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Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism
Chris Wilson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
11 October 2001
Contents
Introduction
Indonesian Islamist Organisations
What Kind of Threat do Indonesian Islamist Organisations
Pose?
What is the Presence of Al Qaeda and Other Transnational
Extremist Organisations?
Conclusion
Endnotes
Introduction
In the wake of the 11 September attacks on the United
States, attention has turned to Indonesia, and the possibility of Islamic
terrorist groups operating from or within that country. Indonesia has
experienced a resurgence of Islamic activity since the fall of President
Soeharto in 1998, but the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims practice
a moderate form of the religion. Indonesia is the world's largest Islamic
country, with 170 to 180 million Muslims out of a total population of
around 215 million.(1) Although most Indonesians are concerned
with the response of the United States to the terrorist attacks, the vast
majority do not as yet support militancy. However, some Islamist organisations
have become increasingly vocal in the weeks since the attacks. In addition,
a number of reports have pointed to connections between these groups and
transnational terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, the organisation headed
by Osama bin Laden. Rohan Gunaratna from the St Andrew's University Centre
for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence has stated recently
that the Al Qaeda network has a number of cells active in Indonesia.(2)
Indonesian Islamist Organisations
There is no organised hierarchy of radical Islam in Indonesia,
rather a number of largely unrelated groups. The main extremist Islamist
organisations in Indonesia are Darul Islam, the Islamic Defender's Front
and Laskar Jihad.(3) According to Al Chaidar, an Islamic activist
and leader of one of eight factions of the Darul Islam network, the organisation
is largely constituted by the approximately 15 000 Indonesians who
returned from Afghanistan after fighting alongside the mujahadeen
against the Soviet Union.(4)
Laskar Jihad is the most prominent and organised of Indonesia's
radical Islamist organisations. In 2000, Laskar Jihad sent around 5000
armed militia members to the Maluku region in eastern Indonesia, where
they are considered to be the main reason for continuing conflict there.(5)
The government in Jakarta has been criticised for not preventing the activities
of the organisation, some analysts suggesting the government is restricted
in it's possible response, not wishing to appear 'anti-Islamic'.(6)
The prospect of US retaliation for the terrorist attacks has boosted Laskar
Jihad membership, with 300-400 joining since 11 September.(7)
Laskar Jihad's popularity rests on more than its ability to support Muslims
in conflicts, such as that in Maluku, the organisation also providing
a strong sense of Islamic identity. Families of the young men fighting
in Maluku also receive remuneration, funded by such activities as garment
exports.(8) The country's ongoing economic crisis makes such
organisations more appealing.
What Kind of Threat do
Indonesian Islamist Organisations Pose?
Indonesia's top Islamic authority, the Council of Indonesian
Ulemas followed President Megawati's meeting with President Bush (on 19
September) by calling for Muslims to unite and join a jihad (holy
war) against the United States in the event of attacks against Afghanistan.(9)
Similar threats have also been made by Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundullah
and the Islamic Defender's Front.(10) Some of these claims
have since been moderated. Ulema Council spokesperson, Dien Syamsuddin,
when asked if warnings of a jihad meant armed struggle, said that
the term may mean any number of forms of struggle (including peaceful),
and condemned plans to 'sweep' (locate and evict) US citizens in Indonesia.
However, the impact of calls for a jihad must have been relatively
predictable, the public likely to perceive the term in the literal sense
of armed struggle.(11)
However, daily demonstrations are taking place in front
of the US Embassy, one protest involving 4000 people on 28 September,
and another on 8 October involving over a thousand members of a number
of different organisations including the Islamic Defenders Front.(12)
These demonstrations have been largely peaceful although Indonesian police
fired warning shots to disperse protestors on 8 September,(13)
and shouted threats outside the Embassy caused the US Ambassador, Robert
Gelbard, to pressure the police for a plan to evacuate diplomatic staff.
On 23 September, members of several Islamist groups calling themselves
the Anti-American Terrorist Soldiers worked through the town of Surakarta
in Central Jakarta searching for Americans to evict, although there are
no cases of violence reported as yet.(14) Two powerful explosions
were detonated in the busy Plaza Atrium Senen shopping mall in Central
Jakarta on 23 September, although they have not as yet been linked to
the 'war on terrorism'.
However, radical Islamist organisations and anti-American
protests do not currently enjoy the support of the majority of the population.
The vast majority of Indonesians practise a moderate form of Islam, excluding
practices such as the veiling of women. This moderate position has been
expressed by some Islamic leaders. Syafi'i Maarif, the chairman of Indonesia's
second largest Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah, said Indonesian
Muslims should focus on the problems of the Afghan people, rather than
attacking US citizens.(15)
Nonetheless, now that United States (and United Kingdom)
missile strikes against Afghanistan have occurred, demonstrations across
Java and elsewhere may become more widespread, greater in size and violent.
Involvement in radical organisations may become more widespread if grievances
against the US strikes combine with the perceived benefits of joining
such organisations, and possible coercion on the part of the organisations.
If the threats of the Islamist organisations discussed above are carried
out following these attacks, the consequences could include a possible
evacuation of foreign diplomatic and commercial staff, and a flight of
tourists and investment. Some of these consequences have eventuated already.
On 9 October, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
issued a warning against travel to Indonesia. Non-essential staff of the
US Embassy in Jakarta were withdrawn on 27 September, and the families
of the staff of some American companies, such as Nike, have been evacuated.(16)
One of the major dangers posed by Indonesian radical
Islamist groups may be to the Indonesian Government itself. While she
was in the United States, President Soekarnoputri pledged Indonesian support
to the US lead coalition against terrorism, receiving in turn from President
Bush pledges of aid and loan guarantees.(17) In supporting
the US lead war on terrorism, the government of Megawati Soekarnoputri
may face difficulties fending off challenges from the Islamic parties
in her coalition, who in turn will be pressured by Islamist sentiment.
President Soekarnoputri has already been criticised in political circles.
House Speaker Akbar Tandjung stated that she should be more critical of
the US led attacks.(18) Concerns within the Indonesian Government
have also become evident, with Vice President Hamzah Haz cautioning the
United States against attacking a sovereign country with the aim of targeting
terrorists. It is also possible that radical Islam may be aggravated and
manipulated by those wishing to destabilise Megawati.
What is the Presence
of Al Qaeda and Other Transnational Extremist Organisations?
For the past two years, the United States has warned
that increasing Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia was creating a large
pool of potential recruits for transnational terrorist networks. The United
States Embassy in Jakarta had been on high alert since August after receiving
intelligence from Europe of bomb threats and surveillance of the US Ambassador
to Indonesia by Sudanese nationals linked to the Al Qaeda network.(19)
According to Umar Juoro, an economist with the Habibie Centre, while the
known radical Islamist organisations within Indonesia are manageable,
the real problem lies with the activities of groups that are as yet not
clearly identified.
Connections between the Islamist groups discussed above
and transnational terrorist organisations or networks are often claimed
but generally not corroborated. It was reported on 27 September that seven
Afghan nationals flew into Ambon (Maluku) to a welcome from local police
and the Laskar Jihad.(20) The Indonesian Director of Immigration,
Muhammad Indra, has agreed it is likely that members of Afghan militias
are entering Indonesia illegally.(21) On 27 September a Muslim
activist and writer claimed that an envoy of Osama bin Laden had visited
Indonesia at least four times, and that the radical Darul Islam movement
and Al Qaeda enjoy a 'special relationship'.(22)
Indonesian students have long studied in the Islamic
religious schools of Pakistan and elsewhere, and reports suggest growing
numbers are being exposed to the same radical teachings as the Taliban.
Throughout the 1990's the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) monitored
700-1500 Indonesian students travelling to the Middle East and suggests
that 30-40 per cent never arrived at their stated destination. It is thought
many of these joined the Taliban in the Afghanistan civil war.(23)
However, many of the Indonesian Islamist organisations
deny involvement with Al Qaeda. While the leader of the Laskar Jihad,
Ja'far Umar Thalib, fought alongside the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan in
the 1980's and met Osama bin Laden, he has stated that he has little respect
for the Saudi terrorist.(24) According to Thalib, the Al Qaeda
organisation approached the Laskar Jihad, but he had declined to become
involved with the organisation. He also denied that there were any Afghan
Mujahadeen in Maluku.(25) Ja'far does however support the attack
on the United States, saying, 'it should be an important lesson for America.'
Another Islamist organisation with supposed links to bin Laden, Majelis
Mujahidin, also denies such links.(26) The Chairman of the
Indonesian Ulemas Council, Nazri Adlani has described as 'slanderous',
international reports that Indonesian Islamist organisations have become
involved in global terrorist networks.(27)
There are also official claims of links between Indonesian
groups and Southeast Asian terrorist and/or separatist organisations,
although independent evidence for these is also largely inadequate. In
August, Indonesian police arrested a Malaysian national following a bombing
in the Atrium Plaza, and two others for bombings in churches throughout
Indonesia.(28) Last year the Philippines Ambassador was injured
in a bombing, and the Malaysian Embassy was attacked with a grenade. Carlyle
Thayer, an expert on Southeast Asian security, has stated that there are
groups of armed militia members that move around the region.(29)
Ja'far Umar Thalib has stated the Laskar Jihad does have links to the
Malaysian Kumpulan Mujahadeen Malaysia (KMM) Islamist organisation. Intelligence
reports suggest these Southeast Asian groups may be linked to international
terrorist networks. The suspected hijackers of the 11 September attacks
were, according to US intelligence, sighted in the Philippines and Kuala
Lumpur.
Conclusion
The impact on Indonesia of the terrorist attacks on the
US and the US reaction and increasingly active local Islamist organisations
is likely to be continued sporadic outbursts of protest and occasional
violence. The relatively porous nature of Indonesian national borders
and the weakness of the Indonesian Government in detecting terrorists,
means that Indonesia may well serve as either a transit point or a sanctuary
for international terrorists. However, the Indonesian Government has a
narrow path to tread in protecting Indonesia from terrorist activity and
ensuring the country is not used by terrorist networks as a sanctuary,
and preventing the spillover of radicalism from Islamist organisations
to moderate Indonesian Muslims.
Endnotes
- T. Dodd, 'Megawati faces Muslim backlash', Australian Financial
Review, 20 September 2001.
- 'International Terrorism: Where to From Here?', Vital Issues Seminar,
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Parliament House, Canberra,
26 September 2001.
- I am not considering the Free Aceh (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) organisation
as a terrorist group in this discussion, as this group is in armed struggle
with the Indonesian security forces.
- 'Osama envoy made several trips to Indonesia: Activist', The Straits
Times, 27 September 2001.
- See 'Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku', International
Crisis Group Report, no. 10, 19 December 2000. The Maluku conflict
has been particularly bloody, with estimates of casualties since 1999
from 6000 to 9000, and the creation of hundreds of thousands of refugees.
- J. Solomon & R. Hindryati, 'Indonesian Radicals Rally in Support
of bin Laden-Western Agencies Suspect Organizational Ties', The Asian
Wall Street Journal, 21 September 2001.
- T. Dodd, 'Megawati risks Muslim rage', Australian Financial Review,
29 September 2001.
- ibid.
- 'Indonesian clerics warn of jihad', CNN.com, 25 September 2001.
- T. Dodd, 'Megawati faces Muslim backlash', op. cit.
- Personal communication with Dr Greg Fealy, Australian National University,
and T. Dodd, 'Megawati risks Muslim rage', ibid.
- D. Harsanto & H. Abu, 'Militant groups rally outside US embassy
against attacks on Afghanistan', The Jakarta Post, 9 October
2001.
- 'Indonesian protests turn violent', BBC Online, 9 October 2001.
- 'Terrorists Operate Freely in Surakarta', The Jakarta Post,
24 September 2001.
- 'Top Muslim leaders stress aid, not violence', The Jakarta Post,
2 October 2001.
- 'Mega slams radicals for anti-US threats', The Straits Times,
3 October 2001.
- T. Mapes, 'Indonesia's US Ties Stir Militant Opposition-Groups Threaten
to Attack American Interests', The Asian Wall Street Journal,
25 September 2001.
- 'RI expresses concern, urges US to limit strikes', The Jakarta
Post, 9 October 2001.
- J. McBeth, 'The Danger Within', Far Eastern Economic Review,
27 September, 2001, p. 20.
- ibid.
- T. Dodd, 'Megawati faces Muslim Backlash', op. cit.
- L. Murdoch, 'Bin Laden 'funded Christian-haters', Sydney Morning
Herald, 28 September 2001.
- Many Indonesians are also thought to have joined the Mujahadeen struggle
against the Soviet Union, see 'Waiting for Osama's Blessing', Tempo,
no. 03/11, 25 September 2001.
- Thalib has stated that bin Laden struck him as a jetsetter when he
met him in Pakistan in 1987 during the Mujahadeen struggle against the
Soviet Union, and has taken a vastly different interpretation of Islam
to the Laskar Jihad, see R. C. Paddock, 'Indonesian Extremist Backs
Terror Southeast Asia', Los Angeles Times, 23 September 2001.
- Harold Crouch of the International Crisis Group is quoted as questioning
reports of mujahadeen in the Malukus due to the lack of casualties
with Middle Eastern appearance, see S. Mydans, 'Militant Islam Unsettles
Indonesia And Its Region', New York Times, 21 September
2001.
- 'Waiting for Osama's Blessing', Tempo, no. 03/11, 25 September-1
October 2001.
- 'No global terrorist link in RI', Jakarta Post, 22 September
2001.
- Dr Greg Fealy of the Australian National University urges caution
when assessing these claims of guilt, as the Indonesian Police have
been known to frame suspects in the past and little motive has yet been
produced for the attacks, personal communication.
- S. Mydans, 'Militant Islam Unsettles Indonesia And Its Region', op.
cit.
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