2.1
In undertaking the No. 18 and No. 19 reviews of the administration of the six National Intelligence Community (NIC) agencies for the 2018-19 and 2019-20 financial years, the Committee asked agencies to provide submissions addressing aspects of their agency that have been reviewed for successive reviews, with requests for more specific topic focuses and continued reporting on areas of interest from previous reviews:
strategic direction and priorities;
changes (if any) to the structure of the organisation;
corporate governance, including information about compliance performance, risk assessment and risk management;
legislative changes that have impacted on administration of the agency, including as appropriate, the frequency and nature of use of any new powers, staffing implications, training, the role of legal officers and need for specialist staff, and the relationship with outside agencies such as police or the judiciary;
involvement (if any) in litigation matters, including any administrative reviews in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal;
human resource management, including:
staffing numbers and demographic information;
recruitment and retention strategies;
staff departure and separation rates;
workplace diversity statistics and initiatives;
training and development;
individual performance management;
staff feedback, complaints and investigations (including public interest disclosures and any code of conduct, fraud, bullying/harassment-related investigations); and
accommodation and facilities, including all locations within Australia where staff are present and any current or planned changes to accommodation arrangements;
changes to the distribution of staff across different areas of the organisation, including the ratio of field and operational staff to administrative staff, the ratio of executive to middle and lower level staff, and the ratio of central office to outlying staff;
security issues, including policies, training, security breaches and e-security;
initiatives implemented or underway to ensure compliance with the revised Protective Security Policy Framework;
security clearances, including clearance rates, number of revocations, current procedures, policy changes, average timeframes, delays and associated outsourcing arrangements;
information and communications technology initiatives;
organisational performance evaluation and accountability, including any outcomes relevant to administration and expenditure for the financial years; and
public relations and/or public reporting, including requests for public access to records.
2.2
Additionally, the Committee asked each agency to report on certain aspects of their administration or initiatives or reform activities that had been identified to the Committee that are specific to their agency.
2.3
In their submissions, agencies outlined significant developments and the relevant aspects of their administration for the two review reporting periods. The majority of the evidence received was classified, so has not been authorised for publication. The Committee scrutinised all material provided and followed up on several issues with detailed questioning at classified hearings and subsequent Questions on Notice.
2.4
This chapter reports the Committee’s findings on the administration of the agencies. In some areas, the discussion is necessarily general due to security and classification needs. Additionally, due to the coverage of two reporting periods and the potential for significant change during that time, this report highlights major points reported to the Committee and will not attempt to reflect all elements of requested information from every agency.
Legislative changes
2.5
During the reporting periods, the Committee conducted inquiries into several bills that affected the operations of the relevant NIC agencies, and for the first time conducted a policy inquiry that related to the operation of the intelligence agencies, while not being specifically related to the bills normally referred under section 29 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (the IS Act). The Committee’s Inquiry into the impact of law enforcement and intelligence powers on the freedom of the press was the first such policy inquiry undertaken by the Committee, but was not finalised during the reporting periods relevant to this report.
2.6
Where applicable, agencies commented in their submissions on the extent to which bills reviewed by the Committee, and other legislative changes, had impacted on their agency’s administration.
ASIO
2.7
ASIO identified a number of pieces of legislation that were passed by the Australian Parliament during the reporting period, or that were taking effect during the periods, that affected their operations, including:
the Counter-terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (no. 1) 2018;
the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (the TOLA Act);
the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (the EFI Act); and
the Foreign Influence and Transparency Scheme Act 2018.
2.8
ASIO indicated to the Committee that these pieces of legislation continued to complement and enhance the operation of ASIO’s key functions. The Committee has received extensive evidence from ASIO regarding the impact of the TOLA Act on its operations as well as to the Committee’s review of the operation of the Act that was undertaken during the reporting periods.
2.9
The impact of the EFI Act was also emphasised by ASIO, and the Committee anticipates further developments related to that legislation to become apparent during the next reporting period.
2.10
ASIO also highlighted the potential benefit from the revised apprehension and questioning powers included in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2020, which was referred to the Committee and reported on in December 2020 and will be considered by the Committee as part of Review No. 20 2020-21.
ASD
2.11
ASD completed the first two years of its operation as a statutory body under the Defence portfolio during the reporting period for these reviews.
2.12
ASD only reported one major legislative change affecting its operations, that being the commencement of the TOLA Act on 9 December 2018, in enabling ASD to respond appropriately as an intelligence and national security agency to the evolving digital environment.
ONI
2.13
ONI reported that the commencement of the Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 on 20 December 2018, and the related Rules to Protect the Privacy of Australians, had the greatest effect on its operation - formally implementing the recommendations from the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, creating the transition from ONA to ONI.
2.14
The evolution of ONI’s functions and its role as the enterprise manager of the NIC was covered in the classified hearings undertaken for the Reviews and will be commented on generally at the relevant sections of this report.
DIO
2.15
DIO identified that it participated in consultation for the Review of the Legal Framework Governing the National Security Community conducted by Mr Dennis Richardson AO at the direction of the Attorney-General (known as the Richardson Review), which was completed in late 2019. No other major legislative changes were identified.
AGO
2.16
AGO identified that amendments to the IS Act during the 2018-19 reporting period clarified or expanded ministerial responsibilities amended with the creation of the Home Affairs portfolio. This ensured that AGO, as an intelligence collection agency, continued to notify, seek agreement, or disclose the correct information to either the Attorney-General or the Minister for Home Affairs.
2.17
AGO did identify that amendments made to the IS Act during the 2019-20 period affected that Act as their enabling legislation, but did not stipulate whether those effects were consequential to its operation.
ASIS
2.18
ASIS did not highlight for the Committee any direct legislative amendments affecting its operations or administration, rather commenting that it continues to work with the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) on interpretation of the IS Act affecting ASIS.
2.19
The Committee did note in the Review No. 17 report that the Intelligence Services Amendment Act 2018 was passed on 5 December 2018, amending the use of force provisions in the IS Act relevant to ASIS, however this was not identified in the ASIS submission for that reporting period.
Litigation
2.20
As reported in previous periods, ASIO identified that its involvement in litigation and other legal matters continued ‘at a high tempo’ during 2018-19. Matters included terrorism and other prosecutions; civil lawsuits; and judicial and merit reviews of security assessments. It provided evidence to prosecutions, and responded to subpoenas and disclosure requests. Specifically, during the reporting periods:
ASIO was involved in 15 and 13 adverse security assessment reviews before the Security Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) related to cancelled passports, visas and security clearances during the Review Nos. 18 and 19 periods respectively;
security assessments were reviewed in the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia during both periods both as a respondent and interested third party;
ASIO contributed to criminal prosecutions in collaboration with law enforcement and prosecuting authorities across Australia.
2.21
ASIS reported that it continues to be engaged in a number of litigation matters, the most high-profile of which is the case relating to the former staff member known as Witness K, which continued through both reporting periods.
2.22
ONI noted that it was involved in one matter in the AAT during the Review No. 18 reporting period, which proceeded to the Federal Court during the Review No. 19 period, as well as AAT upholding exemptions under the Archives Act 1983. ONI also noted the arrest and charging of a former ONI staff member on retention of classified information, resulting in conviction in September 2020.
2.23
DIO, AGO and ASD were not party to any direct litigation matters during the reporting periods for both reviews.
Use of ASIO’s special powers
2.24
ASIO reports each year on its special powers under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) to use specific methods of investigation, which include telecommunications interception and access; use of surveillance devices; entry and search of premises; computer access; and the examination of postal and delivery service articles. These powers are either reported publicly in its public annual report, in the case of questioning and questioning and detention warrants under the ASIO Act, and TIA warrants are reported as part of ASIO’s classified annual report and provided to the Committee.
2.25
The number of warrants approved by the Attorney-General is classified and cannot be reported by the Committee. However, following increases in 2013–14 and 2014–15, and a small reduction in 2015–16, the number of warrants or authorisations for ASIO to exercise its special powers remained relatively stable during the reporting periods from 2017 through to 2020, with only some variations that are mostly related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the last half of the 2019-20 period.
Strategic direction, priorities and organisational structure
2.26
The Committee requested intelligence agencies to report on their organisation’s strategic direction and priorities, as well as any changes to organisational structure. A brief summary of the responses for the two reporting periods is provided below.
ASIO
2.27
ASIO has consistently identified to the Committee, as part of other inquires as well as these reviews, that technological change is the biggest threat to security, but also one of the greatest enablers of countering the same threat. In its submission to the No. 18 Review, ASIO identified that in response to the recommendations of Mr David Thodey AO’s 2017 report A digital transformation of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation it was undertaking a major enterprise transformation program, to take advantage of modern data and technology.
2.28
This transformation program was identified as forming the cornerstone of the ASIO Strategy 2018-23 as well as the priorities within the Corporate Plan for 2018-19. However, within the submission for the No. 19 Review and ASIO’s 2020-24 Corporate Plan, the emphasis has shifted to mission objective activities stated in a strategic plan, delivered through the key priorities of:
counter-espionage and foreign interference;
governance and accountability.
2.29
As outlined in ASIO’s Corporate Plan 2020-25, the enablers of these priorities include people and culture, security, leadership and influence, risk and governance, technology and data, and partnerships. This strategic vision reflects the reality that whilst technology and data is an important element of ASIO’s capability, it is only one part of the suite of capabilities and functions that the agency must utilise in delivering its security mandate.
2.30
Organisational structure changes within ASIO have reflected shifts in strategic direction as well as a consolidation of business lines under two Deputy Director-Generals, focusing on Intelligence Service Delivery and Enterprise Service Delivery.
ASIS
2.31
Major General (RETD) Paul Symon AO continued as the 14th Director-General of ASIS during the periods of both reviews. ASIS continues to undertake a number of review and reform initiatives aimed at ensuring ASIS continues to thrive in the future, especially in the face of the changing digital environment and the challenges that COVID-19 presented for all intelligence agencies. Strategic planning, workforce and training initiatives and technological programs are being progressed.
ONI
2.32
In December 2018, the old Office of National Assessments (ONA) transitioned into the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) as a result of the recommendations from the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review.
2.33
Under its new structure and purpose ONI continues to develop valuable all-source intelligence assessments and collection and analysis of open source information. However, with the transition from the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) to the NIC, ONI is responsible for the enterprise management and enterprise-level leadership of the NIC, creating a single point of accountability to the Prime Minister and National Security Committee of Cabinet on intelligence matters.
2.34
ONI provided the Committee with updates on its progress on objectives set for its evolving role in the NIC for both review periods, outlining a number of evolving priorities in managing coordinated collection and delivery of intelligence across the NIC, as well as being an enabler for certain initiatives.
2.35
ONI’s reports to the Committee regarding the challenges faced not only by the agency but by the whole NIC in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic was invaluable to understanding the pressures and shifting priorities that intelligence agencies faced during the early part of 2020.
ASD
2.36
ASD commenced as an independent statutory agency with effect from 1 July 2018. ASD described this change as ‘the most significant change to the organisation since the Defence Signals Bureau was established 71 years ago’.
2.37
This independent status and the shift to a more public-facing role, especially in relation to cyber security advice and assistance and including producing public annual reporting documents and other corporate resources, has redefined the persona that ASD presents to the Committee as part of these reviews, as well as to the public. This was reflected in the change in classification of some administrative information submitted. The Committee investigated lines of questioning with ASD regarding their continuing evolution at a classified hearing.
DIO
2.38
As per previous review submissions, DIO noted that its strategic priorities are set by its leadership team consisting of its Director, Deputy Director, Branch Heads, Director Corporate Strategy and Accountability, Director Executive and Director Intelligence Mission Integration.
2.39
DIO stated that during the reporting periods it revised and consolidated strategic documents, providing better foresight and impact for strategic reviews and activities.
AGO
2.40
AGO outlined that for the reporting periods that it continued to deliver geospatial requirements for Defence in line with the 2016 Defence White Paper and the ever expanding need for its intelligence products within Defence, across the NIC and broader Government.
2.41
AGO also outlined that at the end of the 2019-20 reporting period it was in the process of developing its next internal strategy document to cover the period 2021-2025, due for release in late 2020.
Human resource management and demographics
2.42
The Committee asked the intelligence agencies to provide an update on human resource management and demographics issues as identified at the start of this chapter.
2.43
Information provided to the Committee regarding the staffing and management arrangements of each agency was mostly classified. However, where possible, these issues are discussed below in general terms or in the terms provided publicly by agencies that report as such.
Staff numbers and demographics
2.44
In its 2019-20 submission ASIO identified that the workforce numbers provided differ from previous years, as they have adopted whole-of-government workforce reporting requirements, with ongoing and non-ongoing employee data only, with no reflection of casual employees. Accordingly, some figures may not reflect the same numbers as previous reports and do not align perfectly with figures provided for the No. 18 review period, but will be reported as per the submission, including non-ongoing employee numbers as part of totals, for continuity of review reporting. Some statistics relevant to traditional lines of inquiry have not been reported, or were not reported in a consistent manner to allow for Committee consideration of the ongoing nature of the agency’s workforce.
2.45
As at 30 June 2020, ASIO employed 2,004 staff (1,704 full time equivalent or FTE), which was a slight reduction from the period ending 30 June 2019 where 2,037 staff were employed (1,877 FTE). At 30 June 2020, there were 62 Senior Executive Service (SES) Officers, down from 70 the year before; 664 ASIO Executive Officers levels 1, 2 and 3 in 2020, down from 680 in 2019, which was up markedly from 608 the year before; and 1,278 other staff in 2020, down slightly from 1,286 the year before.
2.46
In 2020 ASIO male employees outnumbered female employees with 1,053 of the former and 951 of the latter. Nine staff identified as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. Due to a reliance on the Annual Report, statistics for employees with a disability or from a non-English speaking background were not reported for Review No. 19, but 364 and 21 staff identified as such for 2018-19. Age profile statistics were not provided for 2019-20, but in 2018-19 68 staff were aged 24 or under, 274 were 55 or older, with the remaining 1,695 staff being between those ages. Approximately three quarters of ASIO’s workforce continued to be located in Canberra.
2.47
Due to its expanding and evolving role ONI reported that it had 243 and 263 employees at the end of the two reporting periods. This reflects a substantial increase from the 191 the period before, reflecting its growth. At the end of the 2019-20 reporting period, its workforce comprised 227 full-time staff, 36 part-time or casual staff, with all bar two staff located in Canberra. 51 per cent of employees were women, seven of which are at the SES level.
2.48
ONI noted that it continues to provide staff with secondment opportunities to enable skill-sharing and career development.
2.49
Staffing demographics information provided by ASIS, ASD, DIO and AGO were assigned classifications or Dissemination Limiting Markers, and cannot be published in this report. However, the total number of staff in ASD increased for the first reporting period and then increased slightly again for 2019-20. ASIS reported continued but low growth in staffing levels. DIO’s workforce continued to grow slightly over the reporting periods. AGO’s workforce remained relatively stable for the two reporting periods.
Recruitment and retention strategies
2.50
ASIO reported that during the 2019-20 reporting period a combination of low turnover and funding certainty allowed the agency to recruit with certainty to replace core capabilities attract the specialised skills required to deliver capabilities. The 2018-19 period submission outlined greater outreach to universities, for targeted technical capability recruitment.
2.51
Expenditure on marketing was markedly different for the two reporting periods, with $1.5 million being spent in the 2018-19 period, compared to just $313,025 in the 2019-20 period. ASIO attributed this to “reflect[ing] the number of recruitment campaigns undertaken in a particular year, as well as the investment required for campaigns targeting difficult-to-attract skills, such as those for technical and surveillance roles”.
2.52
ONI reported that it continues to recruit and retain interested staff, due to the interesting and challenging nature of its work, which was expanded on at the classified hearings, especially regarding the expanding nature of ONI’s work and how new specialties can be catered for in recruitment.
2.53
ASD noted growth in recruitment in key capabilities and areas of focus for its workforce. ASD continued a range of outreach programs across the cyber security community to implement new Science Technology Engineering and Maths (STEM) programs and cyber security initiatives with students from primary school to tertiary education, however noting that a number of events were cancelled due to COVID-19 impacts.
2.54
ASD conducted 61 recruitment processes in 2018-19 resulting in 194 arrivals during that reporting period. This increased to 82 recruitment rounds in 2019-20 resulting in 308 arrivals for the period, a nearly 58 per cent increase.
2.55
ASIS informed the Committee that it continued to use bulk recruitment activities to fill vacancies and reported success from its updated brand strategy utilising the ‘The Most Interesting Job Interview’ online initiative.
2.56
DIO outlined recruitment numbers that continued at similar levels for the two reporting periods. AGO conducted more recruitment rounds in the 2019-20 reporting period with a resultant increase in direct-entry staff.
Separation rates
2.57
ASIO reported separations of 124 ongoing, non-ongoing and casual employees during the 2018-19 reporting period, with 131 reported separations of ongoing and non-ongoing staff for 2019-20. The average tenure of all separating ASIO employees (including contractors) for the 2018-19 reporting period was eight years versus 12 years average tenure for separating ongoing ASIO employees. Tenure of separating staff for the 2019-20 reporting period was not provided by ASIO.
2.58
During the reporting periods ONI’s separation rates were 9.5 per cent (2018-19) and 13.3 per cent (2019-20).
2.59
ASD reported that its separation rate for both periods was relatively stable and continuing at a level similar to previous reporting periods. The reasons behind these separations were investigated by the Committee at its classified hearing.
2.60
ASIS reported a slight increase in separations from previous periods for the 2018-19 period.
2.61
Both DIO and AGO’s employee separation rates were slightly higher for the two reporting periods than previous periods.
2.62
Separation from agencies, especially of technical experts seeking employment in the private sector, was a line of questioning that the Committee pursued in its classified hearings. The indications from the agencies of the impact that this can have on capability was mixed, and will be discussed later in this Chapter with a related recommendation.
Training and development
2.63
All agencies described the training and development initiatives pursued during the reporting period, encompassing both corporate and operational activities.
ASIO
2.64
ASIO provided detail regarding training and development of staff for the 2018-19 reporting period, but this information was absent for the 2019-20 reporting period.
2.65
During the No. 18 review period ASIO identified a focus on leadership training to accompany a transforming organisation. Core skillsets developed included management and leadership, personal safety, collection and analysis, language, basic and advanced technical competency, and surveillance capability.
2.66
ASIO reported on its Intelligence Development Program and Technologist Graduate Program and Information and Communications Technology Traineeship, aimed at attracting and building internal technical workforce capability. ASIO also identified that in mid-2019 the responsibility for the National Centre for Intelligence and Training moved to ONI from ASIO.
2.67
ASIO also reported a reduction in funds allocated to its Language Skills Development Program, due to budgetary constraints, but noted that the number of staff increased to 38 from 32 in 2017-18.
ONI
2.68
ONI outlined that its Performance Development Framework provides professional development for its workforce in the normal range of corporate endeavours, but also in specialised leadership development, studies assistance for tertiary education and proficiency in foreign languages, with 25 employees accredited in one or more language other than English.
ASIS
2.69
The Committee heard that ASIS provided its staff with a broad range of corporate and operational training during the reporting period. The details of this training are classified and cannot be included in the report.
ASD
2.70
ASD reported that its workforce maintained proficiency in mandatory general training provided by the Department of Defence, including: work, health and safety; workplace behaviour; fraud and integrity awareness; and security awareness. Leadership training continued to enable workforce capability at ASD across both reporting periods.
2.71
ASD also provides specialist training which supports it capabilities. The details of these courses are classified.
DIO and AGO
2.72
DIO and AGO noted staff participation in the mandatory Defence programs, as well as bespoke training for the key capabilities required in their staff. The Committee noted that staff proficiency in the mandatory courses had stayed relatively static for AGO since the last reporting period, whereas DIO staff proficiency had fallen across the board. The Committee discussed training delivery and outcomes with the agencies at classified hearings.
Individual performance management
2.73
Agencies reported on their arrangements for managing the performance of their employees.
2.74
ASIO advised the Committee that, following further reform of its performance framework during 2018-19, it achieved 100 per cent compliance for employee participation in the performance cycle in 2018-19 and 2019-20, as it did in 2017-18.
2.75
All ONI employees are expected to participate in its performance development framework program, with work performance linked to pay scale advancements.
2.76
The performance of the DIO’s, AGO’s, and ASD’s APS employees is formally assessed twice a year, as part of the Defence Performance Feedback Assessment and Development Scheme, which informs performance progression payments. ASD reported that in 2018-19 1,545 staff had their performance progression approved, with 124 employees denied progression. In 2019-20 those figures were 1,062 and 242 respectively. Of those staff across both periods, one and three staff members respectively had not completed mandatory training and the remaining were ineligible because they were on leave or probation, were new starters or trainees, or had recently been promoted.
2.77
The overwhelming majority of DIO and AGO staff had their progression approved. Those who were denied, failed to progress for similar reasons as ASD staff. The Committee notes that AGO did not provide internal performance management statistics for the 2019-20 reporting period, but will analyse the comparative statistics as part of the next review.
2.78
ASIS updated the Committee on its use performance management tools and their importance in managing staff and identifying areas of high performance.
Workplace diversity
2.79
Agencies provided information on the diversity of their workforces, with some classified data being provided by agencies, reflected in general commentary below.
ASIO
2.80
ASIO reported that 46 per cent of its staff were female in the 2018-19 reporting period, exactly the same as for 2017-18, with a slight increase to 47.5 per cent for the 2019-20 period (noting that the non-reporting of casual staff may affect that figure). For the 2018-19 reporting period just under 40 per cent of its SES employees were women, increasing to 43 percent in 2019-20. A total of 18 per cent of all employees were reported for the 2018-19 reporting period as being from non-English speaking backgrounds. Commentary on disability and Aboriginal and Torres-Strait Islander employment was outlined above in the Staff number and demographics section.
2.81
ASIO outlined the outcome of its staff survey, conducted in March 2020 with 90 per cent of staff reporting that diversity and inclusion was valued by the organisation, with high engagement and positive intentions for retention from female staff.
ASIS
2.82
ASIS updated the Committee on strategies which have been underway across reporting periods to increase diversity of its workforce and promote a more inclusive and equitable workplace, acknowledging the NIC-wide focuses on gender equality and diversity recruitment and retention.
DIO
2.83
DIO reported that the gender split in its workforce continues to be close to parity, but with imbalances at specific levels. DIO continued to note that the majority of female workers continue to work in intelligence and security roles, with initiatives in place to realise Evolving Defence Culture 2017-22 targets.
2.84
DIO identified positive moves towards recruitment of Indigenous employees, including partnering with other NIC agencies.
AGO
2.85
AGO reported that the proportion of female employees fluctuated for the two reporting periods, at under 40 percent, but with an increase in the ratio of female ADF members.
2.86
AGO identified that while the gender gap persists in older employee cohorts the disparity is much smaller in graduate intakes. The percentage of employees from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds has remained stable across APS employees, but with an increase in the ADF cohort within the reporting periods. Staff who identified as Indigenous remained steady, as did those who identified with a disability.
ASD
2.87
ASD reported that gender ratios increased slightly across the two reporting periods, from 33/67 per cent female to male in 2018-19 to 35/65 per cent in 2019-20. Due to organisational restructure resulting from becoming a statutory agency, ASD could not report comparison between the two reporting periods by work group.
2.88
Of note is that ASD maintained near gender parity in SES officers with 18 female and 19 male staff in that cohort.
2.89
ASD did not report Indigenous or disability staffing statistics in it submissions, but reports these in its Annual Report with 13 and 18 staff identifying as Indigenous for the 2018-19 and 2019-20 reporting periods, and 25 and 27 with a disability for the same periods.
ONI
2.90
ONI continued to report on its gender targets and promotion of disability, Indigenous, mental health, gender and sexual identity, and cultural and linguistically diversity initiatives in its workforce. ONI’s Diversity and Inclusion Committee was established in 2019 to progress initiatives and analyse targets and programs.
2.91
Employees that identified as being of Aboriginal or Torres-Strait Islander was reported as being five for the 2018-19 period and less than 1 per cent for the 2019-20 period.
Staff feedback and complaints
ASIO
2.92
ASIO outlined the ongoing work of the ASIO Ombudsman, ‘an external service provider who works to resolve staff issues or concerns impartially and informally, through advice, consultation and mediation’. During the 2018-19 reporting period the ASIO Ombudsman met regularly with ASIO’s senior management and staff representatives and provided support to employees and line managers, including:
providing advice in response to four formal contacts from staff;
conducting one preliminary review of investigative matters;
responding to Human Resources on four policy matter queries;
undertook two health checks of business areas; and
undertaking two code of conduct investigations.
2.93
No statistics regarding the work of the ASIO Ombudsman were provided for the 2019-20 reporting period, as the ASIO Annual Report did not outline any specifics.
2.94
ASIO advised that it received no public interest disclosures for either reporting period.
ASD
2.95
ASD recorded two complaints of unacceptable behaviour during the 2018-19 reporting period and four in 2019-20, with resolution either through informal means, the complaint being withdrawn, findings of non-substantiation, or the person having left the agency. ASD also had five alleged breaches of the APS Code of Conduct across the two periods (four and one), were resolved through reprimand, termination or resignation.
ONI
2.96
ONI reported that it received no unacceptable behaviour, bullying or harassment complaints during both reporting periods and it did not conduct any investigations into breaches under the APS Code of Conduct or any disclosures under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013.
DIO and AGO
2.97
For the two reporting periods the number of complaints received by DIO and AGO were either very low or none, and only AGO received a small number of allegations of APS Code of Conduct breaches.
ASIS
2.98
ASIS offers both internal and external channels which enable employees to raise complaints or seek advice. External channels include the IGIS and disclosures under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (discussed below) and a significant internal channel is the existence of an independent ASIS Ombudsman, replicating the services of the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
Complaints to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
2.99
Under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, the IGIS may receive and inquire into complaints in respect of actions taken by intelligence agencies, including in relation to disclosures under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. General statistics regarding complaints received can be found in the IGIS Annual Reports, accessible on the IGIS website.
2.100
During the 2018-19 reporting period, the IGIS received 29 general complaints and five public interest disclosures (PIDs) in relation to intelligence agencies, primarily concerning employment matters such as recruitment and security clearances. All complaints were investigated and no evidence of illegality or impropriety was found.
2.101
During the 2019-20 reporting period, the IGIS received 35 general complaints and two public interest disclosures in relation to intelligence agencies, with the same outcomes as the previous period.
2.102
As with previous reporting periods, in relation to ASIO, the IGIS received a large quantity of complaints about security assessments for visa and citizenship applications, with 750 in the 2018-19 period and 300 in the 2019-20 period. The IGIS stated that the drop for the latter period being most likely related to the impact of travel restrictions from COVID-19 impacts.
2.103
The Committee continues to be concerned regarding this workload for the IGIS and discussed these visa and citizenship complaints in further detail with the IGIS in a classified hearing.
2.104
The IGIS did note that due to the continuing finding of very low errors related to these complaints, the IGIS did modify its process for handling these complaints in March 2020.
2.105
The Committee heard that the IGIS received two complaints and three PIDs in 2018-19 and two complaints and one PID in 2019-20, in relation to ASIS (included in the figures above).
2.106
The IGIS did not report any complaints having been made in relation to ONI for either period.
2.107
The inspection and inquiry-related activities of the IGIS have been outlined in this report in the past, but as these are a matter of public record in Annual Reports and public submissions (to the extent that the Committee can comment on them), the Committee will not comment on these further.
Accommodation
2.108
Agencies updated the Committee on accommodation arrangements. Most advice was either classified or given Dissemination Limiting Markers so cannot be discussed in this report.
2.109
During the reporting periods, ASIS identified that it continues to analyse accommodation needs in line with its workforce and its need to deliver effective service to government.
2.110
ONI reported that it continues to fill its offices as its staff numbers expand, but reported extensive hail damage from the January 2020 storm which resulted in some accommodation repairs but minimal disruption to staff and operations.
2.111
DIO reported that it continued refurbishment works on its accommodation throughout both reporting periods. AGO noted that it continues to manage multiple facilities across Australia, with various building works underway at various stages.
2.112
ASIO’s property portfolio is large and complex, with the agency noting that the Ben Chifley Building hosts Australia’s largest security-accredited auditorium, hosting events over both reporting periods, prior to COVID-19.
2.113
ASD updated the Committee on accommodation issues for their expanding workforce, but also informed the Committee that the Russell Office Building 5 and 6 Infrastructure Upgrade Project was completed in the 2019-20 period, delivering upgrades to modernise building infrastructure and improve security and emergency systems.
Security functions and issues
2.114
Security functions within the agencies encompass physical, technical, administrative, ICT and personnel security. The Committee requested information from agencies regarding security matters, including security procedures and policies, training, security breaches, e-security arrangements, physical security arrangements and security clearances.
2.115
Most of the evidence on security functions and issues was classified. However, the Committee pursued questioning with agencies at classified hearings, especially around the impact that COVID-19 had on each agency’s ability to maintain security and assurance of process. This is covered in Chapter 4 of this report
2.116
ASIO reported that the update of the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF), led by the Attorney-General was concluded in October 2018.
Security breaches
2.117
Agencies informed the Committee of the number and nature of security breaches recorded during the reporting period and any action taken as a result. The details of security breaches are classified and cannot be included in this report. However, the Committee did discuss any breaches of concern with agencies at its classified hearing and is satisfied that they have not compromised national security classified material.
Security clearances
2.118
Employees across the NIC and the agencies covered by these reviews are required to secure and maintain an appropriate security clearance to perform their roles. The Committee invited agencies to provide an update on security clearances and the challenges and improvements that have become evident as the nature of the work of these agencies changes in the modern era. Agencies reported on these matters in their submissions and in classified hearing evidence to the Committee.
2.119
The Committee has received evidence for successive years regarding the timelines faced by agencies for staff to gain initial clearances or have existing clearances revalidated.
2.120
The Department of Defence, through the Australian Government Security and Vetting Agency’s (AGSVA) provides security clearances, supported by personnel security assessments undertaken by ASIO, to a number of the agencies covered by these reviews (DIO, AGO and ASD).
2.121
Across the board, nearly all agencies acknowledged that a focus on new clearances has resulted in a reduction of the median time to process and grant an application for a Positive Vetting (PV) clearance. This may have resulted in negative impacts on revalidation timeframes; however the agencies and AGSVA acknowledge ongoing work to ameliorate these impacts.
2.122
ONI, ASIS and ASIO conduct their own security vetting processes and provided feedback to the Committee regarding times taken to process and impacts on workforce capability.
2.123
In support of other agency clearance processes, ASIO reported that in 2018-19 it completed 32,887 personnel security assessments (4,091 PV), an increase from 32,153 (2,759 PV) the year before. In 2019-20 ASIO completed 34,035 assessments (3,652 PV). Despite the growth in requests and completions, ASIO identifies that it is meeting performance benchmark requirements set by AGSVA.
2.124
In response to identified challenges and in pursuit of consistency and standards for security clearance requirements, the Committee received classified information regarding evaluation and coordination efforts across agencies to increase shared capability for this function. The Committee hopes to be able to report further on this in an unclassified fashion in future review reports.
Oversight, accountability and performance evaluation
2.125
The Committee requested that agency submissions address performance management and accountability, including any outcomes relevant to administration and expenditure for the reporting period.
2.126
There are a number of internal and external oversight and accountability mechanisms in place for each of the intelligence agencies to provide assurance to the Australian public of the legality and propriety of their activities. These mechanisms include:
Ministerial and Parliamentary accountability;
for ASIO, the Independent Reviewer of Adverse Security Assessments.
2.127
Agencies also regularly undertake, or are subject to, formal evaluations of their performance.
Ministerial authorisations and section 13B notices
2.128
Section 8 of the IS Act requires AGO, ASD and ASIS to obtain ministerial authorisation in order to undertake an activity for the purpose of producing intelligence on an Australian person or an activity that will, or is likely to, have a direct effect on an Australian person. The Minister specifies, in the form of a written direction, circumstances in which agencies must seek authorisation before undertaking other activities or classes of activities.
2.129
The Committee asked the relevant agencies to report on the number of ministerial authorisations issued (including class authorisations) and the number of activities undertaken under a ministerial authorisation, categorised by type.
2.130
AGO, ASD and ASIS provided information about the number of ministerial authorisations issued during the reporting periods. For the 2018-19 and 2019-20 periods ASD reported a slight increase in ministerial authorisations between the periods but with the number remaining relatively stable, AGO reported a decrease in ministerial authorisations across the two reporting periods, and ASIS reported an increase and then a decrease in ministerial authorisations.
2.131
Section 13B of the IS Act enables ASIS to support ASIO by undertaking an activity or series of activities to produce intelligence on an Australian person or class of Australian persons without ministerial authorisation. ASIS reported on the number of section 13B notices received from ASIO in the years to from 2016-17 to 2019–20. The number of section 13B notices is classified and cannot be reported by the Committee; however, across those reporting periods the number of ministerial authorisations fluctuated for both categories.
Performance evaluation
2.132
ONI identifies that it attempts to accurately measure, quantify and assess the quality and impact of its work. Qualitative and quantitative data to assess performance information is captured through:
engagement with the offices of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, and their departments;
feedback acquired from senior customers and stakeholders;
internal and IGIS reviews; and
analysing data regarding the use of its assessments.
2.133
COVID-19 presented challenges regarding analysis of open source material, which ONI outlined to the Committee in its submission and in classified hearing evidence.
2.134
ASIO establishes performance objectives for the forthcoming year in its corporate plan, in line with the requirements of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013. It monitors its performance against these objectives throughout the year and includes an assessment of whether objectives were met in an annual performance statement included in its annual report.
2.135
ASIO identified that for the 2018-19 reporting period it achieved six of the eight performance objectives, with two objectives within the ‘Countering espionage, foreign interference, sabotage and malicious insiders’ key activity being only partially achieved due to increased awareness and pressure for ASIO to respond during that period.
2.136
For the 2019-20 period the ASIO Annual Report identifies all key missions as being achieved. This is identified as being due to the effect of new legislative powers, as well as a focus on key services, whilst adapting to challenges as they arise.
2.137
ASD outlined the establishment and continued operation of its Audit and Risk Committee and the operation of its various committees that operate under the ASD Executive Committee to manage governance, performance and risk, as well as fraud management and conduct of internal audits to assess effectiveness.
2.138
ASIS has both internal and external measures in place to assist it to evaluate its performance. DIO described performance management and evaluation processes over the two reporting periods, including internal reviews and NIC governance reporting. AGO described its internal governance frameworks and performance outcome and results evaluation.
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
2.139
The IGIS is an independent statutory office holder with responsibility for reviewing the activities of the AIC agencies. Throughout the reporting periods for both reviews, the Hon Margaret Stone occupied the position of IGIS.
2.140
The IGIS describes her purpose as:
…to provide assurance that each intelligence agency acts legally and with propriety, complies with ministerial guidelines and directives, and respects human rights.
2.141
The IGIS undertakes ongoing inspection and monitoring activities to identify where intelligence agencies have deviated from these standards and where remedial actions may be required. She has the power to inquiry into an agency’s activities, either at her ‘own motion, at the request of a Minister, or in response to a complaints’.
2.142
The Committee sought a submission from the IGIS on any issues of administration and expenditure arising during the IGIS’s inspection and inquiry activities during the two reporting periods. The IGIS, or the Office’s representatives, appeared at classified hearings, during which the Committee sought additional information on inquiries and other inspections conducted during the reporting periods, either based on information in the IGIS’ submission or those raised directly by the agencies.
Major inquiries and inspection outcomes
2.143
In previous Review reports the Committee has outlined the inquiries and inspections that were reported by the IGIS. As these are all a matter of public record, in both the IGIS’ submissions to the reviews and in its Annual Report, the Committee will only outline the avenues of inquiry pursued with the IGIS as part of the Nos. 18 and 19 reviews.
2.144
In its submissions to the reviews, the IGIS highlighted the following inquiries and inspection related issues that the Committee pursued further under questioning:
an inquiry into ASIO’s conduct and the details around a multi-faceted, multi-agency foreign intelligence operation led by ASIO in 2017 that was identified in previous submissions and has been commented on before regarding internal compliance within ASIO;
an inquiry into unauthorised interception of telecommunications by ASD, launched in May 2018, but regarding conduct in June 2017;
an inquiry into allegations that ASIS officers had engaged in misconduct and fraud;
an inquiry relating to mental health support from an agency, resulting from a public interest disclosure made to the IGIS in May 2019, related to a review for cause process related to security clearance actions;
high levels of visa and citizenship related assessment complaints; and
improvements in ASIO compliance arrangements, as a result of the earlier mentioned inquiry in this list.
2.145
During the classified hearings held with the IGIS and representatives the Committee pursued questioning regarding the above inquiries, inspections and complaints and in all cases was satisfied that the agencies involved had responded appropriately to the IGIS’ actions and recommendations.
2.146
The improvements in ASIO’s compliance is noted, as the Committee had received evidence in recent years regarding the lack of an internal compliance unit at ASIO and will monitor the outcomes and improvements in future reviews.
2.147
The Committee did pursue some information with the IGIS and agencies regarding review for cause procedures, drawn to its attention by the mental health support inquiry undertaken by the IGIS, noting that the IGIS identified that review for cause procedures are being included in its programmed inspection schedule for 2020-21. The Committee will comment on this issue further at the end of this Chapter.
Independent Reviewer of Adverse Security Assessments
2.148
ASIO furnishes security assessments of individuals to Commonwealth agencies in accordance with the ASIO Act. A security assessment may be adverse, qualified or non-prejudicial.
2.149
The Independent Review of Adverse Security Assessments conducts reviews of ASIO adverse security assessments (ASA) furnished to the Department of Home Affairs on non-citizens who remain in immigration detention and have been found by the department to:
be owed protection obligations under international law; and
be ineligible for a visa or who have had their permanent protection visa cancelled because they are the subject of an ASA.
2.150
Mr Robert Cornall AO continued serving as the Independent Reviewer throughout the reporting periods.
2.151
The Independent Reviewer performs the functions outlined by examining:
all information ASIO relied on in making an ASA, as well as any other relevant material, such as submissions or representations made by the subject of an ASA; and
the overall security environment, which is informed by ASIO’s assessment of security threats and any changes to the circumstances or ideology of the individual subject to an ASA during their time in detention.
2.152
The Independent Reviewer may examine an ASA after it is issued and every 12 months for its duration.
2.153
ASIO advised the Committee that at 30 June 2019 there were two ASAs under consideration by the Independent Reviewer with two more referred during the 2019-20 reporting period.
2.154
For those five assessment reviews three were completed finding that the assessments were an appropriate outcome, though with a recommendation related to two of those assessments that ASIO consider certain circumstances when conducting internal reviews of ASAs.
2.155
The other two reviews were terminated during their conduct due to one being revised to a Qualified Security Assessment (outside the remit of the Independent Reviewer) and the other being withdrawn and replaced by a different ASA, which then had a fresh review initiated.
Public relations
2.156
The Committee requested agencies address public relations and public reporting in their submissions, including requests for public access to records.
2.157
ASIO noted that its Director-General of Security and Deputy Director-Generals are publically identified ASIO Officers and undertake public outreach through media responses, public speeches and appearances at various parliamentary forums.
2.158
ONI emphasised that with the transition from ONA to ONI, the agency took the opportunity to rebrand and expand media engagement and reported on increased interest in NIC-wide issues as well as engagement with the Director-General National Intelligence.
2.159
ASD outlined that throughout the two reporting periods, its public engagement increased as its role of a public-facing entity evolves. Through Senate Estimates appearances and through increasing media enquiries (186 and 228 in the two reporting periods) the public persona of the agency has been increasing, with the role of the ACSC in responding to information requests about cyber threats or incidents increasing during those periods. ASD also outlined that the Director-General of ASD made a number of public statements and speeches across the two years.
2.160
ASIS does not have a formal public relations function. The ASIS Director-General presented as a keynote speaker at the 2018 Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers regarding ASIS collaboration with science, technology and innovation capabilities.
2.161
For the purposes of the 2019-20 No. 19 Review, the ASIS Director-General advised the Committee of his decision pursuant to s.41(b)(ii) of the IS Act to publicly declare the identities of the two Deputy Directors-General of ASIS. This declaration is reflected in the official witness list for the classified hearings for these reviews from April 2021, and the Committee acknowledges the trust placed in the Administration and Expenditure Review process with the formal identification of Mr Fabio Meloni and Ms Catherine Burn through this mechanism.
2.162
DIO reported that it did not undertake any media liaison activities or public engagements during both reporting periods. However, it did publish its Defence Economic Trends in the Asia-Pacific 2018 on its website.
2.163
AGO advised that it responded to four media requests during the reporting period.
Requests for access to public records
2.164
All agencies examined as part of Administration and Expenditure reviews are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act 1982, but are subject to the release of records under the Archives Act 1983 (Archives Act), which enables the public to access Commonwealth records during an ‘open period’. Pursuant to section 40 of the Archives Act, any member of the public can request access to government records once they fall within the open period. In accordance with changes to the Archives Act implemented on 1 January 2011, the open period is currently transitioning from 30 years to 20 years. The open period for the end of the reporting periods for this report encompasses all records created before 1998 or 1999.
2.165
The Archives Act operates on the basis that as much information should be released as possible. Most records within the open period are eligible for public access and 98 per cent are wholly released. Very small percentages (less than .25 per cent) are wholly withheld because they consist of exempt information, as defined in section 33 of the Archive Act.
2.166
ASIO identified that during the 2018-19 reporting period 344 applications were made for access to its records and 410 requests were completed, with 334 and 399 respectively for the 2019-20 period. Each request resulted in the examination of thousands of pages of material.
2.167
ASIS advised that it responds to requests for access to records under the Archives Act. The number of requests and the volume of material involved varies from year to year, but as per previous Review reports, some processes continue to remain problematic.
2.168
ONI reported a continuing decline in Archives Act requests over the reporting periods, with a significant decline for the 2019-20 period.
2.169
DIO reported that it received 71 and 76 referrals to examine classified information during the reporting periods and that it processed and completed 85 and 72 of these requests in the periods.
2.170
AGO reported one public access request for the 2019-20 reporting period and one FOI request, processed in accordance with a Ministerial statement that AGO would apply FOI principles even though it is an exempt agency.
2.171
During the reporting periods ASD received requests for 24 and 15 records for 2018-19 and 2019-20 respectively. Ten of which were later cancelled and six completed for 2018-19 and four completed with the rest outstanding for 2019-20.
2.172
ASD also updated the Committee on the outcomes of a number of outstanding requests back to 2016-17, with the majority of outstanding requests being released without redactions following the completion of processing.
Committee comment
2.173
The Committee has reviewed the administration of the six relevant intelligence agencies for the 2018-19 and 2019-20 financial years and is generally satisfied that they are overseeing their administrative functions and administering their outcomes and outputs effectively.
2.174
The impact of COVID-19 on agencies was significant and whilst only affecting the operation of the agencies for the latter part of the 2019-20 reporting period, it became clear to the Committee that its longer term impact would be significant.
2.175
One particular element of administration of these agencies that hasn’t traditionally been investigated, or submission detail sought on, are support services to staff. The Committee has looked at statistics regarding complaints and administrative actions, but not the underlying causes of those events and actions and the support that agencies provide to their staff for those events, or even more generally.
2.176
The Committee received evidence from agencies at classified hearings regarding psychological support services for staff, mostly catalysed by the IGIS investigation into mental health support for staff undergoing a review for cause action, but also outlined in regard to support for staff during COVID-19’s initial operating impact. Whilst the particular case was discussed, the more general topic of support services and psychology support became an avenue of enquiry.
2.177
The Committee welcomed the indication from the IGIS that mental health and support is now ‘on our radar’, but also that agencies indicated the strong need for psychological support for staff and the critical role that plays in keeping important national security and intelligence functions operating at maximum capacity.
2.178
While the Committee received evidence of the key role that these services and the psychologists play, the Committee also received evidence that psychologists with requisite security clearances are a rare commodity, and that competing salary offers can cause agencies to play off against each other and cause supply issues for appropriately qualified practitioners, as well as inflate costs.
2.179
The Committee acknowledges the challenges that specialist support roles play in agencies with high pressure and sensitive work that may test the mental health of employees. The Committee also recognises that while agencies may want to attract the best talent with attractive salary offers, that denying one agency a specialist support service, whilst also increasing salary cost is not desirable.
2.180
The Committee considers that with the evolving enterprise management role that ONI is to fulfil, that there is merit for a shared psychological support service to be considered and supported within that agency’s remit, with access available to all NIC agencies, not just the ones reviewed by this Committee as part of this review. Creating a shared resource would not only allow for attraction of the best talent to a central service, but also allow for agencies to meet demand that their own internal services might not be able to meet during times of increased pressure.
2.181
Additionally, this shared service could be utilised to create career pathways for psychology post-graduate students to become organisational clinical psychologists with support for research and extended study in return for assured employment upon graduation. This study pathway could also be used as time for the recipients to get the requisite security clearance and other training, so they are ready to support staff upon commencement.
2.182
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government resource the Office of National Intelligence to consider the potential scope of a shared psychological support service for all National Intelligence Community agencies to access for mental health support of staff.
2.183
This shared service could be scoped in line with potential study support for psychology post-graduate students to become clinical practitioners within the support service upon completion of the supported study.
2.184
The Committee also pursued questioning at the classified hearings regarding the review for cause procedures that were the subject of the IGIS inquiry. The investigation of a current security clearance holder for areas of concern, to establish whether that holder is suitable to continue holding such a clearance is an avenue of administration that the Committee has not traditionally interrogated with agencies.
2.185
The Committee has taken an interest in the security clearance vetting processes of intelligence agencies for a number of years and is interested in interrogating review for causes processes in coming years, especially in relation to a perception that some agencies could ‘vet and forget’ staff and the ongoing threats that a staff member with grievances may pose to national security.
2.186
The Committee also pursued questioning with agencies regarding avenues of investigation and advice regarding staff complaints or concerns. Most agencies outlined in their submissions that complaints or concerns were investigated and resolved, but outside escalation to the IGIS, the Committee felt that only the presence of the ASIO and ASIS Ombudsman was a suitable alternate internal mechanism for staff and managers to seek support and advice.
2.187
The existence and support for the Ombudsman services provided to ASIO and ASIS staff is welcomed by the Committee, but the Committee believes that such support should be universal to all NIC agency staff. The Committee realises that the unique and classified nature of the work that the agencies under review by the Committee, and across the wider NIC, challenges existing Commonwealth Ombudsman services, but the Committee believes that there is merit in replicating the existing service model that ASIS and ASIO have in place for the NIC as a whole. The Committee recommends the government consider whether this could be done by creating specialist service capability within the Commonwealth Ombudsman or creating a NIC Ombudsman for staff support and advice, potentially under the auspices of ONI.
2.188
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate the establishment of a staff support advice Ombudsman service for access by employees of all National Intelligence Community agencies.
2.189
In line with the discussion in the Committee’s report for Review No. 17 (2017-18), the Committee continued to receive evidence that requests for information under the Archives Act from a small number of applicants are having a continued impact on agencies’ resources by requesting significant volumes of information and appealing decisions with the AAT and the court system.
2.190
As stated in previous reports, the Committee supports the increased transparency which accompanies public access to historical records. However, it is still mindful that transparency must be balanced with preserving the confidentiality of sensitive information and with the efficient use of public resources.
2.191
It is the Committee’s continued view that the current resourcing impact of the Archives Act on intelligence agencies is both undesirable and unsustainable. As are the more serious risks arising from agencies defending a decision not to release sensitive material within the AAT or the court system, as this can create an avenue for inadvertent release of other sensitive information, or just frustrating the parties involved.
2.192
In its last report the Committee stated that it hoped this issue would be addressed by the Richardson Review. However, this review did not address these ongoing appeal issues, rather focusing on protection of identities and closed hearing processes.
2.193
The Committee has heard evidence in the past suggesting class-based exemptions for particular intelligence, or longer ‘closed access’ periods for sensitive information, that would potentially address ongoing appeals and the associated resourcing and expenditure. However, the Richardson Review report did not support exemptions or the lengthening of closed access and the Government response agreed with the review’s recommendations.
2.194
The Committee notes the ongoing effect that appeals from a small number of individuals has created, and whilst recognising the recommendations of the Richardson Review and the Government’s response, the Committee believes that repeated and consistent requests and appeals from these individuals is unduly diverting resources away from agency missions.
2.195
Therefore the Committee considers that consideration of creation of a mechanism to enable NIC agencies to have an Archives Act applicant and appellant declared vexatious is appropriate. This mechanism could be based on the existing declarations available under Part VIII, Division 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. Alternately, if this is not supported by Government that additional resourcing be provided to address ongoing and persistent applications and appeals.
2.196
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate the creation of a mechanism to enable National Intelligence Community agencies to apply to have an individual who lodges persistent and repeated applications and appeals for access to historical ‘open access’ material under the Archives Act 1983 to be declared vexatious. This mechanism could be created in similar terms to those provided under Part VIII, Division 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982.
2.197
Alternately, if the above is not supported, then the Committee recommends that additional resourcing be provided to National Intelligence Community agencies that identify these issues in Budget bids, to address ongoing and persistent applications and appeals.
2.198
The Committee noted the repeated identified workload that the Office of the IGIS is continuing to experience regarding delays in visa application processing by the Department of Home Affairs when an ASIO security assessment is required.
2.199
Whilst the IGIS is not an agency that the Committee examines formally in relation to Administration and Expenditure reviews, the information that the IGIS provides is invaluable to the Committee’s considerations, and it is again a concern that resources are being diverted to looking at a high number of complaints that have been found to be overwhelmingly without any illegality or impropriety (the only grounds that the IGIS can investigate in relation to these complaints). Given the IGIS reported that it received 750 and 300 complaint for the 2018-19 and 2019-20 reporting periods, the majority of which related to the time taken to process, this is a significant impost on that agency.
2.200
As noted above, the Committee is interested to see if the revised process that the IGIS has adopted regarding these complaints will make a difference to complaints received. The Committee looks forward to receiving information on this in future reviews.
2.201
The Committee heard mixed reporting from agencies regarding separation of staff, the reasons for those separations and the mechanisms available for those staff to return if desired.
2.202
Whilst the Committee acknowledges that certain skillsets of intelligence agency employees are attractive to private industry and that salary offers will often not be able to be matched, the Committee also received evidence at a classified hearing that other benefits can also be a consideration for staff, either in retention or return. One such benefit outlined is access to paternity leave for employees wishing to take extended paid leave to be the primary carer of a child, equal to that available to female employees.
2.203
The agency identified that they are working with the Australian Public Service Commission and other NIC agencies to develop opportunities and flexibility in this regard. The Committee welcomes this identification of alternate option investigation and looks forward to receiving more information in future reviews.