without being expressly defined.[89]
1.142
The explanatory memorandum states that the amendments 'reflect the
distinction that exists at international law between civilians and members of
an organised armed group.'[90]
However, the amendments made by the bill do not apply specific obligations in
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (that set out the core
obligations of IHL). The terms of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols themselves appear to contemplate that direct attacks on civilians are
only permitted where the civilians 'directly participate in hostilities'.[91]
1.143
Rather, the amendments made by the bill appear to be drawn from
commentary relating to customary IHL, in particular from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[92]
While the ICRC commentaries may provide soft law guidance in relation to the
application of IHL they do not provide a complete answer to human rights
concerns.[93]
1.144
Introducing an additional category of persons who may be targeted in a
non‑international armed conflict raises human right concerns because it
allows targeting of people who may not 'directly participate in hostilities'. A
person whose role within the organised armed group is not related to providing
assistance connected to the hostilities, or whose role in or membership of the
organised armed group may have changed or even ceased, would appear to be a
permissible target under the amendments. In this respect, the former Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions made the following
observations in his Study on Targeted Killings:
...the ICRC's Guidance raises concern from a human rights
perspective because of the "continuous combat function" (CCF)
category of armed group members who may be targeted anywhere, at any time. In
its general approach to DPH [direct participation in hostilities], the ICRC is
correct to focus on function (the kind of act) rather than status (combatant
vs. unprivileged belligerent), but the creation of CCF category is, de facto, a
status determination that is questionable given the specific treaty language
that limits direct participation to "for such time" as opposed to "all
the time."
Creation of the CCF category also raises the risk of
erroneous targeting of someone who, for example, may have disengaged from their
function. If States are to accept this category, the onus will be on them to
show that the evidentiary basis is strong. In addition, States must adhere to
the careful distinction the ICRC draws between continuous combatants who may always
be subject to direct attack and civilians who (i) engage in sporadic or
episodic direct participation (and may only be attacked during their
participation), or (ii) have a general war support function ("recruiters,
trainers, financiers and propagandists") or form the political wing of an
organized armed group (neither of which is a basis for attack).[94]
1.145
As the intent of the bill is to establish a specific status
determination for members of organised armed groups to be targeted in
non-international armed conflicts, the concerns raised by the former Special
Rapporteur are particularly relevant. Where customary norms of IHL applicable
to non-international armed conflicts may permit the targeting of members of
organised armed groups, there should be clarity about whether conduct could
subject persons who are otherwise not directly engaging in hostilities to being
killed. In cases where the killing of a person is not in accordance with IHL,
the obligations under the right to life, such as the duty to investigate, will
also be engaged.
Committee comment
1.146
The proposed amendment to the definition of the war crimes of murder,
mutilation and cruel treatment engages and may limit the right to life.
1.147
The effect of this amendment would be to permit the targeting
(including death or injury) of members of an 'organised armed group' without
the person targeted being subject to criminal sanctions.
1.148
The committee notes that the preceding legal analysis identifies
potential human rights concerns with respect to the right to life and targeting
of members of organised armed groups in non-international armed conflicts.
1.149
Noting the concerns raised above, the committee draws the human
rights implications of the bill to the attention of the Parliament.
Bills not raising human rights
concerns
1.150
Of the bills introduced into the Parliament between 7 and
10 November 2016, the following did not raise human rights concerns:[95]
-
Australian Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation
Authority Amendment (New Governance Arrangements) Bill 2016;
-
Civil Nuclear Transfers to India Bill 2016;
-
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Amendment (Support for
Commonwealth Entities) Bill 2016;
-
Interactive Gambling Amendment Bill 2016;
-
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Legislation Amendment
(Defence Force) Bill 2016;
-
Superannuation (Excess Transfer Balance Tax) Imposition Bill
2016;
-
Superannuation (Objective) Bill 2016;
-
Seafarers and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2016;
-
Seafarers Safety and Compensation Levies Bill 2016;
-
Seafarers Safety and Compensation Levies Collection Bill 2016;
-
Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2016; and
-
Treasury Laws Amendment (Fair and Sustainable Superannuation) Bill
2016.
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