Bills Digest No. 183 2002-03
Defence Legislation Amendment Bill 2003
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as introduced
and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest does not have
any official legal status. Other sources should be consulted to determine
the subsequent official status of the Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Defence
Legislation Amendment Bill 2003
Date
Introduced: 26 March 2003
House:
House of Representatives
Portfolio:
Defence
Commencement:
Amendments of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 commence 28
days after the date of Royal Assent. Other amendments commence on a variety
of dates. Where necessary, these commencement dates are stated in the
Main Provisions section of this Digest.
Among other things, to make changes to the
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 in response to recommendations
made by the Abadee report, A Study into the Judicial System under the
Defence Force Discipline Act.
Australia’s
system of Defence Force discipline is summarised in the 1999 report of
the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Military
Justice Procedures in the Australian Defence Force.
The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFDA) is the primary statute.
It:
… creates service offences and service tribunals, vests
service tribunals with jurisdiction to hear and try service offences and
provides for the punishment of persons convicted of service offences.
The Act also contains detailed provisions in respect of arrest, search
and custody and the investigation of service offences and establishes
a comprehensive system for the appeal and review of convictions and punishments.
Finally, it creates the office of the Judge Advocate General, details
procedural matters and details the principles of criminal liability that
are to apply to proceedings conducted by service tribunals.(1)
Also relevant are regulations and rules made under
the DFDA, other Commonwealth statutes such as the Criminal Code, the Evidence
Act 1995 and the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955.
The last piece of legislation provides the means by which those convicted
by courts martial or Defence Force magistrates can appeal their conviction.(2)
Three categories of offence are created by the
DFDA. First, there are offences ‘peculiar to the defence forces, such
as endangering morale, absence without leave, and disobedience of command.’(3)
Second, there are offences that are the same or similar to, civil offences
but that apply only to service equipment, defence members or defence civilians.(4)
These offences include destruction or unlawful possession of service property
and dealing in narcotic goods. Last, the DFDA imports offences ‘directly
from the general law.’(5) However, certain very serious offences
are not tried before service tribunals. Thus, the DFDA provides that offences
like treason, murder, manslaughter and bigamy cannot be tried by a service
tribunal without the consent of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.(6)
Convening Authorities—who are appointed by Service
Chiefs—have important roles in relation to prosecutions under the DFDA.
For instance, they decide whether there should be a trial and what the
charges should be. Prior to the administrative changes made in the aftermath
of the Abadee report (see below) a Convening Authority also exercised
other functions—for instance, it decided who would try a matter and selected
the trial judge.
Under the DFDA, minor disciplinary breaches can
be dealt with by Discipline Officers. Additionally, the DFDA establishes
two classes of service tribunal authorised to try less trivial ‘service
offences’.(7) Service tribunals are ad hoc tribunals rather
than bodies with a permanent existence. ‘Service offences’(8)
include offences against the DFDA or regulations (see above). The first
class of tribunal is the ‘summary authority’. Summary authorities deal
with most matters and are drawn from the ranks of ADF officers. They try
the less serious service offences, conduct preliminary hearings for more
serious offences and have more limited powers of punishment than courts
martial.
The second class of tribunal consists of courts
martial and Defence Force Magistrates (DFMs). The DFDA provides that a
General Court Martial consists of a President, who cannot be below the
rank of Colonel, and at least four other members.(9) It is
able to try serious offences and is empowered to hand down the most severe
penalties of all the service tribunals. A
Restricted Court Martial
consists of a President who cannot be below the rank of lieutenant-colonel
and at least two other members.(10) It hears matters like absence,
insubordination, assault and theft.
A court martial performs a ‘jury-like’ function
and also determines punishment.(11) Members of courts martial
are all serving officers and, until recently, were appointed by a Convening
Authority.
Binding legal rulings are provided to courts martial
by Judge Advocates (JAs) who are legal practitioners of at least 5 years
standing.(12) Judge Advocates perform essentially the same
function as is performed by a judge in a jury trial.
Trial before a Defence Force Magistrate is another
way of dealing with service offences, particularly offences not suitable
for trial before a summary authority or court martial, like complex fraud
matters.(13) DFMs are appointed by the Judge Advocate General
(JAG). However, the JAG can only appoint a person who is a member of the
judge advocate’s panel. A person cannot be appointed to the panel unless
he or she is a legal practitioner of at least 5 years’ standing who has
been appointed by a Chief of Staff nominated by the JAG. Typically, DFMs
are ‘senior full-time ADF legal officers or senior part-time ADF lawyers,
such as Queen’s Counsel and civilian magistrates.’(14)
The JAG is an independent statutory office created
under section 179 of the DFDA. The JAG must be a Federal Court or State
Supreme Court judge. The functions of the office include:
… making procedural rules for service tribunals, providing
the final legal review of proceedings within the ADF, participating in
the appointment of Judge Advocates, Defence Force Magistrates and legal
officers for various purposes and reporting upon the operation of laws
relating to the discipline of the ADF.(15)
In 1995 Brigadier the Hon
Mr Justice Abadee, a NSW Supreme
Court judge and a Deputy Judge Advocate General, was commissioned by the
Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to examine arrangements for the conduct
of trials under the DFDA in order to determine whether those arrangements
satisfied current tests of judicial impartiality and independence.(16)
The Abadee inquiry was appointed in the aftermath of a number of High
Court challenges to the system of military justice established under the
DFDA.(17) Additionally, judicial decisions in the United
Kingdom and Canada
had determined that aspects of the military justice systems in those countries
did not satisfy standards of judicial independence and impartiality.(18)
Brigadier Abadee’s report, A Study into the
Judicial System under the Defence Force Discipline Act was presented
to the CDF on 11
August 1997. It was not made public. However,
its 48 recommendations are summarised in an Appendix to the report of
the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Military
Justice Procedures in the Australian Defence Force (see below).(19)
Thirty-nine of Brigadier Abadee’s recommendations were agreed to by the
CDF.(20) Among the most important of Brigadier Abadee’s comments
were those relating to the Convening Authority. He said:
There is a most powerful case for eliminating the multiple
roles of the convening authority.(21)
In its report on military justice, the Joint Committee
described the multiple roles of the Convening Authority and also set out
Brigadier Abadee’s concerns:
Under current arrangements the Convening Authority
in ADF disciplinary proceedings has the power to:
• determine whether there should be a trial;
• determine the nature of the tribunal and the charges;
• select the trial judge and jury;
• select the prosecutor; and
• review the proceedings.
Justice Abadee
noted concerns that these arrangements may engender a perception of unfairness
regardless of the actual fairness of the particular proceedings. Having
initiated the prosecution, the Convening Authority could be seen to have
an interest in the outcome of the case justifying the decision to prosecute.
Further, where the officer presiding at the trial is under the command
of the Convening Authority, allegations may be levelled regarding the
undue influence of the Convening Authority, to the possible detriment
of the accused individual. As one of a number of measures to address this
shortfall in the current system, Justice
Abadee recommended that the
multiple roles of the Convening Authority be removed.(22)
In his 1997 Annual Report, the Judge Advocate General
commented:
The recommendations in the Abadee report are based
on a recognition of the importance of maintaining service discipline whilst,
at the same time, paying proper regard to both the existence and appearance
of a fair trial and independent system of trial. …
The most important recommendations relate to the multiple
roles presently vested in the Convening Authority. The first of those
roles is concerned with the decision to lay charges and the selection
of appropriate charges. However the Convening Authority also appoints
the Judge Advocate and the members of the court or the Defence [F]orce
Magistrate. It is my firm view that Command influence should cease at
the point at which charges are laid. In the light of present day concerns
for an independent trial in disciplinary procedures and the experience
in other military jurisdictions, I regard it as essential that both the
Judge Advocate and members of the court or the Defence Force Magistrate
be appointed by an authority other than the Convening Authority. If the
reforms presently under consideration are implemented these functions
will be vested in the Judge Advocate General.(23)
In June 1998, the position of Judge Advocate Administrator
(JAA) was created by administrative decision. The JAA is now called the
Chief Judge Advocate(24)—a position that will be statutorily
constituted by the Defence Legislation Amendment Bill 2003. The position
was established to consider requests for the selection of Judge Advocates
and Defence Force Magistrates and to send the requests to the JAG for
decision. As the JAG remarked:
In practical terms this procedure separates the process
of selecting a JA or DFM from the convening authority and accordingly,
makes the appointment of this officer independent of the authority preferring
the charges against the accused.(25)
In June 1999, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade reported that the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) had agreed that Convening Authorities would continue to decide whether
to prosecute but would no longer select the members of a Court Martial
or Defence Force Magistrate, that a prosecution policy would be introduced
to guide Convening Authorities and that reviews of court martial proceedings
and DFM trials would be conducted by an authority other than the Convening
Authority.(26) The ADF said that the function of selecting
members of courts martial and DFM would be transferred from the Convening
Authority to the JAG.(27)
In his annual report for 1999, the Judge Advocate
General reported that ‘administrative policy and procedures’ designed
to respond to the Abadee report were being implemented ‘where possible
in order to give practical effect to the recommendations in anticipation
of legislative change’.(28) These changes included:
… administrative directions which give effect to the
separation of review of courts martial and Defence Force magistrate trials
from the power to convene, and the transfer of the power to select Judge
Advocates, Defence Force magistrates and Section 154 Reporting Officers
to [the office of the Judge Advocate General].(29)
Additionally, the Judge Advocate General reported
in 1999 that the Judge Advocate Administrator had been consulting with
the three Services to develop ‘appropriate procedures for the transfer
of responsibility for selection of courts martial members from the convening
authority to my office.’(30)
In his annual report for 2000, the Judge Advocate
General said that ministerial approval had been obtained for statutory
amendments to give effect to the Abadee report recommendations but that,
due to other legislative priorities, legislation was unlikely to be introduced
before 2002.(31)
The need for the post-Abadee reforms to be reviewed
has also been considered. For instance, the Joint Standing Committee has
said it:
… accepted that the proposed post-Abadee reforms to
the ADF discipline system appear to establish a balance between
‘the needs of the ADF, the interests of justice per se and its practical
administration in the ADF.’ However, … the issue of institutional independence
in relation to prosecution should be reviewed after the proposed post-Abadee
arrangements have been in operation for sufficient time to allow the impact
to be assessed. … a review after three years would be appropriate.(32)
This recommendation was supported by the Government
Response to the Joint Standing Committee report.(33)
Part of the Model Criminal Code project, in which
the Commonwealth has been involved, has included the enactment of principles
of criminal responsibility which now apply to all Commonwealth offences.
These principles are found in Chapter 2 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code.
Before Chapter 2 could be applied to all Commonwealth offences, existing
offence provisions were reviewed with a view to harmonising them with
Chapter 2, modifying its application where necessary or clarifying the
application of Chapter 2.
During 2001 application statutes were passed for
legislation in each Commonwealth Government portfolio. However, not all
offence provisions were clarified in this process. Items 4 and
5 of Schedule 1 are designed to do so. They repeal and replace
sections 35 and 36A of the DFDA. Three separate offences are created
as a result—negligent performance of duty, unauthorised discharge of a
weapon and negligent discharge of a weapon.(34) Further, as
a result of re-structuring the offences, the amendments clarify that the
fault element of ‘intention’ applies to the element of conduct in the
offences and ‘negligence’ to the result of that conduct.
Item 6 repeals section 40B of the DFDA (‘negligent
conduct in driving’ by a defence member or defence civilian).
Part VI of the DFDA provides for the investigation
of service offences. Section 101C sets out the rights of a person in custody
in respect of a service offence, before they have been charged or summoned.
For instance, a detainee cannot be questioned by an investigating officer
unless he or she has been told the name and rank of the investigating
officer [subsection 101C(1)] and either:
• cautioned as required by ‘subsection 101D(2)’.
This inserts a requirement that the caution(35) must be given
in a language in which the person is reasonably fluent, or
• informed, in a language in which they
are reasonably fluent, ‘of the matters referred to in subparagraphs 101D(2)(a)(i),
(ii) and (iii)’.
The caution need not be given in writing. The references
to subparagraphs 101D(2)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) quoted above are otiose
because they were repealed by the Defence Legislation Amendment Act
1995. The effect of items 8 and 9 is remove the repealed
references, re-insert the cautioning requirements and add two new requirements
that apply when a person is detained and questioned:
• if practicable the caution and the response
to it must be tape recorded, and
• if no tape recording is made then, in
any proceedings before a service tribunal, the prosecution has the burden
of proving it was not practicable to make the recording.
As stated in the Background section of this Digest,
the DFDA establishes ‘convening authorities’ to convene courts martial
and restricted courts martial and to exercise other statutory powers and
functions.(36) Under the DFDA, where a charge is referred to
a Convening Authority, it may direct that the charge not be proceeded
with, it may refer the charge for trial or convene a court martial.(37)
A Convening Authority has similar referral powers if a reviewing body,
the Defence Force Discipline Tribunal or the Federal Court orders a new
trial for a person.(38) The Convening Authority also has decision-making
and referral powers where a person elects to be tried or punished by a
Defence Force magistrate.(39) Last, where proceedings before
a DFM are terminated by a Convening Authority under subsection 129A(4)
of the DFDA, the Convening Authority may refer the matter to a DFM or
court martial for action under Part IV of the DFDA.
Notes inserted by items 12-15 and 22
state that where a charge or a case is referred to a DFM, it must be referred
to the magistrate nominated by the Judge Advocate General. It appears
that, in practice, this power is already with the JAG as a result of the
implementation of administrative directions. However, the notes foreshadow
the substantive amendment of the DFDA which gives an explicit statutory
power to the JAG to effectively select Defence Force Magistrates (see
below, new subsection 129C(1)).
Item 16 adds some natural justice requirements
to provisions relating to the Convening Authority. For instance, if a
Convening Authority believes that he or she would be biased or seen to
be biased in exercising powers in relation to charging a person, or ordering
a new trial referring a convicted person for punishment or other action
to a Defence Force Magistrate or court martial, the Convening Authority
will be able to refer the charge, order or conviction to another Convening
Authority [new subsection 103(8)]. New provisions will also enable
the Convening Authority to refer a matter to another Convening Authority
if the interests of justice require it [new subsection 103(9)].
The Explanatory Memorandum explains that:
There is currently no provision in the DFD Act that
allows one convening authority to refer a charge to another convening
authority. In certain circumstances this may be required in the interests
of justice because of service exigencies or the need to maintain the independence
of the convening process.(40)
Item 17 repeals section 118 of the DFDA. Section
118 provides that a Convening Authority cannot appoint a person to be
a member or JA of a court martial if he or she believes the person would
be biased or be seen to be biased. Section 118 is no longer needed because
Convening Authorities will no longer have independent powers of appointment
under the DFDA. The requirement to avoid bias in the appointment of court
martial members or JAs will be part of the responsibility of the JAG,
who will effectively determine who will sit on courts martial as a result
of the amendments made by new section 129B (see below).
Items 18-20 insert notes into relevant provisions
in the DFDA to the effect that a Convening Authority must not appoint
a person as a member or JA of a court martial unless the person has been
nominated by the JA. These notes also refer to new subsection 129B,
which will contain the JA’s substantive powers in relation to the appointment
of courts martial members and JAs.
Part XI of the Defence Force Discipline Act
1982 provides for the appointment of a Judge Advocate General and
Deputy Judge Advocates General. The JAG must be a person who is or has
been a judge of a federal court or a State or Territory Supreme Court.
Deputy Judge Advocates may be drawn from the ranks of legal practitioners
with five years standing.
As stated earlier, the functions of the Judge Advocate
General include ‘making procedural rules for service tribunals, providing
the final legal review of proceedings within the ADF, [and] participating
in the appointment of Judge Advocates, Defence Force magistrates and legal
officers for various purposes …’(41) As a result of administrative
directions issued in the aftermath of the Abadee report, the JAG’s role
has been enhanced. For instance, the JAG selects Judge Advocates for courts
martial.
New sections 129B and 129C give a
statutory power to the Judge Advocate General to effectively determine
who will be appointed to courts martial and who will be the DFM trying
a particular charge. While a convening authority will appoint the person,
it cannot do so unless the JAG has nominated the person for the position.
New subsection 129B(2) provides that the JAG cannot nominate a
person as a member or JA of a court martial if he or she believes the
person is biased or would be seen to be biased.
Part IX of the DFDA contains provisions relating
to the review of service tribunal proceedings. All convictions and punishments
are automatically reviewed by a ‘reviewing authority’.(42)
Additionally, a person convicted of a service offence can petition for
a review by a reviewing authority appointed by the Service Chief. This
petition must be lodged within 90 days of the conviction.(43)
There may then be a further review by the Service Chief. A person convicted
by a court martial or DFM may also be able to appeal their conviction
to the Defence Force Discipline Appeals Tribunal.(44)
The requirement that a petition for review by a
reviewing authority be lodged within 90 days of conviction is amended
by items 28 and 29 so that a person will have 30 days after
the automatic review has been completed to lodge their petition. The amendments
also give the reviewing authority the power to extend the 30 day period.
Item 24 makes an amendment designed to ensure
that reviewing authorities are impartial. It provides that a ‘reviewing
authority’ will only be a ‘competent reviewing authority’ in relation
to a particular charge if it has not exercised any powers as a Convening
Authority in relation to that charge (new section 150A). Consequential
amendments are also made which either replace the expression, ‘reviewing
authority’ with the expression ‘competent reviewing authority’ or use
the expression ‘competent reviewing authority’, where relevant (items
26, 28 and 30).
Section 154 of the DFDA presently provides that
a ‘reviewing authority’ cannot commence a review of court martial or DFM
proceedings that have resulted in a conviction without first obtaining
a report on the proceedings from a legal officer appointed by the CDF
or a service chief. Item 31 provides that such a legal officer
cannot be appointed for more than three years but can be reappointed.
Items 32, 33 and 45 correct outdated
references to the ‘Chief of Staff’ that were missed when the Defence
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) Act 1997 was enacted.
The DFDA empowers Discipline Officers to deal with
minor discipline infringements that would otherwise be dealt with as service
offences and to do so ‘without resort to the more formal and administratively
complex summary trial procedures.’(45)
The disciplinary infringements that can be dealt
with by Discipline Officers include absence from duty, disobedience of
a lawful command, failure to comply with a lawful general order, and sleeping
or being drunk on watch.(46) The powers of Discipline Officers
include imposing fines, restricting privileges, stopping leave, and imposing
extra duties or extra drill. A Discipline Officer may decide not to impose
any penalty if the infringement is trivial or decline to deal with a matter
that is too serious.(47)
At present the jurisdiction of Discipline Officers
extends only to defence members who hold a rank below non-commissioned
rank.(48) The effect of items 34-36 is that ‘officer
cadets’(49) will also be subject to the jurisdiction of Discipline
Officers for minor disciplinary infringements under Part IXA of the DFDA.
Item 38 is designed to provide certainty
about when punishments imposed by a Discipline Officer take effect. It
inserts new section 169FA into the DFDA, which states that a Discipline
Officer may impose a punishment that takes effect immediately or one which
commences on a specific day. In the latter case, the punishment must commence
within 14 days of its imposition.
New sections 188A-188B provide for the appointment
of a Chief Judge Advocate whose functions are to provide administrative
assistance to the Judge Advocate General. Additionally, the JAG can delegate
his or her powers to the Chief Judge Advocate—except for the power to
appoint Defence Force Magistrates, to dissent from a legal opinion in
a report of a reviewing authority, or nominate members of the judge advocates’
panel. In exercising a delegated power the Chief Judge Advocate is subject
to the direction and control of the JAG.
A person cannot be appointed as a Chief Judge Advocate
unless he or she holds the rank of naval captain, colonel or group captain
and is a member of the judge advocates’ panel (new section 188C).
In 1989 the High Court handed down its decision
in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan.
In this case Staff Sergeant Ryan
challenged the jurisdiction of a Defence Force Magistrate to hear and
determine three charges that had been brought against him under the DFDA.
He argued that the DFM’s statutory powers offended the constitutional
separation of powers found in Chapter III of the Constitution and, further,
that by reason of section 80 of the Constitution, a jury trial was mandated
in his case.
The High Court rejected these arguments.(51)
However, a majority of the Court concluded that two particular provisions,
severable from the rest of the DFDA, interfered with the exercise by State
courts of their criminal jurisdiction and thus exceeded the Commonwealth’s
powers in sections 51(vi) and (xxxix) of the Constitution. The provisions
were subsections 190(3) and (5) of the DFDA. They were designed to protect
a defence member from the ‘double jeopardy of prosecution before a service
tribunal and before a civil court.’(52)
The result of the invalidity of the two subsections
is that, in the words of Brennan and Toohey
JJ:
[A] defence member whose conduct renders him liable
to punishment for a service offence and a corresponding civil offence
is amenable to the jurisdiction of a civil court as well as the jurisdiction
of a service tribunal and (subject to any common law protection from double
jeopardy) punishment as for a civil offence as well as for a service offence.(53)
Having been invalidated by the High Court, subsections
190(3) and (5) have no operation and are thus repealed by items 41-44.
Item 46 provides that appointments to the
judge advocate’s panel cannot exceed three years. However, a person can
be reappointed. This amendment applies to appointments made after the
proposed legislation receives Royal Assent (item 48).
Schedule 3 of the DFDA sets out tables of punishments
that can be imposed by a superior summary authority (Table A), a commanding
officer (Table B) and a subordinate summary authority (Table C). Subordinate
summary authorities can be either Naval officers above a certain rank
(in which case certain punishments can be imposed) or ‘any other subordinate
authority’ (in which case lesser punishments can be imposed). Item
47 repeals and replaces those parts of Table C that relate to ‘any
other subordinate authority’ so that they reflect the hierarchy of punishments
contained in section 68 of the DFDA. The amendments are also designed
to clarify that ‘commanding officers and executive officers of ships and
naval establishments have the power to impose punishment on soldiers and
airmen, as well as the power to try soldiers and airmen under subsection
108(2).’(54)
Amendments relating to the cadet services commence
six months after the date of Royal Assent unless earlier proclaimed (clause
2).
In 2000, the Government released a review of the
Australian Services Cadet Scheme (ASCS), Cadets: The Future.(55)
Its purpose was to provide a strategic plan for the ASCS. Among other
things, it recommended that the Australian Army Corps Cadets, the Naval
Reserve Cadets and the Air Training Corps should be re-named as the Australian
Army Cadets, the Australian Naval Cadets and the Australian Air Force
Cadets, respectively.(56)
Amendments to the Air Force Act and the other statutes
listed below reflect these recommendations.
The Air Force Act establishes the Air Training
Corps. Item 1 of Schedule 2 provides that the Air Training
Corps will continue in existence as the Australian Air Force Cadets. Items
2-7 make consequential changes. Item 8 is a transitional provision
which continues appointments of anyone who holds an appointment to the
Air Training Corps as members of Australian Air Force Cadets.
Items 9-11 change references in the Archives
Act to reflect the new names of the cadet services.
Items 12-15, 20 and 25 make consequential
and transitional amendments to the Defence Act as a result of the name
changes to the cadet services.
Items 30-32 make changes to the Freedom
of Information Act 1982 that are consequential to the name changes
to the cadet services.
Item 33 provides that the Naval Reserve
Cadets continues in existence as the Australian Navy Cadets and item
38 continues the appointments of members of the Naval Reserve Cadets
as Australian Navy Cadets. Items 34-37 make consequential name
changes.
Item 39 makes changes to the Privacy
Act 1988 consequential on the name changes to the cadet services.
Item 40 makes changes to the Safety,
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 consequential on the name
changes to the cadet services.
Section 80A of the Defence Act 1903
creates an offence of falsely representing oneself to be a returned soldier,
sailor or airman. Section 80B creates an offence of improper use of service
decorations.
Items 16-19 of Schedule 2 convert
penalties in sections 80A and 80B from dollar amounts to penalty units
and also increase the penalties that can be imposed. As a result of the
amendments, a person convicted of a section 80A offence will be liable
to a maximum penalty of 30 penalty units ($3 300) or 6 months imprisonment,
or both. The maximum penalty that can be imposed at present is $200 or
6 months imprisonment, or both.
The maximum penalties for wearing a service decoration
when not entitled to do so or falsely representing oneself to be the person
on whom a service decoration has been conferred will be increased from
a fine of $200 to a penalty of 30 penalty units or 6 months imprisonment,
or both. The maximum penalties for defacing or destroying a service decoration
will be increased from a fine of $200 to a penalty of 60 penalty units
or 12 months imprisonment, or both.
Items 16-19 commence 28 days after the date
of Royal Assent (clause 2).
Section 124 of the Defence Act 1903 enables
the Governor-General to make regulations ‘not inconsistent’ with the Defence
Act in order to give effect to the Act and also to prescribe a large range
of matters. One of these matters is:
The appointment, procedures and powers of courts of
inquiry, boards of inquiry and investigating officers.(57)
These matters are set out in the Defence (Inquiry)
Regulations 1985. As the Explanatory Memorandum points out, those regulations
were amended in 2000, in part to create the position of ‘inquiry assistant’
and thus allow ‘greater efficiency in the board or court inquiry process
relating to Defence Force matters.’ The powers of an inquiry assistant
include assisting an investigating officer to gather evidence for the
purposes of an inquiry and giving that evidence to the investigating officer.(58)
As section 124 of the Defence Act recognises, a
regulation cannot be inconsistent with the primary statute under which
it is made. However, there appears to be some doubt that existing paragraph
124(1)(gc) enables regulations to be made about ‘inquiry assistants’.
Item 21 amends paragraph 124(1)(g) so it is clear that subordinate
legislation can be made on this subject.
Subsection 124(2A) of the Defence Act enables regulations
to be made requiring a witness appearing before a court of inquiry or
board of inquiry to answer questions even if the answer might incriminate
the person.(59) Items 22-24 extend the power to compel
answers to investigating officers and inquiry assistants.(60)
Investigating officers and inquiry assistants include officers, warrant
officers, the holder of an office above APS Level 4 classification, and
certain other non-APS civilians.
The amendments relating to Defence Act inquiries
commence on Royal Assent (clause 2).
The Defence HomeOwner Scheme was introduced in
1991 and is administered under the Defence Force (Home Loans Assistance)
Act 1990 (the Home Loans Act). It is designed ‘to assist eligible
members and ex-members of the Australian Defence Force to purchase their
own homes by providing a subsidy on the interest of an $80,000 home loan
borrowed from the approved lender, the National Australia Bank.’(61)
Eligible ex-members who wish to use the scheme
have, in general, two years after their discharge date to apply for the
subsidy entitlement. Exemption from this sunset clause applies to members
‘who have transferred directly (with a break of less than 21 days) to
the Emergency, Inactive or Active Reserves, or served in the Gulf War
between 2 August 1990 and 9 June 1991.’(62)
Item 27 of Schedule 2 will enable
the Secretary of the Defence Department to make a determination extending
the eligibility of certain incapacitated ex-members(63) beyond
2 years if the person’s failure to apply for an entitlement within the
2 year period was caused by a compensable disability that resulted in
the person’s discharge. The Secretary’s refusal to make such a determination
will be reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (item 26).
Amendments to the Home Loans Act commence on Royal
Assent (clause 2).
The purpose of the Defence Legislation Amendment
(Application of Criminal Code) Act 2001, the Defence Legislation Amendment
(Application of Criminal Code) Regulations 2001 and the Defence Legislation
Amendment (Application of Criminal Code) Regulations 2001 (No. 2) was
to ‘harmonise the offence-creating and related provisions … with the general
principles of criminal responsibility as codified in Chapter 2 of the
… Criminal Code whilst at the same time ensuring that the offences continue
to operate as intended by Parliament.’(64)
Subsection 2(2) of the Defence Legislation Amendment
(Application of Criminal Code) Act 2001 provides that certain parts
of that Act commence on the later of:
(a) the day on which Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code
commences; and
(b) the day after the day on which this Act receives
the Royal Assent.
Subsection 2(2) may have been designed to ensure
that the relevant parts of the Act commenced no earlier than 15 December
2001—the date on which it was planned that Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code
would apply to all pre-existing Commonwealth offences. However, the ‘day
on which Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code commences’ could be read in other
ways because, for example, Chapter 2 applied to Criminal Code offences
and new Commonwealth offences before 15 December 2001. On such readings,
the Defence Legislation Amendment (Application of Criminal Code) Act
2001 commences on 2 October 2001, the
day after Royal Assent. Item 28 of Schedule 2 repeals and
replaces subsection 2(2) to provide that the Act commenced on 15 December 2001.
Items 1 and 2
of Schedule 3 change the commencement date for the Defence Legislation
Amendment (Application of Criminal Code) Regulations 2001 and the Defence
Legislation Amendment (Application of Criminal Code) Regulations 2001
(No. 2) from ‘the day on which Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code commences’
to specify a date of 15 December 2001. The Explanatory Memorandum says
that the purpose of these changes is the ‘remove any ambiguity.’(65)
This ambiguity may arise for similar reasons as those stated in the previous
paragraph.
Subclause 3(2) of the Bill
provides regulations ‘are taken to still be regulations’ despite being
changed by amendments in primary legislation.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade, Military Justice Procedures in the Australian Defence
Force, 1999, p. 23.
- ibid.
- AD Mitchell &
T Voon, ‘Defence of the indefensible? Reassessing the constitutional
validity of military service tribunals in Australia’,
Federal Law Review, vol. 27, no. 3, 1999,
pp. 499–525 at p. 501.
- ibid.
- As Mitchell & Voon, ibid, point out section 61
of the DFDA provides that a defence member or defence civilian is guilty
of an offence if he or she commits what would be an offence in the Jervis
Bay Territory,
irrespective of whether that offence is committed inside or outside
the Jervis Bay
Territory. The Jervis
Bay Territory
is generally subject to ACT law.
- Section 63, DFDA.
- Joint Standing Committee, op.cit.
- Section 3, DFDA.
- See paragraph 116(2)(a) and subsection 114(2), DFDA.
- See subsection 114(3), DFDA.
- Joint Standing Committee, op.cit., p. 28.
- Section 196 & subsections 134(1) and (4), DFDA.
- Mitchell & Voon, op.cit, citing S Thompson, ‘An
Officer and a Gentleman’, Law Society Journal, 1982, pp. 306-307
at p. 307.
- Joint Standing Committee, op.cit., p. 28.
- Judge Advocate General, Defence Force Discipline
Act 1982. Report for the period 1 January to 31 December 2001, p.
1.
- Government Response to the Report on Military Justice
Procedures in the Australian Defence Force by the Joint Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, March 2001, p. 1.
- Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan
(1989) 166 CLR 518; Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991)
172 CLR 460; Re Tyler;
Ex parte Foley (1994) 181 CLR 18.
- Joint Standing Committee, op. cit.
- In 1997, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade commenced an inquiry into military justice procedures
in the Australian Defence Force. The Committee ceased when Parliament
was prorogued for the 1998 General Election, re-convened early in 1999
and reported in June that year. The Joint Committee also examined the
system of military inquiry operating in the Australian Defence Force.
The military inquiry system had been the subject of public scrutiny
following cases involving both the deaths of service personnel and complaints
against ADF members. The Committee’s report, Military Justice Procedures
in the Australian Defence Force was presented in June 1999.
- Recommendations that did not find favour included
the proposal that consideration be given to establishing an independent
Director of Military Prosecutions on a tri-service basis. The Government
Response to the Joint Standing Committee report stated, ‘The Australian
Defence Force was of the view that the recommendations that were agreed
would significantly improve institutional independence with respect
to prosecution in Courts Martial and Defence Force Magistrate trials
without creating the position of an independent Director of Military
Prosecutions. The [ADF] held serious reservations about the practicality
and need for such an appointment under present circumstances.’
- Joint Standing Committee, op. cit., p. 203.
- ibid, p. 121.
- Judge Advocate General, Defence Force Discipline
Act 1982. Report for the period 1 January to 31 December 1997, p.
5.
- Judge Advocate General, Defence Force Discipline
Act 1982. Report for the period 1 January to 31 December 2001, p.
11.
- Judge Advocate General, Defence Force Discipline
Act 1982. Report for the period 1 January to 31 December 1998, p.
5.
- Joint Standing Committee, op. cit., p. 121.
- ibid, p. 203.
- Judge Advocate General, Defence Force Discipline
Act 1982. Report for the period 1 January to 31 December 1999,
p. 4.
- ibid.
- ibid, p. 3.
- Judge Advocate General, Defence Force Discipline
Act 1982. Report for the period 1 January to 31 December 2000,
p. 4.
- Joint Standing Committee, op. cit., p. 136. Emphasis
in the original.
- Government Response to the Report on Military Justice
Procedures in the Australian Defence Force by the Joint Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, March 2001, p. 1. See response
to recommendation 46.
- New subsections 35, 36A and 36B, respectively.
- The caution involves the person being told that they
need not answer questions but that anything said or done by them may
be used in evidence.
- See sections 3 & 102, DFDA.
- Subsection 103(1), DFDA.
- Subsection 103(2), DFDA.
- See subsections 103(4) & (6), DFDA.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 4.
- Judge Advocate General, Defence Force Discipline
Act 1982. Report for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2001, p. 1.
- Section 152, DFDA.
- Subsection 13(1), DFDA.
- Joint Standing Committee, op. cit., p. 32.
- ibid, p. 29.
- Section 169A, DFDA.
- Section 169F, DFDA.
- Section 169C, DFDA.
- The expression, ‘officer cadet’, is defined to mean
a person holding the rank of midshipman in the Navy or officer cadet
in the Army or Air Force.
- (1989) 166 CLR 518.
- A unanimous High Court rejected the section 80 (trial
by jury) argument. Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Dawson & Toohey JJ
rejected the separation of powers argument on the basis that although
the Defence Force Magistrate was exercising judicial power, he was not
exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth because section 51(vi)
of the Constitution enabled laws to be made for a military disciplinary
code outside Chapter III and to impose a duty to act judicially on those
administering that code.
- (1989) 166 CLR 518 at 545 per Mason
CJ, Wilson & Dawson JJ.
- (1989) 166 CLR 518 at 755 per Brennan & Toohey
JJ—quoted in S Gaegler, ‘Gnawing at a file: An analysis of Re Tracey:
Ex parte Ryan’, University of Western Australia Law Review, 20(1),
June 1990, pp. 47–60 at p. 57.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 8.
- John Topley et al.
Cadets: The Future. Review. A Strategy for the Australian Services
Cadet Scheme, 2000.
- ibid, p. 45.
- Paragraph 124(1)(gc), Defence Act.
- Defence (Inquiry) Amendment Regulations 2000 (No.
1) No. 327, Explanatory Statement.
- Within limits—for instance, an answer cannot be compelled
if the witness is a defendant in ‘live’ criminal proceedings. Further,
compelled evidence is not admissible in criminal or civil proceedings
against the witness, unless he or she is being prosecuted for false
testimony. See subsections 124(2B) & (2C), Defence Act.
- The protections that apply to witnesses before courts
of inquiry and boards of inquiry also apply.
- http://www.dha.gov.au
- http://www.dha.gov.au
- There are two classes of incapacitated ex-member under
the Home Loans Act. First, there are incapacitated ex-members who on
or after 15 May 1991,
are discharged from the Defence Force because of a compensable disability.
Second, there are incapacitated ex-members who were discharged before
this date. This second class of ex-member stopped being eligible to
apply for Home Loans Act assistance on 1 December
1994. The amendments made
by item 27 affect the first category of ex-member, not the second
category.
- See, for example, Defence Legislation Amendment (Application
of Criminal Code) Regulations 2001 (No. 1), Explanatory Statement,
p. 1.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 12.
Jennifer Norberry
23 June 2003
Bills Digest Service
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