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|
|
% change from 1990 |
% change from 1990 per capita |
per capita emissions (tonnes of CO2e) |
|
|
Australia |
-4 to -14 |
-34 to -41 |
17 to 15 |
|
European Union |
-20 to -30 |
-24 to -34 |
9 to 8 |
|
United Kingdom |
-26 to -32 |
-33 to -39 |
8 to 7 |
|
US (2009 budget proposal) |
0 |
-25 |
16 |
|
Canada |
0 |
-25 |
18 |
|
Germany |
-40 |
-41 |
9 |
|
Netherlands |
-30 |
-39 |
9 |
|
Norway |
-30 |
-43 |
6 |
|
Switzerland |
-20 to -30 |
-32 to -40 |
5 |
Sources: Secretariat calculations based on White Paper, p 3-3; Garnaut Report, p 177; Department of Climate Change Fact Sheet – Emissions, target and global goal; 'Economic cost as an indicator for comparable effort'; 'A new era of responsibility: renewing America's promise' (US 2009 Budget), p 21; United Nations, World Population Prospects. Final column calculated by applying percentage changes to 1990 per capita emissions (including land use change and forestry) from World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool.
5.14 Another way of assessing the comparability of effort is in terms of economic cost. Australia's costs of mitigation are higher than in most other developed countries. The Government's view is that that the cost of mitigation needs to be considered in the context of a country's capacity to pay, and alongside other relevant indicators.[16] Table 5.2 compares the costs of equivalent per capita reductions in emissions in various countries.
Table 5.2: Cost of achieving emissions (% change from reference 2020 GNP)
|
|
5 per cent target |
15 per cent target |
|
Australia |
-1.1 |
-1.6 |
|
Canada |
-1.1 |
-1.5 |
|
Japan |
-0.2 |
-0.4 |
|
United States |
-0.3 |
-0.4 |
|
European Union |
-0.4 |
-0.6 |
|
Russia and CIS |
-3.6 |
-5.3 |
|
World |
-0.7 |
-0.9 |
Source: 'Economic cost as an indicator for comparable effort', Australia's submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change.
5.15 The economic costs of mitigation for Australia are a product of its particular national circumstances, including its population growth, industry profile, resource endowment and mitigation potential.
5.16 Australia has a fast‑growing population for an advanced economy. A significant part of this is due to high immigration, which means we are hosting people who would otherwise be adding to emissions in other countries.
5.17 By contrast population has been almost static in parts of the European Union and is projected to decline in Japan. In per capita terms, even Australia's 5 per cent target implies a reduction of 34 per cent in emissions from 1990 to 2020. This is a comparable percentage change in emissions to that proposed by our peers (Table 5.1).[17] However, even after this reduction the level of Australia's per capita emissions will be well above those in most other countries.
5.18 Australia has a relatively large share of emission- and energy-intensive industries and a dominance of low-cost coal in electricity generation, which determines the extent of economic restructuring and/or technological transformation required.
5.19 While Australia has the potential in the long run to make more use of renewable power, most renewable projects are some time from reaching large-scale commercial application and some do not have the potential to generate baseload power or respond to peaks in energy demand.
5.20 It is important to note that international linking allows national targets to be achieved at lower cost, through overseas abatement as well as domestic emissions reductions. As a result, countries that have fewer opportunities for low cost domestic mitigation may meet ambitious targets at low cost to the economy as a whole by purchasing credits in the market.
5.21 The exposure draft says that Australia's emissions targets are set with regard to:
(i) the principle that the stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at around 450 parts per million of carbon dioxide equivalence or lower is in Australia's national interest.[18]
5.22 As discussed in Chapter 2, the scientific evidence suggests that the global concentration of greenhouse gases needs to be kept to 450 ppm to avoid the dire consequences following from increases in average temperatures of over 2 degrees. Some submitters argued that Australia should therefore make an offer consistent with its fair share of a global effort to the world stabilising concentrations at 450 ppm. As Professor Garnaut says:
...to make an unrealistically low offer in the international negotiations is to negate the prime purpose of our own mitigation, which is to facilitate the emergence of an effective agreement.[19]
5.23 Australia currently has per capita emissions well above the global average and some submissions regard it as neither fair nor realistic to expect the world to accept Australia being allocated a disproportionate share of emissions entitlements forever. The Garnaut Review assumes every country in the world agrees to allocate remaining allowable global emissions, and through emissions trading, to eliminate differences in per capita emissions gradually over the period to 2050 ('contract and converge'). Under this arrangement, Australia's contribution would be about a 25 per cent reduction from 1990 levels.[20]
5.24 The logic of limiting the Australian offer to a maximum reduction of 15 per cent was questioned by some witnesses:
...having the option of a 25 per cent reduction or thereabouts at 2020 on the table would make sense, seeing that it can be computed as somewhere like the fair share that Australia would contribute to an ambitious global agreement—that of course being more and more realised as Australia’s true national interest in a climate change debate.[21]
I think it would be helpful to our place in these international discussions if we kept on the table the chance of a 25 per cent reduction by 2020, conditional on others doing comparably stringent things.[22]
5.25 The Committee believes that once allowance is made for Australia's faster population growth and the structure of the economy, its plans at least match those proposed by other advanced economies. The targets are a responsible start to the scheme.
5.26 The Committee believes it is important to calibrate Australia's national commitments to reflect scientific evidence, the availability of low emissions technologies and the scope of international action on climate change. This could enable Australia to consider adopting stricter emissions targets past 2020.
5.27 Our ambition should be to accelerate development of renewable energy alternatives and improve energy efficiency. The goal would be to reach a position where even more ambitious targets could be adopted without causing economic hardship for households, resulting in carbon leakage or endangering energy security.
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