- Other issues as communicated to Defence and identified by the Committee
Review of Department of Defence procurement matters
5.1During this inquiry, the Committee conducted a review of three specific case studies pertaining to procurement matters and the acceptance of new capabilities into service. This included consideration by a limited number of members of the Subcommittee of classified documents.
Australian Centre for International Justice
5.2The Australian Centre for International Justice (ACIJ) provided a submission in support of this inquiry, specifically in the context of Defence’s response to date to the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry, as addressed in the Department of Defence Annual Report 2021–22 (Annual Report).
5.3The ACIJ contended there are shortcomings in the lack of transparency about the progress and outcome of Defence responses. Specifically, the concerns pertain to the potential of further incidents not being captured within the IGADF report; Australia’s reparation plan may not be aligned to international best practice; and growing scepticism about the extent to which the proposed reforms will appropriately address cultural and organisational failings.
Committee comment
5.4In relation to the three procurement matters considered, the Subcommittee thanks the Minister for Defence and the Department of Defence for facilitating access to these materials and understanding the Subcommittee’s constructive intent in pursuing these issues. Noting the type of information and classification of material that was reviewed, the specifics will not be disclosed via this public report. These matters may be subject to further parliamentary scrutiny via other mechanisms and/or separate forums with Defence senior leadership given the constraints that currently apply to the Subcommittee and full Committee in conveying findings and making recommendations in relation to classified matters.
5.5The Committee invited Defence to respond to the ACIJ’s submission. The Committee welcomed the constructive supplementary submission from Defence addressed the holistic Afghanistan Inquiry Reform Program, recommendations relating to compensation, and transparency.
5.6The Committee understands the Afghanistan Inquiry Reform Plan was released on 30 Jul 2021, and acknowledges the establishment of the Afghanistan Inquiry Response Program (AIRP). The AIRP has the primary mandate to implement the recommendations referenced within the IGADF report.
5.7The Committee acknowledges that the AIRP is not solely limited to the Afghanistan Inquiry recommendations. This provides a mechanism to critically examine the root causes which is enabling collaboration with a range of stakeholders to implement meaningful reform.
5.8The Committee understands there have been challenges in implementing the recommendations regarding compensation payments to alleged victims noting the current geopolitical situation and the natural difficulties in identifying the appropriate personnel in Afghanistan. The Committee accepts Defence’s genuine intent to implement these recommendations and notes its collaboration with the Department of Finance, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Attorney-General’s Department to explore additional options to implement the relevant recommendations.
5.9The Committee notes the information available on the Defence Afghanistan Inquiry website which includes details of welfare support options for those who may be impacted by the Inquiry, including copies of the redacted Afghanistan Inquiry report, details of Defence’s response to the Inquiry’s recommendations, and answers to Frequently Asked Questions. This is an issue which the Subcommittee will endeavour to monitor periodically and seek an update in future Annual Report inquiries.
5.10The Committee recommends the Department of Defence continues to ensure that information publicly available on the Defence Afghanistan Inquiry website is regularly updated and specifically addresses the following criteria:
- details of redress pathways for Afghan victims and their families
- clear articulation as to how survivors, victims’ families, and affected communities should be informed about their rights and available remedies
- detailed information on planned and completed reforms within the ADF and how the reforms will address the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Report’s recommendations.
Other Defence Subcommittee activities
5.11During the annual report review, the JSCFADT – Defence Subcommittee conducted a series of site inspections and received briefings to better understand the pressures on Defence as well as ensuring the Committee appropriately fulfills its parliamentary oversight responsibilities by receiving information firsthand by commanders in each location.
5.12Of note, was the Defence Subcommittee inspections of Western Australia and Northern Territory Defence facilities in August 2023. The Defence Subcommittee visited HMAS Stirling, Campbell Barracks, RAAF Base Learmonth, Naval Communication Station Harold E Holt, RAAF Base Curtin, RAAF Base Tindal, and HMAS Coonawarra / Larrakeyah Barracks.
5.13These interactions enabled the Committee to receive enhanced situational awareness of the realities of the DSR recommendations and AUKUS force posture requirements. This enabled greater appreciation as to how this strategic force posture change and evolution will inform and support the National Defence Strategy, and understanding current and emerging issues including personnel, capability, and infrastructure across key sectors of Defence.
Committee comment
5.14The Committee deeply values the effort and resources that Defence invested to facilitate the intensive visit of Defence Subcommittee members to Western Australia and the Northern Territory. It was instructive, both from a strategic and operational level, and the professionalism displayed by Defence and ADF personnel across all facilities and capabilities was inspiring.
5.15It is both obvious and a matter of great concern that critical infrastructure upgrades at strategically important remote airbases and bare bases have been neglected for decades. Investments were proposed and planned in 2010–2012 yet never occurred. It is acknowledged that major investment at RAAF Base Tindal is now underway, and that planning appears to be accelerating in the context of the Defence Strategic Review for investments at RAAF Base Learmonth and RAAF Base Curtin, which is welcome.
5.16While the Subcommittee does not seek to become a roving complaints shop or replicate Defence’s robust internal processes for the allocation of funds to minor and medium capital works and maintenance activities, a number of things observed raise systemic questions of interest.
5.17In particular, the Committee seeks further information regarding Defence’s allocation of moderate works in the context of several areas observed at RAAF Base Learmonth. It is not prudent to mention all issues discussed in this public report, however, two examples are noted:
- the peculiarity of having no air-conditioning in the limited maintenance work sheds – those that must work in these sheds report that in hot weather which regularly reaches 40 degrees Celsius, and on such days, it is only possible to work approximately 10% of the time in short iterations. This is clearly ridiculous and a false economy. The Subcommittee is keen to understand how such a requirement is proposed, the criteria on which it is assessed and how decisions are made – in particular what weight is given to common sense local command input
- sewerage system capacity constraints which may limit the number of people that can be realistically accommodated in a contingency to less than the number of beds available or required. The Subcommittee seeks to understand the interplay between the consideration of these sort of discrete and essential works in the moderate works program and future major capital upgrade projects.
- The Subcommittee was seriously disturbed to observe that Defence had allowed the pier supporting diesel refuelling of the Harold E Holt Naval Communications Station to get into such a state of disrepair. The old adage ‘prevention is better than cure’ seems to have been ignored, with essential ongoing or moderate maintenance activities being deferred to a larger future capital upgrade that has not occurred. Without providing further public comment at this stage, this is an issue of ongoing interest to the Subcommittee.
- Finally, the Subcommittee was privileged to spend time at Campbell Barracks with the Special Air Services Regiment (SASR). Formal and informal discussions make clear the scale of the Regiment’s transformation in light of the recommendations of the 2020 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan inquiry report, and the strategic circumstances Australia faces.
- Australians have every right to expect our public institutions to confront wrongdoing – for individuals to be held to account, and for leaders to take responsibility to lead required change. As is appropriate, there is a clear and unequivocal acknowledgment by senior leaders of an institutional failure over a decade ago in Afghanistan in upholding international law and the standards expected. The Subcommittee was briefed again in detail on the deep strategic alignment and cultural alignment work that has occurred.
- Past failures of course, in any human endeavour, must be kept in perspective and need not define an institution or every individual provided that change has occurred. The Subcommittee is concerned that public discourse and media reporting in relation to these events implicitly and wrongly conflates the past and the present. The events of concern occurred well over a decade ago. The rightful acceptance of institutional and collective responsibility for cultural failings, and the process of holding individuals to account, must not be allowed to tar the reputations of the majority of those who served then and who serve today.
- Overwhelmingly, Australians who served in Afghanistan did so with distinction. SASR has a proud history, has accepted responsibility for the failings of a few, and has been transformed as it continues to self-reflect and learn.
- SASR have risked and continue to risk their lives in the service of our country including on missions past and present that cannot be publicly disclosed. It is notable that more special forces members have lost their lives in training than operational service, such is the dangerous nature of what they are required to do.
5.24The Committee recommends the Government consider how the estate works program accommodates minor works that may not carry immediate/urgent risk, but which local commanders identify as priorities which would enhance critical capacity in advance of major planned works. For example, at RAAF Base Learmonth, areas like air conditioning in the maintenance sheds to enable work to continue in hot weather or sewerage system upgrades to remove a practical capacity limitation.
5.25The Committee recommends the Department of Defence report back to the Committee in 3 months and then 6 months, from the tabling of this report regarding the:
- progress of urgent works required to enable diesel refuelling to occur from the jetty at Harold E Holt Naval Communications Station and other short-medium termed planned remediation works
- specific circumstances which led to the deterioration of this mission critical asset over the last five or more years and an explanation of failures in the capability assurance mechanism.
5.26The Committee recommends that in the context of the continuing implementation of the 2020 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan inquiry report and any legal proceedings that may arise, the Government and Parliamentarians strive hard to publicly articulate the:
- critical and unique role capabilities of Australia’s Special Forces
- overwhelming professionalism of those elite forces who served in Afghanistan and serve Australia today
- significant transformations that have occurred over the last decade
understanding that individual and institutional failures over a decade ago do not define all those who serve or served, and that security classifications mean the majority of their good work to keep our country safe may never be known, hence the Government and Parliament bears the responsibility to highlight the importance of their service.
Mr Julian Hill MP
Chair
Defence Subcommittee
13 September 2023
Hon Shayne Neumann MP
Chair
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
13 September 2023