2.1
This chapter provides an update on the situation on the ground in Afghanistan since the evidence received for the committee’s interim report, including the political situation, security and terrorism risks, human rights and Australia’s engagement with Afghanistan at a diplomatic level.
Political situation in Afghanistan
2.2
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) stated in its submission that the Taliban regime remains in control of Afghanistan, with ‘no indication of a credible political or armed opposition forming’. Further:
The Taliban’s early steps have not generated confidence in the international community, and its governance model and early appointments are unrepresentative. The Taliban appears unlikely to make genuine efforts in the short term towards a truly inclusive government that represents Afghanistan’s broad ethnic, religious, and political landscape.
Australia, like all other members of the international community, does not recognise the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
2.3
The Refugee Council of Australia (RCA) explained:
The Taliban continue to consolidate power by appointing their own members to government positions in Kabul and in the provinces, including to the hundreds of mid- to high-level positions vacated after the fall of the Afghan republic. Some Taliban governors issued orders formally banning the hiring of non-Taliban. Except in a handful of cases, the Taliban regime in Kabul and the provinces is composed almost entirely of Taliban members, betraying a lack of regard for international calls—including by Australia—to form an inclusive government.
2.4
DFAT advised that the Taliban is ‘struggling to provide basic services amidst a severe humanitarian crisis, a near collapse of the financial sector and loss of skilled citizens’. DFAT described the Taliban’s bureaucracy as fragile, with the Taliban ‘prioritising internal control over competence and integrating former combatants into key government roles’.
2.5
Mr Ahmad Shuja Jamal, who is now based in Australia working with the RCA as a special adviser, worked for the government of Afghanistan as Director‑General for International Relations and Regional Cooperation at the Afghan National Security Council until late August 2021. He summarised the current political situation in Afghanistan:
[B]efore the world's eyes Afghanistan is sinking into an authoritarian regime, with summary executions, enforced disappearances, gender apartheid and a stifled media. Australia and the international community could do something about it. They hold the cards. They have what the Taliban crave, which is international legitimacy. But, before countries with different priorities step in and give the Taliban just that, it is important for Australia and its partner nations to coordinate actions quickly and seek a more permanent, nationally representative and rights-respecting political arrangement in Afghanistan. This remains possible. The Taliban themselves call their de facto regime an 'interim' government. Afghan politicians, activists inside the country and diaspora are organising in this direction. It is time for the world to amplify their voices…How Australia and the international community choose to deal with the Taliban at this moment will reverberate in history.
Security risks
2.6
During the committee’s hearing, it was noted that there was media reporting that the United Nations (UN) estimated that over 100 members of the previous government, its security forces and people that served with coalition forces have been killed by the Taliban and its affiliates since Kabul fell. Mr Daniel Sloper, Special Representative on Afghanistan, DFAT, responded:
We trust the United Nations report but we are not able to independently verify it. But that would be consistent with anecdotal reports and others that we receive that there are some reprisal attacks occurring, particularly focused on security or intelligence personnel associated with the previous regime. Again, we have raised this directly with the Taliban leadership. We are told this is actually vendettas and people taking advantage of the current situation as there is a transition in power. Our view is that, irrespective of the reasons for these attacks, the Taliban, if they claim to be a government or an authority, must investigate them and hold those responsible to proper justice. Of course, that's a complicated request when we also have concerns about their justice system at present, and there is no constitutional framework beyond the previous constitution under which that could occur.
2.7
The RCA also described the Taliban’s treatment of those who oppose them within Afghanistan:
The Taliban have waged an ongoing campaign of persecution against ethnic minorities such as Hazaras, Turkmens and Uzbeks, who have been forcibly dislodged form their homes by the thousands in Jawzjan, Faryab, Takhar, Daikundi and Balkh provinces. Taliban have also targeted, in apparent revenge attacks, members of rival tribes in the south, including Kandahar and Helmand. In Kabul, the Taliban have arrested high-profile critics and detained men from the Panjshir province, where there is an armed opposition to the Taliban…
Former members of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and others associated with the Afghan republic have also been targeted, often taken from their homes, killed and their bodies dumped. While numbers are unknown, Human Rights Watch…has documented nearly 50 ANDSF killed by Taliban.
2.8
Regarding the current security situation within Afghanistan, particularly in relation to the movement of people and restrictions faced by women,
Mr Sloper stated:
[W]ith the cessation of military conflicts across the country, there is certainly some improvement in the broader security situation and access to particular regions…We have seen the removal of checkpoints, the beginning of travel by night, the capacity for people to move between provinces more easily than they could in the past, but this is really only for men and for women who are accompanied and, therefore, for many there are very tight restrictions on women. Many are encouraged to stay at home, and in some provinces they aren't able to work or work in many of the professions they did before.
Terrorism concerns
2.9
Mr Roger Noble, Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism, DFAT, stated that the ‘No. 1 international counterterrorist concern…is ensuring that Afghanistan doesn’t return to where it was in 2001, prior to the September 11 attacks’. With the Taliban now in control of Afghanistan, DFAT assessed that:
Security risks, principally stemming from Islamic State—Khorasan Province (ISKP), continue. Taliban support for transnational terrorists and their ability to exercise governance over remote and ungoverned spaces will determine how much terrorists can operate in and from Afghanistan.
2.10
Mr Sloper noted that Australia is ‘working with other international partners in our overseas network to deter transnational terrorism,’ but acknowledged:
We have had a number of terrorist attacks that have occurred internally since August, particularly many claimed by ISIS-K or Islamic State Khorasan Province, ISKP. They are opposed to the Taliban. They still pursue jihad. They have not targeted the Western elements yet but are attacking both Taliban and major sites. We did not see any until
22 January—there was a pause over about four weeks—but we do not have any intelligence or information on how or when they may occur, so that continues to be a risk for the international community and, of course, for the Afghan people.
2.11
The RCA reported that:
ISK[P], the Afghan affiliate of ISIS, has targeted government-affiliated individuals in the east and has waged battles with the Taliban in the same region. In Kabul and the north, ISK[P] has waged a highly lethal campaign against Hazara communities, blowing up hospitals, religious centers, schools, and voting centers.
2.12
Mr Noble explained that ISKP is:
… the principal terrorist concern inside Afghanistan, principally because it has aspirations not only to attack Afghans inside Afghanistan but international, transnational aspirations and connections outside Afghanistan. It's the No. 1 organisation being watched, I think, by the international community, alongside others. Al-Qaeda would be another entity.
…
The other principal concern is the export of the idea. ISKP's success and the Taliban's ascendancy have resonated around the terrorist networks, so there's an international effort to combat what is called the victory narrative—any sense of success and the recruiting value that's been obtained by what has happened in Afghanistan in the last year.
2.13
Mr Noble added that ‘the Taliban are aware of the Western and international objective of not allowing Afghanistan to become a repeat of 2001, where it's able to export terrorism.’ However, the ‘big question to be watched carefully in the coming years is: how is the Taliban able to control them, and what is the Taliban's capacity to do so?’
2.14
In terms of how the Taliban are managing security and terrorism within their interim government, Mr Sloper provided the following insight into DFAT’s understanding:
Our judgement is that, at the moment, the Ministry of Interior Affairs is primarily responsible for internal security, but the Ministry of Defense, through its deployment of new forces badged as Afghan military forces, also has a role. But we do see, when specific situations are raised—for example, around humanitarian assistance—that action is taken usually by the Ministry of Interior Affairs to prevent those recurring, and we have seen Taliban officials replaced or commanders replaced when concerns have been raised. But we really have no visibility of how that process occurs or what is underway within that ministry itself and who are the key decision-makers, beyond what you would see in the public media about the key figures at the top having a great deal of influence. But how they operate together and how they implement their security measures, including against the ISKP, is unclear. When raised—and we have pursued commitments to ensure that Afghanistan is not a haven for terrorism—we are told that the Taliban understand the international concern, that they have been taking action, and we've been told that between 500 and 600 people who are associated with the ISKP have been arrested and, in addition, that a smaller number have been killed in military actions. Again, though, that's unverifiable, and I would say that there is also a concern that other attacks or actions are being taken under cover of so-called ISKP activity or responses to terrorist activity.
Human rights situation
2.15
Submitters raised concerns about the human rights situation in Afghanistan. For example, the RCA explained:
The Taliban continued to consolidate power and deepen their campaign of retribution against opponents and minority groups. The Taliban also introduced more repressive social measures, curtailing women’s public appearance, announcing rules for men’s beards, and maintaining a ban on teenage girls’ education…The ability of Afghans to leave the country has diminished after Taliban curtailed flights out of Afghanistan, and neighbouring countries restricted travel and visa issuance. Many Afghans at risk remain trapped and in hiding, often in dire situations.
2.16
The RCA submitted further:
Girls aged 13 and above are largely deprived of schooling. University attendance, where possible, remains strictly segregated by gender. The Taliban Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which replaced the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, issued orders stopping barbershops from trimming or shaving men’s beards and prohibited women from traveling or going outside the house without a male companion. It also prohibited public transport from offering rides to women without ‘appropriate Islamic hijab.’ Together with earlier orders prohibiting women from working in government offices, these rules largely prohibit women from most forms of public participation.
2.17
DFAT noted Australia’s concern about reprisals against former members of the Afghan security forces:
In December 2021, [Australia] joined others in expressing deep concern at reports of summary killings and enforced disappearances of former members of the Afghan security forces. [Australia has] called on the Taliban to effectively and uniformly enforce and uphold the amnesty for former members of the Afghan security forces and former Government officials. Reported cases must be investigated promptly and in a transparent manner, those responsible must be held accountable, and these steps must be clearly publicised as an immediate deterrent to further killings and disappearances.
2.18
DFAT stated further that the Australian Government ‘is particularly concerned about the deteriorating situation for women and girls’ in Afghanistan and noted that the Taliban had done little to address the international community’s concerns on human rights, particularly women’s rights. DFAT noted:
…reports of closures of girls and mixed schools, their non-inclusion in government and civil society, increased early and forced marriages, and the prohibition of women from leaving their homes without a male guardian. In December 2021, the Foreign Ministers of MIKTA countries (Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia) described widespread reports of loss of rights for women and girls as deeply disturbing. Equal access to health, education, employment, and other services must be ensured, including through internationally funded programs.
2.19
Mr Nawid Cina, Acting General Manager at Mahboba’s Promise also described the dire situation faced by women, noting in particular:
[W]idows who don't have a male in the household are particularly vulnerable, especially if they have young daughters. There are cases where we are seeing forced marriages and harassment. What it also means is they have a direct in[road] to a network of others, as in our case, that they can get to. It's almost like a security compromise when they get into one family, and that means they can start targeting all families. The risk from that perpetuates itself into forced marriages.
...
And then there is the risk for young women. Putting aside the general facts like barring education—the Taliban will always talk about education—they have been talking from the beginning about education—they haven't done anything. High school students are still banned; a lot of the primary schools are closed. Right now we're organising an initiative that will reach 10,000 girls who don't have any access to education. I would not rely upon their discourse in any way, shape or form.
2.20
Mr Sloper stated that ‘the Taliban have committed to all [women and girls] being able to return to school at the beginning of their new academic year, which is in March. So that will be a key test’. Notably, media reports indicate that senior Taliban leaders are sending their daughters to school and university overseas.
Work rights for female NGO staff
2.21
In answer to a question on notice, Save the Children provided the committee with a letter from the Taliban’s Acting Minister of Ministry of Economy which stated:
All female staff of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) may return to work with Sharia Hijab adopted. There is no restriction in recruitment and work of female staff for non-governmental organizations.
2.22
World Vision Australia (WVA) explained that while some female staff are able to work in health services, they are required to have male chaperones who have to be paid by the NGOs. Mr Patrick Thomas, Head of Low Income, Fragile and Humanitarian Contexts at WVA, explained:
We have over 500 local staff. About 93 per cent of our entire staff complement is Afghan nationals. In terms of our female staff on the ground delivering maternal and child health services, mobile clinic services, particularly in the provinces that we work in in the west of Afghanistan, they have been able to work, under certain conditions, obviously, that the Taliban have put. That includes having an escort [paid by us,]…so that is an additional burden.
2.23
Similarly, Ms Fiona McSheehy, Acting Country Director and Director Field Operations at Save the Children Afghanistan, stated:
Save the Children has been clear from the start: we can't operate without female staff as part of the cohort that's implementing the programs, in part because we can't treat females and young girls if we don't have female staff to do that…[W]e have commitments from the authorities at the highest level that females must be allowed to work unhindered, and that's across the NGO sector within Afghanistan. There's absolute clearance for females to be able to work, and they are encouraged to do so…A provision of being able to work is that females must be accompanied by a chaperone of their family. It needs to be a male relative or husband. Yes, we are having to pay an incentive to those chaperones, because otherwise what was happening was that our female staff were pulling their husbands and brothers out from their work in order to be able to work for us, so we were financially pressurising families by asking females to work without a paid chaperone. So we are paying them for that role, yes.
2.24
Ms McSheehy added that the role of the chaperone is to chaperone female staff from point A to point B, and when they arrive at the health clinic, the chaperone will wait outside all day until the female staff have finished work. Ms McSheehy noted the chaperones are ‘not allowed into the mobile health clinic sites, because that's a protected area where women and children are’. Furthermore:
We've also had to increase the size of the premises that we rent because the authorities are insisting on segregation of female and male staff. Whereas before we could have had a room with mixed staff, now we have to have two rooms—one with female and one with male. So there are definitely additional costs in relation to female members of staff; however, we have absolute categoric support for females to be allowed to work, to be encouraged to work for NGOs, and a directive that they must be allowed to do that freely.
Addressing human rights
2.25
In relation to managing the human rights situation in Afghanistan, the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), recommended that the Australian Government:
Advocate at the Human Rights Council for the establishment of an adequately resourced UN Fact-Finding Mission for Afghanistan to monitor the human rights situation and hold the Taliban accountable for violations of human rights and its commitments to the inclusion and protection of women and minorities.
2.26
The committee notes that on 7 October 2021, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted a resolution to appoint a special rapporteur and team of experts to monitor the human rights situation in Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban by March 2022.
2.27
DFAT submitted that Australia ‘continues to add its voice to international calls to the Taliban regime to uphold, respect and protect all human rights in Afghanistan’.
Australia’s diplomatic engagement
2.28
DFAT submitted that Australia’s overseas engagement in Afghanistan, which continues to be led by a diplomatic mission operating from Qatar, remains focused on:
safe passage for Australian citizens and those eligible to travel to Australia;
reinforcing regional stability, including through humanitarian support;
influencing the Taliban towards respecting human rights, particularly for women and girls, and minorities, and humanitarian principles;
encouraging formation of an inclusive political process; and
deterring a resurgence of transnational terrorism and maintaining our counter terrorist financing efforts.
2.29
DFAT noted that Australia’s Special Representative on Afghanistan, Mr Daniel Sloper, is authorised ‘to engage with the Taliban regime in multilateral and group meetings where there is benefit in doing so’, and has joined meetings with Taliban Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs Mottaqi along with representatives from partner countries on 27 October and 1 December 2021. These meetings ‘reinforced the international community’s expectations of the Taliban regime’.
2.30
Save the Children submitted that:
Constructive engagement with the Taliban around human rights should be prioritised over imposing conditionality attached to funding. We have learned that attaching conditions to funding has only served to alienate the Taliban from productive engagement and, consequently, to exacerbate the suffering of Afghan children.
2.31
ACFID agreed, stating:
Action to address mounting humanitarian needs among the Afghan population cannot and should not be conditional upon the Taliban’s behaviour. Evidence shows that withholding funding as a lever to improve governance is not an effective strategy. It also doesn’t account for the role that the international community has played in Afghanistan over the past twenty years, including the direct relationship between the withholding of international funding flows and the current economic crisis.
2.32
Mr Sloper explained that the Taliban have largely honoured an agreement not to interfere in the delivery of assistance, although:
…from time to time [it has been] found that there have been localised incursions, or seizures of goods, or interference—particularly with women associated with the delivery of the assistance.
On each occasion we, or other donors, have raised this directly with the Taliban leadership, or UN agencies working there have raised it. In those cases, it has been addressed. However, the role of women and ensuring that assistance reaches women remains a concern. That's increasingly so over the last few weeks. Since the end of last year we've seen a rise in reports of interference, including most recently a suggestion that in one province women who were unaccompanied—that is, working alone—were threatened with shooting. This has also been raised with the central leadership of the Taliban, who have taken action with regard to that and given us an assurance, but that is yet to be tested. Obviously, it's very concerning.
We've also called on them to protect human rights, particularly the rights of women and girls with regard to education and employment; of minorities; and of media freedoms and so on. I have to say that we've had very little detail on that. As you'd be aware from media reports, there's a rise in concern about incidents of reprisal killings and other alleged activity, including restrictions on educational opportunities for girls and employment opportunities for women.
2.34
Mr Sloper concluded that ‘we're judging the Taliban by their actions. We remind them regularly that while our humanitarian assistance is absolutely unconditional, beyond that we do expect movement and that we'll continue to hold them accountable for those actions’.
2.35
Mr Jamal also raised the importance of continued diplomacy with Pakistan whereby ‘diplomatic work with countries like Pakistan can help at-risk Afghans awaiting resettlement to gain access to and remain there in safety’. He stated:
I believe that the Pakistani policy is that they have kept their borders open to Afghans wanting to come into Pakistan but that they've not issued visas to a single Afghan over a long period of time—several months, in fact, over the past year or so. This has given rise to desperation and also to people paying very large amounts to brokers who then feign to provide them with visas from the embassy.
That has created a situation of abuse that I think is certainly avoidable. It is also avoidable because certain countries—and it's my understanding that Ecuador and Brazil are among them—offer visas to Afghans if they could demonstrate that they have an active application for settlement in the US. That includes, as an example, applications for humanitarian parole. All they have to demonstrate is a reference number confirming their application is active. I think Australia can actually enter into a conversation with Pakistan, at least to enable Afghans who have active resettlement cases with Australia to be there in safety and to make use of the better conditions of life in that country.
2.36
Another issue raised by Mr Jamal was the treatment of diplomatic missions and diplomats of the former Afghan Government:
[T]here are indications that certain countries in the world are actually changing their dispositions towards Afghan diplomatic missions, including actions such as freezing their bank accounts or giving them ultimatums to close down their embassies and to hand the keys over to the host nation. We think this is a move in exactly the wrong direction, not only at a time when are there many Afghan Australians and their relatives who want consulate services but also as a message to the world that these diplomats, who are already accredited and working under dire circumstances, are being thwarted in a way that's counterproductive—not just to the citizens of these countries who are of Afghan origin but also by sending the wrong message on normalising the Taliban. With respect to…individual diplomats, I think that, beyond just enabling them to continue to do their work, including offering essential services, it is essential that, when they come to the Australian government seeking protection and seeking asylum, legitimate—I think very legitimate—cases are heard fairly and are given due process rights and, in my opinion, heard sympathetically.
2.37
The committee continued to hear that Australia has a moral obligation to assist Afghans and that to do so was also in Australia’s security interests. For example, Mr Timothy Watkin, Head of Government Relations and Media at ACFID, noted:
We have a moral obligation [to assist Afghanistan], and it's also clearly in Australia's interests, in terms of the regional security implications [and] global security implications, that we do not walk away.
2.38
Similarly, Mr Thomas warned if we do not enable ‘people to put food on their own tables, we're just creating an environment of desperation and abandonment and we're letting others fill that void, which we can't afford to let happen,’ therefore:
We do need a dual focus on the immediacy, on the desperation that we are seeing on the ground, with a focus for the long term. We do need to enable Afghans to put food on their own plates eventually, and this is so crucial to giving them hope for the future.
2.39
Mr Sloper concurred that assisting the Afghan people was also in Australia’s security interests:
[DFAT] are very focused on humanitarian assistance because of the need to help the Afghan people in a dire situation—but we also would wish to see the country not implode, if I can be frank—and for stability, which is in the interests of those within the country and also the broader region.
2.40
Chapter 3 details the serious humanitarian issues facing Afghanistan.