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The executive government
The core of the
executive government is the Cabinet, though in fact the Cabinet has no legal
power and its existence is not mentioned in the constitutions of any of the
four countries. It holds power because it is a committee, chaired by the prime
minister or premier, of ministers who collectively control the party or parties
which have the confidence of the lower house, and can usually be sure of the
passage through that house of any legislation it wants. Constitutionally,
Cabinet exercises its power through the Privy Council (called the Executive
Council in Australia
and New Zealand
and the Canadian provinces) which does the bidding of the Cabinet. It exercises
its policy and administrative power through ministers (not all of whom are
necessarily in the Cabinet) who collectively control all the machinery of
government administration and who must obey Cabinet decisions or lose office.
Cabinets also have such specific power over legislation as Parliament grants to
the Executive or Privy Council, typically covering such matters as when or
whether to proclaim an act passed by the parliament, or granting power to make
delegated legislation.
Cabinet has control over all
government bills, which must be approved either by the full Cabinet or by a
Cabinet committee delegated the necessary power. In the smaller parliaments,
where party discipline and involvement tend to be tighter, the outline of a
bill is usually considered by a government party committee and approved by the
full parliamentary party before being introduced into the parliament. In these
parliaments one might say that, as far as legislation is concerned, there is
party government rather than Cabinet government.
Even when the government
parliamentary party has no formal control over Cabinet actions, prudent prime
ministers or premiers will always consider carefully the views of their
supporters. Mrs Thatcher
has said that she would have acted more decisively to cut government
expenditure but for the fear of Conservative backbencher dissent.
There are other aspects of the
executive government which must be considered. How many ministers should there
be? How should they be selected and removed? What are their obligations? Is it
desirable that they must be members
of one of the houses of parliament? Can
the executive government bypass the
parliament in matters of defence and foreign affairs? Finally, there is the matter of the appointment of judges. There
is supposed to be a separation of powers, but in fact judges are appointed by
politicians.
The Privy or
Executive councils, the legal source of the Cabinet’s power, are established in
various ways. The Canadian
Constitution Act of 1867 states that the executive government and authority of
and in Canada
are vested in the Queen, and delegated to the Governor-General. There is also a Privy Council for Canada,
to aid and advise the Governor-General in the government of Canada.
The Canadian Privy Council usually has more than a hundred members. It is not
only composed of current ministers but, as Privy Councillors are appointed for
life, it also includes all former Cabinet ministers. There are also some
special appointments such as the provincial premiers appointed in 1967 as part
of the centennial celebrations. Such a body would obviously be unworkable, so
it almost never meets. The decisions of Cabinet are regarded as decisions of
the Privy Council. If the Privy Council does meet-and it has met only three
times since 1945-it is for ceremonial purposes. The first of the three meetings
was to receive the King’s approval in 1947 of the marriage of his daughter Elizabeth,
and the other two, in 1957 and 1959, were chaired by the Queen.
The Australian Constitution
similarly provides that the executive power is exercised by the
Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and that there is to be a
Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General. The Constitution
further provides that the Governor-General, with the advice of the Executive
Council, decides the number of government departments, appoints and removes the
bureaucracy, and appoints judges to the Commonwealth courts.
New
Zealand has had an Executive Council since
1841, fifteen years before responsible government. The Council was set up by
the Governor using his prerogative powers. It was not mentioned in the New
Zealand Constitution Act of 1852 nor, except in passing, in its modern
replacement, the Constitution Act of 1986.
The Executive Councils of Australia
and New Zealand
are usually presided over by the Governor-General. An official deputy is
appointed, always a minister. In Australia
all ministers, assistant ministers and parliamentary secretaries are made
members of the Executive Council, and once appointed remain members for life.
In New Zealand
membership is limited to those who are ‘for the time being Our responsible
advisers’, that is ministers. Meetings of these Executive Councils are a
formality. They are organised by the prime minister’s public servants and may,
with the prior approval of the Governor-General, be held in his or her absence.
The quorum is three.
The situation is even easier with
the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
The Cabinet is regarded as a committee of the Privy Council, so separate
meetings of that body are unnecessary. Since it is impotent as a body,
membership of the Privy Council is generously bestowed. There are now more than
250 Privy Councillors, who serve during the life of the Sovereign who appoints
them, and for six months after. All Cabinet ministers and all appeal judges are
members. The judicial committee of the Privy Council consists of those
councillors who are judges, and hears appeals from certain Courts, including
Courts in the colonies. The judicial committee no longer hears appeals from Canada
or Australia.
The Privy Council includes some Commonwealth politicians, to whom the only
benefit has been the use of the prefix ‘Right Honourable’.
Prime ministers,
although technically only the chairmen of the Cabinets and first among equals,
have enormous power if they choose to use it. They have to hold the various
factions of their parties in balance, or at least neutralised, while at the
same time trying to organise things so that the next election can be won, and
possibly to move the affairs of the nation in a desirable direction. They
decide who will be in the ministry, they dismiss ministers they do not want,[28] their policy decisions prevail while
they maintain dominance of Cabinet, and they have enormous powers of patronage,
such as honours, awards, political promotions and government appointments.
Skilful selection of a particular person for a key job is a great source of
prime ministerial influence on policy. The view is widely held that it was the
failure of Edward Heath
to use his patronage effectively that cost him the leadership of the
Conservative Party.
A prime minister usually has his own
department, with some expertise in all fields, and the Cabinet administrations
report to him too. Whether a prime minister uses his power ruthlessly, or
instead tries to be a conciliator and consensus-seeker, depends on his
personality. Whatever their personal preference, no prime minister (or leader
of the opposition) can escape from a presidential role during an election
campaign. The media now focus on the party leaders to an extraordinary extent,
and if attempts are made to bring forward other ministers or shadow ministers
during election campaigns, they are usually virtually ignored, unless one of
them makes a gaffe. As far as the public is concerned, the prime minister is
almost the only figure in the government’s election campaign.
But a prime minister’s power is not
unlimited. As Norman St
John-Stevas wrote, ‘when things go well the
prime minister can use his personal powers although he does not need to, when
they go badly he needs to use them but they can no longer be invoked.’[29] Harold
Wilson expressed it differently. ‘The prime
minister’s task is to get a consensus of Cabinet’, he wrote, ‘or he cannot
reasonably ask for loyalty and collective responsibility.’[30] Moreover, ministers have their own
departments, with a great deal of expertise in their own fields-usually more
than is available to the prime minister-and they may be getting advice which
suggests that the prime minister’s wishes are unwise or unworkable. If a
minister is resisting a prime minister’s wishes, the prime minister’s only
weapon is to bring the matter before Cabinet or a Cabinet committee but, as St
John-Stevas pointed out, it is by no means
certain that the prime minister’s wishes will prevail. If that happens, the
only remaining option for the prime minister, if he still wants to have his
way, is removal of the minister, which may be very damaging politically.
Besides, the minister’s replacement may accept the same departmental advice.
If a prime minister wishes to have a
major reshuffle of the ministry, the usual method is to ask all ministers for
their resignations. Reshuffles can be used to shift poor performers to less
important portfolios, or to promote the better-performing ministers. In those
parties where the selection of ministers is left to the prime minister, a
reshuffle can be used to promote promising backbenchers, or to put unsatisfactory
ministers (or ministers the prime minister finds incompatible) out to pasture
on the backbench. Of course the prime minister again has to consider the likely
reaction of his party. Even the strongest prime minister cannot always do
exactly what he or she would wish.
Whether dictatorial or not, prime
ministers have to keep the confidence of their Cabinets, because if they are
disaffected the poison soon spreads to the party as a whole. The only antidote
is electoral success, but if that seems to be in doubt a coup is almost
certain. The manoeuvrings that removed John
Gorton in Australia
in 1971, David Lange
in New Zealand
in 1989 and Margaret Thatcher
in the UK in
1990 all originated in the Cabinet. Perhaps the most dramatic error of
judgement occurred in Queensland
in 1987 when the National Party government was in disarray as a result of the
revelations of a royal commission into corruption. Premier Bjelke-Petersen
dismissed three ministers for disloyalty, but this provoked a party revolt in
which Bjelke-Petersen lost the leadership. The National Party, still in
disarray, lost the 1989 election.
The number of
ministers is usually at the discretion of the prime minister or premier, but he
operates under several constraints. The
size of the ministry must be sufficient to
appease the political ambitions of the government party members. There must be
room, where necessary, for upper house ministers and ministers representing regions. There must be sufficient
ministers to provide adequate political supervision of the bureaucracy in a
world where the reach of government seems to be steadily increasing. On the other hand the ministry must
not be embarrassingly large. This is a problem in tiny states or provinces such
as Tasmania (population
459 659) and Prince Edward Island
(population 137 800). In Tasmania, in 1990, the government party had
thirteen members, of whom one was premier and eight others were ministers, and
after providing a Speaker, a chairman of committees and a whip, there was only
one backbencher to be whipped. A
somewhat similar problem arose with the Army of Oz which, according to L.
Frank Baum,
had four generals, four colonels, four majors, four captains and only one
private.[31]
A
further constraint on a prime
minister or premier is that the administrative structure of government is not
easy to change. Setting up new departments is expensive, with many additional
high-level bureaucrats to be provided, while
reductions produce surplus bureaucrats who
may have security of tenure. Reorganisation of the existing structure of
departments tends to be slow and cumbersome, with a plethora of
inter-departmental committees to
resolve demarcation disputes. Finally,
an incoming prime minister or premier may
have to take into account election promises made about the structure of
government. The result of the pressures is that the size of the ministry has
been steadily increasing in all of the four countries we are considering. In
sixteen of the twenty parliaments, all ministers are members of the Cabinet. In
the four national parliaments the sheer number of ministers is felt to make
this impractical, for a Cabinet of more than twenty or so members is clumsy and
inefficient, though Canada
put up with this until recently, and Australia
did for three years when Whitlam was prime minister.
United Kingdom
In 1901 there
were twenty ministers in the UK Cabinet, and 27 other ministers not in the
Cabinet. Nearly half the ministers, including the prime minister, were peers.
By 1946 the number of ministers was 67, though now less than a quarter were
peers, and by 2000 the ministry had
grown to 87, including only fourteen peers, all non-hereditary. Over the years,
except in the special circumstances of
the two World Wars, the size of the Cabinet has remained relatively stable,
ranging between eighteen and 22.
In the Blair Government the 22
Cabinet ministers are mostly designated as secretaries of state, though there
are exceptions-the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Chancellor, President of
the Council, Lord Privy Seal, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Treasury (chief whip) and Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and
there is also one minister. Two of the Cabinet ministers are peers, although
neither is hereditary.
The great ministerial growth has
been in the number of non-Cabinet ministers, usually described either as
ministers of state or parliamentary under secretaries of state. The dilemma is
that effective administration not only requires that the size of Cabinet be restrained but also that all major
areas of government administration be represented there. In the UK,
non-Cabinet ministers may attend Cabinet when business specifically concerning their departments is concerned, but that is not the same as having an
influence on general policy. There
were attempts to solve this problem by making a Cabinet minister responsible
for several ministers outside the Cabinet, but there were difficulties over
which minister was responsible to the Commons, and doubts about whether the
Cabinet ministers concerned would have the necessary information to do their
jobs effectively.
Such an ‘overlord’ system was
introduced by Winston Churchill
in 1951, but it was not liked by the Commons, particularly as all three
overlords were peers. It lapsed in 1953. An informal system of co-ordination of
non-Cabinet ministers by selected
Cabinet ministers worked rather better, but the eventual answer was to create
monster departments, each under a Cabinet minister, who may have the assistance
of as many as four ministers of state, and one or more parliamentary under secretaries. With such large organisations there
must be mini-Cabinet meetings of the ministers concerned, and the usefulness of a minister of state depends on the extent to which the Commons
and other outside interests are prepared to accept a junior minister rather
than insisting on dealing only with the Cabinet minister.
In
1901 there were seventeen ministers in the Canadian Cabinet, with three other
ministers not in the Cabinet. The number of ministers had not increased by
1946, but rose steadily after that, reaching 39 by the 1990s, all in the
Cabinet. Prime Minister Mulroney made some attempt to stem the flood, reducing
the number to 35 in 1993, and his successor, Kim Campbell, made even bigger
changes later in the same year (with an election pending) reducing the number
of ministers to 25. The Liberals overwhelmingly won the election in October
1993, and the new prime minister, Jean
Chrtien, took the radical step of adopting
the ministerial system widely used elsewhere, with 22 ministers in Cabinet and
eight secretaries of state who were part of the ministry, but not members of
Cabinet. But even Chrtien could not hold the numbers down, and two years later
they had increased to 25 Cabinet ministers and nine secretaries of state. Canada
also uses parliamentary secretaries extensively, there normally being about 30 of
them, and the prime minister rotates these positions among the backbenchers in
order to give them a chance to show their quality. parliamentary secretaries may respond during question time, and
may sometimes attend meetings of Cabinet committees.
In
the first Australian Federal Parliament in 1901 there were seven ministers
(intended to be one from each state, plus a prime minister) as provided in the Constitution. The Parliament has to authorise
any increase, but has never made any real difficulty, though sometimes the
prime minister has been reluctant to ask. When Alfred
Deakin was prime minister in 1909 he had seven colleagues in a
coalition ministry, so he did not
hold a ministry himself. As prime minister
he survived on a backbencher’s pay supplemented
by voluntary contributions from other ministers (and on the salary he received as the anonymous Australian
correspondent for the London Morning Post). Not all prime ministers
have been so modest, and the number of ministers rose to nineteen in 1946 and 29
in 2000. There were also twelve parliamentary secretaries in the latter year. The number of ministers, as a
proportion of the membership of the House of Representatives, has doubled since the First Parliament.
Since
1956 there has been a Cabinet of between eleven and eighteen members, except
for the Whitlam years of 1972 to 1975, when all 27 ministers were in the
Cabinet. A massive and rather clumsy reorganisation in 1987 reduced the number
of government departments from 28 to eighteen, of which sixteen were major
departments and the other two were minor ones, retained for political reasons.
(One of the minor ministries is Veterans’ Affairs. Logically it should be part
of Social Security, but the veterans would be deeply offended.) In the 2000 Howard
ministry all the seventeen ministers responsible for major departments are in
the Cabinet, and they are assisted by junior ministers, outside the Cabinet,
who are responsible for designated areas of their responsibility. For instance,
the Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (a Cabinet
minister) is assisted by the Minister for the Arts. These junior ministers are
accountable within their specific responsibilities, and answer questions on
them. There are also twelve parliamentary secretaries, eleven of them assigned
to Cabinet ministers. The other one is parliamentary secretary to the Cabinet.
Australia
has had the smallest ministry of modern times. After Labor won the December
1972 election, there was a delay in announcing the final result while late
votes were counted and preferences distributed, so there could be no immediate
meeting of the Parliamentary Labor Party. In the meantime Gough
Whitlam and his deputy Lance
Barnard were sworn in as a two-man ministry,
sharing 27 portfolios. This is not however the smallest recorded ministry.
After King William IV
dismissed Lord Melbourne in
1834, the Duke of Wellington formed a one-man ministry which lasted for three
weeks until Peel, the prime minister-designate, returned from a Continental
holiday.
New
Zealand has followed the same pattern as the
other national parliaments. Eight ministers in 1901, thirteen in 1946 and 25 in
1999. New
Zealand has also adopted the idea of a
Cabinet (twenty members after the 1999 election) with five additional ministers
outside the Cabinet, as well as one parliamentary under secretary.
The selection of
the ministry is normally in the hands of the prime minister or premier, but
here again he operates under constraints. If the government is a coalition-as
all the non-Labor governments have been in federal Australia since the Second
World War, for instance-there will have to be negotiations to decide how many
ministers the junior coalition partner will provide, and what ministries are to
be available to it. The leader of
the junior coalition partner will usually
insist on deciding which members of his or her party will be ministers.
Of course prime ministers and
premiers will be looking to select as ministers those with the most ability or
promise, but they must reward their close supporters, for otherwise these
people are liable to become their bitterest enemies. They must also recognise
that their party will inevitably be divided into factions, whether formal or
not, and it may not be wise to exclude a faction from the ministry, for it may
create frustration and divisiveness. They must also consider whether their
rivals are better kept in the Cabinet, where their disruptive activities may be
constrained by the discipline of Cabinet solidarity, or given the freedom of
the backbenches. The problem was well illustrated by an alleged remark of President
Lyndon Johnson,
who had a rather earthy turn of phrase. He was asked why he did not dismiss the
head of the FBI, J. Edgar
Hoover. ‘I would much rather have that man
inside my tent,’ replied Johnson, ‘pissing out, than outside
pissing in.’
In
the Canadian and Australian federations prime ministers must try to see that all states or provinces are represented, for
otherwise there will be strong local reactions. They must also see that there
are sufficient women in the ministry, or there will be criticism from women’s
groups. Fortunately the increasing number of highly talented women in the
various parliaments makes it likely
they will get there on merit rather than as mere tokenism. Finally, in nearly
all of the bicameral parliaments a prime minister or premier must select sufficient ministers from
the upper house, for most of the surviving upper houses have successfully
maintained that there must be enough ministers in those houses to reward the political efforts of
their members, to increase the pool of available ministerial talent, to answer
questions and to handle government legislation. Whether these reasons are still valid will be discussed later.
A
prime minister may of course consult anyone he chooses. The deputy prime minister would normally be consulted, though not
perhaps when Mrs Thatcher
was the prime minister and Sir Geoffrey
Howe her deputy. In the United Kingdom,
but not in the other countries, the chief whip has an influence, particularly
on the selection of junior ministers.
Then there may be important support-groups outside the Parliament who have
favourites.
It
is all very delicate and complex and, despite the enormous power and patronage
it gives to prime ministers, some of them must look with envy at parliaments
where the government party does the job itself. Although the leaders would have
to live with the results, they might think that at least they would be spared
the trouble, and the blame. There are eight parliaments in which one or both of
the major parliamentary parties elects its ministry. These parliaments are the
New Zealand House of Representatives and
the seven parliaments in Australia-the
federal Parliament and those of the six states. In most of them the Parliamentary Labour (or Labor) Party elects the ministry by
exhaustive ballot, but in Canberra
and in some of the states there are formal factions.
In Canberra, for instance, the 1990 Labor election victory resulted in the 110 Labor MPs and
senators being split four ways-48 right-wing faction, 31
left-wing, 21 centre-left and ten unaligned. No faction had a majority, which
created opportunities for some complex deals. The first task for the faction
leaders after a winning election is
to divide the ministerial spoils between the factions, and then put forward
their nominations for the places. There may be some negotiation with the prime
minister at this stage, if the balance of the ministry is wrong: too few
senators, perhaps, or not enough women, or no one from a particular state. The faction leaders sometimes agree to let a non-aligned
member in, but they certainly have more difficulty in gaining preferment. There
may also be problems if there is an imbalance of talent between the factions. One right-wing backbencher said that
as far as he could see the only way he could be made a minister was either to
join the left-wing faction or to become a woman, and he was so keen to become a
minister he was seriously considering the surgical operation. He later became a
minister, still a right-winger.
The results of the negotiations
between the faction leaders are rubber-stamped by the Parliamentary Labor
Party, the Caucus. After the
surprise Labor win in the 1993 election, the Caucus effectively gave Prime
Minister Keating the power to choose his own
ministry. Parliamentary secretaries
are chosen by the prime minister.
When
in opposition in the UK
the Parliamentary Labour Party elects
eighteen members of the Shadow Cabinet, and participates in the election of the
Leader. At least four of the elected candidates must be women. The nineteen
elected members of the Shadow Cabinet must,
under the rules of the parliamentary party, form the basis of an incoming
Labour Cabinet, provided they have retained their seats at the General
Election, but otherwise ministers are chosen by the prime minister.
In
Canada there is
a long tradition of having ‘regional’ ministers, though what makes a region is
not clearly defined. Sometimes it has meant a province, sometimes a group of
provinces-the prairies or the Atlantic, for instance-and
sometimes just part of a province such as Ontario
or Quebec. The ministers have a
portfolio responsibility, the regional responsibility being informal but
sometimes very effective. In the past regional ministers have, at different
times, been responsible in their regions for dispensing patronage, for the
party organisations, and for influencing government expenditure and
departmental programs. The Quebec
regional minister (the Quebec
lieutenant as he is usually called) is particularly important. In recent years
in both the Liberal and Conservative governments the regional ministers have
become the dominant members of the provincial caucuses, the party meetings of
the MPs from each province. In addition to fighting for the interests of his
region, both within Cabinet and directly with departments, a regional minister
is expected to explain federal decisions to his region and to try to soothe any
complaints.
Of course sometimes prime ministers
or premiers look beyond their own party or established coalition. If a major
party is in a minority but is trying to form a government, the offer of a
ministry to a minor party may be an effective bait. Sometimes it can be used to
induce a defection. In Queensland
the National and Liberal parties had long been in coalition in government, but
the coalition broke up just before the 1983 election, at which the National
Party won 38.9 per cent of the vote and half of the 82 seats. The National
Party premier, Sir Joh
Bjelke-Petersen, offered two Liberal
ex-ministers a return to the ministry if they would join the National Party.
They did, and Bjelke-Petersen had his majority. (Both the Liberal renegades
later went to jail for misuse of their ministerial allowances.)
There was a somewhat similar event
in Newfoundland in 1971. After
the election a coalition of Conservatives and the New Labrador party commanded 22
votes in the 42-member Assembly. Fifteen coalition members were made ministers
and one was made Speaker, but two of the six members excluded from office
deserted the coalition and joined the opposition Liberals, giving them a
majority and themselves ministries.
In the early days of a hung
parliament, it is usually fairly easy for a minority government to reach some
sort of accommodation with those holding the balance of power, for a very early
election would focus attention on the major parties at the expense of the minor
parties and Independents, who would tend to be blamed for the instability. As
time passes, this fear declines.
In all the parliaments, no matter
what the method of selection of the ministry, the prime ministers or premiers
allocate the portfolios. They may of course consult, they may have inner
circles, and they may be under various pressures, but ultimately the decisions
are theirs. The only ministerial post traditionally requiring a professional
qualification is that of Attorney-General, who usually has to be a qualified
lawyer, though this rule has been sometimes broken in the states and provinces.
When the first Labor government was formed in the Australian Parliament in 1904
there were no lawyers in the Parliamentary Labor Party, so one was borrowed
from the Liberals to be Attorney-General. In New
Zealand, Labour Prime
Minister George Forbes,
who had no legal qualifications, doubled as Attorney-General between 1933 and
1935. There is no shortage of lawyers in the major political parties these
days.
A minister must
be a member of one of the houses of parliament. In the UK
there is no legal requirement that a minister should be in either the Lords or
Commons, but current political reality makes it inconceivable that any minister
could long remain outside Parliament. Besides, a British prime minister has had
a life peerage in his gift.
In Canada,
and in the provinces, there is no constitutional requirement for a minister to
be or become a member of one of the houses, but it is felt to be a political
necessity. There have been 75 instances in Ottawa
when ministers were appointed who were not at the time members of either house.
Four subsequently became members of the Senate and the remainder stood for the
House of Commons. Not all were successful. General A.G.L. McNaughton
was Minister of National Defence for nine months in 1954-55, and stood for
election twice, losing both times. He then resigned as a minister. The Canadian
prime minister has the useful weapon of usually being able to create a vacancy
by offering a compliant government party MP in a safe seat the chance to become
a senator, but supposedly safe seats are sometimes lost in by-elections.
In Australia
the Constitution provides that no minister of state can hold office for more
than three months without being or becoming a senator or member of the House of
Representatives. In the states of South Australia,
Tasmania and Victoria
the constitutions provide that ministers must be members of one of the houses.
There is no formal requirement in the other states, except in Western
Australia, where there must be at least one minister
in the upper house.
The New Zealand Constitution Act of
1986 provides that no one can be appointed a minister or member of the
Executive Council unless that person is a member of Parliament, but there is
provision for someone to be appointed as a minister if that person was a
candidate at the general election, and the minister is then given 40 days to
become an MP. The reason for these arrangements is that the writs may not be
returned for two weeks after an election and until the writs are returned there
are no MPs. The Act also provides that ministers must vacate office within 21 days
of ceasing to be MPs.
It should be noted that the
requirement that a minister must be a member of one of the houses of parliament
does not apply in many of the other countries which have responsible government
but not the Westminster system. In
the Netherlands,
for instance, usually between a third and a half of the ministers are appointed
from the Parliament, the remainder being specialists in the work of the
ministry to which they are appointed, often civil servants or university professors.
The prime minister is traditionally chosen from the parliamentarians, though
there is no constitutional requirement for this to be so. The ministers answer
questions and speak to their bills in both houses of Parliament, though they
may not vote or move motions in either house. This widening of the ministerial
pool is a very sensible arrangement which should be seriously considered by
other countries with responsible government.
Looking at the European Union
countries, the ministers who are chosen from the parliaments in the Netherlands,
Sweden and Luxembourg
must resign from the Parliament on appointment as a minister. This is workable
in parliaments which use proportional representation, but in countries which
use single member constituencies the by-elections could be very embarrassing
for a newly-installed government, and might even cost its majority in the lower
house.
Although there is no constitutional
provision in the UK,
Canada or Australia
to prevent a prime minister being in the upper house, it is now inconceivable. Prime
ministers in the House of Lords were common in the nineteenth century, and
upper house prime ministers were not unknown in Canada
and New Zealand.
The last prime minister to be in the House of Lords was Lord Salisbury, who
retired in 1902. There was some thought that Lord Curzon might become prime
minister in 1923, but King George V chose Stanley Baldwin instead. As late as
1940 Lord Halifax was seen by
some as an alternative to Winston
Churchill. That era is now past, although
since 1963 hereditary peers have been able to renounce their titles and status
for life, and to stand for the House of Commons. Lord Home used this avenue to
become prime minister in 1963.
Australia
is a curious exception to the rule that a prime minister must be in the lower
house, though only in a minor way. When Prime Minister Holt
was drowned in December 1967, the Liberal Party chose Senator Gorton
as its new leader, and therefore automatically Prime Minister. Gorton’s
selection was possible because the death of Holt created a
vacancy in a safe Liberal seat in the House of Representatives. Gorton
was prime minister as a senator for three weeks until he resigned to contest
the by-election. Parliament did not meet during this period.
The only other upper house prime
minister this century was in New Zealand
in 1925, but he lasted for only sixteen days.
One would have thought that it was
also well established that the principal economic and finance minister,
variously called the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Finance Minister or
Treasurer, must be in the lower house, because in all the parliaments it is in
the lower house that financial legislation must be initiated. New
South Wales has broken this rule, and under the Carr
Labor Government the Treasurer is in the upper house, an institution he affects
to despise.
One method prime
ministers may use to tighten their control of Cabinet is to set up formal
Cabinet committees, and to chair such of them as they choose. Margaret Thatcher
was not a great believer in formal committees, and often took key decisions
after consultation with a small group of ‘true believers’, and their decision
was imposed on the Cabinet or Cabinet committees. A Cabinet colleague, Francis
Pym, records a typical event:
The 1981 budget was rigidly deflationary and thus highly
controversial at a time of deep recession, yet the strategy behind it was never
discussed in Cabinet and was only revealed to the full Cabinet on budget day
itself. One can guess the reason: the Chancellor and the prime minister
concluded that the Cabinet might well insist on some changes. But that is why
the Cabinet exists-to make collective decisions on important issues that face
individual Departments, and thus affect the government as a whole. Collective
responsibility is based on collective decision-making. Margaret
Thatcher is not the first prime minister to
circumvent her colleagues, nor will she be the last, but this habit is not the
sign of a happy or healthy government.[32]
Such concealment of the details of
the budget from most of the Cabinet until the last possible moment is practised
in virtually all the parliaments, though ministers are usually involved in
earlier steps-the review of proposed expenditure being the most important
one-which contribute to the preparation of the budget. budget secrecy is far
from new. It is claimed that it began when Gladstone
was Chancellor of the Exchequer under Palmerston. The two were
always quarrelling, and Gladstone
held his budgets back until the last moment so as to prevent Palmerston
from persuading the Cabinet to alter them.
Under Blair, in
2000, there were eighteen Cabinet committees and thirteen sub-committees. These
committees are a useful way of involving non-Cabinet ministers in the
government administration, but it is important for the prime minister to keep
in touch with what they are doing in key areas. Prime Minister Blair
chaired no less than six of these committees, those on health performance and
expenditure, constitutional reform, defence and overseas policy, Northern
Ireland, the intelligence services, and the
liaison consultative committee with the Liberal Democratic Party.
Until the 1993 election, won by the
Liberals, all the Canadian ministers were in the Cabinet, which had 39 members
under the Mulroney Government, far too many for efficient decision-making.
Cabinet meetings were no more than broad political discussions, and there had
to be a smaller group to supervise the administration. This was the 24-member
priorities and planning committee which was the equivalent of the Cabinets in
the other national parliaments. There were also two small, powerful committees
for ‘operations’ and ‘expenditure review’.
With
the smaller Cabinets now being used in Canada,
it is appropriate for there to be a number of committees responsible to Cabinet
rather than taking over its role. In the 1997 Liberal government there are four
such committees, on Economic Union, Social Union, Special Committee of Council,
and Treasury Board. None are chaired by the prime minister.
If a minister is unavailable, the
head of his department may attend a Cabinet committee in his place. These
public servants have the unusual but perhaps appropriate title of deputy
minister.
In the 1998 Howard Coalition
Government in Australia
there were five Cabinet committees. In a press statement, Howard
said that he had decided to make more use of the committee process for matters
that did not need to come to the full Cabinet other than for final endorsement.
He said he had also formed a General Administrative committee to free up
Cabinet meetings for major policy decisions.[33]
Three of the committees were to be
chaired by the prime minister-the National Security committee, the Expenditure
Review committee and the Employment and Infrastructure committee. The two
committees which the prime minister permitted others to chair were the Parliamentary
Business committee and the General Administrative committee.
In New
Zealand under the 1999 Labour government
there were nine Cabinet committees and four ad
hoc ones. The prime minister chaired the policy committee, the committee on
‘closing the gaps’ and the appointments and honours committee, as well as the
ad hoc committee on intelligence and security.
Although the
Cabinet can make the broad policy decisions when necessary, the detailed
supervision of administration has to be left to the responsible ministers. The
actual administration is in the hands of public servants (civil servants in the
UK) who are
generally politically neutral in all the countries we are considering, though
of course they have their traditions and their prejudices. As Sir Kenneth
Wheare put it: ‘what is really meant, perhaps, by saying that the official is
not a party man is that he is not a one party man ... he offers his best
services to the party in power, to the government of any party.’[34] Nevertheless the top appointments are
in the hands of the minister, in consultation with the prime minister for
important or controversial ones. There is sometimes a tendency to appoint
individuals, possibly outsiders, who are thought to be sympathetic to the
government’s objectives. This feeling is particularly strong if an incoming
government has spent a long time in opposition.
An alternative approach, sometimes
used in tandem, is for ministers to appoint policy-makers to their personal
staffs. Unfortunately, after a party has spent a prolonged period in
opposition, such individuals tend to be zealots often with no experience or
understanding of public administration. The disastrous administrative
experiences in Australia of the Whitlam Labor Government, which gained office
in 1972 after the Labor Party had been 23 years in opposition, are a
fascinating case study.
Although the loyalty of public
servants to their (temporary) political masters is rarely in question, there is
no doubt that their primary loyalty is to their own service. In the career of a
public servant, the senior public servant in a department is much more
important to his juniors than is the minister. Departments usually have their
own traditions and their own agenda, and their assessment of a minister is
largely based on how successful the minister is in implementing their agenda,
and obtaining the necessary funds from Cabinet. Their agenda will always
include increased power for the department, and almost never the reduction of
staff or the shedding of responsibilities. If the minister has his own
priorities, his ideas will be loyally investigated, but there is nothing so
slow moving as a public servant who thinks the minister is making a mistake.
One reforming minister in the UK
claimed that ‘the greatest danger for a radical minister is to get too much
going in his department. Because, you see, departments are resistant,
departments know they last and you don’t.’[35]
One way of circumventing public
service delays, and at the same time reducing effective accountability to
parliament, is to set up non-departmental agencies. These are used for many
purposes: quasi-judicial functions, such as conciliation and arbitration of
industrial disputes, adjudication of disputes arising out of departmental
administration or disputes over human rights and so on; policy advice;
scientific and cultural activities; and business enterprises, known by many names,
such as nationalised industries and crown corporations. They are usually
statutory bodies-set up by an act of parliament-whereas government departments
are established by order of the Privy or Executive Council. From the point of
view of ministerial responsibility to parliament it would be preferable to keep
all the agencies within the departmental structure, but the desire to remove
some activities from direct political control has led to the proliferation of
non-departmental agencies. There is an extraordinary range of statutory
authorities. They have even been found inside departments, and departmental
public servants have been statutory authorities. The level of official
ministerial control is laid down in the relevant act, and may range from the right
to give general directions or to give directions only in certain specified
matters, to no mention of the matter in the act, or a specific prohibition in
the act against any ministerial intervention. Nevertheless the minister retains
the power of appointment and replacement (subject to the act) and weak
managements are sometimes unnecessarily compliant with ministerial wishes.
Agencies know where their funding comes from, and may tend to pursue
ministerial enemies while neglecting the transgressions of ministerial friends.
Parliamentary control is patchy.
Some non-departmental agencies are not even required by their Act to report to
parliament, and a substantial number of government bodies are neither
departments nor statutory authorities. As Professor
Sawer put it:
legislatures are free to make whatever provision they
choose in statutes establishing and regulating quangos, even to engaging in low
comedy like that of the Queensland parliament, which created a ‘Fish Board’ of
four members and declared it to be a ‘Corporation Sole’.[36]
Parliament does have the power to
demand that any directions given by the minister should be tabled in the
parliament, and to question the agency through the minister. If the agency
receives public funds, questions may be asked during estimates debates and
possibly by the Public Accounts Committee. Select or standing committees may
investigate its activities, or the opposition may raise its problems during
debates. But such supervision is sporadic, and unless there has been a widely publicised
administrative fiasco the minister can usually head off any serious
investigation, with the support of the government party. In general, these
non-departmental agencies are a great source of unsupervised executive power.
Governments sometimes acquire shares
in public companies, usually all shares, sometimes just a controlling majority.
In 1989 the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public
Administration identified 208 government controlled companies, 55 associated
companies, and Commonwealth involvement in 58 companies limited by guarantee
and 67 incorporated associations. Even then, the committee was not sure that it
had identified all the companies in which the government had an interest.
Ministers have substantial power and
patronage at their disposal in making appointments to the boards of such
companies, but their power of direction is limited by the responsibility of the
board under company law. A special case sometimes occurs when a government
business is privatised. Although the government must keep out of the day-to-day
running of the privatised company-otherwise the privatisation would be a
farce-circumstances may well arise when its behaviour needs to be controlled in
the interests of the community, such as when a strategic asset seems likely to
fall under foreign ownership or control, or when a company is contemplating a
change of direction which would have damaging social consequences. A technique
which has been used is for the government to retain a ‘golden share’, whose
terms of issue are set out either in special legislation or in the company’s
articles of association. Typical examples, from United
Kingdom and New
Zealand experience, are the right to
determine the policy of the corporation, and the right to veto changes to the
articles of association. The power to use the golden share rests with the
government. parliament is not consulted.
Defence and
Foreign Affairs are two important areas in which parliament has tamely
acquiesced in the Cabinet continuing to exercise powers which traditionally
were held by the sovereign and Privy Council, but which the development of
responsible government should have rendered obsolete.
Defence
There can be
little doubt that the decision to declare war, or to order military forces to
start fighting, is the most serious a nation can take. Yet the decision is made
by the Executive. Except in Canada,
there is no statutory need for the approval of the legislature. Sometimes, but
by no means always, the legislature is asked to approve the decision, but this
is often after substantial military risks have been taken, and funds committed
far in excess of those voted by parliament.
The Gulf War is a good example. Iraq
occupied Kuwait
on 2 August 1990 and the UN
Security Council promptly imposed sanctions on Iraq,
and later authorised the use of force to implement the sanctions. Britain
sent ground, air and naval forces in support of both objectives, and Mrs
Thatcher refused to rule out the use of
defensive force even if not authorised by the Security Council. The House of
Commons was in summer recess, and it was more than a month before the House met
to consider the matter. This meeting was not initiated by the government, but
was held at the request of the leader of the opposition. The actions of the
government were then overwhelmingly supported. In late November the Security
Council authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’ to force Iraq to withdraw
from Kuwait if it had nor done so by 15 January, and this was debated by the
House twelve days later. The government was again overwhelmingly supported, as
it was in a further debate of 15 January, the day hostilities began. (All three
votes were technically on motions to adjourn the House, but no one was in any
doubt about the real issue.)
Australia
made the decision in August 1990 to commit three ships to the Gulf blockading
force, in advance of the UN Security Council decision. The decision to commit
the naval force was not even made by the Cabinet, it was made by the prime
minister and a few of his Cabinet colleagues. These ships were engaged in
blockade duties almost immediately, and in active war operations from 15
January. On 21 and 22 January Parliament debated the issue, and each house
passed a resolution in favour of the commitment-a week after the fighting
started, though the commencement date had been known for more than six weeks.
The Parliament would not have been recalled even then but for the fact that the
procedures of the Senate allow for its recall at the request of a majority of
senators, and this had been done. Prime Minister Hawke,
not prepared to have the Senate get all the publicity, recalled the House of
Representatives too.
Of course a parliament has other
methods of disciplining a government which is fighting an unwanted war. The
lower house could dismiss the government, or the parliament could refuse to
pass the necessary appropriations or reject bills or regulations concerned with
the war. Party discipline would prevent the former, and although the House of
Lords and the Canadian and Australian Senates could obstruct any legislative actions of the government it is
inconceivable that they would do so in such circumstances, for the victims
would be the country’s servicemen on active duty, obeying government orders.
It is certainly true that parliament
can have no useful role in the control of military operations. This is best
left to a small group, whether called a War Cabinet or not, and the prime
minister must be its leader. The Falklands campaign was
a superb example of such a system working well. But although parliament must
not attempt to interfere in the detailed direction of military operations, it
must insist that an executive government which is responsible to it must seek
its approval before committing the nation to war or putting its armed services
in a position where involvement in war is likely. Of course if a surprise
attack is launched, a Pearl Harbor for example, the government would have to
take the necessary action, but it must also seek parliamentary approval as soon
as practicable. If this is not done, responsible government is meaningless.
Canada
is the only one of the four countries to have taken the appropriate steps. The
National Defence Act authorises the government to commit the armed forces to
active service, and provides that parliament must meet within ten days of this
power being exercised. The Emergencies Act provides that the declaration of an
emergency (a crisis in public welfare or in law and order, or war) is effective
the day it is issued, but a motion to confirm the declaration must be
introduced into each house within seven sitting days, and there are provisions
on the length of the emergency, and provisions that all orders and regulations
made under the Act must be introduced into each house within two days of being
issued.
In the case of the Gulf War, the
government moved a motion in the House of Commons on 24 September 1990, condemning the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait and
supporting the UN measures against it. On 27 November the House of Commons
voted to support armed intervention by UN forces, to which Canada
had made a contribution. On 15 January 1991, the day the ultimatum to Iraq
expired, the House of Commons was recalled to debate a government motion
reaffirming support for armed intervention by the UN force. The Parliament was
thus involved, and gave its prompt approval to every step taken by the
government.
Foreign
Affairs
The executive
government must be responsible for the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs,
but the parliament must be involved if the government enters into long-term
international commitments; this involvement must include the negotiation of the
treaty, with the states or provinces involved if their rights would be
affected, as well as the final ratification of the treaty. There are an increasing number of these international commitments,
on issues such as the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations
conventions on human rights, environmental standards, and trade. Certainly the
government must negotiate and approve the signing of international treaties,
but there is no reason, in administration or logic, why the parliament should not be involved in the negotiation of treaties
and why the ratification of such treaties should not be made by the parliament
rather than the government. This is
not done in any of the four countries. Parliament will of course have to pass
any legislation which is necessary to implement treaties, but treaties often
give substantial power or responsibilities to the government without any
necessity for legislation.
The Australian High Court has held
that as long as there is a bona fide treaty the federal Parliament has the
legislative power to implement that treaty, regardless of the effect on the
powers of the states. Moreover, it used to be held that a treaty does not have
any local effect until it is incorporated by statute, but treaties are having
an increasing effect on the interpretation of local law. In Australia,
for instance, the courts assume that the Parliament will intend to act in
accordance with Australia’s
obligations under international law when it enacts legislation. In the famous Teoh case in 1995 the High Court held
that ratification of a treaty gave rise to the ‘legitimate expectation’ that
the government would act consistently with the terms of the treaty even if
those terms had not been legislated into Australian domestic law.
To avoid this confusion, action
should be taken as a matter of course to pass an Act to bring the wording of a
ratified treaty on such matters as human rights into Australian domestic law.
If Australia is
not prepared to accept the obligations of such a treaty it should not be
ratified in the first place, or if it has been ratified Australia
should withdraw its ratification, or at the least declare some reservations.
By no means all international
agreements are ‘treaties’ subject to ratification. It only applies when a
formal requirement for it is written into the treaty. This is normally done
when a treaty has significant political content or when national legislation
would be needed to implement it.
In the UK
new treaties subject to ratification ‘lie upon the Table’ in each house for 21 days before ratification, though the government
has the discretion to waive this rule if it thinks this desirable. This ‘Ponsonby’ rule began in 1924, was
then abandoned but restored in 1929, and since 1997 explanatory memoranda have
accompanied all treaties that are laid before the Parliament. The explanatory
memorandum describes the contents of the treaty, and then goes on to list the
arguments for and against the UK
becoming party to it.
Ponsonby’s 1924 announcement
included the undertaking that ‘if there is a formal demand for discussion
forwarded through the usual channels from the opposition or any other party,
time will be found for the discussion of the treaty in question.’ If the
opposition front bench does not make such a request, a backbencher may be able
to secure a debate in private members’ time. As a result of these provisions,
some controversial treaties are debated, but many are not, and in any case the
decision on ratification remains with the government, not the Parliament. Some treaties have an express
requirement for parliamentary approval, and these of course cannot be ratified
by the government without such approval, but such treaties are rare.
In
Canada the
provinces are actively involved with the federal government in treaty negotiation
because, under the Canadian Constitution, the provinces have powers with which
the federal government cannot interfere. If a proposed international treaty
deals with such a matter, a provincial official or minister may head the
negotiating delegation. The federal Parliament has no formal rights in treaty
negotiation or ratification, but the practice has developed for the government
to move resolutions in each house to seek approval for ratification of the most
important treaties. Sometimes the resolution includes referral to a committee
and a report from it before the vote on ratification is taken. The committees
most likely to be involved are the Standing Committee on External Affairs and
International Trade and the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development. Committees may also be consulted by a minister during the
negotiating phase. The decisions on ratification, and whether the Parliament
should be consulted at any stage, still rest with the government.
It is also accepted in Canada
that the provinces are able to enter into international agreements of less than
treaty status, usually cultural agreements. Quebec
has entered into several agreements with France,
and the Canadian provinces which border the US
may enter into cultural agreements with their neighbouring states.
In Australia, Prime Minister Menzies
announced in 1961 that the government would present to both houses the texts of
treaties which had been signed, or to which accession was contemplated, but
this promise began to lapse by the late 1970s. Until that time the approval of
the federal Parliament was normally sought for the ratification of treaties
when federal legislation would be needed to implement them, but this too began
to lapse. Treaties began to be tabled in bulk every six months, including many
which had already been signed or ratified. The government began to view the
negotiation and ratification of treaties to be purely an executive function, an
attitude which was clearly expressed by the Labor Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Senator Evans, who said in 1994 that ‘tabling treaties is not
intended to be an exercise in ascertaining Parliament’s views about whether or
not Australia should become a party.’
In 1996 the new coalition government went some of the way to solving the problem,
by setting up a Joint Standing Committee (one with members from each house) to consider the possible effects of
all treaties on state, territory and federal laws, and the method of
implementing the treaties. Treaties must be tabled in Parliament at least
fifteen sitting days before the government takes action, except in cases of
urgency. Fifteen sitting days means an elapsed time of between one and three
months, and the government has agreed that the fifteen sitting days could
probably be increased if really necessary. Each treaty must be accompanied by a
‘National Interest Analysis’, which is similar to an explanatory memorandum,
and describes the impact on Australian citizens, the cost of implementing the
treaty and any necessary changes to Commonwealth or state/territory law. When
tabled in Parliament, the text of proposed treaties and the draft National
Interest Analysis are automatically referred to the Treaties Committee for
review. The committee invites comments from anyone with an interest in the
subject matter of the proposed treaty, and conducts public hearings.
The federal government consults with
state and territory governments during the negotiation of proposed treaties.
There is a Treaties Council (comprising the prime minister, premiers and chief
ministers) and a commonwealth-state-territory Standing Committee on Treaties.
The Treaties Council has met only once, in 1997, and it is said that the
meeting was very brief, being conducted in a lift while the prime minister,
premiers and chief ministers were moving to their lunch room. The Standing
Committee on Treaties, on the other hand, does some useful work, but too many
of the premiers do not see why their parliaments should be involved, and seem
to think that all the power that is needed is to be able to veto the
ratification of a treaty, without having any involvement in its development.
And they are most unlikely ever to be given such a power.
The Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties writes to all state and territory governments seeking their views on treaties
it is considering. The Standing Committee also seeks the views of the state
parliaments, but this has little effect because only Victoria
has a committee dealing with treaties, and without such a committee the request
from the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties is lost among all the other
paperwork.
Although this is a considerable
improvement on what went on before, and the government has occasionally
accepted recommendations of the committee, there are still problems. The
National Interest Analyses need improvement, being made more analytical rather
than simply describing the terms of the proposed treaty. And the state
parliaments need to set up proper arrangements for considering proposed
treaties when they are forwarded to them by the Joint Standing Committee on
treaties.
Except in the case of minority
governments, the government will always have a majority on the Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties, and party discipline being what it is, the majority is
unlikely to make recommendations which would seriously upset the government. In
any case, there is no federal parliamentary vote on the ratification of
treaties, and the input of the states and territories is advisory only. The
federal government still makes the decision on ratification, and may do so
before the treaty has been considered by the Joint Standing Committee.
New
Zealand partly followed the Australian
example in the following year. New Zealand
signs between 30 and 40 treaties a year, and about a third are referred to the
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, accompanied by a National Interest Analysis, modelled on the
similar documents presented to the Australian Parliament. The select committee may refer the treaty to another select
committee if it thinks that is appropriate. The Minister for Foreign Affairs
said in 1998 that ‘the government will not ratify a treaty until the select
committee has reported back to the House [with a copy of the treaty and the
National Interest Analysis], or 35 days have elapsed since the treaty was
tabled.’ But the final decision on
ratification still rests with the government.
It
is true that it is well established, in both legal and constitutional practice
based on the sovereignty of Parliament, that
international agreements, even when ratified, have no internal legal effect unless Parliament has transformed their
provisions into domestic law, but the effects of an international agreement may
nevertheless be enormous. Australia
has an additional problem because of the possible effects of international
agreements on the Commonwealth Constitution. The Constitution divides political
powers between the Commonwealth and
the states, and amendments to the Constitution are supposed to be made only by
national referendum. However, the
High Court has ruled that if the
federal government enters, in good
faith, into an international treaty which obliges it to do certain things
within Australia,
then the federal Parliament is entitled to the necessary power to implement the
treaty even though it is denied that
power by the Constitution. There are limits to this power. Any laws passed by
the parliament under such a power must do no more than give effect to the
treaty or agreement, and must not breach express or implied limitations in the
Constitution. Substantial changes can nevertheless be made, and such amendment
of the Constitution by the government without the formal approval of the Parliament
or the people is a gross anomaly.
Executive
federalism
Another method by
which a government makes laws which effectively bypass the parliament occurs in
the federations of Canada
and Australia.
The Canadians call the system ‘executive federalism’, by which the governments
in Ottawa or Canberra reach an agreement with the governments of the provinces
or states, and then present a bill to the various parliaments with the warning
that the bill must be passed unaltered, otherwise the whole agreement will be
wrecked. Though sometimes muttering darkly, the parliaments agree.
In Australia,
the federal and state parliaments do not even have the chance to consider one
important area of government finance, its borrowing. By a 1927 constitutional
amendment, power over such borrowing was given to a Loan Council made up of the
members of the federal and state governments.
It
can be seen that the various parliaments have yielded, had taken away, or
failed to claim, a large part of their legislative responsibilities. The
Cabinet is the winner. The loser is responsible government.
Membership of the
ministry imposes certain obligations. The ministry must maintain a solid
profile, expressed in rather cynical form by Lord Melbourne
after Cabinet discussion of the corn laws in 1841:
Bye the bye, there is one thing we haven’t agreed on, which
is, what we are to say. Is it to make our corn dearer or cheaper, or to make
the price steady? I don’t care which, but we had better all be in the same
story.
The advice the
Executive or Privy Council gives to the head of state must be unanimous.
Ministers should not criticise the actions of other ministers or express
private views or speak about a ministerial colleague’s portfolio without first
consulting that colleague, must loyally support any Cabinet decisions, must not
publicly disassociate themselves from any government decision, and must not
announce a major new policy in their own area of responsibility without prior
Cabinet approval. If a minister does so, Cabinet must either endorse the new
policy or the minister must resign.
Of course ministers do sometimes
break these rules. What action is taken depends on the prime minister, but
something should be done, for a Cabinet cannot be publicly bickering and remain
effective. How soon the prime minister takes action depends both on his
personality and the political standing of the offending minister. Much more
common are unattributable ‘leaks’, information passed to the news media by the
minister or his staff. Such leaks are always self-serving, either in terms of
publicity for the minister, or damage to his rivals, or publicity for policies
the minister is trying to sell to Cabinet. Such leaks are difficult to control,
for proof of the culprit’s identity is very difficult, though there may be deep
suspicions.
In Britain
there have been at least two occasions when the principle of Cabinet solidarity
has been breached. The Wilson Labour Government permitted seven dissenting
Cabinet ministers to campaign outside Parliament against the Labour Party line
in the referendum on the terms of British membership of the EEC, though a
junior minister, Eric Heffer,
was forced to resign for speaking against the terms in the House of Commons.
Cabinet ministers were again openly campaigning against each other in 1977 on
the method of election to the European Parliament. These are the only modern
examples, but there were earlier ones. Four ministers joined the National
government in 1931 on condition that they could dissent on tariff policy. The
revised Prayer Book in 1928, votes for women before the First World War and the
secret ballot in the nineteenth century were all matters on which ministers
could vote as they wished. Labour Cabinet ministers have also voted in the
party National Executive Committee against policies decided by Cabinets of
which they were members, and from which they did not resign. James
Callaghan summed up the Labour attitude when
he said that: ‘I certainly think that the doctrine [of collective ministerial
responsibility] should apply, except in cases where I announce it does not.’
In Australia
the Liberal and National[37] Party
coalition governments sometimes have difficulty in presenting a united front.
National Party leaders have several times openly criticised Cabinet policy.
McEwen attacked the 1967 decision not to devalue the currency, and his
successor Doug Anthony
did the same in 1971. No action was taken by the prime minister against either.
In the 1999 referendum on whether Australia
should become a republic the coalition
government did not take a stance, although Prime
Minister Howard was openly opposed. Ministers
could campaign on either side, and sometimes came into angry conflict with each
other.
Labor ministers have always been
permitted to speak at party conferences, and can if they wish challenge Cabinet
decisions there. During the 1972-75 Whitlam Government, ministers were entitled
to speak on any subject at meetings of the parliamentary party (the caucus). A
minister defeated in Cabinet could take his case to the caucus and try to
organise a reversal. Great confusion and acrimony resulted. The next Labor
government, that of Hawke, elected in 1983, was much more tightly disciplined,
and ministers did not take part in debates in caucus, except on matters which
concerned their ministerial responsibilities. They did, however, retain their
right to have frank discussions at meetings of their factions, including the
right to criticise Cabinet decisions.
In New
Zealand both National and Labour Party
ministers may speak frankly at their caucus meetings, sometimes breaching
Cabinet solidarity in the process, but in practice they do not often speak
outside their ministerial responsibilities. In the National Party government
elected in 1990 Winston Peters
was the sole Maori in the Cabinet. He seemed to think that this gave him the
right to criticise the policies of his colleagues, particularly the economic
policy. Peters had substantial community support, not only
among the Maoris, and Prime Minister Bolger
took some time to discipline him. He was eventually dismissed in October 1991.
He left the Nationals and formed his own party, called the New Zealand First
Party. He held the balance of power after the 1996 election, and joined in a
coalition with the Nationals, being given the post of Treasurer. He lasted
rather longer this time, but was eventually dismissed again, this time for
walking out of a Cabinet meeting.
Apart from being
shifted by the prime minister, ministers may of course lose office by death,
loss of their parliamentary seats, resignation or dismissal. Dismissals of
ministers are rare. Ministers are usually given the option of resignation,
which they prefer to take. Since 1970, although many ministers resigned under
pressure or lost office in a re-shuffle, the only two actual dismissals in the
UK were those of Barbara Castle in 1976, when she refused to resign voluntarily
in order to permit the incoming prime minister (Callaghan) to reorganise his
Cabinet; and Keith Speed, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the
Royal Navy, who was dismissed in 1981 for publicly criticising cuts in the
Defence estimates. (In fact the cuts would have destroyed the aircraft-carrier
and amphibious strength of the Royal Navy, but fortunately had not taken effect
before the Falklands War broke out in the following year. The cuts were later reversed.)
There have been no dismissals in Ottawa,
but they have been fairly common in Australia
and New Zealand.
Two Australian ministers were dismissed by Whitlam in 1975. Clyde Cameron
refused to resign when he was requested to do so, in order to shift him to a
lesser portfolio, so he was dismissed. He then accepted the lesser portfolio.
The deputy prime minister, Jim Cairns, was dismissed for misleading the Parliament,
and also because one of his staff had a conflict of interest. Whitlam himself
was dismissed by the Governor-General later in the year for refusing to ask for
an election when he was unable to obtain supply from the Senate. In 1978 Malcolm
Fraser dismissed Senator Withers
as Minister for Administrative Services because he committed ‘an impropriety’.
Actually what he did was to suggest a name for an electorate to a royal
commission inquiring into a recent electoral redistribution in Queensland.
Withers was undoubtedly unlucky, but Fraser was
anxious to preserve an image of ministerial integrity after the turmoil of the
Whitlam years. There was another dismissal, though it was not strictly a
ministerial dismissal. Senator Sheil
had been named as Minister for Veterans’ Affairs in 1977, but he made some
favourable statements about apartheid in South
Africa which were contrary to government
policy, and he was dismissed before being sworn in.
There have been six ministerial
dismissals in New Zealand
since 1970. In 1988 the conflict over economic policy between Lange
and his reformist finance minister, Roger
Douglas, was coming to a head. In November Lange
dismissed a Douglas
supporter, Richard Prebble,
the Minister for State-Owned Enterprises, for public disloyalty. Prebble had
claimed that Lange was irrational and dictatorial, and that he
was acting unconstitutionally. Douglas himself
was dismissed a few weeks later. Two other dismissals involved Winston
Peters. The final dismissal was of the
Immigration Minister, Tuaraki John
Delamere, a Maori who was found to have been
authorising residency papers for Chinese migrants in exchange for their
investment in Maori businesses or land. This was a considerable embarrassment
for the ruling National Party government, for it occurred shortly before
polling day in the 1999 election, but it actually made little difference, for
the Nationals were heading for defeat anyway.
Resignations are
much more common than dismissals. Some resignations are genuinely voluntary, on
grounds such as age or ill-health, or because the minister wishes to pursue
business interests or accept an interesting non-parliamentary appointment. Such
resignations are common in the UK,
with no less than 59 between 1970 and 2000. Of course some resignations are
forced by the prime minister, the alternative being dismissal. Very
occasionally proffered resignations are refused. In deciding what to do about
resignations prime ministers have to consider a number of factors: the image
they wish their government to project, and whether the behaviour of the
minister will damage it; their own standards of acceptable ministerial
behaviour; party support for the erring minister, and whether removal would be
more damaging than retention; and the professional competence of the minister.
Different prime ministers view these
factors differently. The only offence from which there seems no comeback is the
deliberate misleading of the parliament. The problem was summed up in the
removal of British War Minister Profumo,
who had to go ostensibly because he misled the House of Commons, but actually
because of the political damage caused by the revelation of his association
with a prostitute called Christine
Keeler, who was also being used by the
Soviet Naval Attach. A contemporary poem ran:
Now see what you’ve done, said Christine.
You’ve upset the whole party
machine.
To lie in the nude is not at all
rude,
But to lie in the House is obscene.
The problem of ministerial
responsibility, and whether the minister has a duty to resign if there has been
some mistake made by a subordinate, was dealt with in the 1976 report of the
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration: ‘There is little
evidence that a minister’s responsibility is now seen as requiring him to bear
the blame for all the faults and shortcomings of his public service
subordinates regardless of his own involvement, or to tender his resignation in
every case where fault is found.’ The best known ministerial resignation over
departmental failings was as a result of the Crichel Downs affair in England,
but it has been claimed that the resignation of the minister, Sir Thomas
Dugdale, was actually because of disagreement with government policy. Ministers
must answer to Parliament for what their departments have done, and if mistakes
have been made they must reveal what action has been taken against the
offenders and to prevent a repetition. But these days that is where ministerial
responsibility ends, unless the minister wants to go.
The removal of a minister with its
implied admission of a ministerial mistake may be more politically damaging for
a government than the mistake itself. In fact since 1970 in the four countries
we are considering only four ministers have resigned directly as the result of
the shortcomings of their department. Three were in the UK, where the Foreign
Secretary, Lord Carrington, the Lord Privy Seal and a minister of state,
resigned because of the bad advice given by the Foreign Office on the events
leading up to the Argentinian occupation of the Falklands. This seems extreme,
for clear and timely intelligence assessments have never been one of the strong
points of the Foreign Office. Besides, the performance of the Defence Minister,
John Nott
(who offered to resign but was kept on), was very much worse. In Canada,
the Minister for Fisheries and Oceans, John
Fraser, in 1985 resigned from the Mulroney
Conservative Government over a controversy surrounding the sale of tainted cans
of tuna.
Of course, if a minister or his
department are not performing well, there may be embarrassing pressure applied
by questioning and criticism in the House, and that may result in the prime
minister either moving the minister to another portfolio or sending him to the
backbench. Ministers cannot deliberately distance themselves from decisions
taken in their departments, though some try. If a minister is patently
incompetent, or not taking the necessary action to see that administrative
mistakes are corrected, then he may have to go. But whether he goes or not will
depend of a weighing of the political costs and benefits. Such removals are
very rare in New Zealand,
where it is almost unknown for a minister to be sacked for mere incompetence.
(In fact it has happened only once in the past 30 years, in 1978.)
Censure motions have not been
effective in causing the removal of a minister. There have been no such censure
motions carried in the lower houses of any of the four countries in modern
times. It is true that the Australian Senate, which is not normally controlled
by the government, has several times passed motions of censure of Senate
ministers, but there has been no result. On one occasion the House of
Representatives immediately passed a vote of confidence in the minister, on
party lines. On the other occasions the censure motion was simply ignored.
There can be no doubt that ministers depend for their survival on the lower
house, and the censure of the Senate, though perhaps of interest, has no
political effect.
Resignations
over the collective responsibility of Cabinet
The collective
responsibility of Cabinet requires that a minister must resign if he or she
cannot accept the decisions or policy of the Cabinet or prime minister. The
most dramatic resignations have occurred in the UK.
They are the most numerous, too, for there have been no less than seventeen
such resignations between 1970 and 2000 over issues such as entry into the EEC,
Northern Ireland policy, single-parent policy, attitude to the European Union,
agricultural policy and dissatisfaction with the prime minister. Four of these
resignations were very dramatic. In 1985 the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael
Heseltine, was in dispute with the prime
minister over the method of providing additional capital for the Westland
Helicopter Company, and he resigned in January 1986. Prime Minister Thatcher
weathered the storm over her handling of this affair, as she did in 1989 when
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel
Lawson, resigned because he found Cabinet
policy (in reality, Mrs Thatcher’s
policy) unacceptable. In the following year the Minister for Trade, Nicholas
Ridley, wrote an article in The Spectator
saying that Germany was seeking to dominate a federal Europe, and that
surrendering British sovereignty to the European Union was little better than
handing it over to Hitler. This was completely contrary to Cabinet policy, and
despite being a long-time supporter of Mrs
Thatcher, he had to go. The fourth such
resignation, that of her deputy, Sir Geoffrey
Howe, later in the year, on her attitude to
the European Union, was fatal for her and she was deposed. In 1995 her
successor, John Major,
was challenged for the leadership by the Secretary of State for Wales,
John Redwood.
Redwood resigned from the ministry in order to conduct his campaign against
Major, but he was easily beaten.
In Canada
the resignations have been much less dramatic than in Britain.
There have been six such resignations over Cabinet policy since 1970, one
during the 1968-72 and two during the 1974-79 Trudeau Liberal governments, two
under Mulroney between 1984 and 1993, and one under Chrtien
in 1996. Eric Kierans resigned in 1971 because of disagreements with the
government’s economic policy, Jean Marchand in 1976 over the handling of a
strike by air-traffic controllers, James Richardson in the same year because he
opposed the official language policy, Suzanne Blais-Grenier after publicly
criticising the government for permitting the closure of a Montreal oil
refinery, Lucien Bouchard because of a proposal to amend the Meech Lake Accord,
and Sheila Copps, the deputy prime minister, in 1996 because of a broken
campaign promise. She resigned her seat too, but was re-elected in a
by-election.
Malcolm
Fraser resigned as Australian Minister for
Defence in 1971 because Prime Minister Gorton
became involved in a dispute between Fraser and
the Army. This resignation caused a challenge to Gorton’s
leadership, and Gorton was replaced as prime minister in a
coup by William McMahon
in March 1971. The Parliamentary Liberal Party very unwisely elected Gorton
as Deputy Leader. As Gorton was deeply resentful of McMahon
and some of his collaborators, the situation was very unstable. McMahon’s
opportunity came a few months later, when Gorton wrote a
series of newspaper articles on his political contemporaries, including Cabinet
colleagues. He also referred to the damage caused by Cabinet leaks, which was
clearly aimed at the prime minister, who was not known as ‘Billy
the Leak’ for nothing. McMahon had his grounds, and required Gorton
to resign. In 1977 the Attorney-General, Robert
Ellicott, resigned because he considered
Cabinet decisions were compromising his legal independence as the First Law
Officer. In 1979 Eric Robinson, the Minister for Finance, resigned because he
was unable to give Prime Minister Fraser his unqualified support, but
reconsidered his position and rejoined the ministry four days later. Andrew
Peacock resigned in 1981 because he found
the level of interference by Fraser
unacceptable. In 1989, during the Hawke Labor Government, the Minister for
Telecommunications and Aviation Support resigned because he opposed a Cabinet
decision to build a third runway at Sydney Airport.
In New
Zealand in 1982 Derek
Quigley publicly criticised the National
Party Cabinet for excessive intervention in the economy. Prime
Minister Muldoon offered Quigley the alternatives
of a public apology to his Cabinet colleagues, or resignation. He resigned. In
1997 Christine Fletcher
resigned because of concern over Prime Minister Bolger’s
leadership.
Resignations
for personal errors
Since 1970 there
have been a number of resignations of ministers for personal errors or
misjudgements associated with their ministerial offices. In the UK in 1986 Leon
Brittan directed the selective leaking of parts of a letter from the
Solicitor-General in order to discredit and force the resignation of a
colleague, Michael Heseltine, during the Westland helicopter affair, and Edwina
Currie resigned in 1989 after making some remarks about the risk of salmonella
infection in eggs which infuriated the egg producers and many of her
parliamentary colleagues. She resigned, she said, because it was the best
course in all the circumstances. She did not retract or apologise for her
remarks about eggs.
In Canada
under Mulroney there were three such ministerial resignations,
two (in 1986 and 1987) because of conflicts of interest, and the other in 1985
for an alleged violation of the Canadian Elections Act. In 1996, under the
Liberal government of Jean Chrtien,
the Defence Minister, David Colonnade,
resigned because of the impending release of a letter he had written to the
Immigration and Refugee Board on behalf of a constituent, a letter which was in
breach of the secret ethical guidelines for
ministers. Although he accepted the resignation, Chrtien said that Colonnade
would return to the Cabinet, though he did not say when. In 1998 the
Solicitor-General, Andy Scott,
resigned because of ‘a personal error’.
In Australia there have been seven
such ministerial resignations, one during the 1972-75 Whitlam Labor Government
(for misleading the Parliament), one during the 1975-83 Fraser Coalition
Government (for failing to take proper action against a minister who was caught
trying to smuggle a TV set through customs) and two during the Hawke Labor
Government (one for breaching Cabinet confidentiality, and the other for
misleading the Parliament). In the Keating government in 1993 Minister Ros
Kelly took control in her office of a thirty million dollar program intended to
provide recreational facilities, and used it for blatantly electioneering
purposes. When asked by the Auditor-General for details of the program, she
said they had not been kept. Proposals, she said, had been entered on a ‘great
big whiteboard’ in her office, and were erased after a decision had been made.
She eventually resigned, defiant to the end. In the first Howard Government the
Assistant Treasurer James Short,
and the Treasurer’s Parliamentary Secretary resigned because of a conflict of
interest when they made administrative decisions concerning companies in which
they held shares. In 1998 the Minister for Administrative Services resigned as
a result of his inadequate supervision of the abuse of travel allowances by his
ministerial colleagues.
There has been only one such
resignation since 1970 in New Zealand, though in 1956 a minister was criticised
for carrying on a business as an importer while at the same time being the
minister responsible for import licensing. He offered to resign, but instead
was transferred to a different ministry. In 1996 Denis
Marshall resigned as Minister for Conservation
because of the tragic mishandling of an incident at Cave Creek.
Resignations
because of unacceptable personal behaviour
Ministers may
also be forced to resign because of revelations of unacceptable personal
behaviour, not related to their ministerial responsibilities. Conservative
ministers in the UK
have a surprising propensity for being involved in sex scandals. Lords Jellicoe
and Lambton in 1973 and Cecil Parkinson
in 1983 all had to resign because the revelations in the media of their sexual
transgressions had made them political liabilities. Of course there was not
always a sexual element in such resignations. Reginald
Maudling, the Home Secretary, resigned in
1972. He was involved with an architect who was under police surveillance, and
resigned because he was responsible for the police force. Lord Brayley,
a junior minister, resigned in 1974 after embarrassing inquiries were made into
a company with which he had been involved. In 1993 Michael Mates, the Northern
Ireland Security Minister, resigned because
of improper links with Asil Nadir, a tycoon who broke bail and fled to Cyprus.
The year 1994 was busier for the sexually active. One minister resigned because
he had an affair and his wife committed suicide, and an assistant whip had a
gay affair with a 20 year old; he was unlucky because the law to reduce the age
of consent to eighteen had passed the House but had not yet been promulgated.
In the same year two junior ministers in the Major Government resigned over
allegations that as backbenchers they had received money for asking parliamentary questions on behalf of Mr Mohammed
Al-Fayed, the owner of Harrods.
The pattern was much the same in the
Blair Government. In 1998 the Secretary of State for Wales
(and nominee for the leadership of the new National Assembly of Wales) resigned
after he was robbed at knife point and had his car stolen in what turned out to
be a well-known gay cruising area. Later in the same year Peter Mandelson, the
Minister for Trade and Industry and an influential figure in the Blair
Government, resigned after it was revealed that he had taken a housing loan of
373 000 from another minister, who was himself under fire as an associate
of the disgraced tycoon Robert Maxwell. Mandelson was too important a figure
(at least in the prime minister’s eyes) to remain out of office for long, and
he took over the difficult task of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in
late 1999, only to be forced to resign again a year later.
There were an unusual number of
ministerial resignations for unacceptable personal conduct in Canada-four
under Trudeau and five under Mulroney-but
things have quietened down under the Chrtien Liberal Government. The
resignations under Trudeau involved a minister who was
convicted of contempt of court, another who signed the husband’s name on a
document to obtain an abortion for a woman with whom he had had an affair, a
third who attempted to influence a judge who was trying a constituent, and the
fourth for tax offences. The five under Mulroney were also
dramatic. In 1985 the Minister of National Defence, Robert Coates, resigned
because he had placed himself in ‘a compromising situation’ during a visit to West
Germany. The others resigned for diverse
reasons: land speculation; trying to influence a judge; a conviction on a
drinking and driving offence; and for being involved in a number of
embarrassing incidents.
In Australia
there have been eleven such resignations since 1970. In 1976, soon after the
Fraser Government took office after the dismissal of Whitlam, the Minister for
Posts and Telecommunications, Victor
Garland, was charged with committing
electoral bribery offences. The Chief Magistrate of the ACT dismissed the case,
and Garland returned to the
ministry. The next was more serious, for it involved Phillip
Lynch, who was Treasurer and deputy leader
of the Liberal Party. An inquiry in Victoria
had linked him to improper land speculation, and although a legal opinion found
that Lynch had done nothing illegal a further report expressed
doubt about the propriety of some of Lynch’s deals. Lynch was
returned to the Cabinet, but with a lesser ministry. He remained deputy leader
of the Liberal Party. The third case also involved a deputy leader, this time
of the National Party. Ian Sinclair
was charged with forging his father’s will for his own benefit, but was
eventually acquitted and immediately reinstated in the Cabinet. Another
resignation was for attempting to smuggle a television set through customs; the
minister concerned was not reinstated.
One minister in the Hawke Labor
Government, Mick Young, set what was probably a record by resigning and being
reinstated no less than three times. He was very influential as Federal
Secretary of the Labor Party, which probably explains his survival. He left Parliament
in 1988 after being cleared of yet another charge, but soon afterwards resigned
as Federal Secretary of the Labor Party when he accepted a part-time
consultancy with Qantas airlines.
In 1992 Graham Richardson, the
Minister for Transport and Communications in the Keating Labor Government, was
forced to resign when it was revealed that he had put pressure on the President
of the Marshall Islands to help a relative who was facing trial over alleged
fraudulent business dealings. In 1994 a minister in the Keating Government, Alan
Griffiths, resigned because of alleged
criminal offences. An inquiry subsequently cleared him, though it did say that
in one respect his conduct was improper.
In 1996 the incoming Liberal prime
minister issued a Guide on Key Elements
of Ministerial Behaviour, but it has not been very effective in controlling
ministerial behaviour. In 1997 a minister, Geoff
Prosser, had to resign because of improper
business dealings. He continued to be a major retail landlord, and this clearly
conflicted with his responsibilities as Minister for Small Business and
Consumer Affairs. Things got worse later in the year when there were
revelations of abuse of travel allowances, which involved both backbenchers and
ministers, and two National Party ministers resigned, as well as the Minister
for Administrative Services, who was responsible for the supervision of the use
of the allowances. The resignations were becoming very embarrassing for the
government, and after the 1998 election Howard
issued a revised Guide. More importantly, he ceased to enforce the Guide so
sternly, and several ministers who appeared to be in clear breach of the Guide
were not forced to resign.
There has been only one such
resignation in New Zealand,
in 1999 when the Minister for Tourism resigned because of a scandal over
‘golden handshakes’.
Some Cabinets
have extra-parliamentary bodies to worry about. In the UK
a Conservative prime minister appoints the party chairman, and, while in government,
has little to fear from the party organisation. In opposition things may be
more tumultuous, over such issues as the policy towards the European Union. The
annual conference of the Labour Party tends to be unruly, and often politically
damaging. The conference elects the National Executive Committee by a
complicated system which results in the unions largely determining its
membership. The NEC is powerful, with a network of a score of advisory
committees which, although they have no direct power, may significantly
influence the parliamentary leadership on legislation and electoral policy.
In Canada
the party leaders of the Progressive Conservatives and Liberals combine the
roles of party chairmen and parliamentary leaders, and party policies are what
they declare them to be.
In Australia the extra-parliamentary
organisations of the Liberal and National parties have very little influence on
policy, which is the hands of the parliamentary leadership, though committees
of the parliamentary party may have a considerable influence on the detail of
election policies. The Labor Party platform is considered at biennial
conferences and is binding on the parliamentary party, though like a religious
tract it is sometimes open to varying interpretations. If the parliamentary
leadership wishes to change policy on a matter covered by the platform, it has
to go cap-in-hand to the conference. The Labor Party is now split into formal
factions, and policy changes are usually achieved by deals between the factions
rather than by the conference as a whole. In the Australian Democrats the full
national membership decides by secret ballot such matters as the parliamentary
leadership and party policies.
The National Party organisation in New
Zealand, which does include some MPs,
produces a political platform, but this is not binding on the parliamentary
party, and a ruthless leader such as Muldoon simply ignores
it. Since 1961 the parliamentary party has had control of Labour policy. A
committee has been established so that party office-bearers can be consulted,
if the parliamentary leader wants to. This is in accordance with the expressed
wishes of the National Executive, which has pointed out that ‘the functions of
such a body, it must be emphasised, would be consultant and advisory only-as
the MPs elected by the people cannot be subjected to any extra-parliamentary
fetter.’ It was because of this parliamentary power that the 1984-89 Lange
Government was able to introduce revolutionary economic changes-a consumption
tax, deregulation and privatisation-which would have been unthinkable to an
earlier generation of Labour stalwarts.
Much is made of
the separation of the executive and judicial powers, but judges are in fact
appointed by the government (in Australia
technically by ‘the Governor-General in Council’) and may be dismissed on an
address by both houses of Parliament. In Canada
the federal government appoints the nine-member Supreme Court, though there is
a requirement that three of the nine judges should be from the province
of Quebec. The federal government
also appoints not only the 31 member Federal Court, but also the judges of the
major provincial courts-a total of about 800 appointments. The failed
Charlottetown Accord would have required the federal government to name judges
from lists submitted by the provinces. By no means all the present appointments
are acclaimed. A 1985 report by a special committee of the Canadian Bar
Association referred to cynicism, uproar and public dismay and outcry over many
of the appointments. Some provinces, in order to avoid unwelcome appointments,
temporarily reduced the sizes of their courts, awaiting a change of government
in Ottawa. Though it is most
blatant in Canada,
in all the countries being discussed patronage sometimes results in
sub-standard judges being appointed, or politically biased appointments being
made to courts dealing with constitutional matters.
There is no obviously better method
of appointment in current use. In the United
States, judges in state courts are usually
elected, mostly by popular vote but sometimes by the state legislature. Few
would find this a desirable option, democratic though it is. Presidential
choices for the Supreme Court have to be confirmed by the Senate, and candidates
have to be prepared for prolonged questioning by the Judiciary Committee. These
hearings are relatively new. For the first century and a half there were none,
but since 1925 they have gradually become automatic, and increasingly
intrusive. The process has become highly politicised, and again would not
commend itself to many outside the United States.
There are judges representing various community groups-a black judge, a female
judge, a Jewish judge-and a president would be taking serious political risks
if he did not propose a similar replacement. When President Nixon
was seeking political support from the southern states, he nominated a
southerner for the Supreme Court. His choice was criticised as being a below average
lawyer, but one of Nixon’s supporters, Senator Hruska (Rep., Nebraska) argued
that below average lawyers had a right to representation on the US Supreme
Court. ‘There are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers,’ he said.
‘They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they, and a little chance?’[38] Senator Hruska did not convince the
Senate of this, but it does seem that the legal stature of proposed judges is
less important to the Senate than their attitudes on controversial issues such
as abortion.
Turning to this problem in the
Westminster-style countries, it is difficult enough to persuade the top lawyers
to leave their lucrative practices to become judges. It would be much more
difficult if they had to face a public inquisition on their suitability by a
parliamentary committee. But judges have to be chosen some way, and it would
certainly not be acceptable for a court to be self-perpetuating. Under the
Australian Constitution, the appointments to the High Court are made by the
Governor-General in Council, that is, by the government, usually in fact by the
prime minister and the Attorney-General. The principal role of the High Court
is the legal interpretation of the Constitution, and its decisions may be very
important to the states. In the past 80 years High Court decisions have been
very centralist and have steadily increased the power of the federal government
at the expense of the states, and it is understandable that the states should
wish to have some influence on appointments to the Court. Under an act passed
in 1979 the federal Attorney-General is required to consult with the
attorneys-general of the six states before an appointment is made to the High
Court, but the final decision rests with the federal government. This process
gives no effective power to the states. The original concept of the High Court
was that there should be five judges so that nearly every state could be
represented, but in fact the High Court started with three judges, all three
from New South Wales or Queensland,
and two of the states (South Australia
and Tasmania) have never had a
High Court judge.
In 1983 Queensland
proposed a solution to the problem which seems fair. According to the Queensland
plan, when a vacancy occurs on the High Court bench, the federal
Attorney-General should ask the six state attorneys-general for suggestions,
and should also forward to them the names of any he has under consideration.
For an appointment to be made, there would have to be support from at least
three of the six states. Such a scheme would be in accord with the principles
of federation. It would be desirable for such a change to be incorporated in
the Constitution, for an act could always be altered by a strongly centralist
government.
Having appointments to the High
Court formally approved by four independent authorities would help to reduce
the likelihood of inappropriate appointments being made on political or
personal grounds. A British Lord Chancellor said that his
first and fundamental duty is to appoint solely on merit
the best potential candidate ready and willing to accept the post. No
considerations of party politics, sex, religion, or race must enter into my
calculations, and they do not. Personality, integrity, experience, standing and
capacity are the only criteria.[39]
One could wish
that all judicial appointments were made on this basis, but they certainly are
not. One Australian prime minister had a strong preference for appointing
judges from his state and of his religion, with some unfortunate results. In
1960 the NSW Labor Government appointed the retiring leader of the federal
(Labor) opposition (a former High Court judge) as Chief Justice of New South
Wales. According to a judge of the NSW Court of Appeal, when he was appointed
he was suffering from advanced senility: ‘He plainly could not manage the job.
He was old and ill, uncomprehending and inarticulate, incontinent and barking
mad.’[40] He lasted for two years.
Fortunately, even when appointments
are blatantly political, the appointed judges often perform in a much more
unbiased manner than they were expected to. As a rather cynical former
Australian federal minister put it: ‘once you put them there, they start
thinking they got there on merit.’[41]
Although the
Cabinet is not mentioned in any of the written constitutions, it remains the
central feature of responsible government. In fact Bagehot
preferred to use the expression cabinet government rather than responsible
government, but there has been a dramatic change in the direction of its
responsibility. Except when there is a minority government, the Cabinet
ministers are collectively and individually responsible not to the lower house
of parliament, but rather to the government party. We no longer have
responsible government, in Bagehot’s sense, but party
government.
The responsibilities and the methods
of selection and removal of ministers are broadly similar in all four
countries, and there is little they can learn from each other. Australian
ministers could learn from ministers in other parliaments, particularly Westminster,
to show more respect for their formal responsibility to the Parliament and to
be more courteously answerable to it.
There are some problems which no
parliament has yet tackled, and one-the use of the defence power-which only Canada
has done anything about. It is an anachronism for the national parliaments to
leave to the government the declaration of war or the giving of orders to the
military forces to commence fighting. Canada
has taken effective action, with its National Defence Act and its Emergencies
Act, to control the government’s behaviour in committing the military forces to
action. All the national parliaments should follow the Canadian example.
Similarly, although the formal negotiation of treaties must necessarily be left
to the government, parliaments should insist on appropriate involvement in the
negotiations and establish that ratification of a treaty requires parliamentary
approval. None of the parliaments has yet taken effective action in this area,
nor have they in improving the method of selection of judges.
In every parliament the number of
ministers has multiplied enormously, there typically having been a threefold
increase in the past century. Yet the pool from which ministers are chosen has
not grown commensurately, in some cases not at all. This problem of the quality
of the ministerial pool is studiously ignored by all the parliaments. Six of
the twenty parliaments being studied use upper house members to increase the
size of the ministerial pool, but this does little to solve the problem of
ministerial quality, and creates other problems. As will be argued in Chapter
8, the presence of ministers in upper houses seriously damages the performance
of those houses as legislatures.
It is now well established that a
prime minister or premier cannot be in the upper house, except possibly for a
brief transitional period. This has been a substantial change in the Westminster
system of responsible government, as described by Bagehot. In Bagehot’s
day, and for half a century afterwards, British prime ministers were as likely
as not to be in the House of Lords. The reason for the change was that a prime
minister in the Lords could not be personally answerable to the House of
Commons, and by the early years of the twentieth century this was no longer
acceptable. Surely the same argument applies to the lack of answerability of
other ministers in upper houses.
Removing ministers from upper houses
of course does nothing to solve the problem of ministerial quality. If one does
not want to be limited to choosing ministers from the ranks of government
supporters in the lower house, why not follow the Dutch and Swedish examples
and fill some ministerial vacancies with highly qualified individuals from the
community? After all, it has never been a requirement in the UK
that ministers be elected to the Parliament (the House of Lords is not elected[42]). Nor is it a requirement that new
ministers should have served an apprenticeship in the Parliament, for there are
numerous examples of new MPs moving directly into the ministry. What is
important is that ministers should be personally answerable to the parliament,
able to present their proposals and handle any questions on their ministerial
performances. This personal answerability to
the parliament is much more important than voting membership of it.
Bringing in some outsiders as
ministers will meet strong opposition from MPs, for the possibility of
ministerial office is regarded as one of the rewards of electoral victory. But
it is possible to make the change, for several countries have done it, and the
overall quality of their ministries has risen markedly as a consequence.

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