Current threat environment
Federal legislative framework for
countering terrorism
Offences
Terrorist organisation proscription
Powers
Australia’s broader counter-terrorism
framework
Citizenship revocation: national
security and foreign policy issues for consideration
Can the current threats be addressed
using existing powers?
National security and
counter-terrorism considerations
Potential for perverse outcomes
Missed opportunities?
International cooperation and foreign
policy considerations
How citizenship revocation fits
within the broader counter-terrorism framework
Conclusion
Introduction
On 24 June 2015, the Government
introduced a Bill that would provide that a dual national’s Australian
citizenship ceases if the person engages in ‘terrorist-related conduct’—legislation
foreshadowed by Prime Minister Tony Abbott in his February 2015 National
Security Statement.[1]
The Government has explained the rationale behind the Australian Citizenship
Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 from two main perspectives:
safeguarding Australia’s national security, and upholding Australian values by
limiting citizenship to individuals who ‘continue to retain an allegiance to
Australia’.[2]
From the national security perspective, the Government argues that keeping
certain people out of Australia, and removing certain people from Australia,
will reduce the chances of terrorism-related offences being committed here.[3]
Recent polling indicates strong community support for
Australian citizenship being revoked on national security grounds.[4]
In a survey conducted by Essential in June 2015, 81 per cent of
respondents supported the stripping of citizenship from dual nationals who are
‘engaged in terrorism or supporting terror groups’.[5]
That survey, as well as a Fairfax-Ipsos poll conducted in July 2015, found
around three-quarters of respondents support citizenship revocation for sole
nationals who take part in terrorist activities if they are able to obtain
citizenship elsewhere (73 and 75 per cent respectively).[6]
Citizenship revocation on national security grounds also has some support among
defence and security commentators.[7]
The measure also has its share of detractors. However, much
of the commentary surrounding the proposal, and the Bill more specifically, has
focused on the mechanism through which a person may lose their citizenship and
whether such an action would be constitutional.[8]
Relatively less attention has been paid to the threshold question of whether
citizenship revocation is a suitable response to the issue at hand. From a
national security standpoint, the question is whether the measure will, on
balance, make Australia a safer place.
This paper outlines some background and context to the
Government’s proposal and highlights some of the broader counter-terrorism and
foreign policy issues that arise from the general proposal to revoke
citizenship on national security grounds. Both aspects of this paper are
intended to bring to the Parliament’s attention matters relevant to
consideration of the threshold question posed above.
This paper does not address other aspects of the proposal,
such as those relating to statelessness, broader human rights implications and
whether citizenship is a right or a privilege. Nor does it provide analysis of
the specific proposals put forward under the Australian Citizenship Amendment
(Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 (the Bill). The Parliamentary Library will
publish its analysis of that Bill separately in a Bills Digest.
The evolving nature of the threat of terrorism and violent
extremism following the September 2001 terrorist attacks has changed the way
that governments around the world respond to prevent terrorism-related violence
and deaths. Most recently, many countries have become particularly concerned
about issues associated with their nationals fighting with overseas terrorist
and insurgent groups (‘foreign fighters’[9])
and different forms of ‘home-grown’ terrorism—whether it be individuals
associated with particular groups, or so-called ‘lone wolf’ or ‘lone actor’
threats.[10]
The foreign fighter phenomenon is not a new issue.[11]
However, the international community, and Western nations in particular, are
especially worried about the implications of foreign fighters participating in
current conflicts in places such as Iraq and Syria.[12]
A range of factors feeds into this, including the ease of travel to some
conflict zones, particularly Syria; new and changing motivations; and a
different cohort (younger, with a higher proportion of women and a lower
proportion known to authorities).[13]
However, the sheer number of foreign fighters who have recently joined
conflicts in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere has been a key cause for concern.
The most recent estimate of the size of the current wave of
foreign fighters was released by the United Nations in May 2015. The
Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee estimated over 25,000 foreign fighters from
more than 100 countries were ‘involved with groups associated with Al-Qaida’.[14]
This included more than 20,000 in Iraq and Syria, with the remainder primarily
in Afghanistan and smaller numbers in countries such as Yemen, Libya, Pakistan
and Somalia. These totals include those who have been killed and those who have
since returned home or moved on to other countries, and therefore may
significantly overestimate the number currently involved in fighting.[15]
While the report does not provide a breakdown by country, it does state there
has been a ‘sharp increase’ in the number of fighters travelling from European
and Asian countries.[16]
An earlier estimate that included country breakdowns indicated the majority of
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq were from other Middle Eastern countries,
with up to 4,000 from Western Europe and 3,000 from former Soviet states.[17]
The international community’s concerns in relation to
foreign fighters fall into two categories. The first relates to their
involvement in the conflicts, such as the boost they provide to terrorist
organisations and insurgent groups, most prominently the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), the impact this can have on the nature and duration of
those conflicts, and their engagement in atrocities.[18]
More relevant to the Bill is the second category—the issues they raise,
including potential threats to security, on return to their home country or
movement to a third country. Countries from which foreign fighters have
originated are worried they will use their experience to stage terrorist
attacks in their home countries, or contribute to terrorism in other ways
following their return, such as recruiting others to the cause, providing
training or raising funds.[19]
The most comprehensive study on the topic indicates that
most returned foreign fighters from Western countries do not go on to be
involved in terrorism plots in the West—but that some do. Thomas Hegghammer’s
2013 study was based on foreign fighters from Europe, the United States, Canada
and Australia who travelled between 1990 and 2010 (before the civil war in
Syria, and before the emergence of ISIL in its current form). Hegghammer
indicates that attempts to reach a reliable estimate of the total number of fighters
are ‘fraught with problems’ and while the estimates he drew on could be used to
support a ‘maximum estimate’ of 7,500, he adopted a ‘best minimal estimate’ of
945 for the study.[20]
He found that ‘no more than one in nine’ (that is, 107 of the 945–7,500) was
later involved in planning attacks in the West (with 24 of 106 plots carried
through to execution):
On the one hand, this rate suggests that far from all foreign
fighters are domestic fighters-in-the-making. On the other hand, a one-in-nine
radicalization rate would make foreign fighter experience one of the strongest
predictors of individual involvement in domestic operations that we know.[21]
Hegghammer and others have warned against conflating
insurgents, foreign fighters and domestic terrorists. There are some important
differences in the motivations of individuals that fall into each of those
categories, which are themselves not homogeneous.[22]
There is also a range of other complexities to be confronted. Some research
indicates that terrorism plots in the West that involve former foreign fighters
are both more likely to come to fruition and more likely to result in
fatalities.[23]
Some research suggests that those who only train with jihadist groups overseas
are more likely to perpetrate attacks following their return than those who
actually engaged in combat.[24]
While a relatively small proportion of returnees might pose threats to
security, there are difficulties associated with determining who they are.[25]
Further, some analysts have put forward a number of potential mitigating and
exacerbating factors that might affect the extent of the threat posed by the
current wave of foreign fighters, compared to those involved in past conflicts.[26]
The measures countries are taking in response to foreign
fighters fall into two main categories: repressive or security-based measures,
and so-called ‘softer’ measures focused on de-radicalisation and disengagement.[27]
Generally, countries pursue measures of both kinds to some degree, with debate
over the right balance between the two.[28]
Revoking a person’s citizenship on national security grounds
falls into the first category. Several other countries, including the United
Kingdom, Canada and France, allow a person’s citizenship to be revoked on
national security grounds. However, the circumstances in which a person’s
citizenship may be revoked, associated processes, and scope for appeal are
different under each model.[29]
The UK has gone the furthest, most recently updating its laws to allow
citizenship to be revoked from a naturalised citizen in certain circumstances
if the Home Secretary has
reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able to become
a national of another country or territory.[30]
The UK law has been challenged on several occasions and both the law and its
use by the Government have attracted considerable debate and criticism.[31]
Measures that fall into the second category include the
well-regarded Deradicalisation–Targeted Intervention program (which includes
the ‘Aarhus model’) in Denmark, and EXIT—Deutschland (extreme right-wing
movements) and HAYAT—Deutschland (radical Salafist and violent jihadist groups)
programs in Germany.[32]
These programs include tailored assistance to individuals to help them break
away and stay away from extremist groups and violent extremism, and reintegrate
into broader society through measures such as counselling, mentoring and help
with education, employment and housing.[33]
Both countries also have prison-based programs that work with inmates convicted
of terrorist or extremist crimes and, in the case of Denmark, inmates
radicalised in the prison environment.[34]
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO)
latest report to Parliament highlighted terrorism as one of the key threats to
Australia’s national security. While it also mentions far-right extremism in
that context, it highlights violent jihadism as the principal terrorist threat,
and points in particular to risks associated with Australians travelling
overseas to train or fight with extremist organisations, supporting the cause
from Australia, and lone actors.[35]
On 12 September 2014, outgoing Director-General of Security, David Irvine,
recommended that the National Terrorism Public Alert System terrorism threat
level be changed from medium to high, meaning a terrorist attack is ‘likely’.[36]
On 24 June 2015, the Prime Minister stated there
are ‘at least 120 Australians’ currently fighting with terrorist organisations
in Syria and Iraq (such as ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra), and that ‘at least 160
Australians’ are supporting those organisations with financing and recruitment
from Australia.[37]
ASIO’s report to Parliament states that Australians also continue to fight with
or otherwise support extremist organisations engaged in conflicts in other
countries such as Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan.[38]
The same day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told Parliament the Government
believes around 30 Australians have been killed fighting in Syria and Iraq.[39]
She did not specify with whom those people were fighting. Accordingly, that
total would appear to include Australians killed while fighting with Kurdish
forces (with whom Australia and coalition partners are cooperating) against
ISIL, as well as those fighting with ISIL or other proscribed terrorist
organisations.[40]
ASIO has stated that around 30 Australians have returned from fighting in
Syria and Iraq, with the ‘vast majority’ having returned before ISIL declared
its ‘caliphate’ in June 2014. This figure includes those fighting for and
against the Syrian regime.[41]
As at 23 July 2015, none of those individuals had been ‘involved in
activities of security concern’ or convicted for terrorism-related offences
following their return.[42]
The proportion of known foreign fighters who have gone on
to be convicted of terrorism-related offences in Australia has been higher than
pre-ISIL averages across several Western nations. The Prime Minister stated
that ‘of the 25 Australians who had returned home after training with
terrorists in Afghanistan or Pakistan, 19 were subsequently involved in
terrorist plotting and eight were convicted of terrorism offences’.[43]
Given the considerably higher number of Australians now involved in overseas
conflicts, this is, as the Prime Minister has put it, a ‘daunting precedent’.[44]
That said, a range of factors may mean that even without measures to prevent the
re-entry of foreign fighters, the risk may not be as great as those figures
might suggest.
A number of Australians have already died in combat; it is
likely that others will join them. Byman and Shapiro have suggested the
proportion of foreign fighters killed in combat is likely to be much higher
than previous conflicts due to ‘the ferocity of the fighting (and infighting)
there’.[45]
Further, given the choice, not all Australians currently fighting with
terrorist organisations in Iraq and Syria would be likely to return.[46]
As noted earlier in this paper, there is research suggesting
that those who train with terrorist groups overseas pose more of a threat on
return than those who actually engaged in combat. Prior to 2012, most
Australian foreign fighters were not engaged in combat—they mainly trained in
Afghanistan and Pakistan and performed support roles in Lebanon and Yemen. In
Iraq and Syria, a higher proportion of Australians is reportedly involved in
combat roles.[47]
Israeli and European intelligence officials have suggested that the training
foreign fighters in Syria do receive may not be particularly well-matched to
the skills that would be useful in planning and conducting attacks in the West.[48]
Australian security agencies may also be more alert to
returning foreign fighters than they would have been in earlier years,
particularly the 1990s, and more experienced and prepared to deal with terrorism
plots.[49]
However, this needs to be balanced against increased resource pressures
associated with monitoring a higher number of individuals. As at
June 2015, ASIO was pursuing ‘more than 400 high-priority
counter-terrorist investigations’.[50]
Since September 2014, state and federal police have
conducted a number of counter-terrorism operations, and reportedly disrupted
six planned attacks.[51]
There has also been the stabbing of two police officers in Melbourne in
September 2014 and the Martin Place siege in December 2014.[52]
The Attorney-General pointed out in June 2015 that since
September 2014, 23 Australians had been charged ‘as a result of 8
counter-terrorism operations’ and that the same number of Australians were
convicted of terrorism-related offences between 2001 and September 2014.[53]
The charging of 23 individuals does not necessarily equate
to 23 counter-terrorism convictions. Firstly, not everyone charged between
2001 and September 2014 was convicted, and likewise it should not be
assumed that those charged since necessarily will be.[54]
Secondly, while they may have resulted from counter-terrorism operations, not
all of the recent charges are for counter-terrorism related offences. For
example, some of those facing charges resulting from Operation Appleby and
Operation Bolton relate to possession of drugs and weapons.[55]
Nonetheless, that number of recent disruptions and resulting charges within
such a short space of time should be taken seriously.
The following sections briefly outline some of the laws
and powers Australia already has in place to deal with terrorist threats, with
a focus on some of the key elements of the latest round of reforms, and
highlights some of the broader issues that citizenship revocation powers raise
from a national security and foreign policy perspective.
The Bill is the latest in the third major package of reforms
brought forward since 2001.
Following the events of 11 September 2001 in the
United States and the subsequent United Nations Security Council Resolution
1373 (2001), the Australian Government, in cooperation with the states and
territories, embarked on a series of significant legislative reforms to respond
to the threat of terrorism.[56]
The reforms included special powers for ASIO, a range of new offences and the
introduction of a mechanism for the proscription of terrorist organisations.[57] The London
bombings in July 2005 prompted further reforms, including the introduction
of the control order and preventative detention order regimes, and additional
police powers in relation to suspected terrorism offences.[58]
The latest package began with the introduction of the Bill
for the National Security Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014 in
July 2014, and continued with the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment
(Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Foreign Fighters Act), Counter-Terrorism
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014 and, arguably, the Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015.[59]
These Acts have extended and significantly expanded existing powers and
offences and introduced a range of additional powers and offences.[60]
The most relevant in the context of the current Bill is the Foreign Fighters
Act, which introduced broad-ranging amendments primarily aimed at
addressing the increased threat of terrorism posed by Australians engaging in,
and returning from, conflicts in foreign countries.[61]
As stated on the Government’s Australian National Security
website, ‘Australia has long played a leading role in the development of laws
to combat terrorism. The Australian Government has an extensive legislative
regime around counter-terrorism, national security and other
cross-jurisdictional offences’.[62]
Some of the key components are outlined briefly below.
The Criminal Code Act 1995 contains a broad range
of terrorism-related offences, including offences that criminalise conduct
relating to supporting, advocating or planning terrorist attacks, in addition
to direct involvement.[63]
Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code includes
offences relating to:
-
terrorist acts, including a range of preparatory offences
(Division 101)
-
terrorist organisations, such as directing their activities,
membership, recruiting, training and providing funds or other support
(Division 102) and
-
financing terrorism (Division 103).[64]
Part 5.5 of the Criminal Code includes offences
relating to foreign incursions and recruitment, including preparatory offences
and the recently introduced offence of entering or remaining in an area
declared by the Foreign Minister.
Australia’s terrorist organisation proscription scheme is
set out in Division 102 of the Criminal Code. The Governor-General
may proscribe a group by regulation if the Attorney-General is satisfied on
reasonable grounds that it is ‘directly
or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the
doing of a terrorist act’ or ‘advocates the doing of a terrorist act’.[65] Such a regulation remains in effect for
three years unless it is repealed or ceases earlier, or a new regulation is
made that replaces it.[66]
Guidelines available on the Australian Government’s National
Security website provide further detail on the process of listing terrorist
organisations, including the roles of different government agencies, factors considered
when determining whether to list an organisation, and monitoring, re-listing
and de-listing.[67]
As at 21 July 2015, there were
20 organisations proscribed under the scheme.[68]
The terrorist organisation offences in Division 102 apply in relation to proscribed
organisations and any found by a court to be a terrorist organisation.[69]
Division 104 of the Criminal Code contains the federal
control order regime. Recently updated, the objects of the control order
regime are now to allow obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be
imposed on a person for the purposes of:
-
protecting the public from a terrorist attack
-
preventing the provision of support for, or the facilitation of,
a terrorist act and/or
-
preventing the provision of support for, or the facilitation of,
engagement in a ‘hostile activity’ in a foreign country.[70]
A control order may be made by an issuing court on
application from a senior Australian Federal Police (AFP) member if it is
satisfied of particular matters, including that the obligations, prohibitions
and restrictions to be imposed under the order are reasonably necessary,
appropriate and adapted to serving one of the above purposes.[71]
Division 105 of the Criminal Code contains the federal
preventative detention order regime. The purpose of the regime is to
allow a person to be taken into custody for a limited time period in order to
either prevent an imminent terrorist act from occurring or preserve evidence
of, or in relation to, a recent terrorist act.[72]
A member of the AFP may apply to a senior member of the AFP for an order
against a person 16 years of age or older, for an initial period of
24 hours. An order permitting detention for up to 48 hours may only
be granted by certain members of the judiciary and certain members of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.[73]
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
Act 1979 sets out ASIO’s functions and powers.[74]
Of particular relevance is Division 3 of Part III, which provides for
the issue of questioning warrants and questioning and detention
warrants in relation to suspected terrorism offences where other means of
collecting the relevant intelligence would be ineffective.[75]
The warrants are intended as intelligence gathering and preventative tools, not
investigative tools. As such, a person is questioned on the basis that they can
provide information about a potential terrorism offence rather than on
suspicion of having committed an offence, and detained on the basis of
preventing the person from damaging evidence or alerting someone involved in a
terrorism offence to the fact that it is being investigated. A person may
actually be detained under either warrant type; the distinction is when a
person may be detained and by whom it is authorised.
The Crimes Act 1914 provides a range of powers
that the AFP uses to investigate terrorism and other crimes, such as search
warrants, arrest and related matters, and covert investigative powers such as
controlled operations.[76]
Powers particular to counter-terrorism include delayed notification search
warrants (Part IAAA), special stop, search and seizure powers
(Division 3A of Part IAA), a lower threshold for arrest without
warrant for suspected terrorism offences (section 3WA) and special rules
where a person is detained following arrest for a terrorism offence
(Subdivision B of Division 2 in Part IC).
In addition to these and other powers, a range of
Commonwealth laws includes special provisions that apply in relation to
suspected or alleged terrorism.[77]
These include, for example, reforms that were made through the Foreign Fighters
Act relating to welfare payments and how courts may deal with foreign
evidence.
Australian governments have a well-established framework and
mechanisms for countering terrorism.[78]
The National Counter-Terrorism Plan outlines Australia’s strategic approach to
preventing and dealing with domestic terrorism. It outlines Commonwealth and
state and territory responsibilities and coordination mechanisms in the areas
of preparedness, prevention, response and recovery.[79]
The Plan was last updated in 2012.[80]
At a Council of Australian Governments (COAG) special
meeting in July 2015, the Prime Minister and state and territory leaders
agreed to and released Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (the Strategy),
which ‘sits above and is complemented by’ the National Plan.[81]
Development of the strategy followed on from recommendations made in a
Commonwealth review of Australia’s counter-terrorism machinery released in
February 2015. Among these was a recommendation that a strategy ought to
be developed ‘which appropriately coordinates and balances our efforts to
counteract the various threats we face’ and that COAG’s agreement should be
sought to a new national strategy on countering violent extremism.[82]
The Strategy comprises five core elements:
-
challenging violent extremist ideologies
-
preventing people from engaging in terrorism
-
international engagement to shape the global environment
-
disrupting domestic terrorist activity and
-
arrangements for responding to and recovering from any terrorist
incidents that may occur.[83]
In the federal jurisdiction, the recent legislative reforms
have been complemented by significant additional funding for intelligence,
security and law enforcement agencies, and a smaller amount for measures to
prevent and counter violent extremism.[84]
As part of a $630 million counter-terrorism funding package announced in
August 2014, the Australian Government committed:
-
$13.4 million to strengthen community engagement programmes in Australia
with an emphasis on preventing young Australians from becoming involved with
extremist groups;
-
$6.2 million to establish a new Australian Federal Police Community
Diversion and Monitoring Team for returning foreign fighters and those who support
them;
-
$32.7 million for a multi-agency national disruption group to
investigate, prosecute and disrupt foreign fighters and their supporters; and
-
$11.8 million for the Australian Federal Police to bolster its ability
to respond to the threat of foreign fighters at home and abroad including local
and regional Liaison Officers and two new investigative teams to help reduce
the threat of extremists leaving Australia.[85]
Successive Australian governments have provided some
funding to deradicalisation and rehabilitation programs within the broader
framework of countering violent extremism (CVE).[86]
However, as a recent government review noted, Australian CVE measures overall
have been limited both in terms of resources committed and effectiveness, and
have a shorter history than more securitised responses.[87]
Further, CVE measures directed at countering threats relating to foreign
fighters have so far been primarily focused on prevention rather than ways to
manage returnees.[88]
The Strategy indicates management of individuals ‘seeking to return’ to
Australia will be managed on a case-by-case basis, with options including
prosecution, personal restrictions, cooperation with government and community
initiatives and participation in CVE and other preventative programs.[89]
The following sections outline some of the national security
and foreign policy-related issues that arise in the context of the proposal to
revoke Australian citizenship from dual nationals for engaging in terrorism-related
conduct. It is not intended as a comprehensive examination of all such issues.
Rather, for the purposes of informing Parliament’s consideration of the Bill
and related matters, it focuses on the extent to which existing powers could be
used to manage the challenges that the proposal aims to address, and outlines
some of the key concerns raised in recent commentary.
A fundamental question that arises in the context of any
proposed new power is whether it is necessary to reach the stated objective. A
key consideration in that context is the extent to which existing tools are
available to deal with the issue that the new power aims to address. In this instance,
citizenship revocation is proposed in order to safeguard Australia’s national
security. In particular, it is argued that keeping certain people out of
Australia, and removing certain people from Australia, will reduce the chances
of terrorism-related offences being committed here.[90]
As is evident from the summary above, Australia already
has fairly comprehensive legal and operational measures in place to deal with
terrorism. An already strong framework was reinforced through reforms passed in
2014. The Government has also stated that further measures will be introduced
later in 2015. These will reportedly include further amendments to the control
order regime, and laws to ‘allow security cleared judges to hold secret
hearings’ when considering applications for search and telecommunications
interception warrants based on sensitive intelligence.[91]
One of the main security-related arguments advanced by the
Prime Minister for introducing the measures in the Bill is the difficulty
involved in obtaining sufficient admissible evidence to prosecute individuals
for conduct they allegedly engaged in overseas. He has stated ‘putting
Australian foreign fighters in gaol is easier said than done ... Bringing foreign
fighters back to face trial in Australia risks leaving them free on our streets
rather than in our gaols’.[92]
Several existing powers are particularly relevant in this context.
The Foreign Fighters Act amended the Foreign
Evidence Act 1994 to remove the requirement for ‘terrorism-related
proceedings’ to comply with the usual rules of evidence, which generally
exclude foreign material obtained outside of the formal mutual assistance
process.[93]
One of the particular obstacles this is intended to address is obtaining
admissible evidence ‘in regions in severe states of conflict, where there is no
functioning government or where the legitimacy of the government is not
recognised by Australia’ (such as Syria), making related investigations and
prosecutions easier.[94]
The control order regime has been in place since
late 2005 but has not often been used. Only two control orders had been
issued up to the end of June 2014.[95]
They have reportedly been used at least twice since then, and could be expected
to be employed more often in light of recent reforms.[96]
Reforms passed in 2014 expanded both the grounds on which
orders may be sought and the purposes for which they may be granted.[97]
There are now several grounds on which an order may be sought, most of which
relate not to what might be prevented by an order, but to what the police and
the court are satisfied a person has already done (such as having trained with
a terrorist organisation, having engaged in hostile activity in a foreign
country or provided support for someone else to do so).[98]
Further, while the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on
a person under a control order must still serve some protective or preventative
purpose, that now extends to preventing support for, or facilitation of, a
terrorist act or engagement in hostile activity in a foreign country.[99]
The threshold for the granting of a control order
(satisfaction on the balance of probabilities) is considerably lower than that
required to obtain a criminal conviction (proof beyond reasonable doubt).[100]
It is possible control orders could be made in relation to individuals of
sufficient security concern to manage the risk to the Australian community
where a prosecution fails or does not proceed. The obligations, prohibitions
and restrictions that may be placed on a person subject to an order are
extensive. They may include, for example, wearing a tracking device, curfew
requirements, prohibitions on being in certain places or contacting certain
people, and regular reporting to police.[101]
Since the Australian Passports Act 2005 was
enacted, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has had the power to refuse or cancel
an Australian passport on several grounds relating to national security and law
enforcement.[102]
Reforms passed in 2014 allow the Minister to suspend a person’s passport
pending a decision about cancellation.[103]
While an Australian citizen whose passport has been cancelled may still return
to Australia, they could not do so undetected. The person would need to obtain
a short-term travel document through the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade in order to enter Australia.[104]
This means authorities can be aware of when such an individual returns,
enabling monitoring of the person from the moment they return.
Revoking a person’s citizenship in some circumstances
might benefit national security. However, it might also undermine national
security by leading to perverse outcomes and missed opportunities.
Some have argued that revoking the citizenship of foreign
fighters and domestic terrorists could actually exacerbate national security
and terrorism threats in the longer term. Not all foreign fighters would
willingly return in any case. But in cases where they would, revoking their
citizenship and blocking their return home may play into the hands of ISIL and
other terrorist organisations, and ultimately result in greater threats to
security, including in Australia.[105]
Professor Ben Saul argues that the policy is ‘certain to make the world more
dangerous and is grossly irresponsible’.[106]
Associate Professor Anne Aly argues that having unwanted foreign fighters
stranded in the Middle East is what ISIL is hoping for: ‘They are building
their state with the lost souls of those who have been lured into their web and
find no escape. Why we would want to give them that is beyond me’.[107]
Adam Lockyer and George Milad, lecturers at Macquarie
University’s Department of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, point
to what past experience, including the formation of Al-Qaida, might teach us on
this point:
During the 1980s, thousands of foreign
fighters travelled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet occupation. They
arrived from around the world, but especially from the Middle East. Egypt even
quietly encouraged its radical Islamists to travel to Afghanistan with the
sincere hope that they would all become martyrs.
However, following the end of the
Afghan-Soviet War, many Arab states blocked their nationals from returning.
Probably the most famous example is Saudi Arabia’s refusal to allow Osama
bin-Laden to return home.
The Middle Eastern secular dictators had
viewed the radical Islamists as mere political nuisances before. Now, having
received CIA training in Pakistan and years of frontline combat experience,
they were considered serious threats.
So, rather than returning to their home
countries, these fighters become professional international jihadists. A few
stayed in Afghanistan to continue fighting alongside the Afghan warlords. Most,
however, chose either to join Osama bin Laden in Sudan or accept Ali Abdullah
Saleh’s invitation to join the fight against the secular socialist government
in Yemen.
These stateless professional jihadists went
on to form the core of al-Qaeda. They were responsible for attacks on the US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the bombing of the USS Cole in the Port of
Aden in Yemen, among many others.
...
In the long run, the jihadists will be
greater threats to Australian security than if they had simply returned home to
their families, normality and ASIO monitoring. Sometimes you should keep your
friends close and your enemies closer.[108]
This would not just be a problem for the Middle East. Just
as the current terrorism threats emanating from that region and elsewhere
present global threats, so too would new or strengthened groups that could
benefit from foreign fighters who might otherwise have returned home. The Strategy
recognises terrorism ‘is a global issue—the threat to Australia is directly
related to terrorism abroad’.[109]
In addition, as has been the case with other recent
counter-terrorism measures and the way they are handled, some have raised
concerns that a policy of citizenship revocation risks increasing social disaffection
and potentially adding to the allure of organisations such as ISIL.[110]
The point about the dangers of conflating foreign fighters with domestic
terrorists is relevant here:
... governments should adapt their communication strategies to
the reality that most Islamists consider confined insurgency more legitimate
than international terrorism. Talk of insurgents and foreign fighters as
“terrorists” will likely fall on deaf ears and may irritate rather than
dissuade the fence-sitters. It is probably better to acknowledge the difference
between domestic and foreign fighting and to discourage each activity with
different sets of arguments.[111]
A further concern, particularly in relation to foreign
fighters, is that by blocking their return we lose an opportunity to integrate
the voices and stories of disillusioned fighters into more effective
counter-narratives to support CVE efforts.
ISIL is notorious for the sophistication, extent and
success of its propaganda efforts.[112]
One of the tactics it employs to attract additional foreign fighters to its
cause is to use those already with the group—particularly Westerners, including
Australian fighters—in its propaganda.[113]
A range of experts including police have argued that if
allowed to return to Australia, disillusioned foreign fighters are in a unique
position to provide a credible counter-narrative to the glamorised version
offered by ISIL.[114]
Those who might be tempted to follow in their footsteps are much more likely to
listen to and be persuaded by former fighters than police, media or government.[115]
Some in the security community have also pointed out that
barring their return means losing the opportunity to benefit from the
information former foreign fighters could provide our intelligence and security
agencies.[116]
However, the potential intelligence value of Australian former foreign fighters
has been questioned by at least one analyst.[117]
Australia has ratified and implemented 14 of the 18 international
counter-terrorism instruments.[118]
It also has obligations under resolutions adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[119]
Two UNSC resolutions adopted in 2014 are particularly relevant.
UNSC 2170 (2014), adopted in August 2014, calls on
all Member States to, among other things:
take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign
terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable
international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF [Al Nusrah Front,
also known as Jabat al-Nusra] and all other individuals, groups, undertakings
and entities associated with Al-Qaida’.[120]
UNSC 2178 (2014), adopted in September 2014,
condemned violent extremism and required Member States to implement a range of
measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters.[121]
It is broader than UNSC 2170, and calls on states to cooperate on the
issue, including by:
preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of
foreign terrorist fighters, including children, preventing foreign terrorist
fighters from crossing their borders, disrupting and preventing financial
support to foreign terrorist fighters, and developing and implementing
prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning foreign
terrorist fighters.[122]
The Strategy restates Australia’s commitment to
effective international cooperation through the UN and other multi-lateral
forums, working with partner countries and civil society, and capacity and
capability building, stating: ‘We will have the greatest impact when we work
with partners in coordinated global action against terrorism’.[123]
Professor Ben Saul has argued that revoking citizenship
from foreign fighters and domestic terrorists goes against Australia’s counter-terrorism-related
international obligations and undermines the international framework for
cooperation on such matters:
It is contrary to Australia's international legal obligations
to counter terrorism globally ...
...
A responsible government would not foist its terrorists onto
other countries, but bring them home to face justice. This is not only the
responsible thing to do from a national security perspective, but is also
required of Australia by international law.
Under United Nations Security Council resolutions since 2001,
every country has legal obligations to prevent, investigate, apprehend,
prosecute and punish terrorists. These obligations are designed to ensure a
coordinated global approach to countering terrorism and to prevent impunity for
terrorists. Australia has long supported these resolutions, and has often
claimed that they justify Australia's counterterrorism laws.
Al Qaeda was able to mount the devastating 9/11 attacks on
the United States precisely because it had found safe haven in Afghanistan and
earlier in Sudan. The Security Council resolutions aim to ensure the global
suppression of terrorism and to prevent terrorists taking advantage of
loopholes and gaps in national law enforcement.[124]
Beyond any specific obligations, several commentators are
concerned that by revoking citizenship on national security or
counter-terrorism grounds, Australia would not be acting as a responsible
international citizen. They argue that rather than dealing with the foreign
fighter problem, such an approach merely shifts it to other countries that may
be less capable of dealing with the individuals in question.[125]
Researcher Andrew Zammit also highlights the reciprocal nature of international
cooperation, pointing out Australia ‘would not appreciate it’ if the Lebanese
Government were to revoke the citizenship of several dual nationals convicted
of terrorism in Lebanon and deport them to Australia.[126]
These points again raise the importance of considering both
the short and long-term implications of proposed national security measures
such as citizenship revocation for terrorism-related conduct.
Both the way the legislation is framed, and how it would be
used in practice, could affect the degree to which issues such as those
outlined in this paper may materialise.
A Commonwealth review of Australia’s counter-terrorism
machinery released in February 2015 recommended development of a
comprehensive strategy for managing the controlled return of Australian foreign
fighters. The review suggested the strategy should comprise a range of what
might be called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ options, and that the various options not be
treated as mutually exclusive:
Options should include prosecution, revocation of
citizenship, temporary or permanent exclusion from Australia while negotiated
returns take place, mandatory de-radicalisation, cooperation with law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, and rehabilitation support. The options
should not be mutually exclusive – a range of options may be imposed on an
individual, informed by an assessment of the level of threat the individual
poses, coupled with an assessment of the needs of the individual to enable
successful rehabilitation.[127]
While not detailing how the other components of the strategy
mentioned above are being or may be taken forward, the Explanatory Memorandum
to the Bill does state that the Government is ‘taking a multi-faceted approach’
to countering terrorist threats, including by implementing the review
recommendations relating to CVE and managing the return of foreign fighters.[128]
Interestingly, the Strategy makes no mention of
citizenship revocation or loss, though it does mention ‘permanent or temporary
exclusion from Australia of non-citizens’ and passport cancellations among the
personal restrictions that might be employed to manage foreign fighters.[129]
These descriptions of how citizenship revocation might (or
might not) fit into the broader counter-terrorism framework provide a contrast
to some of the descriptions of the measure given by the Prime Minister, which
have tended to suggest less selective use of the proposed new power. For
example, in June 2015, the Prime Minister stated:
We’re trying to prevent people from leaving
our country to become terrorists; we’re trying to prevent hardened terrorists
from coming back; and we’re striving to lock up any that we can’t keep out.
...
So, if you leave Australia to fight for
terrorist armies in the Middle East, we don’t want you back—and if you’re a
dual citizen, we certainly won’t let you back.[130]
Security analyst David Wells recently suggested that ‘used
sparingly against the most serious targets and threats, preferably
post-conviction, citizenship-stripping of dual nationals could deliver
operational outcomes and free up resources to focus on emerging threats’,
though he cautions that those benefits need to be weighed against potential
drawbacks.[131]
This paper has outlined just some of the complexities facing
the Parliament as it considers the Bill, and that the Government will be faced
with finding a way through if the Bill is passed.
While the means by which the Government proposes to
implement its proposal are certainly important, threshold issues relating to
whether it is necessary, and whether the associated benefits are likely to
outweigh any negative consequences should also be carefully considered. A
fundamental question is whether the threats that the Bill aims to address can
be dealt with using existing measures. From a national security perspective,
further issues that arise include the potential creation of a more significant
threat in the longer term and losing the opportunity to integrate the stories
of disillusioned foreign fighters into measures to combat the appeal of
organisations such as ISIL. From a foreign policy and international cooperation
perspective, questions have been raised about whether the proposed new measures
are consistent with our international counter-terrorism obligations and broader
notions of good global citizenship. The impacts of actions Australia takes now
will likely play out over many years to come. In considering the Government’s
proposal, it will be important to ensure that Australia is not risking more
intractable social and security problems further down the track by favouring an
immediate short-term solution over a more durable and sustainable one that
might take longer to establish.
[1]. T Abbott
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[2]. T Abbott,
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[3]. Abbott, Magna
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[4]. The Australian
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simplicity, this paper refers to ‘citizenship revocation’, as the discussion is
focused on the potential implications of certain individuals losing
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[5]. B Keane
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[6]. Ibid.;
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[7]. See for
example N James, ‘Terrorism,
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[8]. See for
example C Uhlmann, ‘Abbott
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citizenship’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) News, 13
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[9]. For
a more comprehensive definition, see T Hegghammer, ‘The
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[10]. Australian
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[11]. Hegghammer,
‘The rise of Muslim foreign fighters’, op. cit., pp. 53–63, 71–89;
A Zammit, Australian
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[12]. United
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P Bakowski and L Puccio, “Foreign
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Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, February 2015;
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[13]. D Byman
and J Shapiro, Be
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[14]. Analytical
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[15]. In
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gone to Iraq and Syria had been killed and 10–30 per cent had left
the conflict zones: PR Neumann, ‘Foreign
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[16]. Analytical
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[17]. PR
Neumann, op. cit. See also R Barrett, Foreign fighters in Syria,
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[18]. Analytical
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[19]. Analytical
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[20]. T Hegghammer,
‘Should
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between domestic and foreign fighting’, American Political Science
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[21]. Ibid.,
p. 10.
[22]. Ibid.,
p. 6–13; Hegghammer, ‘The rise of Muslim foreign fighters, op. cit.,
pp. 57–59; Byman and Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 16–18; D Malet,
‘Foreign
fighters playbook: what the Texas revolution and the Spanish civil war reveal
about Al-Qaeda’, Foreign Affairs (online edition),
8 April 2014, accessed 17 July 2015.
[23]. Hegghammer,
‘Should I stay or should I go?’, op. cit., pp. 10–11.
[24]. Zammit,
Australian foreign fighters, op. cit., p. 6.
[25]. Ibid.,
pp. 5–7; Hegghammer, ‘Should I stay or should I go?’, op. cit.,
p. 10; Barratt, op. cit., pp. 26–27.
[26]. Byman
and Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 9–22; Zammit, Australian foreign
fighters, op. cit., pp. 5–6; Barratt, op. cit.,
pp. 21–27.
[27]. There
is a lack of consensus about terms such as radicalisation, de-radicalisation
and disengagement. A useful delineation is provided by Vidino and Brandon,
whereby de-radicalisation relates to an individual changing their views and
ideology, whereas disengagement has the more modest and pragmatic aim of an
individual ending involvement in a terrorist organisation or activities: L Vidino
and J Brandon, Countering
radicalization in Europe, ICSR, King’s College London, 2012,
p. 8–10, accessed 15 July 2015.
[28]. Archick
et al, op. cit., pp. 10–12; L Vidino et al, 2014, op. cit.;
Byman and Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 26–27; Bakowski and Puccio,
op. cit., pp. 6–9.
[29]. For
brief overviews, see ABC, ‘Fact
check: how does Australia’s plan to strip foreign fighters of citizenship
compare to other nations?’, ABC News, updated 11 June 2015
and S Pillai, ‘Proposals
to strip citizenship take Australia a step further than most’, The
Conversation, 29 May 2015; both accessed 15 July 2015.
[30]. Immigration
Act 2014 (UK), section 66 (amending section 40 of, and inserting
section 40B into, the British Nationality Act 1981 (UK)), accessed
15 July 2015. For further details, see M Gower, Deprivation of
British citizenship and withdrawal of passport facilities, Standard note,
House of Commons Library, updated 30 January 2015; MJ Gibney, ‘The
deprivation of citizenship in the United Kingdom: a brief history’, Immigration,
Asylum and Nationality Law, 28(4), 2014, pp. 326–335, both accessed
15 July 2015.
[31]. M Gower,
op. cit.; ABC, op. cit.; Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), ‘Citizenship
revoked’, BIJ website, accessed 15 July 2015 (this is the
homepage for an ongoing investigation being conducted by the BIJ and is updated
regularly with new articles).
[32]. Ministry
of Social Affairs and Integration (Denmark), ‘Deradicalisation—Targeted
Intervention’, Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration website; Exit—Deutschland website; HAYAT—Deutschland website; all
accessed 16 July 2015. For other EU country examples, see Vidino and
Brandon, op. cit.; Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration
Affairs, The
challenge of extremism: examples of deradicalisation and disengagement
programmes in the EU, Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration
Affairs, October 2010, accessed 15 July 2015; R Butt and H Tuck,
European
counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation: a comparative evaluation of
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for Strategic Dialogue, 2014, accessed 16 July 2015.
[33]. Ibid.;
Briggs and Silverman, op. cit., pp. 42–44; E Braw, ‘Inside
Denmark’s radical jihadist rehabilitation program’, Newsweek,
17 October 2014, accessed 16 July 2015.
[34]. Ministry
of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (Denmark), ‘Denmark’s
deradicalisation efforts’, factsheet, Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and
Integration Affairs, updated August 2011; European Network of
Deradicalisation, ‘Violence
Prevention Network e.V.’, European Network of Deradicalisation website;
both accessed 16 July 2015.
[35]. ASIO,
op. cit., pp. 1–5. See further Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet (DPMC) and NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet (NSW DPC), Martin
Place siege joint Commonwealth-New South Wales review, Australian and
NSW Governments, January 2015, pp. 10–13, accessed
16 July 2015; Council of Australian Governments (COAG), Australia’s
counter-terrorism strategy: strengthening our resilience, Commonwealth
of Australia, 2015, pp. 1–4, accessed 23 July 2015.
[36]. T
Abbott (Prime Minister) and G Brandis (Attorney-General), National
Terrorism Public Alert level raised to high, media release,
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a revised National Terrorist Threat Advisory System on 23 July 2015:
COAG, Communique, COAG
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[37]. Abbott,
Magna Carta Lecture, op. cit. For some information on the
characteristics of identified foreign fighters and supporters and their
involvement in Syria and Iraq since 2011, including brief details of
54 individuals and profiles of 16, see A Bergin, M Clifford,
D Connery, T Feakin, K Gleiman, S Huang, G Hutchinson,
P Jennings, D Lang, A Long, C Murphy, S Roworth,
R Turner and S Yasmeen, Gen
Y jihadists: preventing radicalisation in Australia, Australian Strategic
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[38]. ASIO,
op. cit., p. 3. See also S Payne, ‘South
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[39]. J Bishop
[Responder], ‘Motions:
national security’, House of Representatives, Debates,
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[40]. See
for example M Schliebs, ‘Aussie
fighter dies near ISIS HQ’,
The Australian, 3 July 2015, p. 4 (about Reece Harding)
and H Aston, ‘Mother
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4 March 2015, p. 9 (about Ashley Johnston); both accessed
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[41]. Senate
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[42]. COAG, Australia’s
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p. 3.
[43]. T
Abbott (Prime Minister), Address
to the 35th Singapore Lecture, Singapore, media release,
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[44]. Ibid.
[45]. Byman
and Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 20–21.
[46]. Ibid.;
R Barrett, op. cit., p. 22; Bergin et al, op. cit.,
p. 16; COAG, Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy: strengthening our
resilience, op. cit., p. 3.
[47]. Zammit,
Australian foreign fighters, op. cit.,
pp. 9–11.
[48]. Byman
and Shapiro, op. cit., p. 20.
[49]. Ibid.,
p. 21; Zammit, Australian foreign fighters, op. cit.,
pp. 10–11.
[50]. Abbott,
Magna Carta Lecture, op. cit.
[51]. Ibid.
Operations have included, for example, Operation Appleby in Sydney, Operation
Rising and Operation Amberd in Melbourne, and Operation Bolton in Brisbane. See
Australian Federal Police (AFP), 15 people
detained as part of major counter terrorism investigation, media
release, 18 September 2014; AFP, Man
in court after Operation Appleby arrest, media release,
10 January 2015; AFP and Victoria Police, Counter
terrorism Operation Rising update, media release,
18 April 2015; AFP and Victoria Police, Joint
Operation Amberd, media release, 9 May 2015; AFP and
Queensland Police Service (QPS), Two
Brisbane men arrested on terrorism-related offences, media release,
10 September 2014; AFP and QPS, Further
charges laid in counter terrorism operation, media release,
17 October 2014; D Box, ‘More
terror suspects caught in police net’, The Weekend Australian, 27
December 2014, p. 6; all accessed 16 July 2015.
[52]. ABC,
‘Terror
suspect Abdul Numan Haider continued to stab fallen officer’, ABC News,
4 October 2014; ABC, ‘Sydney
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in Martin place’, ABC News, updated 16 December 2014; both
accessed 17 July 2014.
[53]. G Brandis
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[54]. Council
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[55]. AFP,
Man in court after Operation Appleby arrest, op. cit.; Box, op. cit.
[56]. UN Security
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[57]. The
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Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003, Border Security
Legislation Amendment Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment
(Anti-hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002, Criminal Code Amendment
(Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002, Security Legislation
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 and the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism Act 2002; all
accessed 21 July 2015.
[58]. Key
measures were included in the Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2)
2005, accessed 21 July 2015. For an overview of other relevant
legislation enacted in the ten years from September 2001, see
G Williams, ‘A
decade of Australian anti-terror laws’, Melbourne University Law
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[59]. National Security
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014; Counter-Terrorism
Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 ; Counter-Terrorism
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014; Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015; all
accessed 13 July 2015. While the Government includes the last of
these Acts when referring to its ‘tranches’ of national security legislation,
access to telecommunications data, and the data retention scheme established by
that Act, have much broader relevance across law enforcement.
[60]. M Biddington
and C Barker, National
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19, 2014–15, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2014; C Barker,
M Biddington, M Coombs and M Klapdor, Counter-Terrorism
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2014–15, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2014; C Barker, Counter-Terrorism
Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014, Bills digest, 50,
2014–15, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2014; J Murphy and
M Biddington, Telecommunications
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[61]. Barker
et al, Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014,
op. cit.
[62]. Australian
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to combat terrorism’, Australian National Security website, accessed
20 July 2015.
[63]. Criminal Code
Act 1995, accessed 20 July 2015.
[64]. Division 100
contains definitions relevant to Part 5.3.
[65]. Criminal
Code, op. cit., subsection 102.1(2).
[66]. Ibid.,
subsection 102.1(3).
[67]. Australian
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accessed 21 July 2015.
[68]. Australian
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21 July 2015.
[69]. Criminal
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[70]. Ibid.,
section 104.1. The definition of ‘engage in a hostile activity’ in
subsection 117.1 (1) for the purposes of Part 5.5 (Foreign incursions
and recruitment) is also used for the purposes of Part 5.3 (Terrorism).
[71]. Ibid.,
sections 104.2–104.5. The obligations, prohibitions and restrictions that
may be imposed are listed in subsection 104.5(3).
[72]. Ibid., section 105.1.
[73]. Ibid.,
section 105.2 and Subdivision B of Division 105.
[74]. Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, accessed
20 July 2015.
[75]. Ibid.
[76]. Crimes Act 1914,
accessed 20 July 2015.
[77]. For other
powers, see Australian Government, ‘Laws to combat terrorism’, op. cit.
[78]. For an
overview of how this has evolved since 2001, see DPMC, Review
of Australia’s counter-terrorism machinery, Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra, January 2015, pp. 2–9, accessed 21 July 2015.
[79]. National
Counter-Terrorism Committee, National
counter-terrorism plan, 3rd edition, Commonwealth of Australia,
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[80]. In the
Federal sphere, the latest White Paper dates to 2010: DPMC, Counter-terrorism
white paper: securing Australia, protecting our community, Commonwealth
of Australia, Canberra, 2010, accessed 21 July 2015.
[81]. COAG, Australia’s
counter-terrorism strategy: strengthening our resilience, op. cit.
p. v; COAG, Communique,, op. cit.
[82]. DPMC, Review
of Australia’s counter-terrorism machinery, op. cit., pp. vi.;
T Abbott (Prime Minister), Review
of Australia’s counter-terrorism machinery for a safer Australia, media
release, 23 February 2015; accessed 21 July 2015.
[83]. COAG, Australia’s
counter-terrorism strategy: strengthening our resilience, op. cit.
pp. 6–21.
[84]. C Barker,
‘Countering
terrorism and violent extremism’, Budget review 2015–16, Research
paper, 2014–15, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, May 2015, accessed
16 July 2015. See D Watt, ‘Defence
budget overview’ in the same publication for spending on defence operations
in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.
[85]. T Abbott
(Prime Minister) and G Brandis (Attorney-General), Counter-terrorism
measures for a safer Australia, media release,
26 August 2014, accessed 21 July 2015. For details of other
components see Barker, ‘Countering terrorism and violent extremism’,
op. cit. and T Abbott (Prime Minister) and G Brandis
(Attorney-General), New
counter-terrorism measures for a safer Australia, media release,
5 August 2014, accessed 21 July 2015.
[86]. C Barker,
Australian
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Research paper series, 2014–15, Parliamentary Library, Canberra,
10 February 2015, accessed 21 July 2015.
[87]. DPMC, Review
of Australia’s counter-terrorism machinery, op. cit., pp. 30–35.
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