- Support to national crisis
Overview
4.1The increasing frequency and seemingly near constant occurrence of natural disasters and domestic crises is creating concurrency pressures on Defence that risk its overall warfighting preparedness and capabilities. This highlights the importance of investigating and potentially developing a more robust and better resourced national disaster response framework, that lessens the frequency and extent of reliance on Defence.
4.2This chapter focuses on workforce pressures, including the substantial percentage of Defence personnel that have directly supported domestic disaster relief tasks since 2019. This continual commitment at scale impacts the ADF’s preparedness, places increased pressure on specialist capabilities and creates new risks to national security.
4.3Evidence received by academic contributors reiterated the reality of the ADF’s force posture requirements and its levels of preparedness would continually be affected if Defence remains a force of choice for domestic crisis response. The frequency of natural disasters further complicates this, noting Defence’s remit to assist partner nations in the region if requested.
4.4The Committee analysed the deployment of the Reserves to create additional capacity to complement the ADF’s total workforce system, noting a high proportion of reservists are also engaged as first responders and in other disaster response related roles. Evidence received from Defence and academic bodies discussed the realities of preparedness implications and the impacts to Australia’s national security architecture.
4.5Finally, the Committee received and reviewed evidence regarding design principles for alternative models, and acknowledges the ongoing Senate Select Committee’s inquiry on Australia's Disaster Resilience. This chapter offers some initial perspectives and recommendations while not seeking to replicate the material being considered in more detail by the Senate inquiry for the Government’s consideration.
Strategic context
4.6The DSR referenced the employment of ADF resources to conduct domestic disaster relief was increasingly in tension with the requirement to resource operations and activities to defend Australia and its national interests.
4.7Defence's mission and purpose is to defend Australia and its national interests in order to advance Australia’s security and prosperity. While Defence’s primary remit is the conduct of military operations and activities, history has proven that it also has responsibility to support civilian communities and authorities in response to natural disasters. This has resulted in competing pressures noting the changing strategic circumstances that are challenging the rules-based global order, and the frequency of natural disasters requiring Government-led intervention and assistance.
4.8Climate change is becoming an increasingly important strategic-level consideration when analysing future domestic crisis relief national frameworks. Future response options will need to account for a near-persistent effect, requiring a robust and scalable architecture, and capable of responding to significant and potentially concurrent natural disasters.
4.9In the event there remains an over-reliance on the ADF responding to domestic and regional humanitarian and disaster relief operations, these concurrency pressures will ultimately affect the ADF’s preparedness, readiness, and combat effectiveness.
Workforce pressures
4.10Since 2019, Defence committed over 35,000 personnel from a workforce of approximately 62,000 in support of domestic disaster relief tasks. This placed pressure on the holistic workforce, as well as impacting specialist areas. As an example, the medical response during COVID was sustained on what is a proportionally small capability.
4.11Defence referenced the increased risk of it being able to achieve its directed mission due to personnel availability, and this will continue if workforce pressures are not appropriately addressed. Retention and recruiting mitigation strategies have been implemented but will take time to have an effect.
4.12Defence’s total workforce system is used to enhance personnel capability output as required. Support to domestic disaster relief tasks have proven that Defence Reserves have not created significant additional capacity in supporting domestic disaster relief operations. Defence stated that:
while Army’s 2nd Division (Reserve Division) has been restructured to better coordinate Defence engagement with other Commonwealth, state and territory organisations, the high representation of first responders, Australian Public Servants, and critical medical practitioners in the Reserves, often resulted in these Reservists remaining in their core employment as this best meets the needs of rendering domestic disaster relief.
4.13The Reserves are vulnerable to the same concurrency pressures faced by the ADF permanent workforce. Air Vice Marshal Steven Chappell noted the prioritisation of where many reservists serve at time of crisis is informed by their primary employment. This has resulted in the ADF not being able to meaningfully increase its numbers to augment and offset the pressure on the permanent force during disaster relief operations.
4.14Dr Alex Bristow from ASPI referenced the potential for Government to access a parallel workforce. Dr Bristow articulates the difficulty with this option, noting it will likely be the same personnel that are already undertaking key roles in state and territory crisis response. Although there are benefits in States and Territories taking on greater levels of responsibility, the cost-benefit analysis will likely result in requests for the Commonwealth to fund this new support apparatus.
ADF preparedness implications
4.15Defence is prepared to provide domestic disaster relief through the Chief of the Defence Force Preparedness Directive (CPD). In the event of domestic natural disasters, Defence provides an appropriate level of response in both emergency and non-emergency situations based on Australian Government direction within standing arrangements. This assistance delivers an outcome or effect at a time when the States or Territories own resources are unlikely to be sufficient or have been overwhelmed.
4.16Defence acknowledged that while it is proactively postured to support the response to domestic disaster relief, the unprecedented scale, duration, and frequency of support called out in recent years is unsustainable without accepting significant impacts to ADF preparedness for its primary defence of Australia role. Dr Bristow supported the ADF being able to predominately focus on national security threats as a result of current geostrategic competition; however, acknowledges the difficulty in securing a pathway which sees it spared from the near-persistent support requirements to domestic disaster relief tasks.
4.17The concurrency pressures faced by the ADF also presents additional national security issues. Dr Dowse referenced the potential for adversaries to leverage such concurrency pressures as an opportunity to target civil infrastructure and populations via hybrid-warfare. Dr John Blaxland stated that it is ‘conceivable that an adversary could create or exploit a crisis in Australia’s neighbourhood, presenting a challenge to find the resources needed to respond appropriately, mindful of Australia’s recent over-reliance on the ADF for domestic crisis management’.
4.18Economies from conducting disaster relief tasks need to be considered through ADF preparedness requirements. Specific activities involving the use of specialised skills including air mobility, engineering, and medical can be mutually beneficial from a force preparedness perspective. RAND Australia referenced however, that general labour tasks provide limited training benefit and tasks such as firefighting and emergency response diverge from the capabilities of the ADF.
Alternate models and organisational adjustment
4.19The Committee received evidence that suggested there needs to be a clear distinction between domestic and international crisis response. This would improve current Defence policy, and by clarifying the primary response options for both ‘national’ and ‘international’, it will allow Defence to concentrate its efforts in our near region, especially in the Pacific Island countries, including the training of local agencies through the Defence Cooperation Program.
4.20Alternative models must be explored to ensure that Defence remains a force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community. Defence states:
The Department of Home Affairs with support from other Government agencies, is considering options for creating additional capacity for the Commonwealth to support states and territories in responding to natural disasters. Defence is supporting this initiative.
4.21The Committee noted the ongoing Senate Select Committee’s inquiry on Australia's Disaster Resilience. Defence suggested that a deployable contingency workforce may alleviate the over-reliance on the ADF at time of crisis. Disaster Relief Australia supported this initiative and articulated two primary benefits:
The first is that it will alleviate the impacts to ADF preparedness. The second is that it will provide an additional benefit to Defence by engaging ADF personnel in a civilian organisation ahead of discharge, thereby assisting them with their transition from ADF service.
4.22Alternative models include having a percentage of the ADF permanently assigned, on a rotational basis, in preparation for domestic crisis response tasks. This would enable the remainder of the force to concentrate on warfighting and prepare for conflict. Dr Bristow proposed that a better option would be ‘strengthening the Commonwealth’s role in crisis response beyond the ADF and its reserves, potentially rebalancing some of the responsibilities presently resting with States and Territories’.
4.23ASPI recommended the following are implemented in support of national crisis:
- Prioritise building civilian capabilities for national resilience and response in the National Defence Strategy, freeing the ADF to focus on geostrategic threats and regional response
- Distinguish which facets of national crises involve malign actors and states and allow Defence to focus on those, while civilian agencies handle disaster relief
- Use plain language in the 2024 National Defence Strategy to communicate honestly with the Australian public about their role in whole-of-nation crisis response, which will include preparations for peace and wartime situations.
- Australia may benefit from a unifying national scheme. RAND Australia supported this perspective and articulated the importance of professional debate and discussion to explore the most relevant ideas. Dr Dowse proposed options that include retiring a HECS debt because of community service linked to a national response workforce.
- Dr Blaxland proposed an Australian Universal Scheme for National and Community Service in which a ‘voluntary, incentivised scheme that harnesses Australian traditions of volunteer service and mutual assistance would help Australia to respond more effectively to these contemporary challenges’.
Committee comment
4.26The Committee concludes the near-persistent requirement for Defence to respond to natural disasters and domestic crises is creating an unsustainable concurrency pressure that will soon lead to the degradation of the ADF’s warfighting capability. This is exacerbated by the significant challenges in recruitment and retention given the strength of the economy.
4.27The Committee is firmly of the view that the ADF must be seen as a force of last resort to aid the civilian community in natural disasters and be called only to provide truly unique capabilities that only the ADF possess or essential surge capacities when State and Territory responses are genuinely overwhelmed. The ADF cannot continue to be seen as some sort of ‘shadow workforce’, especially in circumstances where certain States or Territories have not adequately resourced and increased their own capabilities, and community resilience and responses.
4.28These plain-speaking conclusions may be confronting to some, however the risks to Australia are genuine and profound:
- There is a real risk now that the ADF’s warfighting capabilities will soon be degraded. This problem is compounded as it is occurring at a time when geo-strategic competition is challenging the rules-based global order and in which rapidly increased strength is essential to deter conflict
- Concurrency pressures are also creating new opportunities for potential adversaries and malign actors to exploit these vulnerabilities via information operations and hybrid warfare
Put plainly again, if the civilian community are over-reliant on the ADF to provide responses to now predictable annual natural disasters in Australia and our near region, this provides an easy opportunity to take hostile cyber, kinetic or hybrid actions coercing governments to make impossible choices. These words and these conclusions should not be taken lightly by Australians or any Parliamentarian.
4.29The Committee supports the initiative by the Federal Emergency Management Minister in developing options for resilience and response options to address now essentially annual climate related crises. The Committee has not reached detailed conclusions as to what the appropriate responses may be, which will be determined by governments, taking into account the report of the Senate inquiry. The Committee notes, however, and would support proposals such as assigning Disaster Relief Australia as a national body, ensuring greater resources are rapidly made available in the States and Territories for both institutional and community-based responders, and investigating the formulation of a scalable deployable contingency workforce.
4.30The Committee notes the very significant percentage of Defence members that have been assigned to domestic disaster relief tasks (over 50% of the ADF in recent years) as well as the specialisations that experience a near-persistent and unsustainable level of commitment.
4.31The Committee concludes that it is profoundly naive to rely on the Reserves to meaningfully supplement the permanent ‘first responder’ workforce in times of national crises. This is because a high proportion of reservists’ primary occupations are already in areas that are critical for disaster relief operations including first responders, public servants, and critical medical practitioners. This tension is not abating in the short to medium term; therefore, alternative workforce strategies need to be explored.
4.32The Committee recommends the Government notes the Committee’s:
- acceptance of the evidence provided by the Department of Defence regarding the impact of domestic operations to its warfighting preparedness
- view that the current disaster response model between the Commonwealth and the relevant States and Territories is not sustainable noting the near-persistent expectation of ADF support and concerning impacts that risk ADF readiness and warfighting capabilities
- conclusion that States and Territories should continue to take the lead in their response to natural disasters and need to adequately resource their responsibilities to limit reliance on the ADF to genuinely unique capabilities or truly exceptional circumstances.
4.33The Committee recommends the Government use the National Defence Strategy to clearly articulate:
- the expectations of all Australians as part of a whole of nation crisis response
- distinguishing between disaster relief and national crisis involving malign actors and states, and national and international crisis response
- concurrency pressures and the real-time risk to a response to national crises as well as the commitment of the ADF abroad
- the ongoing risks arising from climate change and how that is informing Government-led initiatives.