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| Waste Type | Each Year | Total Inventory |
|---|---|---|
| Low level solid waste | 150 drums* | 5000 drums* |
| Intermediate level solid waste | 1.5 cubic metres | 200 cubic metres |
| Intermediate level liquid waste | 300 litres | 6500 litres |
| Spent fuel | 37 elements | 1630 elements |
*200 litre capacity
4.4 The 1993 Research Reactor Review (RRR) concluded that interim storage of radioactive waste at Lucas Heights conforms to world best practice and is the safest short term storage arrangement. At the same time, however, the RRR described the final disposal of high level wastes at an appropriate site as a crucial issue to be resolved prior to any decision regarding a new reactor. [5] The `high level wastes' referred to by the RRR take the form of spent fuel rods, which in September 1997 the then Commonwealth Minister for Science and Technology announced would be sent overseas for reprocessing. [6] While the reprocessed waste eventually will be returned to Australia, DISR representatives advise that this waste would take the form of solid, long lived, intermediate level radioactive waste. They claim that the nature of the reprocessing waste therefore differs from the high level liquid waste anticipated by the RRR in 1993.
4.5 In light of developments regarding both the management of spent fuel rods and the nature of reprocessing waste to be returned to Australia, the Howard Government determined that a storage facility designed to cater only for low and short-lived intermediate level radioactive wastes would be adequate for Australia. Accordingly, in February 1998, the then Minister for Resources and Energy announced that a National Radioactive Waste Repository would be established in the central north region of South Australia.
4.6 The National Waste Repository will take the form of a near-surface repository for the disposal of Australia's low level and short lived, intermediate level radioactive waste. [7] While South Australia's central north region [8] of some 67,000 square kilometres has been selected as the location for the repository, the specific site is yet to be determined but is expected to be identified late in 1999. [9] Once the site selection is finalised, it will be considered for the possible co-location of a national storage facility for long-lived intermediate level radioactive waste, which is the type of waste arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel rods overseas.
4.7 DISR representatives advise that, once identified [10], the repository site within the central north region of South Australia will be subject to an environmental impact assessment. Thereafter, should all approval processes be satisfied, it is anticipated that construction of the national waste facilities would commence in 2000. [11] In accordance with this projected timetable, DISR representatives are confident that both the repository and storage facilities should be operational:
… well before HIFAR is decommissioned, before the replacement reactor is operational and the long lived intermediate level radioactive waste is returned from the overseas processing of the HIFAR fuel rods. [12]
4.8 The Howard Government's decision to support a near-surface waste repository for low level and short-lived intermediate level waste contrasts with the recommendation of the 1996 Senate Select Committee on the Dangers of Radioactive Waste. The Select Committee had recommended that:
… a national above ground storage facility be established which has the capacity to take low, intermediate and high level radioactive waste. [13]
4.9 The above-ground storage option was favoured by the 1996 Senate Select Committee in the belief that it would minimise risks of environmental contamination and adverse effects on people. [14] The fear that an underground storage facility could mean radioactive waste is `out of sight, out of mind', and by implication inadequately managed, was raised again in the course of this inquiry. In response, DISR indicated that the underground repository would be subject to institutional control for a period of between 100 and 300 years, at the end of which the facility would not produce any radiation significantly above background levels. [15]
4.10 Furthermore, DISR advised the Committee that a number of countries have demonstrated that near-surface disposal of radioactive waste is safe and effective. In 1997, near surface waste repositories for low level and short-lived intermediate level wastes were either operational, or in the process of being established, in over 30 countries. [16]
4.11 Notwithstanding the Federal Government's announcement of a National Radioactive Waste Repository, many critics of the new reactor proposal expressed dissatisfaction with ANSTO's current nuclear waste disposal arrangements and the fact that they will continue in the short-term. The Sutherland Shire Mayor informed the Committee that he believes `… spent fuel and what is going to be done with it is the major concern to all residents'. [17]As a reflection of this concern, the Sutherland Shire Council qualified its support of a new reactor with the following conditions:
4.12 The concerns of the Sutherland Shire Council are reinforced by the findings of an independent study undertaken by Alan Martin Associates at the Council's instigation. [19] The study estimates development of a radioactive waste repository, as announced by the Government, to be a long term project requiring a minimum of 15 years. Consequently, there is a danger that the announced intention to develop disposal facilities may be used as an excuse to persist with temporary or inadequate waste storage arrangements at Lucas Heights. As the Alan Martin study observes, this poses a dilemma for the Sutherland Council, in that:
It appears almost certain that spent fuel and waste will continue to be stored at Lucas Heights in increasing quantities for the next 20 to 30 years and the storage arrangements should be considered in this long term context. On the other hand, any significant investment in the upgrading of storage facilities could reduce the commitment to development of disposal facilities. [20]
4.13 In response to such concerns, ANSTO stresses that a number of initiatives are well underway to ensure that waste management issues are resolved before the replacement reactor commences operation. In addition to the planning process for the national waste repository, ANSTO specifically refers to a Waste Management Action Plan it has developed for the period 1996-2001. The plan addresses `legacy' issues which have arisen from the accumulation of radioactive wastes at Lucas Heights and the need to refurbish or replace existing facilities. Moreover, a number of specific elements of the plan concern initiatives ANSTO will complete before commissioning of the replacement reactor. These include:
4.14 While acknowledging ANSTO's strategic initiatives under the Waste Management Action Plan, the Committee notes the criticisms of a number of inquiry participants regarding storage arrangements.
4.15 In its submission, the Sutherland Shire Council noted that its key concern is that the decision to consider locating a replacement nuclear reactor at only one site (Lucas Heights) in the absence of an established management approach for future waste streams from the reactor:
… effectively condemns Sutherland Shire to remaining the defacto repository for highly radioactive reactor spent fuel and other nuclear wastes, and will probably in the longer term make the site a target for processing/reprocessing of reactor spent fuel for encasement in SYNROC. [22]
4.16 The most extreme of these criticisms came from Dr Helen Caldicott who alleged:
… Lucas Heights is a high level radioactive waste dump. No matter what anyone calls it, it is a high level radioactive waste dump, with standards that would not apply anywhere around the world, except I suppose in the most nefarious of facilities in America … the spent fuel rods have been put in the ground in containers which are now leaking and allowing water into them. That means that, if water gets in, water gets out. [23]
4.17 ANSTO strongly refuted these and other claims concerning the adequacy of its radioactive waste storage arrangements. Executive Director, Professor Garnett, informed the Committee that ANSTO's waste management practices currently are being accredited to international ISO 9000. [24] Furthermore, the RRR confirmed that ANSTO's interim storage of radioactive waste conforms with world best practice and is the most practical and safest short-term arrangement. [25]
4.18 ANSTO contended that high level waste is no longer a `crucial issue', as described by the RRR, and that Lucas Heights cannot be described as a high level waste dump. ANSTO's reasoning is that although spent fuel rods are stored on-site, eventually they will be sent overseas for reprocessing. However, while generally acknowledging the adequacy of ANSTO's storage arrangements, the Committee notes that spent fuel rods do need to be held for a number of years before they can be exported. As indicated by the replacement reactor EIS:
ANSTO have made a commitment that spent nuclear fuel would be transported off-site as soon as the constraints provided by cooling, radiation safety and forming economical loads for transport allow. As a result, no spent fuel would be stored on site for longer than nine years. [26]
4.19 Nine years is not an insignificant amount of time in the Committee's view, and in accordance with this, the Committee therefore appreciates the concerns of local residents regarding spent fuel.
4.20 A number of inquiry participants referred to an incident in recent years involving water penetration of spent fuel containers at Lucas Heights as possible evidence of negligence in ANSTO's management of radioactive waste. Professor Garnett acknowledged that such a problem had arisen, but claimed that there had been no risk of leakage. The incident occurred when rainwater penetrated a degraded top seal of a spent fuel storage tube. The presence of the water was detected and appropriate modifications were made to ensure that the problem could not re-occur. ANSTO emphasised that the containment barriers around the storage facility prevented any risk of leakage. This was supported by the Safety Review Committee which concluded that there were no health or environmental consequences arising from the incident. [27]
4.21 Another incident involved the 'dropping' of a fuel rod. Mr Morris of the AMWU told the Committee that:
The information that we have obtained, through our own inquiries, was that a fuel rod that was being retrieved from a dry storage in a flask was being moved to allow any water that may have been in the fuel rod to drip out away from the fuel rod while the fuel rod was inside its transport flask. When they opened the door underneath the transport flask, the rod dropped 300 millimetres. It did not fall out of the flask; the majority of the fuel rod was still contained within the flask. When the operators found that this was the case they immediately lowered the flask onto the floor, completely covering up the fuel end. So it never found the floor. It never burst open on the floor, as had been reported in the press. The operators concerned were exposed to a minimum amount of radiation. [28]
4.22 Mr Mathews of the AMWU also told the Committee of an incident when gases were released into the atmosphere after an operator:
… inadvertently left a valve open. The gas went through the charcoal filter and through the ventilation system, which set off an alarm. The alarm indicated that there was active gas going up the stack. … the safety people … checked the plant , found the fault and isolated it. [29]
4.23 In relation to the fuel rod incident and the release of atmospheric emissions Professor Garnett told the Committee:
I must say that, with the few events in February—the fuel rod in a building, which was an issue with our own workers, and the issue of the small atmospheric emissions which, as I have said, were reported to ARPANSA, and I am sure ARPANSA can confirm that—we did not breach any of our standards or emissions. They were not actually of radiological consequence. [30]
4.24 This conclusion was supported by Dr Loy of ARPANSA who advised the Committee:
We agree with the position that Professor Garnett took, that it was of no significance in terms of causing damage to people, but it was an illustration that maybe things were not being managed as well as they could be in that context. That is why it is important to look at these incidents, to do a very detailed analysis, to look at the root cause of it to see whether it is something that is systematically going wrong—in which case you obviously need to address it—or whether it was just an act of God, as it were. It is important, even though people were not harmed by the accident, to take it seriously and look at it in some detail. That is certainly what ANSTO is doing and we will review it. [31]
4.25 Notwithstanding the assurances of ANSTO and ARPANSA there is no doubt that recent incidents at Lucas Heights Reactor have raised the concerns of local residents. It is clear that ANSTO's management of these occurrences could have been better. For instance, complaints were made, and highlighted in the local media, that the Sutherland Shire Council was not informed of the 'fuel rod incident' until five weeks after it had occurred on 1 February 1999. Further, this incident only became public knowledge after details were leaked to the local media by an ANSTO staff member. This was confirmed by Mr Howard Matthews, AMWU representative, [32] and by the Mayor of Sutherland Shire, Councillor Kevin Schreiber. [33]
4.26 The Committee believes that relations between ANSTO, the Sutherland Shire Council, and the community are in need of substantial improvement. In particular ANSTO needs to be more conscious of its obligations to keep the Council, and other relevant authorities, informed of any incidents and activities which may impact upon the community or the environment. The 'Community Right to Know Charter Relating to ANSTO' should be finalised as soon as possible.
4.27 In announcing the Commonwealth Government's decision to proceed with a replacement reactor at Lucas Heights, the then Minister for Science and Technology noted that $88 million had been allocated for the export of spent fuel rods for reprocessing overseas. [34] The Government's intention is that Australia would enter an agreement with the United States Government to repatriate 689 spent fuel elements of US-origin, with no waste being returned. The remaining 1,300 spent fuel elements from HIFAR operations would be exported for reprocessing in France by COGEMA, [35] with wastes eventually being returned to Australia in the form of intermediate level waste. [36] ANSTO had previously contracted to send the material to Dounreay in Scotland. During the course of the Committee's inquiry that facility ceased to be available, leading to the COGEMA contract. This change in arrangements for reprocessing spent fuel rods led to suggestions that ANSTO and the Commonwealth may not be able to guarantee access to an overseas reprocessing facility.
4.28 This possibility was discussed in the following exchange:
Prof. Garnett—You are probably aware that the minister has given responses on this in the Senate a number of times. ANSTO, as a statutory authority, has entered into an agreement with Cogema for reprocessing the spent fuel from HIFAR, and that contract enables and allows for the reprocessing of spent fuel from a replacement reactor. The contract is a commercial contract, but it certainly allows for the removal of the spent fuel, reprocessing and return of waste in the form of ILW [intermediate level waste] to Australia.
CHAIR—How long is that contract for?
Prof. Garnett—The contract is for the fuel from the existing reactor and extends into the fuel from the replacement reactor.
CHAIR—Forever, if you like? For the life of the new reactor?
Prof. Garnett—It is certainly for all the fuel, and the statements in the contract are for the replacement reactor.
CHAIR—Do you have any contingency plans if there is a closing down of that plant, given that one has closed down already?
Prof. Garnett—I think it is a slightly different situation, with all due respect. Dounreay was a particular plant with a particular focus. It was initially there for handling certain kinds of waste. Cogema is a very different operation. It is a commercial operation and, if you have been travelling around France, you would have noticed that 70 per cent of France's power is nuclear. The fuel from their power program goes to the Cogema plant for reprocessing. Fuel from the Japanese plants goes to either France or to another British facility, which is a commercial facility. I honestly think that when you speak to the French they will tell you that they do not expect to be replacing their nuclear power infrastructure for 70 per cent of their electricity in the next 40 or 50 years and that they believe Cogema is there well and truly for the long haul. [37]
4.29 In light of the Commonwealth Government's decision to export all of Australia's spent fuel rods for reprocessing overseas, ANSTO argues that disposal of high level radioactive waste is no longer a problem for Australia. While wastes eventually will be returned to Australia from France, they will be at the intermediate level only, and therefore suitable for storage at the proposed national waste repository to be established in regional South Australia. On ANSTO's analysis, the reprocessing arrangement therefore appears to supersede the conclusion of the 1993 RRR that a national high-level waste repository was an `inescapable concomitant of having any kind of nuclear reactor'. [38] As set out in Chapter One, however, the Committee believes that the conditions imposed by the Minister for the Environment and Heritage in relation to waste disposal should be strictly observed. Construction should not commence if strategies are not in place for the long term management of nuclear wastes, including the identification and proving of a repository site.
4.30 The Sutherland Shire Council was concerned not only about the need to make the establishment of a waste repository a pre-condition for approving the construction of the replacement reactor [39] but also expressed its concern that wastes should not be stored at Lucas Heights for more than five years. [40] Councillor Schreiber told the Committee that he believed the waste issue will be the issue that will give the project the 'green light' or the 'red light'. [41]
4.31 Dr Hardy, President of the Australian Nuclear Society, agreed that waste disposal had been identified as a major issue. Dr Hardy referred to the decision of the Minister for the Environment and Heritage to make construction of the replacement reactor conditional on a satisfactory waste management plan. Dr Hardy accepted this approach believing it essential. However Dr Hardy did not believe that the construction should be held up while a final decision on a repository is made but rather that the two processes should proceed in parallel. [42] In 1993 the RRR had rejected reprocessing overseas as a viable method for managing high-level radioactive waste. At this time, the RRR had argued that world opinion was tending to favour the conditioning and direct disposal of spent fuel rods in preference to reprocessing. [43] Furthermore, reprocessing was seen as having associated problems, not the least of which was the high-level liquid waste by-products that eventually would be returned to Australia, let alone the questionable ethics of effectively exporting a problem to be solved elsewhere.
4.32 Since 1993, however, ANSTO argues that the viability of overseas reprocessing has developed significantly, and indeed has been instituted as the standard international practice for managing spent research reactor fuel. In support of this claim, ANSTO informed the Committee of a number of countries now conducting reprocessing operations on a commercial basis:
4.33 While the commercial nature of such operations addresses concerns that overseas reprocessing amounts to Australia `exporting a problem', the true nature of the waste that ultimately will be returned to Australia remains contentious. In respect of the waste [45] that eventually will be returned from France, ANSTO submits that it clearly meets the International Atomic Energy Agency criteria for intermediate level waste. [46] However, the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre argues that some countries, including the United States, would classify such waste as high-level. Furthermore, the Environment Centre informed the Committee that UK reprocessing contracts stipulate that radioactive waste containing the same amount of radioactivity (as that contained in the spent fuel sent for reprocessing) must be returned to the country of origin. [47]
Thus, if Dounreay reprocesses 1300 fuel rods from Lucas Heights that will mean the 2,600,000 curies – over 85% of the radioactivity currently held in the spent fuel at Lucas Heights – will be returned in a radioactive waste form to Australia. [48]
4.34 Regardless of definitions, the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre states that the returned waste will require the same disposal method as high level waste, namely a deep geologic repository. Yet ANSTO's intended management strategy for this returned waste is the proposed above ground national storage facility for long-lived intermediate level radioactive waste possibly to be co-located with the National Waste Repository in the central north region of South Australia. That the establishment of this facility is yet to be confirmed, and in any case, is perceived by the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre as merely an interim waste management measure, leads to the criticism that:
… ANSTO have not guaranteed that they will get rid of the nuclear waste that they currently have on site. There is certainly no guarantee that they can get rid of any future spent nuclear fuel. I think it is quite dishonest of them to give the impression that there are contracts even for all the current spent nuclear fuel stockpile let alone future stockpiles. [49]
4.35 In response to this concern, the Committee notes the reassurance of DISR that above ground storage of radioactive waste has been demonstrated by many countries to be safe and effective. Nevertheless the Committee supports the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre in advocating that ANSTO commit to removing all spent fuel from Lucas Heights at the earliest possible opportunity that safety dictates. Concurrently, a commitment from the Commonwealth Government to proceed with an appropriate storage facility for intermediate level waste is essential to ensure that the radioactive by-products of reprocessing can be safely managed.
4.36 A further issue associated with radioactive waste management is the likely cost and waste levels arising from decommissioning of HIFAR and, ultimately, also the proposed new reactor. While predictions regarding the likely cost of decommissioning HIFAR varied widely in evidence to the Committee, the actual decommissioning procedures appeared less contentious.
4.37 DISR representatives informed the Committee that HIFAR will be decommissioned in accordance with a three stage approach practiced internationally. The first stage of decommissioning involves the removal of spent fuel elements which are returned to their country of origin after an appropriate period of radioactive decay. Subsequently, in the case of HIFAR, the 10 cubic metres of heavy water coolant will be removed, and the heavy water sold or used in the new reactor if the selected design should require heavy water as a moderator. As the final stage of the decommissioning process ANSTO proposes a care and maintenance period of at least 30 years, before the final decommissioning of HIFAR. [50]
4.38 Once the fuel and coolant is removed from HIFAR, ANSTO advised the Committee that the vast majority of the remaining components will, after 30 years, be low level waste. The process of decommissioning a research reactor, therefore, is much simpler and safer than is the case for power reactors, as verified by the findings of PPK's environmental impact statement:
While decommissioning of a nuclear reactor would appear a complex process because of the radiological considerations, overseas experience has demonstrated that with proper planning and management decommissioning can be carried out without adverse impact on either health or the environment. [51]
4.39 The 1993 RRR also confirmed that technology exists for the safe decommissioning of HIFAR, and that the processes favoured by ANSTO are appropriate and consistent with international practice. [52] This view is in stark contrast with Dr Helen Caldicott's position on decommissioning, which suggests that the technical processes are poorly developed and therefore potentially very hazardous. Dr Caldicott claimed:
… they are still experimenting with decommissioning reactors in the United States. They have never done a big one; they have done a few small ones. But it is extremely hazardous to the workers…we are dealing with a problem that has not been resolved in the most sophisticated country in the world dealing with the nuclear industry. This is an experimental project with which very few people have had any experience. [53]
4.40 ANSTO strongly rejects Dr Caldicott's assertions, and informed the Committee that decommissioning has become a well developed industry. In 1995 the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Cooperative Program on Decommissioning alone listed 20 reactors, seven reprocessing plants, two fuel material plants and one isotope handling facility undergoing routine decommissioning. Furthermore, a recent report of the UK Government's Trade and Industry Committee indicates that decommissioning of nuclear facilities has proven cheaper and quicker than initially anticipated. [54]
4.41 On the subject of HIFAR decommissioning costs, the RRR endorsed ANSTO's estimates that these were likely to fall within the range of $48-70 million, depending upon the specifics of the adopted strategy. However, this estimate was challenged by a number of inquiry participants, who alleged `creative accounting' on ANSTO's behalf. Dr Helen Caldicott submitted that decommissioning costs could be as much as $70 billion. [55] More moderate in its projections, yet nevertheless dissatisfied with ANSTO's cost estimates, the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre cautioned:
If you look at the figures for decommissioning a nuclear plant, you can at least double or treble them, because that has been the experience in other facilities overseas, albeit some of them bigger facilities. But there are a whole range of problems that come up…that do all add substantially to final costs. [56]
4.42 The Environment Centre stressed to the Committee that in order to assess the overall cost benefit of the new reactor proposal, it is essential to evaluate the true magnitude of likely costs for decommissioning both HIFAR and eventually its replacement, in addition to long term radioactive waste management. Acting as a consultant to the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre, Ms Jean McSorely urged the Committee to establish:
… what bond will be set aside and how much has been estimated for the decommissioning of both of the reactors on site – all of the planned decommission, and that means the current reactors plus the radioisotope laboratories plus the molybdenum stock. Everything that is on site, in theory, has to go. That is what the council wants and that is what the people of the area want. Then you have to ask what will be the cost of all the waste management storage and disposal for the current reactor and the future reactor. [57]
4.43 Whilst the Federal Government has recently announced that the site for the low-level waste storage facility is located in the central north region of South Australia, it has not yet determined precisely where or what type of facility will be built to store the waste from Lucas Heights. The Minister has indicated that 'a preferred repository site is expected to be identified late in 1999' and that 'once a site is identified, the repository proposal will be subject to full environmental assessment'. [58]
4.44 The Committee strongly disagrees with this approach. The issue of where the spent fuel rods and other waste at Lucas Heights should be stored has remained unresolved for too long. Resolving this problem was identified by the RRR as a 'crucial issue' and a solution 'essential'. [59] It should be resolved before any further decisions are made or any work is commenced on a new reactor, no matter where it is located. The continuing use of Lucas Heights as a storage facility for high-level or intermediate level nuclear waste should cease.
[1] PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1/Main Report, p.10-4.
[2] See appendix3 for details of these classifications.
[3] Prior to 22 October 1998 the then Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and Energy was responsible for radioactive waste management. Submission No.30, p.5.
[4] ANSTO booklet, Managing Radioactive Wastes and Spent Reactor Fuel, p.5.
[5] K.R. McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August 1993, p.216.
[6] Media Release, Minister for Science and Technology, 3 September 1997.
[7] Information about the site selection process is contained in a series of fact sheets produced by DISR and attached at Appendix 6.
[8] This area encompasses the Woomera and Nurrungar Prohibited areas, pastoral leases and some Commonwealth land.
[9] Media Release, Minister for Industry, Science and Resources, 6 July 1999.
[10] Field investigations have commenced in the central north region of South Australia. Test drilling will be conducted at eighteen sites to determine their geology. Five sites will be chosen against technical selection criteria. The site finally selected will be subject to an EIS process.
[11] The Commonwealth has no formal agreement with the South Australian government in relation to the proposed repository. While discussions are occurring currently, final identification of the preferred site will result in more formal negotiations.
[12] Evidence, p.E208.
[13] Senate Select Committee on the Dangers of Radioactive Waste, No Time to Waste, Recommendation 17, April 1996, p.xix.
[14] Senate Select Committee on the Dangers of Radioactive Waste, No Time to Waste, p.132.
[15] Evidence, p.E218.
[16] Submission No.30, p.6.
[17] Evidence, p.E31.
[18] Submission No.25, p.5.
[19] Submission No.25, Attachment B.
[20] Alan Martin Associates, Comments on Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Issues, 3 March 1998, Submission No.25, Attachment B, p.2.
[21] Submission No.29A, section 14, p.2.
[22] Submission 25, pp.10-11.
[23] Evidence, p.E164.
[24] Evidence, p.E240.
[25] K.R. McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August 1993, p.216.
[26] PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1/Main Report, p.10-61.
[27] Submission No.29A, Section 13, p.4.
[28] Evidence, p.E267.
[29] Evidence, p.E267.
[30] Evidence, p.E365.
[31] Evidence, pp.E417-418.
[32] Evidence, p.E268.
[33] Evidence, p.E324.
[34] Media Release, Minister for Science and Technology, 3 September 1997.
[35] COGEMA is a French Government-owned company that operates two commercial power reactor spent fuel reprocessing plants at the La Hague facility. See PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement Nuclear Reactor – Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 3/Supplement, p.10-6.
[36] Evidence p.E367.
[37] Evidence p.E367.
[38] K.R. McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August 1993, p.216.
[39] Evidence p.E328.
[40] Evidence p.E324.
[41] Evidence p.E328.
[42] Evidence pp.E342-3.
[43] K.R. McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August 1993, pp.xxii-xxiii.
[44] Submission No.29A, Section 13, Spent Research Reactor Fuel, p.1.
[45] Incorporated in borosilicate glass. See PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement Nuclear Reactor – Supplement to Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 3/Supplement, p.10.8-9.
[46] Australia adopts the IAEA criteria for the classification of spent fuel wastes, as published in Safety Series No. 111-G-1.1, 1994, Classification of Radioactive Waste. The IAEA indicates that `the lower value of about 2kW/m3 is considered reasonable to distinguish HLW from other radioactive waste classes, based on the level of decay heat emitted'. Below 2kW/m3 wastes are either intermediate or low level wastes. The Dounreay cemented waste will have a heat rate of 0.006 kW/m3. Submission 29A, Section 13 Spent Research Reactor Fuel, p.1.
[47] Submission No.7a, Information concerning the wastes which will be returned to Australia from spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in Scotland, p.1.
[48] Submission No.7a, Information concerning the wastes which will be returned to Australia from spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in Scotland, p.1.
[49] Evidence, p.E54.
[50] Submission No.30, p.10
[51] PPK Environment & Infrastructure, Replacement Nuclear Reactor – Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Volume 1/Main Report, p.19-12.
[52] K.R. McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August 1993, p.225.
[53] Evidence, p.E179.
[54] Submission No.29B, p.6.
[55] Evidence, p.E179.
[56] Evidence, p.E57.
[57] Evidence, p.E54.
[58] Media Release, Minister for Industry, Science and Resources, 6 July 1999.
[59] K.R. McKinnon, Future Reaction, Report of the Research Reactor Review, Commonwealth of Australia, August 1993, p.xxii.
