4.1
The Department of Defence (Defence) seeks approval from the Committee to proceed with Stage Two of the Garden Island (East) Critical Infrastructure Recovery Program. The proposed works will address critical condition, capacity and compliance issues with some Garden Island Defence Precinct (GIDP) wharves, as well as base-wide engineering services such as base electrical supply, fuel supply, sewerage infrastructure, potable water, and compressed air.
4.2
The estimated cost of the project is $286.5 million (excluding GST).
4.3
The project was referred to the Committee on 28 March 2018.
4.4
Subject to Parliamentary approval, construction is expected to commence in late 2018 and be completed in late 2023.
Conduct of the inquiry
4.5
Following referral, the inquiry was publicised on the Committee’s website and via media release.
4.6
The Committee received three submissions and two confidential submissions.
4.7
On 11 May 2018, the Committee conducted a site inspection, and public and in-camera hearings. A transcript of the public hearing is available on the Committee’s website.
Need for the works
4.8
In its submission, Defence stated that the GIDP is a key operational and support base for the Royal Australian Navy (Navy) in support of Defence operations. GIDP provides the critical facilities and infrastructure required to securely and efficiently berth, replenish, maintain and repair Navy ships.
4.9
Defence told the Committee that:
In late 2012, Defence identified the need to undertake a comprehensive technical assessment of the condition, compliance and capacity of the wharves, and associated berthing infrastructure and engineering services at the GIDP.
4.10
This assessment resulted in the Garden Island Technical Assessment of Wharves and Berthing Infrastructure (GITA), which was completed in early 2014. Defence stated that:
The GITA identified significant deficiencies with the GIDP wharves, engineering services and supporting infrastructure. The most severe issues identified were the poor condition and limited capacity of the Cruiser Wharf and Oil Wharf as well as the inadequacy of the base’s electrical supply and reticulation and subsidence across the wharves.
4.11
In order to address the most significant issues identified in the GITA, Defence developed a Critical Infrastructure Recovery Program (CIRP). The CIRP was split into two stages. According to Defence:
Stage One will demolish the existing Cruiser Wharf and Oil Wharf, construct a new realigned wharf in their place, and extend the adjoining East Dock Wall to limit the new realigned wharf’s protrusion into Sydney Harbour.
4.12
Stage One was referred to the Committee for inquiry on 2 March 2017, and received parliamentary approval on 14 June 2017.
4.13
According to Defence, Stage Two of the Garden Island CIRP ‘proposes to deliver repair, installation and replacement works to the remaining wharves and the base-wide engineering services including electrical, fuel, potable water, sea water, sewerage and compressed air’.
4.14
In its submission, Defence elaborated on the deficiencies in the existing infrastructure at the GIDP.
Electrical Services
4.15
According to Defence:
It is Navy best practice to provide shore power to ships when they are berthed alongside the wharves, wherever and whenever possible. This reduces duty watch manning requirements and maintenance liability on ships’ diesel generators, and is essential during major maintenance periods to allow overhaul of the power generation systems.
4.16
In its submission, Defence outlined the key issues with electrical services at the GIDP:
Inability to meet maximum electrical demand when all ships are connected to shore power;
Aged and inefficient secondary electrical distribution;
Lack of sustained electrical supply in the event of an emergency. The current Central Emergency Power System (CEPS) can supply the GIDP for approximately 12 hours in the event of an electrical outage; and
Inconsistent and non-compliant secondary electrical distribution to key wharves.
Marine Structures
4.17
Defence’s submission listed the key wharf structure issues requiring rectification at the GIDP:
Degraded wharf structures, which are exhibiting increasing levels of damage, concrete spalling, cracking of structural elements and rusting of reinforcing. These issues are present in the West Dock Wall (WDW), the Fleet Base East Wharves and the Northern Dolphin;
Poor or missing corrosion protection required to protect key wharf structural elements from the effects of marine environments. Currently, wharves across GIDP are either unprotected or have corrosion control systems which no longer provide protection due to dilapidation;
Subsidence, deterioration and scouring of the wharf deck and sea wall, with Fleet Base East wharves two to five experiencing ongoing subsidence issues; and
Inefficient and inadequate ship berthing and mooring infrastructure, specifically the fenders and bollards at WDW, East Dock Wall and the Northern Dolphin.
Fuel Services
4.18
Defence told the Committee that ‘reliable, efficient and safe fuel supply and storage’ is a ‘primary requirement for the GIDP’. Defence’s submission outlined the issues with current fuel services at GIDP:
There is only a single working cope point on the Gun Wharf that represents a single point of failure which would render the whole fuel system inoperable.
The existing bulk fuel storage tank (Knoll Tank) is 100 years old and the subject of many serviceability reviews. The structural integrity of its roof is reducing capacity from 6.3 mega litres to less than 5.4 mega litres.
Due to deterioration over time, the pipework connecting Knoll Tank to Oil Wharf, Cruiser Wharf, East Dock Wall and the FBE wharves has been decommissioned, leaving Navy to rely on Self Propelled Water Fuel Lighters for fuel handling.
In order to effectively service proposed new pipework reticulation, the increased rate of fuel distribution for current and future naval vessels, and the increased distance that fuel needs to be pumped around GIDP, upgrades to the pump house and associated infrastructure are required.
The Knoll Tank is also currently used to store either clean or contaminated fuel, as operational need dictates. It is operationally desirable that Knoll Tank only be used to store clean fuel, and as such a smaller Quarantine Tank is required to store and treat contaminated fuel until it is suitable for transfer to the Knoll Tank.
Hydraulic Services
4.19
Defence’s submission outlined the deficiencies identified in hydraulic services at GIDP:
The single line sewerage rising main connecting GIDP to the Sydney Water network is significantly undersized. As there is only a single point of discharge, failure of this component would lead to the system being inoperable, which would require sewer discharge being removed from ships and buildings by sewer vacuum trucks.
The sewerage pipework throughout GIDP is aged, and has a range of issues including lines requiring cleaning, cracks, joint separation, and seepage into pipes, tree roots and obstructions. Defence estimates that 90 per cent of the pipework is either defective or in poor condition, and that 15 per cent of sewerage pits need repair or replacement.
While the seven sewerage pumping station structures are in good condition, the control systems are aged and in poor condition. The pumps vary in condition, from good to end of life. Those at end of life are susceptible to failure, which would result in a complete system failure.
Sewerage cope points are showing signs of corrosion due to age, and some are non-compliant due to issues like orientation. Due to these differing standards, standard operating procedures are inconsistent, resulting in work health and safety concerns for the operators who connect the ships to the cope points.
The piping system for potable water has inadequate isolation valves.
The majority of downstream backflow prevention at GIDP is either non-compliant or non-existent. Their failure would contaminate the drinking water supplied to both buildings and ships.
Metering of the potable water system is required to ensure that the system is operating effectively and without leaks. However, monitoring of water usage is limited to some buildings and berthing locations. Further, the system is manually operated and monitored. This means that Navy is unable to monitor water usage, reduce waste and easily identify issues in the network.
The Sea Water system which was used to operate ships’ on-board fire protection and cooling systems is dilapidated and redundant, and has not been used for ten years. The pipework for this system is occupying valuable space in the services’ tunnels and at cope points on wharves which could be used for other services.
The compressed air system suffers multiple issues, including dilapidated reticulation, aged compressors, and aged and non-compliant wharf side cope points.
Options considered
4.20
In its submission, Defence stated that it considered five options:
Option One incorporates the highest priority scope items, including:
Substantial upgrade of the electrical services;
Repair of the FBE wharves’ seawall to address subsidence (not scour protection;
Repair of key structural elements of the WDW;
Repair of selected portions of the hydraulic services; and
New cope points at each wharf for all services.
Option Two proposes the same works as Option One plus works to the GIDP fuel services system.
Option Three proposes the full resolution of condition, compliance and capacity issues identified in the GITA and related issues identified during design development. It offers a complete solution that significantly reduces risks to Defence’s capability, estate, and work health and safety requirements at the GIDP.
Option Four proposes the full resolution of condition, compliance and capacity issues identified in the GITA as well as further enhancements identified during design development. Option Four, however, has the potential to result in abortive capital works, does not represent the most efficient program approach, and may pre-empt the scope of the Garden Island Defence Precinct Redevelopment project which is not scheduled to occur until the mid-2020s.
Option Five proposes no capital works be delivered. This option would require significant and increasing annual maintenance expenditure to address emergent issues and failures. It would provide no capability improvement whilst exacerbating severe risks to Defence’s capability, estate, and work health and safety requirements through the continued and worsening condition of critical wharf and engineering services capability.
4.21
According to Defence, Option Three was selected ‘as it addresses Navy’s highest priority condition, capacity and compliance issues’, reduces the key risks to operational capability, meets the aims of the project, and ‘represents the best value for money solution to the Commonwealth’. Defence stated that it does this by:
Refurbishing or upgrading critical base engineering services infrastructure (electrical supply, distribution and emergency power; fuel; sewerage; potable water; and compressed air) and removing redundant pipework (sea water) to meet current Defence requirements and standards whilst accounting for future growth;
Refurbishing and future-proofing the GIDP wharf structures to ensure that the design life for each structure is achieved and operations are not adversely impacted upon; and
Improving overall environmental outcomes for the GIDP by improving the condition of key services, and providing greater supervision and control of these engineering systems.
Scope of the works
4.22
Defence told the Committee that it has split the proposed works into 11 work elements. Work Element One addresses issues with electrical services; Work Elements Two, Four, Six, Seven and Eleven address issues with the marine structures; Work Element Three addresses fuel services; and Work Elements Five, Eight, Nine and Ten address hydraulic services.
4.23
In its submission, Defence provided a detailed breakdown of the eleven work elements.
4.24
According to Defence, Work Element One is focused on base electrical supply and engineering services, and proposes the following works:
Installation of two new 33 kilovolt (kV) feeder cables. These feeders will provide the required electrical capacity to meet the maximum demand of the base.
Upgrades to the base wide high voltage electrical reticulation. Upgrades to substations (combination of new installed and upgrade to existing) to address compliance issues and ensure sufficient capacity to support the network is also proposed.
Upgrade to the Central Emergency Power Supply (CEPS), including the upgrade and installation of new generators, and frequency convertors within Building 10. Defence also proposes to upgrade the controls of the existing diesel generator, and the installation of a base wide Power Control and Monitoring System in order to more effectively control power distribution in the event of an outage.
Installation of upgraded wharf side power distribution, including the replacement of electrical cope points with new compliant points for all wharves. The cope point upgrade includes standardisation of configuration and orientation, as well as more efficient coverage of wharf space allowing for flexible berthing options for ships.
4.25
Work Elements Two addresses wharf subsidence at Fleet Base East, and includes the following works:
Repair of seawall on FBE 2-5, specifically the installation of a new sheet pile sea wall to cease the loss of fine particle material and resolve the subsidence issue.
Installation of scour protection, including the installation of a combination of a grout mattress and sheet pile scour protection to
FBE 2-5. A sheet pile is to be installed at localised areas of high impact, where the larger ships with larger propulsion systems are to be berthed. A grout mattress is to be installed at lower impact areas. Additionally, Defence proposes to carry out localised subsidence repairs and remediation of pavement subgrade.
4.26
Work Element Three is focused on remediating fuel services, and includes the following works:
Demolition of existing and installation of a new bulk storage tank to replace the ageing Knoll Tank.
Installation of new bunded fuel storage area, including the installation of a new 600kL Quarantine Tank for processing contaminated fuel in a new bunded fuel storage area adjacent to the Bulk Storage Tank.
Construction for upgraded pump house and control room.
Upgrade to existing, and installation of new, pipework reticulation. Additionally, Defence proposes to install new fuel pipe infrastructure and fuel cope points to all wharves.
4.27
Work Element Four seeks to address the needs identified at Fleet Base East 1 North/South, and includes the following works:
Repair to damaged wharf deck structure, wharf edge and bollards.
Installation of impressed current cathodic protection (ICCP) to protect the wharf structure, restoring the wharf design life to 50 years. The ICCP will also be used to earth ships when berthed for corrosion protection of the ship.
4.28
Work Element Five addresses issues with the sewerage infrastructure, and includes the following works:
Currently, GIDP has only one aged and dilapidated sewerage connection to the Sydney Water network. A new second connection is proposed to exit the base at FBE 5, and traverse 400 metres off site to a new connection point in Potts Point. Defence also proposes to install the new pipework to connect to the sewer main, and will include new isolation valves to improve redundancy.
The replacement or relining of approximately 30 per cent of the onsite sewerage pipework to address condition issues.
Upgrades to the pumping capacity of three of the seven onsite pump stations. All seven control panels will be upgraded and connected to a head end monitoring and control system in Building 10.
Replacement of sewerage cope points. The project proposes to replace the existing non-compliant sewerage cope points with new compliant cope points. This includes standardisation of configuration and orientation, as well as more efficient coverage of wharf space allowing for flexible berthing options for vessels.
4.29
Work Element Six is focused on addressing the issues identified at WDW, and includes the following works:
Remediation of concrete elements where spalling has occurred, and repairs to corrosion damage on existing fender backing plates, connections, steel walkways and handrails, as well as installing new breast bollards to allow safe berthing of vessels in extreme weather conditions.
The installation of an ICCP system to protect the wharf structure and the piles. The ICCP will also be used to earth ships when berthed for corrosion protection of the ship.
4.30
Work Element Seven seeks to address issues identified at the Northern Dolphin, and includes the following works:
Remediation of concrete elements where spalling has occurred, refurbishment of 20 existing steel piles, and the installation of new fender backing plates to eastern and western faces.
Extension of the Northern Dolphin structure to FBE1 North to create a contiguous wharf.
Installation of a sacrificial anode cathodic protection system to the Northern Dolphin.
4.31
Work Element Eight addresses issues with the potable water system at GIDP, and includes the following works:
Partial replacement of the potable water pipe network, including installation of additional isolation valves; and installation of new metering and head end monitoring to comply with Defence’s Smart Infrastructure Manual.
Replacement of the existing non-compliant potable water cope points with new compliant points, including standardisation of configuration and orientation as well as more efficient coverage of wharf space allowing more flexible berthing options for ships.
4.32
Work Element Nine proposes removing the existing, dilapidated sea water pipework to facilitate the installation of additional service within the tunnel.
4.33
Work Element Ten focuses on the compressed air network, and includes the following works:
Replacement of the pipework to the east and west of the Captain Cook Graving Dock and reinstatement of the ring main arrangement east of the Dock. The pipework upgrade will also include new connections for the control of the fuel system.
Installation of a new low load compressor to Building 10 to supplement the existing compressors.
Replacement of all existing non-compliant compressed air cope points with new compliant points, including the standardisation of configuration and orientation, as well as more efficient coverage of wharf space allowing for flexible berthing options for ships.
4.34
Work Element Eleven aims to conduct repairs to East Dock Wall, so as to restore its design life to 50 years. It includes the following works:
Remediation of the concrete elements where spalling has occurred and repairs to corrosion damage to fender backing plates, connections, steel walkways and handrails. Defence also proposes to install new breast bollards.
Installation of an ICCP system to protect the wharf structure and piles, and to earth ships to prevent corrosion.
Installation of a combination of a grout mattress and sheet pile scour protection.
4.35
The Committee notes that several of the work elements in this project involve the replacement of non-compliant cope points. As noted above, in its submission, Defence states that it intends to replace the electrical, fuel, sewerage, potable water and compressed air wharf side cope points. When questioned on this aspect of the project, Defence responded:
The cope points are like junction boxes within which we connect the services that are provided from the base to the ships alongside. They're not of a consistent design. There are numerous ones that were built at different times across the island. They're not compliant with many modern contemporary standards. The difficulty comes from the fact they're not the same, so it's hard for the dockyard operators and the ship staff to apply consistent standards which are underpinning part of the safety culture. With varying standards you're exposing people to trip hazards, to electrical risks and to electrocution as they're working with these cables in these co-points which don't even point in the right orientation to where the ships tie-up alongside. It's a relatively minor scope item, but it's an important one, because the physical interface between the wharf surfaces and the ships are through those cope points.
Cost of the works
4.36
The estimated cost of the project is $286.5 million (excluding GST).
4.37
The Committee also received evidence relating to cost breakdowns in the in-camera hearing.
4.38
The Committee is satisfied that the costings for the project provided to it have been adequately assessed by the proponent entity.
Local impact
4.39
Mr Andrew Woodhouse, President of the Potts Point and Kings Cross Heritage and Residents’ Society (the Society), told the Committee that noise from the GIDP was a problem for local residents. Mr Woodhouse stated that, in particular, the dockside generators had been ‘intolerable’ for local residents.
4.40
Furthermore, Mr Woodhouse noted that the Society ‘was not satisfied that noise is being satisfactorily dealt with’, and that in his view, the proposed amelioration measures would be insufficient.
4.41
In response to these concerns, Defence submitted that the need for dockside generators would be reduced as a result of the proposed works. Further, Defence told the Committee that the noise curtains that will be utilised to ameliorate construction-related noise were ‘commonly used in Sydney’, and ‘have proven effective in reducing construction noise’ at other sites around Australia.
4.42
Mr Woodhouse also raised concerns about the potential increase in vehicle traffic as a result of the proposed works. According to Mr Woodhouse:
In terms of traffic impacts, we have now been told by [Defence] that there will be 53 trucks a day. That's a very large number of trucks in a very small area. Potts Point is, essentially, a high-rise area and very dense. Up until recently it was the densest urban area in Australia. It has 21,500 residents according to the latest census results. But we were told that the debris et cetera would be removed by barge at the last meeting in this room that was conducted by Defence.
4.43
In responding to these concerns, Defence told the Committee that:
During Stage Two's hearing Defence advised that, based on the Traffic Study, there will be 46 light vehicles per hour during the morning and evening peak periods (0700-0800hrs and 1600-1700hrs). There will be a maximum of seven heavy vehicles per hour throughout the day using Cowper Wharf Road to the Base entrance. There are currently more than seven buses and 800 vehicles per hour on Cowper Wharf Road during the peak period. The project's additional construction traffic therefore equates to approximately 53 vehicles (including a maximum of seven heavy vehicles) during peak period.
4.44
Additionally, Defence stated that the removal of debris by barge was for Stage One of the Garden Island Critical Infrastructure Recovery Program, and that ‘during Stage Two there is a minimal requirement for rubble removal relative to Stage One’.
Committee comment
4.45
The Committee understands the strategic importance of Garden Island to Navy’s capability and operations on Australia’s east coast. The Committee is also cognisant that facilities at Garden Island are aged and in significant need of repair and upgrade. As a result, the Committee agrees that there is a need for the works, and believes that the scope of the works is suitable to achieve the stated purpose.
4.46
The Committee also recognises the concerns regarding noise and construction traffic raised by the Society. The local impact of proposed public works is always an important facet of the Committee’s scrutiny, and this is particularly an issue when projects take place in close proximity to residential areas.
4.47
In this regard, the Committee thanks Mr Woodhouse for his input, and for conveying the concerns of local residents about traffic and noise from the construction site. The Committee also notes that Defence has responded to these concerns, but nonetheless urges Defence to maintain a focus on ameliorating the impact of both traffic and noise on local residents as much as possible while carrying out these vital works.
4.48
The Committee recommends that the House of Representatives resolve, pursuant to Section 18(7) of the Public Works Committee Act 1969, that it is expedient to carry out the following proposed work: Stage Two Garden Island (East) Critical Infrastructure Recovery Program.
4.49
Proponent agencies must notify the Committee of any change to the project scope, time, cost, function or design – and if the project has been cancelled. The Committee also requires that a post-implementation report be provided within three months of project completion.
Mr Scott Buchholz MP
Chair