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Scrutiny of Bills Reports 1998

SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE FOR THE SCRUTINY OF BILLS

TENTH REPORT OF 1998

2 December 1998

ISSN 0729-6258

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Senator B Cooney (Chairman)

Senator W Crane (Deputy Chairman)

Senator H Coonan

Senator T Crossin

Senator J Ferris

Senator A Murray

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Extract from Standing Order 24

(1) (a) At the commencement of each Parliament, a Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills shall be appointed to report, in respect of the clauses of bills introduced into the Senate, and in respect of Acts of the Parliament, whether such bills or Acts, by express words or otherwise:

(i) trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties;

(ii) make rights, liberties or obligations unduly dependent upon insufficiently defined administrative powers;

(iii) make rights, liberties or obligations unduly dependent upon non-reviewable decisions;

(iv) inappropriately delegate legislative powers; or

(v) insufficiently subject the exercise of legislative power to parliamentary scrutiny.

(b) The Committee, for the purpose of reporting upon the clauses of a bill when the bill has been introduced into the Senate, may consider any proposed law or other document or information available to it, notwithstanding that such proposed law, document or information has not been presented to the Senate.

SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE FOR THE SCRUTINY OF BILLS

TENTH REPORT OF 1998

The Committee presents its Tenth Report of 1998 to the Senate.

The Committee draws the attention of the Senate to clauses of the following bill which contains provisions that the Committee considers may fall within principles 1(a)(i) to 1(a)(v) of Standing Order 24:

Acts Interpretation Amendment Bill 1998

Acts Interpretation Amendment Bill 1998

Introduction

The Committee dealt with this bill in Alert Digest No 10 of 1998, in which it made various comments. The Attorney-General has responded to those comments in a letter dated 1 December 1998. A copy of that letter is attached to this report. An extract from the Alert Digest and relevant parts of the Attorney-General's response are discussed below.

Extract from Alert Digest No 10 of 1998

This bill was introduced into the House of Representatives on 12 November 1998 by the Attorney-General. [Portfolio responsibility: Attorney-General]

The bill proposes to amend the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 to address the implications of a recent decision of the Federal Court in Foster v Attorney-General (relating to section 19). The bill proposes to:

  • provide for a Minister to authorise a non-portfolio Minister or Parliamentary Secretary to act on his or her behalf;
  • validate past authorisations that may have been made in reliance on section 19 to the extent that they may be invalid; and
  • ensure that an order can be made by the Governor-General under section 19 whenever there is any change to the administration of government business and validates past orders made under section 19BA to the extent that they may be invalid.

Retrospective validation

Schedule 1, items 2, 5 and 7

This bill proposes to amend the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 to address the implications of the decision of the Federal Court in Foster v Attorney-General, handed down on 12 October 1998.

The Explanatory Memorandum notes that, in that case, the Federal Court found that section 19 of the Act did not enable the Attorney-General to authorise the Minister for Justice to exercise statutory powers for and on his behalf. The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to suggest that this decision has significant ramifications for other authorisations made under section 19 of the Act, and serious implications for government administration generally.

Therefore, items 2, 5 and 7 of Schedule 1 to the bill retrospectively validate acts undertaken under the legislation as presently in force.

While understanding the argument that this validation may be necessary for the orderly conduct of government, the Committee is concerned that the bill may go further than necessary, and that it may prejudice longstanding tradition and practice. Accordingly, the Committee seeks the advice of the Minister:

  • to identify the specific implications of the decision in Foster's case which the legislation is seeking to address;
  • to confirm that a non-portfolio Minister (or member of the Executive Council who is not a Minister) has the same general rights and responsibilities at law as a portfolio Minister;
  • to identify the usual protocol with regard to oversight by a portfolio Minister of a non-portfolio Minister (or member of the Executive Council who is not a Minister) who would be authorised by the bill to act on the Minister's behalf; and
  • to reassure the Committee that the amendment will not prejudice practice that, in the past, has ensured due process.

Pending the Minister's advice, the Committee draws Senators' attention to this provision, as it may be considered to make rights, liberties and obligations unduly dependent on insufficiently defined administrative powers, in breach of principle 1(a)(ii) of the Committee's terms of reference, and inappropriately delegate legislative power in breach of principle 1(a)(iv) of the Committee's terms of reference.

Relevant extract from the response from the Attorney-General

The Bill makes amendments to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 to address the implications of the decision of the Federal Court in Foster v Attorney-General. In that case the Court found that section 19 of the Acts Interpretation Act does not enable the Attorney-General to authorise the Minister for Justice to exercise statutory powers for or on his behalf. An appeal in the Foster case was heard by the Full Federal Court on 26 November 1998; the Court has reserved its decision.

It has been the practice of current and previous governments to rely on Section 19 to authorise another Minister to act for a named Minister in a statute, where section 19A of the Acts Interpretation Act is not available; and, in particular, to authorise Parliamentary Secretaries to exercise statutory powers vested in Ministers.

The result of the Foster case is that section 19 of the Act cannot be used as authority:

  1. for a portfolio Minister to authorise a junior portfolio Minister to exercise statutory powers vested in the holder of a specific ministerial office;
  2. and, by implication, section 19 cannot be used as authority for a portfolio Minister:
  3. to authorise a non-portfolio Minister to exercise statutory powers vested in the holder of a ministerial office;
  4. to authorise a Parliamentary Secretary to exercise statutory powers vested in the holder of a ministerial office.

The amendments to section 19A address item (i). Section 19A currently provides that a reference in legislation to 'Minister' is taken to be a reference to all ministers appointed to administer the provision. The proposed amendment will provide that a reference to a Minister, whether specific or generic, will be taken to be a reference to all ministers appointed to administer the provision, that is all Ministers within the one portfolio. This will allow all Ministers within a portfolio to exercise relevant statutory powers of the portfolio Minister where appropriate.

Proposed new subsection 18C covers items (ii) and (iii) by providing that a portfolio Minister may authorise a non-portfolio Minister or a member of the Executive Council who is not a Minister to exercise statutory powers on his or her behalf.

The legal framework for government as set out in the Australian Constitution does not distinguish between portfolio and non-portfolio Ministers. All Ministers are appointed under section 64 of the Constitution to administer entire departments of State, with more than one Minister being appointed to administer some Departments. Where more than one Minister is appointed to administer a Department both Ministers are responsible for the administration of that Department.

Parliamentary Secretaries are not appointed under the Constitution to administer departments but since 1990 Parliamentary Secretaries have been appointed as members of the Executive Council under section 62 of the Constitution and so are available if requested to undertake a variety of duties on behalf of Ministers including attendance at Executive Council meetings.

Where a non-portfolio Minister or Parliamentary Secretary acts for or on behalf of another Minister under a Ministerial authorisation, he or she is acting as an agent for the authorising Minister, not as a delegate of the Minister.

The protocol for oversight by a portfolio Minister of a Minister or Parliamentary Secretary authorised to act on the Minister's behalf would vary from Government to Government and Minister to Minister. However, the authorisation would be in writing setting out the functions or exercise of powers in relation to which the Minister or Parliamentary Secretary was authorised to act for and on behalf of the authorising Minister. The authorisation would also set out the circumstances in which the authorisation was to operate or alternatively specify the time when the authorisation was to be effective. The authorising Minister retains ultimate control as the authorisation may be revoked at any time by the Minister.

The Government has taken note of concerns raised that if oral authorisations were permitted the paper trail of government decisions may be difficult to follow. In light of these concerns the Bill provides that authorisations given to both Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries must be in writing. This will ensure that it is easier to ascertain the decision maker when seeking to review or challenge an administrative decision.

Due to the serious implications of the Foster case for government administration, it is appropriate that urgent legislative action be taken to clarify the legal basis for ministerial authorisations and to validate past authorisations that have been made in reliance on section 19 to the extent that they may be invalid.

The amendments will in no way prejudice practice that has in the past ensured due process. On the contrary, the amendments validate past practice. In addition, the new requirement that authorisations be in writing reinforces due process.

The Committee thanks the Attorney-General for this comprehensive response.

Barney Cooney

Chairman

 

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