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MINORITY REPORT

SENATOR DEE MARGETTS, THE GREENS (WA) AND
SENATOR BOB BROWN, THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS

WINE EQUALISATION TAX

1 Introduction

There are two alternative frameworks in which to present an analysis of these Bills [1]. They can be analysed on their own terms (or the terms in which the Government has framed them) or they can be analysed in a broader framework. The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens consider that it is appropriate to examine these Bill in terms of both frameworks.

On its own terms, the Wine Equalisation Tax (WET) proposal fails because of:

• its inability to achieve revenue neutrality;
• the negative impact that the WET will have on the industry and regions in which they are situated.

In the broader framework, the WET proposal has serious flaws because it fails to recognise that:

• alcohol abuse is a major public concern and health issue;
• the taxation system can be an effective tool to achieve socially responsible outcomes; and
• consumers, and the wine industry as a whole are likely to benefit to a greater extent from a volumetric tax.

The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens have consistently argued that the taxation system should be used to encourage socially and environmentally responsible activities and discourage activities that are socially and environmentally destructive. The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens are disappointed that the Government has not taken this opportunity to reform the structure of alcohol taxation.

2 Background

2.1 Details of the Wine Equalisation Tax (WET)

As part of the tax reform package (A New Tax System), the Government proposed that wine, and beverages consisting primarily of wine (including fruit and vegetable wine, cider, perry, mead and sake) will become subject to a Wine Equalisation Tax to replace the difference between the current 41 per cent wholesale sales tax and the proposed GST.

Wine Equalisation Tax is a single stage tax applying generally to assessable dealings in wine or importation of wine on or after 1 July 2000, unless an exemption applies. The WET is imposed on the wholesale selling price of wine at a rate of 29%. If wine is not sold wholesale:

• tax will be imposed on the retail sale or use of the wine; and
• the tax will be based on alternative values such as the notional wholesale selling price.

If the wine has already been taxed, then a credit for the earlier tax will reduce the tax payable on the later dealing, and WET is calculated on the GST exclusive value of wine in most cases.

3 A Failure in its Own Terms

3.1 Revenue Neutrality

The current WST rate on wine is 41 per cent. The WET will be levied at a rate of 29 per cent and will apply to wine (including non-grape wine) and to cider, perry, mead and sake. The proposed WET is claimed to be a `top up' tax to ensure that:

• the price of wine stays at the effective current level (taking into account the forecast 1.9% increase in the CPI); and
• the Government achieves revenue neutrality.

The Government has explicitly stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the A New Tax System (Wine Equalisation Bill) 1998,

The new wine tax replaces the existing wholesale sales tax (WST) that applies to wine and similar alcoholic beverages, and is introduced to ensure that, following the introduction of the goods and services tax (GST), the price of wine remains stable.

Since the wine tax will replace the existing WST treatment of wine, it is not expected to increase or decrease revenue to any significant extent [2].

Many in the industry had major concerns that the WET did not achieve revenue neutrality. The Wine Federation of Australia (WFA) recommended that the WET rate be set at a maximum of 24.5 per cent and concluded that the true WET level for revenue neutrality would be somewhere between 19.6 per cent and 24.5 per cent [3].

The WFA also argues that the major influence of taxation reform on the industry will be the rate of WET. The level will be critical for the continued viability and competitiveness of the industry.

Similarly, the Victorian Wine Grape Growers' Council Inc has suggested that their modelling has supported the WFA's view that the proposed rate of WET would deliver revenue neutrality result at 24.5% [4]. They also point out that the Government has given the assurance that the ANTS package is “not a new tax but a new tax system”.

3.2 Emphasis on Exports, Rural and Regional Australia and Small Business

The Government has continually claimed that it wants to use A New Tax System (ANTS) to promote and assist:

• a value added, export oriented economy;
• rural and regional Australia; and
• small business.

It is clear that Australia's wine industry is of significant value to Australia.

The export of premium wine contributes positively to Australia's balance of trade and international reputation in the industry and in broader forums. With an ever increasing export value of over $880 million per year, this industry makes a positive contribution to Australia's balance of trade.

The Wine Industry is also an important contributor to the economies and character of many rural and regional communities. Like many small businesses, the wine industry is a significant source of employment in communities and helps maintain economies in dwindling regional and rural areas. Wineries also assist greatly in attracting tourists and establishing a tourism industry in local regions.

Many small, regionally based and export oriented wineries have argued that an ad-valorem tax, creates a disincentive to produce quality wine and discriminates against small wineries.

Mr Geoffrey Hick of Bentleys MRI Chartered Accountants, who represent small to medium enterprises in the wine industry in Western Australia have commented,

The proposed ad valorum tax on wine in addition to GST will discriminate against the small wineries in favour of the larger corporate wineries… A considerable proportion of the larger producer's production is made up of bulk wine which will be taxed at a considerably lower rate per litre. This will effectively give a subsidy to larger producers which also produce premium wines in competition with smaller producers [5].

Similarly, Mr Denis Horgan representing the National Small Wineries Coalition has commented,

Small producers' livelihood is being threatened by the WET proposal [6].

In addition, the Vineyards Association of Tasmania Inc. (VAT) opposes an ad valorem based wine tax arguing that the ad valorem nature of the proposed Wine Tax adversely impacts on the small (less than 500t) regional winery [7].

3.3 Concerns Expressed among State Parliaments

The WET proposed by the Government has attracted a high level of concern in a number of States around Australia. The major concern related to the negative impact that the WET would have on the wine industries in the relevant state.

Indeed, in Tasmania, a motion expressing concerns about the WET was moved by Australian Greens MHA Peg Putt in the Tasmanian House of Assembly and was passed unanimously. See Appendix A.

Similarly, in the Western Australian Legislative Council, two motions expressing deep concerns about the WET were moved, one by the Greens (WA) MLC the Hon Dr Christine Sharp and another by Liberal MLC the Hon Barry House. See Appendix B. In addition, the Western Australian Legislative Assembly passed a unanimous motion expressing similar concerns on 21 April 1999. See Appendix C.

All of these motions contained express support for a volumetric based tax.

The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens consider that it is disappointing that these bi-partisan concerns expressed in State Parliaments are not being reflected in Federal Parliament.

4 A Failure in the Broader Context

4.1 The Nature of the Tax: Ad Valorem vs Volumetric

Looking at tax reform in a broader context raises the issue of what is the appropriate nature of a tax on wine (and more generally on alcohol). This issue has been the subject of considerable debate over a long period of time both within the industry and between the WFA and Treasury. This issue has also been the subject of considerable debate throughout the Committee process.

Essentially, as noted in the Chair's report, the debate is between an ad valorum tax and a volumetric tax. An ad valorem tax is a rate of tax, which is fixed according to the value of the dutiable transaction or item. A volumetric tax is also an indirect tax but one directly related to the alcohol content of the beverage.

The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens believe that a volumetric tax is preferable on the basis of public health and safety considerations and the wine industry as a whole. The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens believe that the Government's WET proposal, which is an ad valorem tax, ignores three fundamental issues:

• alcohol abuse is a major public health and safety issue;
• the taxation system can be an effective tool for achieving socially positive outcomes;
• consumers, and the wine industry as a whole are likely to benefit from a volumetric tax.
•  

4.2 Public Health and Safety Concerns

The Chair's committee report has noted that the Wine Federation of Australia gave evidence of indications that there are health benefits associated with the moderate consumption of wine. While the Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens do not contest the validity of these claims, it does not detract from the fact that the WET proposal fails to recognise the immense public health and safety concerns that are related to alcohol abuse.

The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens have major concerns about the significant evidence before the Committee that the WET has a range of public health and safety implications. The public health and safety concerns relate to the direct consequences of alcohol abuse and its reverberating social and economic impacts:

4.2.1 Direct and Indirect Consequences of Alcohol Abuse

There are a number of studies that indicate that alcohol abuse has immense immediate health impacts for the individual and the broader community.

The National Centre for Research into the Prevention of Drug Abuse (NCRPDA) quoted a number of studies in their submission.

Firstly, a study commissioned by the Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services in 1995 [8] estimated that alcohol is associated with:

• 50% of assaults;
• 44% of fire injuries;
• 34% of falls and drownings;
• 30% of car accidents;
• 16% of child abuse;
• 12% of suicides; and
• 10% of machine accidents.

A study conducted by the National Drug Strategy found that over 50% of adult Australians report that they have been the victims of alcohol related anti-social behaviour in the last 12 months [9].

Moreover, a NSW study found that 73% of assaults, 40% of domestic violence and 58% of malicious damage incidents reported to the police were directly related to alcohol misuse [10].

Professor Stockwell gave evidence to the committee that alcohol misuse costs the Australian community $4.7 billion in health care expenses per annum [11].

4.2.2 Is Wine Associated with Alcohol Abuse?

The WFA acknowledge that alcohol abuse occurs and they also acknowledge the reverberating effects on society. However, the WFA argue that the wine is not the form of alcoholic beverage that causes the most harm [12].

There are two responses to this argument.

Firstly, it is true that certain varieties of alcoholic drinks are associated with different levels of alcohol related harm. However, there is strong evidence that cask wine is strongly linked to alcohol abuse and health issues. For instance, the NCRPDA has done research that shows a strong nexus between consumption of regular strength beer and cask wine and alcohol related hospital admissions and rates of assault [13]. In fact, the nexus was so great that the following additional disbenefits occurred when one additional cask of wine or additional carton of beer was drunk per person [14].

Mr David Crosbie from the Alcohol and other Drugs Council of Australia (ACDA) also presented evidence that highlighted major concerns with cask wine. He presented evidence that, in communities where patterns of drinking are largely concentrated on binge and dependent drinking, there is a huge consumption of cask wine. Mr Crosbie outlined evidence from a Northern Territory Community,

What you can see is that a relatively small population of 35,000 people, most of whom of course do not drink cask wine, in the quarter from 1 April to 30 June consumed 351,000 litres of cask wine. What you are talking about there across a year, obviously, is about 1.4 million litres. That is roughly—we tend to talk in thousands of casks sold a week—more than 6,000 four-litre casks being sold each week to that population of less than 35,000.

Secondly, the WET is the proposal that the Parliament is to consider in this package of bills. While the Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens would like a more comprehensive review of alcohol tax on the basis of public health considerations, this is not a persuasive argument for not moving in the right direction in relation to taxation associated with wine.

Indeed, the experience of the States and Territories using their licence fees on beer based on alcohol content provides evidence that even a small step in the right direction can have positive health and social outcomes.

According to David Crosbie of the ADCA, the excise differentiation in States and Territories,

was one of the key catalysts for the production of quality low-alcohol beers. I think the production of quality low-alcohol beers and their overt marketing—because profit margins are there at a lower price—has contributed to saving hundreds of lives on Australian roads [15].

Considering cask wine is associated with significant public health issues, the Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens believe that it is crucial that taxation associated with wine leads the way for further reform of alcohol taxation on a broader basis. Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that a change towards a volumetric taxation system that focuses on alcohol content will increase the overall tax impost on the wine industry.

4.3 Using Taxation as a Tool

The Government's WET proposal fails to recognise that the taxation system can be utilised to affect positive health and safety outcomes. The WET proposal continues the current that is not structured in a way that could encourage less consumption or the consumption of low alcohol beverages.

4.3.1 Variation in Taxation on a Standard Drink

The major concern expressed was that the WET continued anomalies in the current system, which result in the level of taxation per standard drink varying across different brands and varieties.

For instance, based on recommended retail prices in the Australasian Food and Beverage Guide, September 1998 [16], the following variation in taxation of alcohol content currently occurs.

The result is that cheap cask wine is being taxed at a fifth of the level applied to low alcohol beers.

4.3.2 Pricing and Consumption

It is clear that there is a strong nexus between increases in prices of alcohol and reduction in consumption rates. Consequently, a taxation system that influences the price of alcohol is highly likely to affect the amount and type of alcohol consumption and abuse.

Mr David Crosbie from the Alcohol and other Drugs Council of Australia (ADCA) noted that there have been a range of internationally acclaimed studies that establish a direct connection between higher prices and less consumption:

… we are aware from studies all around the world that pricing directly impacts on consumption. People who would suggest to the contrary are flying in the face of over 53 international studies which have been reviewed by the World Health Organisation and other organisations. In almost every case, for every product, as price goes up, consumption of that product goes down in relation to alcohol. Perhaps more importantly, the people who reduce their alcohol consumption the most are the people who are dependent users. That is, people who are already spending as much as they can afford to spend on alcohol tend to buy less alcohol [17]. (Emphasis added).

Indeed, the ADCA highlighted the experience of the States and Territories differentiating their licence fees on beer based on alcohol content, further demonstrating that pricing significantly affects consumption.

Mark Schneider, the campaign director of the Alcohol Advisory Council of Western Australia supported the ADCA's comments on the range of positive health and social impacts, that have been used by the Northern Territory, that resulted from using economic instruments to increase the price of alcohol,

Faced with an enormous drug problems, particularly among the Aboriginal Community, in the form of full strength beer and cask wine, the Northern Territory Government introduced a health levy on those products, which resulted in an 18% reduction in alcohol consumption per head. …There was a 30% reduction in alcohol-related road deaths, a 31% reduction in alcohol-related road accidents and a 29% reduction in the average number of breath-test results over the legal limits [18].

The strong evidence supporting the price – consumption nexus provides strong support for a volumetric based tax that would encourage the production and promotion of low alcohol wine and less consumption of wine as a whole in the community.

4.4 Will a Volumetric Tax Disadvantage the Industry?

Despite the strong arguments that a volumetric tax on alcohol would be positive for the health of Australians, there is an argument that it would hurt the wine industry as a whole.

The WFA came to the conclusion that it would support an ad valorem tax and reject a volumetric tax although acknowledging that a volumetric tax would assist premium wine producers and consumers. The WFA came to this policy position after commissioning research by the Centre for International Economic Studies (CIES) at the University of Adelaide on the implications of alternative wine tax options being considered in the context of tax reform.

The results of this research clearly showed that a switch from the current ad valorem wine tax to a volumetric tax which raises the same government revenue would harm the industry as a whole and especially the non-premium sector, even though it would help the premium wine producers and consumers [19].

Dr Gladstones scrutinised this CIES study in terms of its validity and implications for South Australia and concluded that there were serious flaws in the study [20]. He noted two primary flaws.

The first is that there is an inconsistency between two publications of the report and citing of statistics from the earlier (and presumably least revised) publication.

One of the puzzling things is that it is published in two places: firstly, as a kind of preliminary publication and later in a journal in what appears to be a more revised and perhaps more considered form. There is quite a deal of conflict between the two. The Winemakers Federation cite the initial figures which are at variance with the later revised figures. It happens that the initial figures are more favourable to ad valorem and less favourable to volumetric, whereas the revised figures show a considerably different story [21].

The second is that the study contains some typographical errors that greatly exaggerate the negative impacts of a volumetric tax on South Australia. Dr Gladstones noted that these errors had not been publicly acknowledged.

After reviewing the study, Dr Gladstones conclusions were that the macro economic effects of an ad valorum or a volumetric tax were similar. However, contrary to what the WFA are saying,

South Australia has something to gain out of volumetric taxation as opposed to the rest of Australia, contrary to what South Australians are being led to believe [22].

This position has also been put forward by the Independent Wineries Association [23]. They have noted that South Australia produces the greatest volume of “valuable” wine compared to other states and produces more bottled wine by value than cask or bulk wine. Consequently, South Australia will be a winner from a move to a volumetric tax.

5 Recommendations and Conclusion

The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens conclude that a volumetric tax is the preferable basis for the taxation of alcohol, including wine. The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens believe that a volumetric tax will have positive outcome for public health and safety as well as for the wine industry and consumers.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Bills be amended to effect a volumetric tax for wine and related products.

COMMONWEALTH-STATE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

1 Introduction

The Greens (WA) have a number of concerns in relation to these Bills [24].

In relation to Bills relating to Commonwealth-State Financial Relations the concerns relate to the following issues.

1. The constitutionality of the Bill with reference to the mechanism to lock in the rate of GST;
2. The transfer of the responsibility for financial assistance grants (FAGS) from the Commonwealth to the State.
3. Funding to local governments including:
4. the longevity of the mechanisms in the Bills which maintain the current level of funding;
5. the adequacy of current levels of funding.

   2. Constitutionality

   The Greens (WA) acknowledge that there is a certain amount of constitutional uncertainty surround the whole of the ANTS package. However, in relation to the ANTS (Commonwealth-State Financial Arrangements) Bill 1999 (the Financial Arrangements Bill), the issue of constitutionality relates to the mechanism to lock in the rate of the GST and whether this mechanism falls foul of either section 1 or 55 of the Constitution.

   2.1 Section 1 of the Constitution

   There are two issues surrounding the mechanism used to lock in the rate of the GST.

   1. Can the provision be enacted?
   2. If it is enacted, will it be enforceable?

   George Williams “Locking in the GST Rate” [25] indicated that these clauses would in fact be unconstitutional as they attempt to bind a future parliament.

   [T]he Parliament could not require a subsequent Parliament to gain the consent of the States and Territories before enacting a change in the rate of GST. Section 1 of the Constitution defines the legislative power of the Commonwealth, stating that it `shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives'. This is inconsistent with any attempt to vest legislative power or a right of veto in any other body or person, such as the States or Territories.

   This is reinforced by in dicta from the decision of McHugh J in Chu Kheng Lim v Immigration Minister (1992) [26]

   There is no principle of statutory interpretation which requires a later Act to be consistent with an earlier enactment. Given that Parliament cannot bind its future legislative power, it would be unconstitutional for such a principle of statutory interpretation to be adopted. Moreover, there is no principle of statutory interpretation that an Act is invalid if it has the unforeseen consequence of repealing an earlier Act.

   Consequently, it seems that while the legislative assurances of `locking in the rate' may provide some assurances that the rate will be politically difficult to increase, there is no legal basis to lock in the rate.

   2.2 Section 55 of the Constitution

   The first paragraph of section 55 states (among other things) that “laws imposing taxation shall deal only with the imposition of taxation”. The effect of this requirement was summarised by Fullagar J in Re Dymond (1959) 101 CLR 11 at 18 as follows:

   By reason of the provisions of s 55 it has been the invariable practice since the establishment of the Commonwealth, when Parliament has proposed to levy a tax on any subject of taxation, to pursue that object by means of two separate Acts, the one of which actually imposes the tax and fixes the rate of tax, and the other of which provides for the incidence, assessment, and collection, of the tax and for a variety of incidental matters. It is common to refer to the latter Act as the Assessment Act, and to the former as the Taxing Act.

   The question goes to the status of the ANTS (Commonwealth-State Financial Arrangements) Bill 1999 (the Financial Arrangements Bill), and whether subclause 10(1) offended against the first paragraph of section 55 as a “law imposing taxation”.

   Proposed subclause 10(1) of the Financial Arrangements Bill states (among other things) that the rate of the GST, and the GST base, are not to be changed unless each State agrees to the change. Proposed clause 11 defines “rate of the GST” as the rate specified in the GST Imposition Acts.

   There are two possible arguments in relation to this issue. The first is contained in a research note provided by the Senate Procedure Office,

   it is difficult to characterise this provision as a “law imposing taxation” for the purposes of section 55. Rather, it seems to be a law that requires certain preconditions to be met before a rate of tax imposed under another Act can be changed.

   Bernard Pulle of the Parliamentary Library [27] argues the other possible argument that,

   A `law imposing taxation' may include conditions; for example a tax is imposed on condition that a Minister is satisfied of such-and-such. Lane cites the case of Nott Bros & Co Ltd v Buckley (1925) [28] (Nott) in taking the view that a law imposing taxation may include conditions.

   If Nott is followed, proposed subclause 10(1), being an important condition in changing the rate of GST, may be a law imposing taxation for the purposes of section 55 of the Constitution.

   If proposed subclause 10(1) is in fact a law imposing taxation, then all other provisions in the Bill would be rendered invalid. This would include those aspects of the Bill dealing with changing the base of the GST, the distribution of the GST revenue to the States by way of grants and the appropriation made to effect the distributions.

   While the issue is clearly not resolved, the Greens (WA) have concerns that the Government has not provided any evidence of legal advice on this issue.

   RECOMMENDATION

   That the Government provide copies of any legal advice that the Government has received on the issue of constitutionality of this Bill and other Bills relating to the ANTS package.

   3. Local Government

   The Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens share the concerns expressed by a number of local government associations.

   3.1 Transfer of Responsibility for FAGS

   The transfer to the states of the responsibility for direct funding of FAGS to local government is a major concern. Councillor Campbell representing the Australian Local Government Association commented that this transfer was an abrogation of Commonwealth responsibilities for national standards of local services [29]. He also expressed concern that some states may inflict unfavourable treatment on local government.

   There is a real risk of unfavourable treatment of local government at the hands of some states in the future.

   Mr Mikel of the Western Australia Municipal Association wholeheartedly supported these concerns [30].

   3.2 Adequacy of Local Government Funding

   The local government associations also have concerns that the guarantee by the Government that the quantum of FAGs will be indexed in real terms per capita and the current distribution methodology cannot be sustained. They are concerned that there are a number of measures that the states can impose to erode the value of the guarantee such as the States potentially imposing additional taxes and levies to raise revenue, or the possibility of the States passing responsibilities to Local Government without compensation.

   Regardless of potential erosion, local government associations are concerned that the transfer will keep local government financial assistance at historically low levels with a real increase in per capita funding at best. Councillor Campbell commented,

   There has been a lack of attention to future adequacy of local government means to meet increased demand and need for local services. We note that the states, as a result of the rearrangements, are going to get a growth tax. There is no proposal here for our fair share of a growth tax coming to local government [31].

   On an issue of process, the Greens (WA) and the Australian Greens are concerned that local government has consistently been denied access to the Premiers conference to be able to argue their case in that forum.

   In light of the crucial role Local Government plays in maintaining local services and communities, the Greens (WA) have serious concerns about the implications of these Bills for local government.

   RECOMMENDATION

   The responsibilities for FAGS remain with the Commonwealth and that Local Government is guaranteed adequate funding to provide community services.

   SENATOR DEE MARGETTS SENATOR BOB BROWN

   SENATOR FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA SENATOR FOR TASMANIA

   THE GREENS (WA) THE AUSTRALIAN GREENS

   APPENDIX A

   NOTICE OF MOTION

   13 April 1999

   Ms Putt on tomorrow to move

   That this House;

   (i) recognises that most of Tasmania's wineries aresmall wineries who are a vital part of Tasmania's small business sector providing employment, local cash flow, bringing in tourism dollars, export dollars and contributing to a positive image of Western Australia both locally and overseas

   (ii) is deeply concerned that the Federal Government's tax reform package containing an `ad valorem' tax on wine may destroy Tasmania's small wineries and believe that a `volumetric' tax would be both preferable and more equitable; and

   (iii) accordingly resolve to notify the Prime Minister, Federal Treasurer and all Tasmanian Representatives in the Federal Parliament of the Tasmanian Parliament's opposition to the `ad valorem' wine tax and requesting them not to support such a tax measure but to instead pursue a volumetric tax measure.

   As amended by the Opposition Party.

   APPENDIX B

   NOTICE OF MOTION

   The Hon Dr Christine Sharp MLC

   The Greens (WA)

   20 April 1999

   On the next day of sitting I will move that -

   This House;

   (i) Recognise that the majority of Western Australia's wineries are small wineries who are a vital part of Western Australia's small business sector providing employment, enhancing local economies, attracting greater tourism dollars and contributing to a positive image of Western Australia as a quality wine producing region.

   (ii) Is deeply concerned that the Federal Government's tax reform package containing an `ad valorem' tax on wine may destroy Western Australia's small wineries and believe that a `volumetric' tax would be both preferable and more equitable; and

   1. Accordingly resolve to notify the Prime Minister, Federal Treasurer and all Western Australian Representatives in the Federal Parliament of the Western Australian Legislative Council's opposition to the `ad valorem' wine tax and requesting them not to support such a tax measure but to instead pursue a volumetric tax measure.

   Appendix C

   ---

   Footnotes

   [1] A New Tax System (Wine Equalisation Tax) Bill 1999, A New Tax System (Wine Equalisation Tax Imposition - General) Bill 1999, A New Tax System (Wine Equalisation Tax Imposition - Customs) Bill 1999, A New Tax System (Wine Equalisation Tax Imposition - Excise) Bill 1999.

   [2] page 3

   [3] Submission to the Senate Committee on A New Tax System, Submission No 938, page 38

   [4] Letter, 13 April 1999.

   [5]Letter, 9 April 1999.

   [6] Letter, 19 March 1999.

   [7] Submission to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, Vineyards Association of Tasmania Inc., Submission No 84, Executive Summary.

   [8] English et al, (1995) The quantification of drug caused morbidity and mortality in Australia, 1995 ed. Canberra, Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health, Canberra.

   [9] Makkai, T (1993) The 1993 National Household Survey Report Series Volume 3, Drugs, Anti social Behaviour and Policy Choices, Canberra, Looking Glass Press.

   [10] Ireland, S and Thommeny JL, (1993) The crime cocktail: Licensed Premises, Alcohol and Street Offences. Drug and Alcohol Review, 12(2) pp143-150.

   [11] Evidence to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, 25 February 1999.

   [12] Submission to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, Submission No 938, page 67.

   [13] Submission to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, The National Centre for Research into the Prevention of Drug Abuse, page 3.

   [14] Ibid.

   [15] Evidence to the Senate Select Committee on a New Tax System, 18 March 1999.

   [16] Submission to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, The National Centre for Research into the Prevention of Drug Abuse, , page 3.

   [17] Evidence to the Senate Select Committee on a New Tax System, 18 March 1999.

   [18] The Australian 9 April 1999 page 13.

   [19] Submission to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, Winemakers' Federation of Australia Submission No. 938, pp. 27-29.

   [20] Evidence to Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, 25 February 1999.

   [21] Dr Gladstones, Evidence to Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, 25 February 1999.

   [22] Ibid

   [23] Supplementary Submission to the Senate Select Committee on a New Tax System, page 2.

   [24] A New Tax System (Luxury Car Tax Imposition—Customs) Bill 1999, A New Tax System (Luxury Car Tax Imposition—Excise) Bill 1999, A New Tax System (Luxury Car Tax Imposition—General) Bill 1999, A New Tax System (Commonwealth-State Financial Arrangements) Bill 1999, A New Tax System (Commonwealth-State Financial Arrangements— Consequential Provisions) Bill 1999.

   [25] Research Note for Parliamentary Library, 9 February 1999.

   [26] 176 CLR 1 at pp. 74-75 where a 1992 Commonwealth Act pre-empted a 1986 Commonwealth Act.

   [27] Bills Digest, A New Tax System (Commonwealth - State Financial Arrangements) Bill 1999

   [28] 36 CLR 20, 25-26.

   [29] Evidence to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, 3 March 1999.

   [30] Evidence to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, 25 February 1999.

   [31]Evidence to the Senate Select Committee on A New Tax System, 3 March 1999.

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