Skip to section navigationSkip to content Commonwealth of Australia Coat of Arms Parliament of Australia - SenatePhoto of the Senate Chamber
HomeSenateHouse of RepresentativesLive BroadcastingThis Week in Parliament FindFrequently asked questionsContact

<< Return to previous page | Odgers' Australian Senate Practice Twelfth Edition

Chapter 21 - Relations with the House of Representatives

Simultaneous dissolutions of 1914

Following the 1913 general election for the House of Representatives and periodical election for the Senate, the new Liberal government under Joseph Cook had a narrow majority in the House (38-37) but was in a significant minority (29-7) in the Senate. These were the circumstances in which the first simultaneous dissolutions of the two Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament occurred the following year.

The occasion for the simultaneous dissolutions was the Government Preference Prohibition Bill. The bill was first passed by the House on 18 November 1913, only to be rejected in the Senate on the second reading on 11 December 1913; in the next session the proposed law was again passed by the House on 28 May 1914 and again rejected by the Senate on the first reading on 28 May 1914.

On 10 June 1914 the Prime Minister informed the House of Representatives that, subject to provision of funds for carrying on the public service during the election period, the Governor-General had granted a double dissolution on the basis of advice that the “Parliament was unworkable, that it was impossible to manage efficiently the public business... .” (HRD, pp 1970-1).

There was debate about the decision to dissolve on the ground that the measure in question was not a national or vital one. The Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, Senator G.F. Pearce of Western Australia, contended that a simultaneous dissolutions should only occur when the Senate, by its treatment of the financial measures of the Government, rendered government impossible. Pointing to the collocation of section 57, which follows immediately upon those sections of the Constitution dealing with the financial powers of the Houses, Pearce argued that the House of Representatives was specifically mentioned in section 57 because it is there that money bills must originate. (SD, 15/5/1914, pp 1009-23)

Quick and Garran claim that section 57 may apply to any bill (Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 1901, p. 685), but Pearce’s argument found support in a speech to the Federal Convention by Edmund Barton, Leader of the Convention:

“Deadlock” is not a term which is strictly applicable to any case except that in which the constitutional machine is prevented from properly working. I am in very grave doubt whether the term can be strictly applied to any case except the stoppage of legislative machinery arising out of conflict upon the finances of the country. A stoppage which arises on any matter of ordinary legislation, because the two Houses cannot come to an agreement at first, is not a thing which is properly designated by the term “deadlock” — because the working of the Constitution goes on — the constitutional machine proceeds notwithstanding a disagreement. It is only when the fuel of the machine of government is withheld that the machine of government comes to a stop, and that fuel is money. (Debates of the Convention, Sydney, 1897, p. 620)

Pearce’s approach would likewise seem to be supported by the advice of Chief Justice Griffith to the Governor-General. According to Griffith, the power of dissolution should not be exercised simply because the conditions specified in section 57 exist:

It should, on the contrary, be regarded as an extraordinary power, to be exercised only in cases in which the Governor-General is personally satisfied, after independent consideration of the case, either that the proposed law as to which the Houses have differed in opinion is one of such public importance that it should be referred to the electors of the Commonwealth for immediate decision by means of a complete renewal of both Houses, or that there exists such a state of practical deadlock in legislation as can only be ended in that way. (Quoted in L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, 4th ed., 1978, pp 404-5)

Pearce also observed that the government had not made any attempt to resolve the deadlock by means of a conference between managers of the two Houses.

On 17 June 1914 the Senate agreed to an address to the Governor-General requesting that the correspondence which passed between the Governor-General and his advisers in regard to the double dissolution of the Parliament might be made public. The address stated, inter alia, that:

The decision of Your Excellency appears to be fatal to the principles upon which the Senate has hitherto acted, which, we submit, are in strict accordance with a truly Federal interpretation of the Constitution. The Constitution deliberately created a House in which the States as such may be represented, and clothed this House with co-ordinate powers (save in the origination of Money Bills) with the Lower Chamber of the Legislature. These powers were given to the Senate in order that they might be used; but if a Senate may not reject or even amend any bill because a Government chooses to call it a “test” bill, although such bill contains no vital principle or gives effect to no reform, the powers of the Senate are reduced to a nullity. We submit that no constitutional sanction can be found for that view, which is repugnant to one of the fundamental bases of the Constitution, viz, a Legislature of two Houses, clothed with equal powers, one representing the people as such, the other representing the States. And we respectfully submit that the dissolution of the Senate ought not to follow upon a mere legitimate exercise of its functions under the Constitution, but only upon such action as makes responsible government impossible, e.g. the rejection of a measure embodying a principle of vital importance necessary in the public interest, creating an actual legislative deadlock and preventing legislation upon which the Ministry was returned to power. These conditions do not exist in the present case. (J.86-8)

The Address also stated that there was not a deadlock between the Houses, referring to the following statement:

SESSION 1913

Bills passed and assented to - 23

Bills passed by Senate only - 6

Bills passed by Senate without amendment - 18

Bills passed by Senate with amendments - 5

Amendments disagreed with (Bills laid aside by House of Representatives)- 3*

Bills rejected by Senate - 2

* Including Committee of Public Accounts Bill No. 1

The Governor-General declined to respond to the Senate’s request. He stated, however, that the grounds for the decision were to be found in the Prime Minister’s statement, made with his permission, to the House of Representatives.

The Parliament was dissolved on 30 July 1914. At the election on 5 September 1914, the Labor Party led by Andrew Fisher won 42 seats in the House of Representatives against 32 by the Liberal Party, with one Independent; the result in the Senate was: Labor, 31; Liberal, 5.

The correspondence relating to the dissolutions was tabled in both Houses on 8 October 1914 (PP 2/1914-17).

Previous page | Contents | Next page

top


Website feedback: web.senate@aph.gov.au
Last reviewed 2 February 2010 by the Senate Web Administrator
© Commonwealth of Australia
Parliament of Australia Web Site Privacy Statement
Images courtesy of AUSPIC