CHAPTER 9
CHAPTER NINE
Broader Effects on the Economy and the Community
Introduction
9.1 This chapter examines the Bill's possible broader effects on the
economy and the community. The chapter is based on a number of assumptions,
including the possibility that the Bill will cause a significant shift
away from awards towards enterprise and individual bargaining; a potential
reduction in the power and role of unions; and a possible reduction
in wages and conditions of employees who have weak bargaining power.
9.2 There was little, if any, common ground between those who supported
the Bill as a whole concept, and those who opposed it. On some points
the likely effects of the Bill's likely effects were disputed, for example,
whether individual contracts would enhance or detract from co-operative
teamwork within the workplace. On other points, there was disagreement
on whether a certain effect, if it occurred, would be positive or negative
- for example, whether lower minimum wages, if it led to lower unemployment,
would make for a better society overall.
9.3 While some submissions accepted the importance of workplace reform
and productivity growth, they suggested that this Bill would not achieve
those things, or would not be the best way to achieve them. While there
was general acceptance of the need to reduce unemployment, there was
no agreement on whether the Bill would help that goal.
Effects on Productivity and Economic Growth
9.4 While there was general agreement that improving productivity is
a key to improving Australians' living standards, there was no agreement
as to whether the Workplace Relations Bill would achieve this
9.5 A number of submissions discussed the need for `flexibility' and
`reform' in the labour market, implying that these are the preconditions
(or at least, among the preconditions) of improved productivity. Movement
away from awards and towards workplace bargaining or individual bargaining
was noted in these submissions as beneficial to flexibility.
9.6 However, few submissions described exactly what was meant by `flexibility'
and `reform'. These were catchwords put forward as self-evident goods,
whose implications were supposed to be obvious. Yet 'flexibility' and
'reform' obviously meant different things to different people. `Flexibility'
was promoted as, implicitly, equivalent to `working smarter' - a win-win
situation for management and workers (providing the gains are shared between
wages and profits); or alternatively, it was regarded simply as code for
cutting wages and conditions to increase profits. Correspondingly, it
was sometimes unclear whether `productivity' referred to real economic
productivity (output per hour worked) or merely unit labour costs (output
per wage dollar). `Working smarter' improves real productivity; reducing
wage rates may increase profits, but does not affect real productivity
- at least, not directly. [1]
9.7 The H.R. Nicholls Society argued that the Bill would have a positive
effect:
But even in enterprises where capital intensity is relatively low,
very large productivity improvements do occur when proprietors, in collaboration
with their former employees, have been able to transform the status
of those ex-employees into independent contractors … One such enterprise,
a small manufacturing plant in Victoria (which must remain nameless),
has achieved a virtually instantaneous 30 per cent productivity boost,
the results of which are shared to mutual advantage between employees
and proprietors. [2]
9.8 The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry noted that there
are a full range of relevant factors (including management, work organisation,
and investment, product, service and marketing strategies), but regarded
the environment of employment laws as `absolutely crucial'. [3]
However, ACCI did not articulate how the changes proposed by the Bill
would affect the employment environment in a way which would promote productivity.
9.9 Other submissions set out arguments denying that the Bill was the
right way to go in improving the productivity of Australia's economy,
for a number of reasons.
9.10 Firstly, they claimed that existing arrangements, with enterprise
bargaining and the inclusion of enterprise flexibility clauses in awards,
were sufficiently flexible. They claimed that small business is relatively
happy with the award system, since it removes the need to put effort into
individual bargaining. They pointed to survey results showing that for
small business the award system is not a major impediment to flexibility
and change (penalty rates and flexible working hours were the only notable
complaints). [4] These matters are discussed
further from Paragraph 5.98.
9.11 They pointed to the great growth in part-time work in recent years,
as an example showing that the existing regime does not inhibit change.
They pointed out that during the 1990s Australia's productivity has
increased above the OECD average; this was said to be evidence that
existing arrangements are satisfactory.
9.12 Those who felt that the Bill would be good for productivity growth
drew the opposite conclusion from the point about Australia's healthy
productivity growth in the 1990s: they claimed that enterprise bargaining
has contributed to the productivity growth, and this logically supports
extending the same principle in the way the Bill does. In relation to
the industrial relations reforms of the last decade generally, many
supporters of the Bill acknowledged the benefits, but felt they have
not gone far enough.
9.13 The second argument that the Bill would do little for productivity
growth was that award wages and conditions constitute a `level playing
field'. Each firm must pay award conditions secure in the knowledge
that its competitors must do the same; these matters are effectively
taken out of the realm of competition; firms are thereby encouraged
to concentrate their competitive energy on other matters - such as quality
management, capital investment, teamwork, innovation, technological
improvement - which, it was claimed, are the engine room of real productivity
growth and international competitive advantage.
Low wage competition is not the most effective way of improving productivity.
The most effective way of improving productivity is to focus on other
aspects of our competitive edge: quality, innovation, delivery and service.
[5]
9.14 A recent report by the Economic Planning and Advisory Commission
supports this to a degree:
McKinsey and Company (1995) have reported case studies of five Australian
industries and how they differ from world best practice ... Product
market regulation was considered to be the most significant [factor]
.... Labour market regulation was a lesser factor. There were cases
of restrictive work rules and poor industrial relations, but the report
identified significant progress. [6]
9.15 Thirdly, it was claimed that unions have had a constructive role
in mediating between management and the shop floor during the micro-economic
reforms of the last decade - a time of wage restraint and increasing
profit share. In this argument, to the extent that the Bill would encourage
a return to an `us and them' mentality between management and workers,
it would be detrimental to the productivity growth that arises from
co-operative consultative workplace relations.
9.16 Some submissions, by contrast, regarded unions as interfering
`third parties', a hindrance rather than a help to co-operative workplace
relations. They claimed that the Bill would improve relationships within
the workplace; they did not detail exactly how it would do this; by
implication, it would do it by reducing the involvement of unions. In
answer, union groups stressed that the union is its members; they claimed
that the stereotyped view of interfering union officials fostering discord
between the rank and file and the employer, if it was ever true, is
thoroughly out of date. They also claimed a role for unions, even in
workplaces where there are no current members, as de facto assistants
to the industrial inspectorate in monitoring compliance with the law.
9.17 A recent roundup of research on the relationship between union
presence in the workplace and productivity is inconclusive -
Overall, given the limitations of the studies, the union effects on
productivity in Australia are unclear, although the evidence that does
exist uniformly points to negative effects... even given negative union
effects have existed in the past, as argued above, the decentralisation
of the industrial relations system through enterprise bargaining may
well enhance the capacity of collective voice to yield efficiency gains
to firms and the economy, and hence the relationship between unionism
and the level of productivity could become positive in the future. [7]
9.18 The argument just mentioned implicitly applies more to large or
unionised workplaces. A closely related argument was put, not particularly
referring to the role of unions, that within the firm productivity depends
on co-operative teamwork; teamwork is enhanced by standard, known `fair'
wages and conditions; the growth of individual `secret' contracts will
tend to create a culture of mistrust among workers and will be detrimental
to teamwork.
9.19 It was argued that at the broader scale this dynamic could cause
increased industrial disputation:
Given the spontaneous tendency for workers to compare their pay with
that of others performing similar work irrespective of claimed difference
in productivity, there is an increased risk of industrial disruption
and wage leap-frogging by bargaining groups attempting to restore pay
comparability in a robust labour market. The 1995 CRA dispute at Weipa
exemplified in microcosm the forces at work. [8]
9.20 The Committee was given several admirable examples of co-operative
workplace reform involving innovations such as autonomous work teams and
devolution of management functions towards the shopfloor. [9]
These were described with obvious pride as improving the morale and self-esteem
of employees as well as improving production statistics. Employees feared
that the Bill would jeopardise this type of new relationship by `sending
a signal' to employers that competitive wage-cutting is back on the agenda.
9.21 To this supporters of the Bill said, `What you are doing sounds
great; there is nothing in the Bill that will stop it; and if it is
as great as it sounds, why would management want to stop it?' Employees
answered that this type of reform requires time, effort and a change
in management culture; it is a long term investment; they feared that
the Bill will tempt management to revert to a more confrontational style
in the hope of bargaining down wages; this would be shortsighted and
would give only short term profits; it would retard longer term productivity
growth. Implicit in this argument, of course, is the view that some
proportion of employers are shortsighted; but it is not necessary to
estimate what proportion: the fear is that once the `level playing field'
of award conditions is removed, and a few employers embark on bargaining
down wages, their competitors would be obliged to follow suit in the
short term whether or not they thought it was in their long term interests.
9.22 Several submissions particularly referred to the experience of
New Zealand since the deregulation of the labour market by the Employment
Contracts Act 1991. They said that productivity has increased markedly
and unemployment has decreased markedly since then.
9.23 The evidence on unemployment in New Zealand is resumed from Paragraph
9.42 below. On the matter of productivity growth, the Department of Industrial
Relations provided good summary evidence from several countries. [10]
Its evidence comparing Australia and New Zealand is inconclusive:
On average Australia outperformed New Zealand in terms of labour productivity
after 1989. In New Zealand, labour productivity grew very strongly in
1991-92 in the aftermath of the Employment Contracts Act, and as its
economy began to recover from recession. It also experienced a period
of strong labour productivity growth during 1993-94. By contrast, Australia's
labour productivity growth performance has been more consistent in the
years since its economy began to recover from recession in mid-1991.
While direct causal links are difficult to establish, at least some
of Australia's improved productivity performance over this period might
reasonably be attributed to its initial moves towards productivity based
enterprise bargaining. In the case of New Zealand, that country's solid
employment growth since 1993 has tended to hold back recorded productivity
growth. [11]
9.24 Figure 1, from the Department of Industrial Relations submission
(see page ), shows Australia's superior productivity growth in the 1990s.
New Zealand's performance compared with itself over time is considerable;
its performance compared with Australia, not so impressive. [12]
9.25 A study by the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Australian
Council of Social Service suggested:
On the available evidence, the Employment Contracts Act appears to
have had little discernible effect on New Zealand's productivity performance
over recent years, and to have encouraged a short-term `cost-cutting'
focus amongst employers. [13]
9.26 It is also worth repeating that other factors are involved, and
direct causal links, or the relative importance of industrial relations
law in productivity growth, are hard to establish. Since New Zealand
suffered the 1989-90 recession more severely than Australia, it is perhaps
not surprising that it climbed out of it more steeply.
9.27 Submissions from those who did not see the New Zealand experience
in a favourable light claimed that there has been increasing wage inequality
in New Zealand since the deregulation of the labour market under the
Employment Contracts Act 1991. A recent study commissioned by the Australian
Council of Trade Unions and the Australian Council of Social Service
supports this claim -
[In New Zealand] Employment growth has been strong since 1992 and the
overall unemployment rate has fallen sharply... On average, real earnings
have continued to decline in New Zealand throughout this recent recovery.
This decline masks a dramatic increase in the dispersion of wages/earnings,
with higher skilled and higher paid groups achieving wage increases
and lower paid groups receiving wage reductions (Sylvia Dixon, `The
Inter-Industry Wage Structure: 1971-94' in Labour Market Bulletin
1995:1, New Zealand Department of Labour). [14]
9.28 On this the Department of Industrial Relations commented:
Empirical evidence suggests that `through reducing trade union membership,
the Employment Contracts Act has led to an increase in employment and
downward pressure on wages'. [15]
9.29 The ACTU/ACOSS study gives various evidence that women have been
relatively disadvantaged under the deregulated New Zealand system. [16]
The ratio of female to male ordinary time earnings has declined only slightly,
from 78 per cent to 77.5 per cent, from 1991 to 1995; but women, because
of the typical features of the sectors they predominate in, have been
less likely to receive productivity base pay rises, and more likely to
lose conditions such as penalty rates. However:
9.30 Figures 2 and 3, from the ACTU/ACOSS study, show the trend in inequality
of disposable incomes in New Zealand. The increased inequality is noteworthy,
though not as dramatic as some of the rhetoric makes out. In particular,
Figure 2 shows that the relatively better position of the highest income
group has much more to do with income tax changes in 1988 than with the
Employee Contracts Act; while the reported increase in poverty is mostly
caused by reductions in social security benefits in 1991. On the other
hand, the negative effects of the Act on low income earners may be under-reported
because of lack of information. Contracts covering fewer than 20 employees
do not need to be lodged, so there is no regular reporting on these; [18]
the unreported individual contracts are more likely to be those of employees
who are non-unionised or otherwise in a weaker bargaining position. In
the case of women, for example:
The authors themselves [Hammond and Harbridge 1993) note that they
had access to collective contracts only, in which women were likely
to have retained more favourable conditions than most women employees
covered by individual contracts. [19]
9.31 Returning to the matter of productivity growth, broader comparisons
are equally inconclusive. Among OECD countries there is no simple correlation
between `decentralised' labour markets and higher productivity growth.
[20] Centralised Scandinavia has had
relatively high productivity growth; decentralised Canada and the USA
have had relatively low productivity growth (Australia's industrial relations
system is counted as `intermediate'). [21]
9.32 In evidence to the Committee, Dr Roy Green of the Employment Studies
Centre, University of Newcastle, described the relationship between
productivity and industrial relations legislation:
The essential ingredient of productivity improvement is outside the
sphere of industrial relations and I think we should always remain aware
of that, that investment in new technologies and skills will be fundamental
to productivity improvement, but industrial relations and workplace
change can make a very important contribution to that and, in particular,
in making the best use of our plant and equipment. So industrial relations
legislation is crucial in that respect. [22]
9.33 While industrial relations legislation may not be seen as the essential
ingredient of productivity growth, it can be an important factor. Industrial
relations certainty underpins elements such as the introduction of technology,
availability of resources and modern management techniques. Dr Green referred
to numerous surveys that showed managers had clear views on what constituted
impediments to productivity. In terms of the current industrial legislation
the award system was not seen as such. Indeed Dr Green's evidence reflected
that of Professor Isaac (see Paragraph 5.102) which described the view
of small business which preferred the security and stability of the award
system. [23]
Effects on Unemployment
9.34 Unemployment in Australia has increased greatly since the mid
1970s, and now stands at about 8.5 per cent of the labour force.
9.35 Many submissions asserted that the Bill would help reduce unemployment.
Firstly, they hoped that the general productivity growth which they
expected from the Bill would flow through into greater investment, greater
economic activity generally and hence more employment opportunities.
Secondly, some submissions referred to the classical economic theory
of supply and demand: they said that unemployment is caused (in part,
at least) by legal minimum wages that are set too high: if wages were
deregulated the balance of supply and demand would see them fall to
a market-clearing level:
This activity [setting minimum wages] is equivalent to telling a greengrocer
that he can sell his cabbages at any price above a dollar a cabbage
or he can give them away but he may not sell them for any price between
zero and a dollar… it acts as a barrier of entry to many people
who cannot get into that particular industry at the prices ordained
by the award. [24]
9.36 In general, opponents of these arguments pointed out that the labour
market is significantly different from the product market, and that a
whole literature has developed in `new labour economics' precisely because
the simple neo-classical model cannot explain labour market phenomena.
On this basis the premise that there is any such thing as a `market-clearing
wage' in the neo-classical sense should not be accepted uncritically.
[25]
9.37 There was some argument about the performance of the Western Australian
economy since the labour market reforms of the Workplace Agreements Act
1993 (WA). Some witnesses claimed significantly reduced unemployment in
Western Australia; others queried some of the figures, and in any case
claimed that the improvement could be attributed to general economic recovery
during the period. [26]
9.38 On the other hand, in the relatively deregulated labour market of
the United Kingdom, unemployment has remained high. [27]
9.39 The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) referred to various
studies showing that raising the minimum wage did not lead to increased
unemployment:
Card and Krueger looked at the effect of raising the minimum wage in
New Jersey in the fast food industry and compared it to Pennsylvania
where there had been no increase. Contrary to the conventional theory,
Card and Krueger found that employment actually grew more in New Jersey
than in Pennsylvania. The Card-Krueger study was consistent with similar
studies done for California, Texas and the United Kingdom… Similar
examples can also be shown outside the US literature. For example, work
by Machin and Manning (1994) in the UK on the abolition of works councils
and Bazen and Martin (1991) in France … [28]
9.40 The Economic Planning and Advisory Commission notes that the Card-Krueger
study has received `a mixture of praise and criticism'. [29]
9.41 The ACTU also pointed to the analogy of equal pay for women: predictions
that women would be priced out of jobs because of equal pay rulings in
the early 1970s proved unfounded. [30]
9.42 Many witnesses referred to the experience of New Zealand since
the labour market deregulation of the Employment Contracts Act. Some
emphasised that the unemployment rate has declined greatly since then;
others countered that this could be explained by the predictable recovery
from the 1989-90 recession and by New Zealand's historically lower participation
rate:
During the reform period Australia's labour force participation rate
increased by nearly 3 percentage points. In New Zealand by contrast
the participation rate was around 1.5 percentage points lower in 1994-5
than a decade earlier. [31]
9.43 The participation rate may vary not only because of the state
of the business cycle and the ease of finding employment, but also because
of cultural differences, which is one reason why international comparisons
of unemployment should be used with caution.
9.44 On the subject of minimum wages versus unemployment generally
the most recent OECD Employment Outlook, comments:
The employment or unemployment rates of youth, women and unskilled
workers do not appear to be significantly correlated across countries
with the incidence of low paid employment. This suggests that factors
other than relative wages, such as the overall level of aggregate demand
or the amount of training received, may be more important for determining
labour market outcomes for these groups. [32]
9.45 To sum up generally, this sample of comments from various witnesses
gives the flavour of the deep disagreement on the likely effects of
the Bill on unemployment:
I think most recent international studies, particularly of minimum
wages - and there have been some recent studies in the United States
and Britain - demonstrate that raising minimum wages has an insignificant
effect on employment in the short term and may even help to create employment
in the longer term. [33]
The OECD has found quite clear evidence that its members which have
less flexible labour markets are more likely to endure both high and
persistent unemployment and relatively high inflation rates. [34]
In terms of employment growth, we have suffered very badly in this
state [Victoria]... I can provide copies of all the budgets and economic
statements that this government has provided. Their own forecasts show
that deregulation of the labour market has not provided the hundreds
of thousands of jobs out there. [35]
The evidence, if you look at those companies who have gone into enterprise
agreements [in Tasmania], is that on average employment has increased
significantly more than the state average and in some cases it has increased
dramatically. [36]
Comparison with Global Trends
9.46 The Committee's terms of reference require it to examine 'the
effects of similar provisions in other countries'. The following section
is a brief overview of global trends in industrial relations.
9.47 The decentralisation of industrial relations to the enterprise
or workplace level has been a trend experienced in the vast majority
of OECD countries. However, the extent of the decentralisation, the
methods and structures by which it is achieved, and the economic and
social outcomes which result are as varied as the countries themselves.
9.48 The differing political, social and economic environments and
the myriad variables operating within those countries make it almost
impossible to draw any meaningful conclusions about the effects of decentralisation
as such. Some countries, such as the USA, have always had highly decentralised
bargaining structures, whereas others, such as a number of European
countries, have been characterised by predominantly centralised systems.
In the USA, recent changes have seen the reduction of 'pattern bargaining'
in industries such as automobiles, steel and rubber and the further
reduction of the level of bargaining from company-wide negotiations
to plant level. In Sweden, opposition to national-level bargaining has
been mainly by the few large, export-oriented manufacturing companies
which dominate the Engineering Employers Federation. However, industry
level bargaining is still predominant.
9.49 The movement towards decentralisation has also not been universal.
Japan, which since 1945 has had a predominantly decentralised bargaining
system, has experienced some degree of centralisation in the increasing
participation in the annual Shunto or 'spring offensive' in which unions,
led by industry associations and national confederations, simultaneously
pursue wage increases of a similar kind through coordinated industrial
action. [37]
9.50 In Lessons from Northern Europe: Collective Bargaining and
Economic Performance in Britain, Germany and Sweden Robin Archer
examines what relationship, if any, there is between the economic performance
of a country and its structure of collective bargaining.
9.51 In Great Britain, where legislative and policy changes introduced
by the Thatcher Conservative Government led to a significant decentralisation
in bargaining, there was a marked improvement in productivity growth in
the 1980s (albeit from a fairly low level). However, while workplace bargaining
is likely to have played a part in this improvement, Archer points to
evidence that this growth is unlikely to lead to sustained long-term productivity
improvements because cost-based numerical reforms have been pursued rather
than quality-based functional reform. In addition, total wage growth outstripped
productivity growth leading to the conclusion that 'the net outcome of
workplace level productivity bargaining in Britain has been rising unit
labour costs and declining international competitiveness'. [38]
9.52 Centralisation of bargaining arrangements is considered by many
commentators to coincide with better pay equity outcomes between men and
women. The submission made by the Department of Industrial Relations to
this inquiry acknowledged this suggested link but suggests that 'there
are many other factors which could explain the greater gender inequalities
in the more decentralised countries. These factors include occupational
and industry concentration of female jobs, cultural factors and different
legislative provisions on sex discrimination'. [39]
9.53 One aspect of economic performance not examined by the Department's
submission is wage dispersion. In his submission to the Committee, Raymond
Harbridge, Associate Professor of the Industrial Relations Centre at the
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, provided evidence of the
effect of New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act 1991. His data
shows a very wide wage dispersion within the collective bargaining sector.
The OECD's Employment Outlook 1996 finds that real wages for low-paid
men in New Zealand (those in the first decile) are over 10% lower than
they were a decade ago. [40]
9.54 Australia has also experienced increasing wage dispersion (noted
in the same OECD report), although not of the same magnitude as in New
Zealand. Recent figures show that this trend is continuing. Employees
in the private sector gained average annualised wage increases of 5.1%
through enterprise bargaining in the March 1996 quarter. This contrasts
with an increase of only 3.7% in average weekly ordinary time earnings
economy wide. [41]
Conclusions
9.55 Much material was put to the Committee about the possible effects
of the Bill on the Australian economy. The viewpoints expressed were
as disparate and varied as the number of people willing to express them.
In addition, much material has been referred to about economic performance
both here and abroad. Again, the extent of disagreement among the commentators
makes drawing a definite conclusion very difficult in this context.
9.56 One thing is however apparent. There is no conclusive evidence
to suggest that the Bill will provide a basis for better economic performance
than that which has been achieved under the existing system. In this
regard, the Committee was impressed at the site visits conducted during
these hearings where real demonstrations exemplified what could be achieved
within the existing system and involving a co-operative approach between
employers, unions and employees.
9.57 What is clear is that our system, which provides reasonable and
appropriate protection for the living standards of working Australians,
is not inconsistent with solid economic performance. Fairness and efficiency
can go hand in hand.
9.58 Statements to the effect that 'the system this Bill seeks to reform
has helped contribute to a long term decline in workers living standards
in Australia, relative to those in many other countries, while contributing
to our unacceptably high level of unemployment' by Minister Reith have
not been verified by the evidence.
9.59 Government Members of the Committee disagree with the above
conclusions.
FIGURE 1
Trends in labour productivity, Australia and New Zealand, 1988-1995
[see paragraph 9.24]
Source: Department of Industrial Relations, submission 1016 p96, drawing
on ABS catalogue no. 5206.0 and Reserve Bank of New Zealand
FIGURE 2
Real disposable income indexes for fulltime wage and salary earners:
New Zealand, 1981-1994 [see paragraph 9.30]
source: Australian Council of Trade Unions and Australian Council of
Social Service, Report of the Study Program on Structural Adjustment
and Social Change: Stage 1 - New Zealand, January 1996, p17; New
Zealand Statistics, `Labour Market 1994'
FIGURE 3
Increases in real disposable incomes for fulltime workers and beneficiaries:
New Zealand, 1984-1993 [see paragraph 9.30]
source: Australian Council of Trade Unions and Australian Council of
Social Service, Report of the Study Program on Structural Adjustment
and Social Change: Stage 1 - New Zealand, January 1996, p24
Footnotes
[1] Changes in real productivity will naturally
influence unit labour costs, depending on how wages move in response
to the changes.
[2] Submission No. 441, p. 1592, H.R. Nicholls
Society.
[3] Submission No. 905 p. 3387, Australian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
[4] Isaac J.E., Small Business and Industrial
Relations: Some Policy Issues, Industrial Relations Research Series
No. 8, University of Melbourne, July 1993, p. xiv.
[5] Evidence p. E 633, Dr R. Green.
[6] Economic Planning and Advisory Commission,
Future labour market issues for Australia, Commission paper no.
12, Canberra, July 1996, p. 26.
[7] Economic Planning and Advisory Commission,
The Changing Australian Labour Market, Commission paper no. 11,
Canberra, March 1996, p. 61.
[8] Green R., `Productivity: Current Trends
and Prospects', ACIRRT working paper no. 40, University of Sydney,
April 1996, p. 29.
[9] For example, Cadbury's Hobart factory:
site visit 8 July 1996.
[10] Submission No. 1016, pp. 92ff, Department
of Industrial Relations.
[11] Submission No. 1016, pp. 92ff, Department
of Industrial Relations.
[12] Submission No. 1016, p. 96, Department
of Industrial Relations.
[13] Australian Council of Trade Unions and
Australian Council of Social Service, Report of the Study Program
on Structural Adjustment and Social Change: Stage 1: New Zealand,
1996, pp. ii, 18.
[14] Australian Council of Trade Unions and
Australian Council of Social Service, Report of the Study Program
on Structural Adjustment and Social Change: Stage 1: New Zealand,
1996, p. 17.
[15] Submission No. 1016, p. 109, Department
of Industrial Relations, quoting an OECD economic survey of New Zealand,
June 1996.
[16] Australian Council of Trade Unions and
Australian Council of Social Service, Report of the Study Program
on Structural Adjustment and Social Change: Stage 1: New Zealand,
1996.
[17] R. Harbridge and M. Street, New Zealand
Journal of Industrial Relations 20(1)24, quoted in Australian Council
of Trade Unions and Australian Council of Social Service, Report
of the Study Program on Structural Adjustment and Social Change: Stage
1: New Zealand, 1996, Appendix 9.
[18] Submission No. 1016, p. 83, Department
of Industrial Relations.
[19] Australian Council of Trade Unions and
Australian Council of Social Service, Report of the Study Program
on Structural Adjustment and Social Change: Stage 1: New Zealand,
1996, appendix 9, p. 2 quoting Wilson, New Zealand Journal of Industrial
Relations 19(3)269-270.
[20] `Centralisation' is defined as `the
extent of inter-union and inter-employer co-operation in wage bargaining
with the other side'. Economic Planning and Advisory Commission, Wage
Bargaining Systems and Productivity Growth in OECD Countries, background
paper No. 26, 1993, pp. 14, 29.
[21] Economic Planning and Advisory Commission,
Wage Bargaining Systems and Productivity Growth in OECD Countries,
background paper No. 26, 1993.
[22] Evidence p.E 622, Dr R. Green.
[23] Evidence p.E 624, Dr R. Green.
[24] Evidence, p. E 192, N. Evans (H.R. Nicholls
Society).
[25] `The `new labour economics' thus suggests
that the presence of institutional factors such as collective bargaining
or minimum wage legislation is not necessary for wages to be above the
market-clearing level.' Economic Planning and Advisory Commission, Future
Labour Market Issues for Australia, Commission paper No. 12, July
1996, p. 4.
[26] Evidence p. E 1416ff, 1451ff.
[27] Submission No. 1016, p. 102-3, Department
of Industrial Relations.
[28] Submission No. 1017, p. 127-8, Australian
Council of Trade Unions.
[29] Economic Planning and Advisory Commission,
Future Labour Market Issues for Australia, Commission paper No.
12, July 1996, p. 112.
[30] Submission No. 1017, pp. 128-9, Australian
Council of Trade Unions.
[31] Australian Council of Trade Unions and
Australian Council of Social Service, Report of the Study Program
on Structural Adjustment and Social Change: Stage 1: New Zealand,
1996, p. 6.
[32] Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Employment Outlook, Paris, July 1996, p. 94;
see also pp. 69, 98.
[33] Evidence, p. E 636, Dr R. Green.
[34] Evidence, p. E 1361, N. Cusworth (Chamber
of Commerce and Industry of WA).
[35] Evidence, p. E 172, L. Hubbard (Victorian
Trades Hall Council).
[36] Evidence, p. E 313, T. Abey (Tasmanian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry).
[37] Bray, Mark, 'Decentralised Bargaining
in North America and Japan', p.93, in Peetz, Preston and Docherty (eds),
Workplace Bargaining in the International Context, Department
of Industrial Relations, Canberra, 1993.
[38] Archer, Robin, 'Lessons from Northern
Europe: Collective Bargaining and Economic Performance in Britain, Germany
and Sweden' in Peetz, Preston and Docherty (eds), Workplace Bargaining
in the International Context, p. 165-166 and pp. 177-178, Department
of Industrial Relations, Canberra, 1993.
[39] Submission No. 1016, p. 106-107, Department
of Industrial Relations.
[40] Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), Employment Outlook, July 1996, p. 63.
[41] Department of Industrial Relations, Wage
Trends in Enterprise Bargaining, Canberra 1996.
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