Chapter 3
The framework convention on climate change and the Kyoto Protocol (Part
b)
International Negotiations Following Kyoto
3.88 Since Kyoto, negotiations between governments have continued. In
November 1998, the Fourth Conference of the Parties (CoP 4) adopted the
`Buenos Aires Year 2000 Plan of Action' to strengthen the implementation
of the UNFCCC and prepare for the Kyoto Protocol's entry into force. Decisions
were made on a program of work and a process for elaborating rules for
the Kyoto (flexibility) mechanisms, the development of technology transfer
and future commitments for developing countries; compensation and adaptation;
financial resources - Global Environment Facility (GEF); national communications;
issues of compliance and land use change and forestry; and an undertaking
to discuss supplementarity, ceilings, long term convergence and equity
issues. [1]
3.89 The Fifth Conference of the Parties (CoP 5), which took place in
Bonn in 1999, continued discussions on a program of works, rules of compliance,
land use and forestry change and market mechanisms. [2]
3.90 Negotiations will continue at the Sixth Conference of the Parties
(CoP 6) in The Hague in November 2000. Each of the following aspects of
the negotiations are further considered in this chapter:
- the three Kyoto mechanisms: Emissions Trading; Joint Implementation
(JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM);
- the use of sinks;
- the compliance system;
- the role of developing countries and carbon leakage; and
- ratification.
Emissions Trading
3.91 An international emissions trading system is a central element of
the Kyoto Protocol. Under Articles 3, 6 and 17, Parties are allowed to
trade unused emissions credits - that is, Parties whose net emissions
are likely to fall below their assigned amounts can sell them to Parties
who require additional credits. However, the Protocol states that international
emissions trading shall be supplementary to domestic actions to reduce
emissions. Because of disagreement during the Kyoto meeting, the detailed
design and structure of the system - including rules for verification,
reporting and accountability - was deferred for negotiation to future
meetings. It is expected to be discussed at the next meeting of the Parties
(CoP 6). [3] Emissions trading is discussed
in detail in chapter 9 of this report.
3.92 The Australian Government supports the introduction of emissions
trading at an international level and is considering its domestic introduction.
Mr Tulpule emphasised that:
… we [ABARE] are arguing a couple of things very strongly. The
first is that it is very important to have full and free emissions trading.
That is a conclusion that you can draw from the model, and it is a conclusion
that we think will help us to achieve our Kyoto targets at a much lower
cost than would otherwise be the case. We think that is an important
result in the model. [4]
The role of sinks - land use, land use change and forestry
3.93 The role of sinks is discussed in detail in chapter 7 of this report.
The word `sinks' refers to those natural processes which absorb carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere. The role of sinks is one of the most complex
technical issues in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The rules and modalities
to operationalise the sinks provisions in the Kyoto Protocol, and their
applicability in the flexibility mechanisms, are yet to be agreed by the
Parties. The scope of the use of sinks as a measure to offset emissions
from elsewhere is dependant on the final definitions accepted for forests
and what may be counted as an additional activity. A number of potential
loopholes could be created as a result of these definitions. The permanence
of sequestered carbon in forestry or other vegetation-based sinks has
also been of significant concern to many stakeholders. Other uncertainties
relate to the measurement and monitoring of carbon stored in sinks. How
this will be operationalised at an international and domestic level has
been a key issue and, in particular, confidence in and the transparency
of any accounting system developed.
3.94 In relation to sinks, Ralph Hillman, Ambassador for the Environment,
told the Committee that:
Sinks are of critical importance to Australia. The definition and rules
to be adopted will impact on the size of our abatement task, as well
as the cost. This will be a key issue for us at CoP 6. [5]
3.95 The Australian Government also achieved a provision at Kyoto, under
Article 3.7 of the Protocol (the Australia clause). The clause allows
countries to include emissions from land clearing to be added to their
1990 baseline to calculate the emissions target in the Kyoto commitment
period of 2008 to 2012. [6] Higher baseline
emissions imply a higher target, and if emissions from land clearing are
declining for other reasons, this frees up allowable emissions for other
sectors. [7]
3.96 The Australia Institute has argued that the clause `effectively
[only] benefits Australia':
… there is an important issue concerning the interpretation of
Article 3.7 that has a major bearing on the calculation of base year
emissions. The clause provides a trigger which permits a Party to include
land use emissions in its base year amount; it applies to `[t]hose Parties…
for whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse
gas emissions in 1990…'. This trigger applies almost exclusively
to Australia. [8]
3.97 The Institute also explained that:
… the fact that the large fall in the rate of land clearing occurred
in 1991, and not in 1990 or earlier, was extremely fortuitous for it
means the Australia's total allowable emissions under the Protocol are
6 per cent higher than they might otherwise be, and extra tranche of
emissions that may be worth $640 million in emission permits. The 6
per cent is a very large number by any standard and Australia's land
clearing data will undoubtedly attract intense scrutiny from other Parties
to the Framework Convention. [9]
3.98 While, under the Kyoto Protocol, Australia is permitted to include
land clearing within its total emissions, it is currently not reported
in the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory because of considerable uncertainties
in calculating the effects on emissions. [10]
The Australia Institute and the Australian Conservation Foundation have
criticised the decision of the Conference of Parties at Kyoto, at the
request of Australia, to include land clearing when calculating national
totals of carbon emissions. [11] These organisations
argue that, if falls in the rate of land clearing occur, when factored
into national totals, they may allow Australia to go close to meeting
its Kyoto target without the need for further abatement action that would
reduce current trend increases in energy emissions:
Simple calculations show that even if rates of land clearing do not
continue to decline… then emissions from Australia's fossil fuel
and other sectors can increase by 22 per cent while Australia remains
within the 8 per cent overall target set at Kyoto. If the Government
implements its announced plan to reduce land clearing by 20,000 ha./an.
then emissions from the fossil fuel and other sectors can increase by
28 per cent. [12]
3.99 The Australia Institute argued that, again because of accounting
rules, plantations would be less effective sinks than is widely considered
to be the case:
The opportunity to use plantations to offset emissions from fossil
sources will be much less extensive than many people believe. There
is a lot of hype about the opportunities for land holders to establish
plantations or woodlots with a view to selling the emission credits
in the future. The first fundamental point to recognise is that carbon
stored or sequestered in plantations can only count towards the Kyoto
target if it meets two conditions:
- the plantations must have been established after 1990; and
- they must be established on land that was cleared before 1990.
If a plantation meets these criteria then it may count towards the
Kyoto target. However, in practical terms only large, professionally
managed plantations are likely to qualify and be commercially worthwhile.
[13]
3.100 CANA summed up the sensitivity and importance of the land clearing
issue to stakeholders in the climate change negotiations in Australia
as follows:
The Australia clause (Article 3.7 Kyoto Protocol) enables Australia
to increase fossil fuel emissions between 13 per cent and 26 per cent
and still meet the Kyoto target. [14] It
allows industrial emissions to be written off against `land use change'
(LUC). This is possible because land clearing in Australia has slowed
since 1990 – producing less greenhouse gas emissions. This will
`compensate' for increased industrial emissions. The Australian Government
negotiating team at Kyoto in 1997 knew this and yet failed to reveal
the information openly at the negotiating table. [15]
Recommendation 5
The Committee recommends that strict rules to govern the use of carbon
sinks should be included in any emissions trading framework developed
by the Parties to recognise the uncertainties in measurement and the long
term security risks.
The compliance system?
3.101 Means for demonstrating compliance with the targets agreed in the
Kyoto Protocol have also been the subject of international negotiations
but have not yet been agreed. The Kyoto Protocol puts great emphasis on
compliance assessment. [16] It repeatedly stresses
the need for accountability and verification.
3.102 Michael Grubb noted that the Parties have expressed concern that
`many emission sources and sinks might be hard to estimate and that compliance
assessment would be correspondingly hard'. [17]
He also pointed out that `the Protocol provisions for reporting and review
are scattered throughout the document, making their overall effect difficult
to grasp at a glance'. [18]
3.103 Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol provides the mandate for the adoption
of compliance procedures and mechanisms and is one of a number of provisions
in the Protocol that will provide the basis for its `compliance system'.
The monitoring, reporting and review provisions in Articles 5, 7 and 8
of the Protocol will provide the tools for assessing Parties' compliance,
or non-compliance, with their target obligations. These provisions will
provide an important early warning device, enabling Parties to identify
and address (or to seek help to address) potential compliance problems
at an early stage. [19] Articles 16, 18 and
19 of the Protocol contain the specific legal processes concerning compliance.
[20] Article 18 is directed at overall compliance
with specific commitments and, with Article 16, basically provides a framework
for more negotiations and the development of an `indicative list of consequences'
for non-compliance. [21]
3.104 Michael Grubb points out that Article 18 makes the Protocol a `potentially
stringent mechanism, far more so than in most other international agreements'.
[22] He concludes that the wording of the Article
suggests that the Parties intend to try to enforce compliance by imposing
a range of penalties in a routine and systematic way.
3.105 Article 19 of the Protocol provides for the settlement of disputes
procedure in the UNFCCC.
3.106 To be effective, the Kyoto Protocol will require a robust and efficient
compliance regime. Accurate and transparent measurement and reporting
of emissions provide the foundation for the effective operation of the
Protocol's market-based mechanisms. [23] Parties
must have an accurate assessment of their emissions in order to monitor
the effect of transfers and acquisitions under the mechanisms. The importance
of an effective compliance mechanism is strengthened because the level
of non-compliance with targets is rolled over into later commitment periods.
If a developed country does not emit the whole of its assigned amount
by the end of the commitment period, it is allowed to carry forward the
unused portion to the next commitment period. This is known as `banking'
of emissions. Verification of actual emissions levels achieved, and their
comparison with accepted targets, is critical to this banking process.
3.107 At CoP 5, the Parties agreed that the Protocol's compliance system
should have three objectives: promoting compliance, preventing non-compliance
and determining and addressing instances of non-compliance. Details of
the Protocol's compliance system remain to be negotiated. [24]
3.108 It has been accepted that the system should have both facilitative
(to encourage compliance) and enforcement (to deter non-compliance) functions,
although there was no consensus as to how these functions could be implemented.
[25] In earlier international agreements, international
pressure has been used as a major enforcement mechanism, with the threat
of trade restrictions for non-compliance.
3.109 Ralph Hillman, Ambassador for the Environment, advised the Committee
of the current Australian view about compliance mechanisms:
Current proposals range from facilitative means designed to help Parties
overcome their implementation problems to enforcement or hard measures
such as requiring additional emission reductions in a subsequent commitment
period. Australia has argued that a strong facilitative component is
important to achieve implementation of Parties' commitments, but we
are yet to finalise our position on consequences. [26]
3.110 The two main aspects of Australia's view are, therefore, that the
compliance mechanism should focus primarily on country targets and that
it should have a `pro-compliance' approach, that is, the system should
encourage and facilitate countries to meet their obligations before punishment
for infringements is considered.
Recommendation 6
The Committee agrees that the integrity of the Kyoto Protocol rests
on its ability to deter non-compliance and recommends that the Australian
Government works with the Parties towards the adoption of firm sanctions
for non-compliance.
Recommendation 7
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government support the
development of a reporting mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol which will
identify and assist those Parties falling behind in Protocol emissions
targets.
The role of developing countries and carbon leakage
Developing countries and the Kyoto Protocol
3.111 Developing countries are currently not required to commit to agreed
targets under the Kyoto Protocol. This situation has generated considerable
international debate, especially in the context of possible transference
of emissions from activities in developed countries to activities in developing
countries (`carbon leakage'). The commitment of developing countries to
targets under the Protocol was also a common concern in the submissions
to the inquiry from industry. As a result of current modelling on greenhouse
gas emissions, ABARE noted that:
Emissions from non-Annex B countries are projected to account for more
than half of global emissions well before 2010. [27]
3.112 The inquiry heard much debate about whether and when developing
countries should agree to binding targets, and whether this issue should
affect Australia's timetable for ratification.
3.113 Ambassador Hillman addressed the Committee with the issue of how
and when developing countries should take on targets under the Kyoto Protocol
and confirmed that the Australian Government is `not asking the developing
countries to ratify; [but]… asking that they agree to a pathway towards
taking on targets'. [28]
3.114 In the United Nations, developing countries seek to group together
under the umbrella of the Group of 77 (G77) plus China (numbering more
than 120 countries at full strength). [29]
Since the inception of the climate change regime, developing countries
have been united by the principle that any major response action should
be led by the industrialised world. Developing countries, as formally
represented by the G77 and China, have firmly resisted efforts to open
discussions on quantified emissions commitments. [30]
3.115 Developing countries will be affected directly by the physical
aspect of climate change (as acknowledged in Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the
UNFCCC) and indirectly, by the implementation of response measures in
developed countries to meet the Kyoto targets (Articles 3.14 of the Kyoto
Protocol and 4.8 of the UNFCCC). [31]
3.116 Adoption of Kyoto targets and mechanisms will affect the structure
of world trade and investment and adoption of technology. [32]
Hence, developing countries, despite having no emissions abatement targets,
are likely to feel the economic consequences of emissions abatement measures
in developed countries, through trade and investment links. [33]
ABARE claimed that the consequences for developing countries would include
those arising from:
- lower world prices for fossil fuels as developed countries' demand
for fossil fuels falls in order to meet their abatement targets;
- reduced investment in Annex B regions as a consequence of lower returns
following the implementation of carbon equivalent penalties;
- higher import prices for energy-intensive goods;
- some relocation of energy-intensive industries from developed to developing
countries as developed countries introduce emissions reduction measures;
- restructuring of developing country economies away from fossil fuel
extraction towards capital-intensive activities such as iron and steel
and aluminium production (associated with carbon leakage) leading to
increased demand for capital; and
- impact from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which provides for
direct developing country involvement in emissions reduction projects
in a host country. [34]
Importance of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
3.117 In general, developing countries are keen to see the Kyoto Protocol's
CDM implemented.
3.118 Under the CDM, the richest countries shall provide `new and additional
financial resources' and facilitate technology transfer to developing
countries. So-called UNFCCC Annex II Parties (essentially the OECD) will
fund the `agreed full cost' incurred by developing countries for submitting
their national communications. These funds must be `new and additional'
rather than redirected from existing developmental aid funds. UNFCCC Annex
II Parties will also help finance certain other UNFCCC-related projects,
and they will promote and finance the transfer of, or access to, environmentally
sound technologies, particularly for developing country Parties. The UNFCCC
recognises that the extent to which developing country Parties implement
their own commitments will depend on financial and technical assistance
from the developed countries. [35]
3.119 ABARE pointed out that the CDM has the potential to offer low cost
abatement opportunities for Annex B countries while assisting developing
countries to achieve sustainable development. [36]
The credits can also create revenue for developing countries as, under
the CDM, non-Annex B countries will receive a share of the emissions reduction
credits generated by certified emissions reduction projects. [37]
3.120 ABARE noted the importance of ensuring that the CDM `is implemented
in a way that is all encompassing in its approach to projects, and includes
removals by sinks as well as emissions reductions by technology transfer'.
[38] The organisation concluded that, unless
the latter is the case, `the benefits from the Clean Development Mechanism
will not be distributed equitably among developing country Parties to
the Protocol'. [39]
3.121 In relation to the cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol, Ambassador
Hillman, asserted that:
The Clean Development Mechanism is significant not only because it
will give developed countries access to low-cost abatement opportunities
in developing countries, and thereby lower the global cost of reaching
the Kyoto targets, but also because it will lead to substantial flows
of investment and environmental technology to developing countries.
This prospect has softened the attitude of many developing countries
to the concept of the flexibility mechanisms and to progress in the
negotiations more generally. [40]
Should developing countries take on targets?
3.122 The importance of encouraging commitment by developing countries
was highlighted by Ambassador Hillman when he stated:
This is probably the most difficult of all the issues, yet it is central
to ratification by the United States and others, including Australia.
The United States Senate has made it clear that it will not ratify the
Kyoto Protocol unless there is meaningful participation by developing
countries. The G77 - that is, developing countries, and particularly
China and India - strongly resist any suggestion that they should take
on binding targets. They were successful at Kyoto in having a draft
article on voluntary targets removed from the text. A strong United
States push to address this in the formal negotiations at the fourth
Conference of the Parties in Buenos Aires in 1998 led to the G77 blocking
substantive progress on virtually all other issues. The United States
is now focusing on bilateral contact and informal dialogue in which
Australia participates to take this issue forward. [41]
3.123 In response to questions from the Committee about the rationale
for Australia to wait to ratify the Protocol until developing countries
have agreed to a commitment to taking on greenhouse gas emissions targets,
Ambassador Hillman argued that a global, communal effort was required
to achieve reduction in emissions:
The reasons are environmental. There is very little point in our acting
unless down the track the developing countries also act. [42]
3.124 However, Ambassador Hillman went on to explain that:
There is another angle to it. I mentioned the environmental angle,
but there is an important economic angle… . In a situation in which
the developing world has no prospect of taking on targets, it will lead
to what we call carbon leakage; that is, investment in carbon intensive
industries such as aluminium, smelting, cement, paper and even petroleum
refining will gradually move offshore simply because the cost burden
in Australia will be too high. We will see substantial shifting of industries
offshore. This will have two impacts: first, an economic impact on Australia
and, second, the emissions, instead of being contained by the Kyoto
targets, will simply move somewhere else where there are no targets.
[43]
3.125 However, other witnesses pointed out that developed countries had
agreed to take the lead. [44] The Australia
Institute drew attention to the fact that the aim of the 1995 Berlin Mandate:
… was to set mandatory targets for rich countries exclusively.
It stated, inter alia, that the purpose of the process was the
`strengthening of the commitments of the Parties included in Annex I',
i.e. the developed countries, through the adoption of a protocol. The
aim was for Annex I Parties `to set quantified limitation and reduction
objectives within specified time-frames' and specifically said that
the process would `[n]ot introduce any new commitments for Parties not
included in Annex I'. [45]
3.126 The Berlin Mandate reaffirmed the principle, enshrined in the UNFCCC,
that: `developed countries should take the lead in combating climate change
and the adverse effects thereof'. The Mandate not only stated that the
targets to be set would apply to developed countries alone, but also set
down the principles that were to guide the process, notably:
The fact that the largest share of historical and current global emissions
of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that the
per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low
and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries
will grow to meet their social and development needs. [46]
3.127 The Australia Institute explained that:
The Mandate reflected universally accepted ethical principles,…
that those countries responsible for increased concentrations of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere should do most to reduce the problem, especially
since, being rich countries, they were in a better position to do so.
These principles of polluter pays and ability to pay were reinforced
by the acknowledgment that while rich countries became rich by burning
fossil fuels, poor countries would suffer most of the damage of climate
change. There was no challenge to these views. [47]
How likely is carbon leakage?
3.128 The potential shift of production and associated carbon emissions
from developed countries to developing countries is described as the carbon
equivalent leakage effect. [48] ABARE estimated
that the rate of carbon equivalent leakage will be 14 per cent in 2010
under independent abatement. [49] With emissions
trading introduced, they suggest that leakage would be reduced to 8 per
cent.
3.129 Concerns were expressed in a range of submissions suggesting that
mandatory measures to cut emissions, which have the effect of increasing
energy prices, will see industry move out of countries such as Australia
because of the competitive disadvantage that would be produced. [50]
The Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN) expressed the views
evident in a number of submissions and suggested that:
… there needs to be a clear path for the taking on of commitments
by developing countries. At the moment there is no agreed path. It is
a major problem for Australia because many of the competitors for both
our exporting industries and our import competing industries are located
in non-Annex I countries. That presents us with a huge exposure unless
there can be something done about that. The government is in agreement
with that. [51]
3.130 AIGN argued that the Kyoto Protocol `suffers from a fundamental
flaw':
Although non-Annex I countries account for a significant and growing
share of global emissions they are not subject to binding constraints
under the Protocol. Consequently, Australian businesses, especially
those in energy and emissions intensive industries, could be rendered
uncompetitive against developing country producers with no emission
constraints… . [52]
3.131 Mr David Coutts, Executive Director of the Australian Aluminium
Council added weight to this comment:
In terms of ratification, one of the big problems in the Kyoto Protocol
is that developing countries are not part of it. They are our major
competitors for future investment in this industry. The aluminium industry
does have very considerable problems with the Kyoto Protocol being ratified
without some guidance as to what is going to happen to bring developing
countries into the process… . If you choose to increase energy
costs dramatically in Australia to try and meet the Kyoto Protocol that
will, without question, force investment in industries like ours for
these other countries. That will do nothing at all for global warming.
It may even be negative because we are the most efficient at using that
energy at the moment. [53]
3.132 Mr Ian Satchwell, Chief Executive Officer of the Chamber of Minerals
and Energy of Western Australia, also argued that developing countries
must be included in the global greenhouse effort as soon as possible.
[54] The organisation put the view that, in
spite of efforts to produce energy-intensive products efficiently, Australian
industry is likely to attract either international disrepute for exceeding
the Kyoto target, or extra costs in the form of traded emissions targets.
The result will be a loss of capital investment to non-Annex B countries
which can emit CO2 without such penalties.
3.133 Dr Jim McCabe, representing Chevron Australia, explained their
approach to Australia's obligations under the Kyoto Protocol:
We believe that Australia should not fix national rules in the absence
of an international scheme which would allow Australia to reap the benefits
of being a clean fuel greenhouse beneficial fuel supplier through LNG,
and that a greenhouse gas abatement measure should be driven by market
forces rather than government regulation. [55]
3.134 In contrast to other witnesses, Chevron did not believe developing
countries needed to take on targets before the Kyoto Protocol was implemented.
Rather, they could take on CDM projects:
We are looking for ways that the international field can be levelled
but without necessarily saying to Australia that we require developing
countries to be signatories and take targets before we should play the
game. The idea is to look for some innovative ways in which we can maintain
our competitiveness rather than having a single solution of bringing
developing countries into the Kyoto mechanism. [56]
3.135 The Australia Institute argued that industry claims about a loss
of capital investment to developing countries were exaggerated:
While the prospect of some carbon leakage cannot be dismissed, its
likely extent has been grossly exaggerated by the fossil fuel-based
industries and by ABARE in its modelling. In order to be subject to
carbon leakage, firms need to meet three criteria: they need to be energy-intensive
in production, they need to be export-dependent (or import-competing),
and their competition must come from non-Annex B countries (since all
Annex B countries will have emission abatement policies).
The great majority of energy is consumed by industries or activities
that are entirely domestic and face no foreign competition electricity
and gas consumed in households, nearly all transportation, the commercial
and service sectors of the economy. The major sectors that fall into
this category are alumina, aluminium, LNG and steel production. These
sectors account for around 10 per cent of Australia's total emissions.
[57]
3.136 The Institute pointed out that organisations which consider moving
their operations to developing countries will have to address the fact
that the developing countries will also be required to develop emissions
abatement policies in a decade or so, as they take on emissions reduction
obligations. [58]
3.137 There is some agreement that there are a few industries which may
legitimately claim concessions for differential impact. The Australia
Institute explained that:
In a few cases, a good case can be made for some special concessions
for exporters, so that the rest of the economy meets the cost of reducing
emissions. LNG [Liquid Natural Gas] is a case in point. Although produced
using an energy-intensive liquefaction process, it has the potential
to replace more emission-intensive fuels worldwide. In such cases, it
may be desirable to incorporate special transitional provisions to offset
the costs of emission abatement and provide those firms most affected
with a longer period over which to adjust. [59]
3.138 However, developed countries need to be seen as leaders in attempts
to check climate change, but the extent of their leadership is constrained
by economic factors and the willingness of industry to follow. How to
address the vulnerability of developing countries remains an important
issue on the post-Kyoto agenda. [60] Some developing
countries, such as low-lying island nations, are highly vulnerable to
the impacts of climate change and are likely to favour commitment, others
feel more threatened by the potential economic repercussions if they take
abatement action.
3.139 The Committee acknowledges industry concerns about possible `carbon
leakage', although it recognises that only a small proportion of overall
emissions are likely to be effected. The Committee supports efforts to
encourage and assist developing countries to adopt binding targets as
soon as possible.
Conference of the Parties 6 (CoP 6)
3.140 The next post-Kyoto milestone is CoP 6, to be held in The Hague
in November 2000. Major decisions are expected on the operational details
of the Kyoto Protocol with the aim of bringing the Protocol into force
as early as possible. The UNFCCC Secretariat has indicated that many Parties
have indicated a wish to see this occur by 2002. [61]
3.141 At this meeting a number of issues are of particular importance
to all Parties. Senator Hill outlined the level of resolve:
There now appears to be a renewed sense of determination among the
international community to have outstanding issues resolved at the next
Conference of the Parties. It was decided to hold an additional two
ministerial level meetings prior to The Hague COP to further progress
negotiations. This is an unprecedented level of ministerial involvement.
The final detail on these issues will be central to determining the
ability of member nations to achieve their targets. [62]
3.142 Issues of particular concern to Australia have been discussed earlier
in this chapter. Mr Ralph Hillman, Ambassador for the Environment, highlighted
the major issues which the Parties have agreed to negotiate at CoP 6:
The first is the extent to which developed countries should be allowed
to meet their targets through emissions trading and by undertaking emission
reduction projects in developing countries - as distinct from domestic
measures - and what the rules and modalities of these so-called flexibility
mechanisms should be. The second issue is the extent to which sinks,
that is, forestry and land use management, should contribute to meeting
developed country targets. The third issue is which compliance system
should apply and what the consequences of non-compliance should be.
The fourth is the extent to which developed countries need to respond
to demands by G77, that is, developing countries, for transfers of resources
and technology. [63]
3.143 The Ambassador noted that the issue of how and when developing
countries should take on targets under the Kyoto Protocol is also of concern
to Australia. However, no agreed process or time frame has been established
by the Parties to the Protocol to deal with this question and it is not
expected that this issue will be resolved at CoP 6.
3.144 Flexibility mechanisms are believed to offer a substantial reduction
in the cost of implementing Kyoto, compared with a situation where each
country meets its target by domestic measures alone. [64]
The EU, and some G77 countries, are supporting a cap or limit on the extent
to which these mechanisms can be used to achieve targets. Australia on
the other hand, as a member of the umbrella group, is committed to uncapped
use of emissions trading and other flexibility mechanisms. [65]
3.145 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been introduced earlier
in this chapter. Under the CDM developed countries can invest in a project
in the developing world and earn certified emissions reductions (CERs)
to reduce (on paper) pollution in their own country. [66]
Ms Reynolds, representing Climate Action Network Australia (CANA), pointed
out that the CDM is `potentially a very positive part of the Kyoto Protocol'
and that the mechanism provides an opportunity, acknowledged by the Parties,
for developed country investment into developing countries. [67]
3.146 However, Ms Reynolds also expressed concern that this flexibility
mechanism has been identified as a potential Kyoto accounting loophole.
She explained that there is:
… at this stage, no cap on how many rights to pollute you can
buy from establishing developments in developing countries. For example,
in 1990 we may have had an allowance to increase to eight per cent,
but we could go well above our eight per cent target and produce a range
of CDM credits that we have collected between the period 2000-12. You
can actually collect CDM credits from this year or as soon as the rules
are established for the CDM. [68]
3.147 There is concern that developed countries, rather than take action
to reduce pollution at home, could meet a large portion of their emissions
target through involvement in initiatives under the CDM. [69]
CANA recommend that the CDM should only provide credit for activities
that are additional to those which would have been undertaken under a
`business as usual' situation. [70]
3.148 Eligible CDM activities have yet to be finalised under the Kyoto
Protocol. In this context it is noted that some countries, including Australia,
are lobbying for few or no restrictions in terms of activities which will
qualify to be included under the CDM. Ms Anna Reynolds pointed out that
there is concern about what can be included in the CDM and that:
Australia is not opposing clean coal, nuclear technology and sinks
to be included in the Clean Development Mechanism. [71]
3.149 However, a number are Parties are opposed, in particular, to the
expansion of nuclear power as a result of the Kyoto Protocol. [72]
There is support to limit CDM activities to best practice renewable energy
and energy efficiency projects. [73]
Recommendation 8
The Committee recommends that credit for activities should only be
provided for activities that are additional to those which would have
been undertaken under a `business as usual' situation.
Recommendation 9
The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government oppose in
future international negotiations, any proposals for the inclusion of
nuclear technology in the Clean Development Mechanism.
Australian Democrats Recommendation 2
The Australian Democrats recommend that the Commonwealth Government
oppose in future international negotiations, any proposals for the inclusion
of clean coal or sinks in the Clean Development Mechanism.
3.150 Progress on sinks issues is planned at CoP 6, following a special
IPCC report on land use and forestry produced in May 2000. The Australian
Government is also working with the umbrella group on carbon sinks, which
remains a central issue for Australia. Again, the EU and some G77 countries
are trying to limit the extent to which sinks are used to meet Kyoto Protocol
targets. However, the Australian Government is pushing for a very broad
range of activities to be defined as sinks and considers sinks to be a
critical element in enabling Australia to meet its target. [74]
3.151 Senator Hill has commented that:
Australia will be seeking a CoP 6 decision on sinks that all countries
can work with for a better environmental outcome… sinks may offer
a means for developing countries to play their part… .
We will be looking for the rules and definitions to implement Article
3.3 that are in line with the terms of the Protocol… .
Australia will also be seeking a decision that sinks projects are included
in the Clean Development Mechanism. [75]
3.152 Ambassador Ralph Hillman noted that penalties for non-compliance
will be important to most industrialised countries in relation to their
decision on ratification. [76] The Parties
will be required to agree on the difficult issue of the consequences that
would be invoked if a party failed to meet its target. Australia supports
a strong facilitative component to encourage implementation of Parties'
commitments, but is yet to finalise a position on consequences. [77]
3.153 The developing countries will seek reassurance of financial and
technological support in relation to concerns such as the cost of adaptation
to climate change, and building institutional capacity to deal with greenhouse.
[78] These countries are also requesting technology
transfer beyond that associated with CDM. OPEC countries are seeking compensation
for economic loss they might suffer as a result of any fall in oil prices
arising from the emissions abatement policies of the developed economies.
3.154 In his submission, Professor Ian Lowe commented on a further issue
of concern to Australia, that of leadership image:
If our emissions appear to be growing without limit it is very unlikely
that the world community will be sympathetic to our special needs. I
think the world community believes that we got away with something at
Kyoto: we got a more generous target and we got what is known internationally
as the Australian provision that land use change will be included. If,
with all that generosity, we still cannot meet our targets, I think
we are likely to get a very dusty answer to any other pleas for consideration
of our special role in the region. [79]
3.155 If the evidence submitted to this inquiry is correct, Australia's
position at CoP 6 will be viewed closely by Parties that have less liberal
targets agreed. Mr Ian Fry, Regional Coordinator for Pacific Bioweb, having
attended a number of Meetings of the Parties, explained to the Committee:
There are perceptions of Australia's position, and it is generally
considered that Australia's position internationally is regressive.
This is as a result of the actual Kyoto meeting, because Australia accepted
a target that was an increase on its 1990 level when most developed
countries accepted a reduction. [80]
3.156 CANA, in support of this view, summarised the international perspective:
… we see the loopholes and the pushing for more loopholes in the
Kyoto Protocol this year - and this year is crunch time for the Kyoto
Protocol - as Australia being incredibly greedy. We already have the
right under the Kyoto Protocol to grow by eight per cent. Some people
believe that is quite a big allowance. We then have the right to use
the slowing land clearing to offset our increasing energy and transport
emissions. Some estimates are that, with the natural slowing of land
clearing over time, we can increase our energy and transport emissions
by between 25 and 30 per cent. If, on top of that, we can gain another
10 per cent growth in our emissions from carbon sinks and another 10
per cent in emissions growth from buying rights to pollute through the
CDM, then we essentially are seeing the Kyoto Protocol not being the
driver for domestic action that we all want it to be… . [81]
3.157 The Committee acknowledges that Australia has led in some actions
such as the preliminary work on a national emissions trading system and
the introduction of a mandatory renewable electricity target, but in other
areas is actively trying to minimise the need to cut industrial emissions.
The opportunity exists for Australia to demonstrate its commitment to
meeting its target, rather than being on the wrong side of a debate over
cosmetic accounting techniques designed to show Australia in a good light.
Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol
3.158 To achieve any form of success, the Kyoto Protocol must aim for
global participation and a high degree of measurable compliance. [82]
To achieve maximum participation, requirements under the Protocol will
have to be both realistic and achievable by the Parties involved:
The more unrealistic the target is - considering the short timetable
for action - the more costly it will be to meet it. And the more ammunition
the treaty's opponents will have in order to work against it. [83]
3.159 The Kyoto Protocol does not enter into force until it is ratified
by at least 55 Parties which accounted for at least 55 per cent of the
total CO2 emissions in 1990 (Article 25.1). [84]
3.160 Appendix 4 provides a list of countries which have signed, and
also those which have ratified, the Protocol as at 13 January 2000. [85]
The Committee was told that many countries will seek ratification based
on the outcome of CoP 6 at the end of 2000. Ambassador Ralph Hillman noted:
I do not think any Annex I country is considering ratifying the Kyoto
Protocol before CoP 6, with the exception, I think, of France, which
has made some noises. I think they are beginning the process but I doubt
that they will ratify, however, before CoP 6. Most countries are waiting
to get the outcomes they want on those four outstanding issues before
they move to ratification. Currently, only 22 countries have ratified,
and they are all developing countries, most of them very small developing
countries. [86]
3.161 At this point, it remains unclear how many, and which, countries
will ratify the Kyoto Protocol. However, Michael Grubb expresses the view
that ratification by 55 Parties is not a high hurdle, and that the effective
hurdle is the minimum fraction of emissions. [87]
While the position of the US remains uncertain, the Protocol could enter
into force by 2003 without the US. Michael Grubb pointed out that:
Although the US administration dominated design of the Kyoto Protocol
many in the US legislature remain relatively isolated from global realities
and responsibilities, and reflect the deep resistance of the US body
politic to emission restrictions. [88]
3.162 Australia signed the Kyoto Protocol on 29 April 1998, but has not
yet ratified it, and Government members have indicated that they will
wait for US ratification before doing so themselves. [89]
The Minister for Environment and Heritage, Senator Hill, stated, after
the signing, that ratification may have to wait for the resolution of
outstanding issues such as the involvement of developing nations in abatement
agreements and the design of an international system of emissions trading.
[90] However, the Minister also stated that
Australia would not wait for ratification before it moves to implement
the Protocol's provisions and commitments. More recently, Senator Hill
commented:
Having achieved this outcome at Kyoto, our government believes that
it is in Australia's best interests to bring the Protocol into legal
effect sooner rather than later. To this end we have been actively involved
in international negotiations to resolve the outstanding issues from
Kyoto such as flexibility mechanisms, sinks, and compliance. There is
also a need to address the involvement of developing nations in this
global effort. [91]
3.163 Dr Clive Hamilton, from the Australia Institute, noted claims from
Australian industry that:
… we [Australia] should not do anything until developing countries
do and that the US Senate will not ratify the Protocol until developing
countries do show meaningful participation. [92]
3.164 This response to ratification has also been supported by representatives
of Australian industry. Woodside Energy Ltd explained:
In an environment of uncertainty where there is no risk-sharing by
the Australian Government, Woodside believes the current Protocol should
not be ratified by Australia until the US has ratified it and there
is meaningful enrolment of the non-Annex 1 Parties. [93]
3.165 Australia's position with regard to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
was clarified by Ambassador Ralph Hillman, who has suggested that ratification
of the Protocol should occur following resolution of some of the current
uncertainties regarding implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. [94]
The key issues to be resolved were identified as: the rules and models
for the flexibility mechanisms; the use of sinks; the compliance system;
and involvement of developing countries in the Protocol and transfer of
resources and technology.
3.166 There is support for the approach that, irrespective of any final
decisions made at CoP 6 in relation to the flexibility mechanisms, Australia
must ratify the Kyoto Protocol and send a clear message to the world that
it is prepared to play its part as a good international citizen in resolving
the greenhouse issue. Ms Lynette Thorstensen, a consultant for the Australian
Consumers' Association, in support of this view commented:
We would like to see the Protocol ratified as soon as possible by Australia.
We do not believe we have to wait for the US, but we do believe we should
be giving a strong signal of environmental leadership in this area.
[95]
3.167 Professor Lowe also expressed concern that Australia should be
seen to be taking a positive approach to the issue of climate change and
noted that:
Senator Hill recently warned the business community that if the Kyoto
agreement fell over what would replace it would almost certainly be
an international agreement that was less generous to Australia. In terms
of international politics I think that is almost certainly an accurate
assessment. [96]
3.168 Dr Clive Hamilton of the Australia Institute agreed:
I have argued that there would be very substantial benefits for Australia
to ratify before the meeting in The Hague because it will not affect
the coming into force of the Protocol as we are a relatively small player,
but it will enormously increase Australia's bargaining position as a
sign of good faith. [97]
3.169 In relation to addressing targets for greenhouse gas abatement,
Senator Hill also argued that Australia needed to move towards decoupling
economic growth from emissions growth. He pointed out that:
Nations which continue in the ways of the past will inevitably face
an even tougher, more costly task. It seems sensible that Australia
should take precautionary action now to ensure it does not fall into
this latter category. [98]
3.170 In support of Australia's intention to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
a working group of the Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation
Council (PMSEIC), released a paper in June 1999 strongly advocating a
proactive response from industry and government to the challenges and
opportunities presented by global warming. The group recommended that
the Government swiftly ratify the Protocol, that industry should take
a leadership role in developing new technologies and opportunities for
abatement, that Australia should prepare early for the trade in carbon
credits and use the response to greenhouse to promote knowledge-based
industries and exports. [99]
3.171 While targets at Kyoto are not yet legally binding, the working
group notes the expressed intention of the Australian Government to act
as if they were. If Australia waits for ratification while other countries
act, it runs the risk of missing out on global opportunities. [100]
3.172 It appears to this Committee that Australia will only consider
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol after several key issues have been resolved.
These issues include: the rules and modalities for the three Kyoto flexibility
mechanisms - Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development
Mechanism; important definitional and operational issues concerning the
treatment of sinks; design of a system for compliance with the Protocol
obligations; and participation of developing countries. [101]
3.173 Mindful of these issues, Professor Lowe summarised the likely situation
for Australia at the next Convention of the Parties (CoP 6):
The negotiations at The Hague are going to be difficult because some
people see those measures as ways of ensuring that Kyoto works and others
are seeing it as ways of making sure that Kyoto has no effect on them.
I think it is going to be difficult. It seems to me that we are in a
much better position to negotiate if we are approaching, as they used
to say, the court with clean hands; if we can say that we are doing
responsible things within our own political system to restrain emissions.
If our emissions appear to be growing without limit it is very unlikely
that the world community will be sympathetic to our special needs. I
think that the world community believes that we got away with something
at Kyoto: we got a more generous target and we got what is known internationally
as the Australian provision that land use change will be included. If,
with all that generosity, we cannot meet our targets, I think we are
likely to get a very dusty answer to any other pleas for consideration
of our special role in the region. [102]
UNFCCC Beyond 2012
3.174 Progress in implementing the Convention, for example through National
Communications and In-Depth Reviews, financial assistance, technology
transfer and methodological issues, is of critical importance to forging
an effective response to climate change issues. [103]
3.175 The Kyoto Protocol will be reviewed on a regular basis and negotiations
over targets for the post-2012 period are expected to begin no later than
2005. The intergovernmental process on climate change will continue to
evolve as scientific knowledge improves. [104]
Planning for future targets
The Committee notes that, even if ratified, the Kyoto Protocol, would
still fall short of what nature requires to allow the climate to restabilize.
[105] Dr Geoff Jenkins, Director of the Hadley
Centre for Climate Prediction and Research in the UK, explained to the
Committee that:
There is not a unique pathway of emissions in order to stabilise concentrations
in the atmosphere. The sorts of pathways that IPCC have come up with
in order to stabilise at twice the preindustrial levels, 500 parts per
million, involve allowing a small change up to maybe 9 or 10 gigatonnes
per annum globally over the next 100 years or so but then really a quite
rapid decrease and eventually, over a few hundred years, down to levels
of maybe 70 per cent cutback in emissions compared to today's. [106]
3.176 This scenario was confirmed by the Chairman of the IPCC, Dr Robert
Watson. Dr Watson argued that the:
Kyoto Protocol is only a small, albeit very important, first step towards
the ultimate objective of the convention. The reason for that is very
simple: if we were to want to stabilise the earth's climate, we would
have to have global emissions lower than they are today. The emissions
today are about six billion tonnes of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide
from energy systems and about another one or one-and-a-half billion
tonnes of carbon from deforestation. So the total emissions today are
about 7½ billion tonnes. … . At the moment we have every year
an increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 of about 3½
billion tonnes per year. … . If we were to want to stabilise the
climate, eventually the emissions would have to decrease to between
two and three billion tonnes of carbon per year. [107]
3.177 A salutary warning about the likelihood of more stringent targets
in future was provided by Mr Paul Flanagan from Pacific Power:
So, if we think way beyond the Kyoto commitment period, we are going
to have to be doing a lot more than we are thinking about now if we
are actually even to stabilise CO2 emissions at twice preindustrial
levels. That, presumably, can only be achieved over time through the
setting of progressively more stringent and binding international targets.
[108]
3.178 At Kyoto, Australia was fortunate to win a target of 108 per cent.
What will the next target be? In the Committee's view, Australia should
not wait for further emissions targets to be imposed by an international
community. Mindful of past victories won, Australia should accept an ambitious
but fair target for the second commitment period and begin to work methodically
towards it now. Australia can become a world leader on the greenhouse
issue and should look to reap the benefits, rather than be over-protective
about the costs.
3.179 Australia must hold itself accountable to the international community
by looking beyond the immediate commitment period, further developing
its strategic thinking about greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. reductions
through the development of renewable energy sources in the long term),
and ensuring that its response is transparent and verifiable.
Recommendation 10
The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government take a leadership
role in international negotiations on climate change, with a view to moving
through Australia's treaty-making process in a timely manner to achieve
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, including:
- urging other countries to ratify the Protocol;
- starting to work constructively with developing countries to encourage
them to adopt binding targets as soon as possible and to ensure global
emissions constraints; and
- ensuring adequate targets are in place beyond the first commitment
period to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.
Australia and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol
3.180 Australia played an important role in the international community's
response to ozone depletion. It has the opportunity at CoP 6 and beyond
to take a similar leadership role over greenhouse issues.
3.181 National and international research in climate change has highlighted
the potential costs of adverse climate change to Australia. Dr Jenkins
pointed out that:
We would see, certainly, a warming over Australia of maybe two or three
degrees over the next 50 years or so. We see changes in rainfall, but
again the problem with rainfall is that it can be quite model dependent.
We do not have the same robustness of conclusions for rainfall as we
do for temperature… . But in some cases, in the most recent model
runs, we have seen changes of maybe up to 30 per cent less rainfall
in parts of Australia, particularly in Western Australia. [109]
3.182 Dr Watson, representing the IPCC also noted that:
Australia, of course, is significantly affected by the El Nino phenomena,
and so I think one of the key questions is whether or not there will,
as I say, over the next 100 years, be more El Nino events, and, as we
know, in Australia, when you have an El Nino event, one gets some quite
dry conditions. So obviously, if indeed one were to see a trend in El
Nino, one might start to project more dry events, hence having some
potential impacts on agricultural productivity in Australia. [110]
3.183 The Committee established that ABARE had not undertaken any full
impact assessment which took into account the costs of the physical impact
of climate change on Australia or globally. [111]
Dr Fisher, representing ABARE, explained that, at present, the organisation
does not have the models capable of undertaking that sort of study.
3.184 The Chief Executive of the AGO, Ms Gwen Andrews, also acknowledged
that there could be substantial costs to Australia from climate change:
I think we all agree that, yes, there is a cost of not acting, and
it is certainly a cost that governments are seeing and a cost that more
private sector organisations are now viewing as a real future potentiality.
[112]
3.185 It became very clear to the Committee, during its inquiry, that
more information and research about the potential impact - and cost of
that impact - of climate change on Australia is needed. However, as discussed
in chapter 2, Australia faces potential serious impacts on biodiversity,
the Great Barrier Reef, agriculture, human health, tourism and built environment.
It is of serious concern to the Committee that there is such a dearth
of knowledge in regard to the potential costs of not acting. In the Committee's
view, such potential costs to Australia and its region need to be considered
in any discussion about the costs of abatement.
3.186 The Kyoto Protocol does provide a necessary diplomatic framework
for nations to address the climate crisis and defines the basic structural
elements upon which efforts to address global warming in the twenty-first
century will rest. Given the flexibilities in the agreement, many of the
details of which are still to be decided, the specific commitments required
by the Protocol are modest in terms of both environmental and economic
impacts. Evidence indicates that implementing the Protocol commitments
themselves will neither halt global emissions growth nor have a significant
impact on economic growth. Nevertheless, the commitments represent a fundamental
change of course and a structure which, if ratified, implemented and expanded
for subsequent periods, offers the chance of an effective international
framework for arresting and reversing global warming.
3.187 Unlike the majority of developed nations, which will need to reduce
emissions on average 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels, Australia's `victory'
at Kyoto has meant that it will be able to increase 1990 emissions to
108 per cent, to be met on average during the first commitment period
between 2008 and 2012. The consequence of this victory, however, which
also included the insertion of the so-called `Australia clause' in relation
to land clearing, damaged Australia's international reputation and may
have important consequences for Australia in future climate change negotiations.
3.188 Dr Clive Hamilton, Director of the Australia Institute, pointed
out that a greenhouse-constrained future left Australia with important
choices:
The Australia clause was a `get out of jail' card, which the Australian
Government is going to exploit for all it is worth. If I can mix my
metaphors, it is also a poisoned chalice. While the rest of the industrialised
world is making a transition to the next generation of energy technologies,
Australia is locking itself into fossil fuels. Instead of exporting
fossil fuels to Japan as we do now, we will end up importing renewable
energy technology. [113]
3.189 Reducing greenhouse emissions presents costs but also opportunities.
Overall, Australian policy frameworks emphasise a need to reduce emissions
at least cost to the economy, a view which the Committee broadly endorses.
The responsible use of Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, and a domestic emissions
trading system, will also reduce costs. A sensible path of reductions,
which avoids excessive action too early or too late, is the best option.
3.190 The potentially huge long term costs of climate change, both to
Australasia and globally, also need to be borne in mind. The opportunity
to act now to reduce or avert these costs is an important and valuable
one. Developing a serious national approach to abatement will help Australia
grasp this opportunity, along with the opportunity to develop new domestic
and international markets in renewable energy and other technological
innovations.
Footnotes
[1] Brian Fisher, Kyoto Protocol: Economic
impacts on Annex B economies and key Australian industries, Outlook
99, Proceedings of the National Agricultural & Resources Outlook Conference,
Commodity Markets and Resource Management, Volume 1, 17 - 18 March 1999,
ABARE, Canberra, 1999, pp 39-40. See also Peter Cameron, `From Principles
to Practice: the Kyoto Protocol', Journal of Energy & Natural Resources
Law, 18(1), February 2000, p 1-18, at p 10.
[2] Greenpeace International, Greenpeace
Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, Greenpeace Briefing Paper, UNFCCC,
Session of the Subsidiary Bodies, Bonn, June 2-12 1998, Greenpeace International.
[3] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol: A
Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 128-29.
[4] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 905.
[5] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 3.
[6] The Australia Institute, Submission 79c,
p 2281.
[7] The Australia Institute, Submission 79c,
p 2281.
[8] The Australia Institute, Submission 79c,
pp 2283-84.
[9] The Australia Institute, Submission 79c,
p 2282.
[10] Australian Greenhouse Office, National
Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1998, July 2000.
[11] Australian Conservation Foundation and
The Australia Institute, Land Clearing and the Kyoto Protocol: Summary
of a paper presented to Buenos Aires Climate Change Convention Negotiations,
November 1998, http://www.acfonline.org.au/campaigns/globalwarming/govt
per cent20process/landclearing.htm. Detailed analysis of the impact of
the land use change clause in Australia's commitment is discussed in Clive
Hamilton and Lins Vellen, `Land use change in Australia and the Kyoto
Protocol', Environmental Science and Policy, No 2, 1999, pp 145-52.
[12] The Australia Institute, Submission 79c,
p 2281.
[13] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 586.
[14] A Reynolds, & C Hamilton, 1998
Land Use Change in Australia and the Kyoto Protocol, a presentation
given at CoP 5, 12 November 1999.
[15] Climate Action Network Australia, Submission
193, p 2035.
[16] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 143.
[17] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 143.
[18] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 143.
[19] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Climate Change: Options for the Kyoto Protocol Compliance System,
A Discussion Paper, May 2000, paras 10-11.
[20] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 147.
[21] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 147.
[22] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, pp 143, 148.
[23] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Climate Change: Options for the Kyoto Protocol Compliance System,
A Discussion Paper, May 2000, para 15.
[24] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Climate Change: Options for the Kyoto Protocol Compliance System,
A Discussion Paper, May 2000, para 3.
[25] greenhouse.gov.au/pubs/factsheets/fs_cop5.html
(17/07/00), p 2.
[26] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 3.
[27] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 2.
[28] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 6.
[29] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 35.
[30] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p xli.
[31] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 15.
[32] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 3.
[33] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 1.
[34] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 1 and 3.
[35] unfcc.de/resource/iuckit/fact18.html (17/07/00),
pp 1-2.
[36] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 9.
[37] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 34.
[38] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 9.
[39] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 11.
[40] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 2.
[41] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 3.
[42] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 6.
[43] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 6.
[44] See above in this chapter.
[45] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 585.
[46] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 585.
[47] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 585.
[48] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 4.
[49] Cain Polidano et al, The Kyoto Protocol
and Developing Countries: Impacts and implications for mechanism design,
ABARE, 2000, p 4. Carbon equivalent emissions from non-Annex B regions
are projected to rise by 140 tonnes for every 1000 tonne reduction in
carbon equivalent emissions in Annex B countries.
[50] See Proof Committee Hansard, Sydney,
23 March 2000, p 393; Minerals Council of Australia, Submission 107, p
911; Proof Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 April 2000, p 480; and
Proof Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 April 2000, p 485.
[51] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
20 March 2000, p 144.
[52] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network,
Submission 113, p 960-61.
[53] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March 2000, p 47.
[54] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, p 474.
[55] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, p 510.
[56] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, p 511.
[57] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 589.
[58] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 589.
[59] The Australia Institute, Submission 79a,
p 589.
[60] unfccc.de/resource/process/components/response/respkp.html
(17/07/00), p 2.
[61] unfcc.de/resource/process/components/road/roadahe.html
(17/07/00), p 1.
[62] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Warming
to the Challenge: The role of Australian business in combating global
warming, An address to The World Business Council on Sustainable Development
and the Australian Business Council Forum, Melbourne, May 5 2000, p 4.
[63] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, pp 2-3.
[64] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 2.
[65] Mr Ralph Hillman, Proof Committee Hansard,
Canberra, 9 March 2000, pp 2-3.
[66] Climate Action Network Australia (CANA),
Submission 193, p 2036.
[67] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March, p 87.
[68] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March, p 87.
[69] Climate Action Network Australia (CANA),
The Kyoto Protocol – make it work and make it law, Briefing
Paper, September 2000, p 3.
[70] Climate Action Network Australia (CANA),
The Kyoto Protocol – make it work and make it law, Briefing
Paper, September 2000, p 3.
[71] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March 2000, p 87.
[72] Climate Action Network Australia (CANA),
Submission 193, p 2036.
[73] Climate Action Network Australia (CANA),
The Kyoto Protocol – make it work and make it law, Briefing
Paper, September 2000, p 3.
[74] Australian Greenhouse Office, Submission
169, p 1685. See also Greenpeace Australia, Sinks: Australia attempts
to increase its fossil fuel emissions, Greenpeace Australia, 2000.
[75] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Opening
Address to the High Level Forum on Greenhouse Sinks, 18 April 2000,
Department of the Environment and Heritage, Media Release and Speeches,
environment.gov.au/minister/env/2000/sp18apr00.html (14/08/00), pp 3-4.
[76] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 3.
[77] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 3.
[78] Mr Ralph Hillman, Proof Committee Hansard,
Canberra, 9 March 2000, p 3.
[79] Proof Committee Hansard, Brisbane,
26 May 2000, p 563.
[80] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March 2000, p 88.
[81] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March 2000, p 89.
[82] Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, Kyoto – the best we can do or
fatally flawed?, Royal Institute of International Affairs Conference,
London, 20 June 2000, p 2.
[83] Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, Kyoto – the best we can do or
fatally flawed?, Royal Institute of International Affairs Conference,
London, 20 June 2000, p 40.
[84] The US share of global GHG emissions is
38 per cent (Peter Cameron, `From Principles to Practice: the Kyoto Protocol',
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 18(1), February
2000, p 1-18, p 11).
[85] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p xl.
[86] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
22 June 2000, p 682.
[87] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p 255.
[88] Michael Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol:
A Guide and Assessment, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1999, p xl.
[89] Nick Hordern, `Kyoto Protocol may have
to be revised before US signs up', The Australian Financial Review,
17 September 1999, p 23.
[90] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Warming
to the Challenge: The role of Australian business in combating global
warming, An address to The World Business Council on Sustainable Development
and the Australian Business Council Forum, Melbourne, May 5 2000, p 4.
[91] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Warming
to the Challenge: The role of Australian business in combating global
warming, An address to The World Business Council on Sustainable Development
and the Australian Business Council Forum, Melbourne, May 5 2000, p 4.
[92] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 910.
[93] Woodside Energy Ltd, Submission 129, p
1300.
[94] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 2.
[95] Official Committee Hansard, Sydney,
22 March 2000, p 368.
[96] Proof Committee Hansard, Brisbane,
26 May 2000, p 559.
[97] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
16 August 2000, p 910.
[98] Senator the Hon Robert Hill, Opening
Address to the Insurance Council of Australia's Canberra Conference,
10 August 2000, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Media Release
and Speeches, environment.gov.au/minister/env/2000/sp10aug00.html (13/08/00),
p.3.
[99] Prime Minister's Science, Engineering
and Innovation Council, From Defence to Attack: Australia's Response
to the Greenhouse Effect, 25 June 1999.
[100] Prime Minister's Science, Engineering
and Innovation Council, From Defence to Attack: Australia's Response
to the Greenhouse Effect, 25 June 1999, p 3.
[101] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 6.
[102] Proof Committee Hansard, Brisbane,
26 May 2000, p 563.
[103] unfcc.de/resource/process/components/road/roadahe.html
(17/07/00), p 1.
[104] unfcc.de/resource/process/components/road/roadahe.html
(17/07/00), p 1.
[105] Ross Gelbspan, `In Focus: The Climate
Crisis and Carbon Trading', Foreign Policy in Focus, vol 5(20),
July 2000, p 2 (foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n20climate.html).
[106] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 26.
[107] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 36.
[108] Official Committee Hansard, Sydney,
22 March 2000, p 364.
[109] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 25.
[110] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 36.
[111] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 823.
[112] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
9 March 2000, p 9.
[113] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March 2000, p 58.
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