Introduction
4.1
Through various representations from diaspora groups in Australia, the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (the Committee) became aware of widespread concerns regarding interference by foreign governments, including instances concerning international students enrolled in Australian educational institutions.
4.2
The Committee held a public hearing on 13 September 2021 to examine these concerns. The program and transcript from the hearing is available from the Committee’s website, and this chapter has been prepared to enable the Committee to report a summary of the matters discussed.
4.3
The Committee sought to provide an opportunity for invited representatives, including members of diasporas, academia, government and non-governmental organisations, to participate in a discussion of these concerns facing diaspora communities in Australia.
4.4
Due COVID-19 precautions, the public hearing was largely conducted virtually, with government witnesses the only invitees to attend in person.
4.5
The issues raised by witnesses are of particular interest and concern to Committee, as are the effects on diaspora communities within Australia. The Committee acknowledges the contribution of witnesses to the discussion at this public hearing and thanks them for their participation.
4.6
The program, witness list and full transcript of the public hearing roundtable held on 13 September 2021 is available via the Committee’s website: www.aph.gov.au/jfadt.
Foreign interference in Australia's multicultural communities
4.7
At the public hearing, the Committee heard evidence of foreign interference in Australia's multicultural communities. This included, but is not limited to, claims of surveillance, harassment and intimidation.
4.8
Mr Neil Hawkins, Acting First Assistant Secretary, East Asia Division, of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) outlined the department’s approach to reports of interference in Australian communities:
We take these reports seriously and we have, on occasion, conveyed our concerns directly to Chinese officials as well as to Cambodian officials. When we receive reports of potential foreign interference, harassment or intimidation, our approach is to ensure community members are aware of the support available to them, including through the National Security Hotline, the police, the local Crime Stoppers network or the Department of Home Affairs' Foreign Interference Coordination Centre.
4.9
DFAT encouraged ‘people to report their concerns and fears through the appropriate mechanisms’ such as the National Security Hotline and that ‘if they are worried for their own safety, they should be reporting it to the police.'
4.10
Mr Patrick Hallinan, the Assistant Secretary of the Counter Foreign Interference Policy Branch at DFAT, detailed the role of the Counter Foreign Interference (CFI) Taskforce:
That is a taskforce which comprises ASIO, the Australian police and a number of intelligence agencies. They are really the body that is primarily charged with investigating foreign interference related offences, and I understand that in doing that they also engage with state and territory police … Certainly, the CFI Task Force are actively investigating potential foreign interference offences, and, where they find there is sufficient evidence, they'll bring forward charges. They also undertake a range of other activities to deal with instances of foreign interference if indeed an evidentiary threshold is not met.
Representations from diaspora groups
4.11
Ms Elaine Pearson, the Australian Director of Human Rights Watch detailed that it had ‘become aware of examples of surveillance, harassment and intimidation within a number of diaspora communities in Australia’, and stated:
We have documented how Ethiopian Australians and Rwandan Australians have had family members back home arrested, detained and in one case disappear because of the peaceful activities of family members here in Australia. Those from Myanmar and Cambodia and Uighurs have told us how some people in their communities feel unsafe participating in events or protests here in Australia.
4.12
Human Rights Watch outlined that the political affairs of people’s place of origin when immigrating to Australia often follow them even if they had not been previously politically active:
A lot of these people did not necessarily take political stances in their own country. They've come to Australia and found that the repressive architecture of that state has effectively followed them here. In a number of cases, they tried to report these incidents to police, but the police said, 'Because the intimidation has occurred offshore, in a different country, there's not much we can actually do about that.'
4.13
Ms Pearson raised the need for spreading awareness amongst diverse diaspora groups and tertiary institutions, in order to help these communities become ‘aware of what are acts of intimidation and harassment and what are the steps that individuals can take to report such activity.’
4.14
Human Rights Watch detailed that the proliferation and advancement of technology has made ‘harassment and intimidation across borders’ easier via ‘photo and video surveillance and the monitoring of social media accounts.’
4.15
Ms Sophie McNeill, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, highlighted that this harassment and intimidation does not often ‘meet the criminal threshold that the AFP would require’. Ms McNeill stressed it is important for students who need somewhere to seek support to know ‘that their universities care about these topics.’
Vietnamese Australians
4.16
Dr Phong Nguyen, a representative of Viet Tan, detailed that the Vietnamese Government has ‘intensified its crackdown on human rights defenders’ as well as ‘targeted foreign nationals of Vietnamese descent.’
4.17
Mr Than Nguyen, Secretary of the Human Rights Relief Foundation, outlined the risks posed to Vietnamese Australians. Mr Nguyen stated ‘making a comment critical of the regime … could be very dangerous’ as ‘any Vietnamese Australian returning to Vietnam for a visit could be arrested for making such comments.’
4.18
Dr Nguyen elaborated further on the harassment Vietnamese Australians are experiencing and who ‘are sometimes afraid to speak out’:
People who go back to Vietnam have been shown pictures of them attending rallies in Australia and attending meetings in Australia. They have been threatened that their relatives in Vietnam will be implicated if they continue to do so. Not only that, they can be detained and interrogated and then harassed and intimidated. Then they will be asked, when they come back to Sydney, Melbourne or wherever they live, to report back on the activities over here, to report back on people who are heavily involved in such activities.
4.19
Ms Janice Le, a representative from Voice Australia and the Vietnamese Australian Lawyers’ Association, detailed measures used by the Vietnamese Government to harass students studying in Australia:
I understand that the Vietnamese government maintain a database for the management of Vietnamese citizens studying overseas through the Department of International Cooperation. Undoubtedly they would monitor the activities of the students studying overseas, whether they're in Australia or in other countries. When they return to Vietnam—and, of course, their activities will be monitored—and if they were involved in any activities that are considered as anti-state, the lesser consequences include that they won't be able to obtain work from the qualifications that they've attained in Australia or in any other countries. The worst-case scenarios would include that they would be arrested and questioned, and probably detained, over the activities that they did in Australia.
4.20
Ms Le explained that foreign harassment extends beyond students to include members of Australia’s federal parliament:
I understand one of the federal MPs … who made a speech at one of our forums and spoke as a member of parliament, said that when he went back to Vietnam, he was still being followed by Vietnamese security. So that says that they're monitoring not just Australians of Vietnamese descent but also any member of parliament who has actually raised issues about human rights in Vietnam.
Cambodian Australians
4.21
Mr Youhorn Chea, the President of the Cambodia Association of Victoria recommended the following to the Sub Committee:
…the government should refuse visas for political agents to the Cambodian government who engage in the intimidation of community members in Australia, increase the monitoring of the activities of the Cambodian government and its embassy in Australia, undertake an independent review of the Australian rewards scholarship to ensure transparency and a merit based selection process, and support the efficacy of the Cambodian community leaders in Australia.
Chinese interference
4.22
Mr Nurmuhammad Majid, President of the East Turkistan Australian Association, outlined the human rights abuses in Xinjiang:
…the current, ongoing deterioration of Turkestan under the outrageous Chinese regime, especially since 2017, with the establishment of the multiple detention facilities all around East Turkestan, which detain more than one million innocent Uighur citizens around the country, according to international accounts. This number could be reaching five to eight million according to Uighur scholars living overseas. This overall situation has given a mountainous amount of pressure and other types of agonies to the Uighurs living in Australia and other parts of the world, causing huge mental problems, social problems, financial problems and family problems.
4.23
Mr Majid was appreciative of the Australian Government ‘acknowledging the human rights violations committed by the Chinese government’ but demanded more be done:
…there have been more than 40 Australian permanent residents or citizens, or family members of Australian citizens or permanent visa holders, who still are trapped in East Turkestan or different parts of China, who are unable to leave or depart under the Chinese regime. We urge the Australian government to take a positive step to rescue those Uighurs, those Uighur families…
4.24
Mr Majid also called on the Australian Government to ‘increase or give priority to accepting some of the Uighur refugees living in third countries to be able to settle in Australia under the humanitarian program.’
4.25
Dr Lucy Zhao, President of the Falun Dafa Association of Australia, outlined Chinese interference in Australia as well as extensive subversive acts taken to subdue the Falung Gong movement in Australia:
Australian citizens and residents have been monitored and harassed by the agents and the Chinese consulate, and their family members in China have been intimidated, arrested or even sent to labour camp or prison and not allowed to come to Australia to reunite with their family members … and, of course, there is the harassment of and discrimination against Falun Gong practitioners in Australia. The list goes on.
4.26
Mr Majid stated that ‘Chinese authorities are using modern technologies to monitor the activism, the speech and the connections of the Australian Uighurs’. Mr Majid elaborated that those ‘who spoke against China openly’ risk having their family members in China being ‘taken and imprisoned for long-terms’. Mr Majid advised:
Uighur parents in China with only one child living in Australia or other family members who are living in China face intimidation, harassment and direct calls or messages from Chinese security agents.
4.27
Mr Majid also detailed that ‘the Chinese United Front people who are working for the Chinese interests in this country—the Chinese consulate, Chinese embassy’ are interfering directly in Australia’s communities and politics via:
…infiltrating other organisations, or government or individual business bodies, in Australia, to promote the negative aspects of the Uighurs living in China, in East Turkestan. They're just promoting the propaganda mission of the CCP regime, purposefully affecting the East Turkestan community living in this free and democratic country in a way that means we become more vulnerable, unacknowledged by the wider Australian community. There are lots of Australian politicians, Australian media institutions and Australian academics who are still supporting the Chinese repression of the Uighur communities in East Turkestan, plus in Australia.
4.28
Mr Kalsang Tipnak, President of the ACT Tibetan Community, detailed that ‘Chinese state entities and Chinese individuals or Chinese backed entities or businesses, increase their influence on the Australian domestic politicians’. These Chinese assets are then used to ‘silence Australian politicians from speaking out about the human rights situation in Tibet or in East Turkestan or in Hong Kong.’
4.29
Mr Tipnak contended these attempts at foreign interference extend beyond Australia’s politicians, stating that China also attempts to ‘influence communities in Australia by establishing proxy groups, often led by minority groups’ as well as undermine ‘the unity of minority groups like the Tibetan community and sabotage the Tibetan freedom movement by spreading false information on the internet or in social media.’
4.30
Ms Rigzen Wangmo, Secretary of the Newcastle Tibetan Community, stated that ‘[e]ven though we're living in Australia, in a free country, we never stop living in fear of being threatened. We can't raise our voice, because of our people in Tibet.’
4.31
Dr Zoe Bedford, Executive Officer at the Australia Tibet Council, emphasised the pressure people face with relatives living in China and its occupied territories:
One of the primary threats that people feel is that they have to exercise self-censorship, otherwise they might risk their family members. Also, it's not just speaking out publicly about human rights abuses. Even just making phone calls to family, contacting family or trying to get visas for family can actually put their family members under threat, yes.
Australian Government engagement
4.32
As an overview of the Australian Government’s activities to promote and protect human rights in China, and the rights of members of diaspora communities in Australia, DFAT detailed the ‘three levels of engagement’ it undertakes:
1
The first is on the international side, where the foreign minister has consistently made clear our grave concerns about the human rights situation in China. Be it in a joint statement a few months ago with our New Zealand counterpart or in the UN General Assembly or in the Human Rights Council, we have been a prominent voice in bringing international attention to our concerns about the treatment of Uighurs, Tibetans and Falun Gong, amongst others, in China.
2
On the bilateral level, between us directly, we also have regular meetings with our Chinese counterparts, either here or in Beijing. When we have evidence or concerns, we raise these concerns specifically with our Chinese counterparts in a bilateral manner.
3
On the third level, we, of course, meet regularly with these communities to hear firsthand what their experience is and then to transmit that to the officials here and inform the international position which we take with other countries as well.
4.33
After detailing this engagement, Mr Hawkins of DFAT acknowledged that ‘for those involved it's not bringing success fast enough, and of course there's a limited amount that we can do in another country.’
Foreign interference in Australian tertiary institutions
4.34
Human Rights Watch stated that ‘Australian universities have failed to protect the academic freedom of students from China and of academics who criticise the Chinese Communist Party.’ Ms McNeill emphasised that this has left students and staff ‘vulnerable to harassment and intimidation by Chinese government supporters.’
4.35
Ms McNeill stated that ’both students from China and academics who work on China have adopted self-censorship as the most common strategy to avoid threats, harassment and surveillance.’ Ms McNeill stressed this approach was driven by ‘fear that what they did in Australia could result in Chinese authorities punishing their families back home’.
4.36
Ms Catriona Jackson, the Chief Executive from Universities Australia, rebuffed these assertions made by Human Rights Watch:
With my hand on my heart, as the chief executive of the peak body, I have not seen universities in any sense turning a blind eye. These issues are highly complex. What I've seen is university leadership groups engaging with students, urging them to come forward when there are problems, going to ASIO, going to the security agencies to seek advice about how to deal with hugely complex issues that go to escalating geopolitical tension. I have not seen any undue influence…
Australia Government responses
4.37
The Department of Home Affairs discussed guidelines produced in late 2019 by the University Foreign Interference Taskforce (UFIT). These guidelines were designed to help counter foreign interference in Australia's university sector and to help Australian universities address risks associated with maligned foreign actors.
4.38
The Department of Home Affairs explained that work is currently underway to update these guidelines and that the UFIT steering group had agreed that the updated guidelines should be expanded to address issues on university campuses.
4.39
Ms Cath Patterson from the Department of Home Affairs’ UFIT advised that the next iteration of guidelines:
…will look in much more concrete terms at what measures can be taken to prevent harassment and intimidation and to give both students and staff mechanisms to report those incidents. So there has been quite a shift in emphasis over the last couple of years since we first worked on the guidelines, and the HRW report has been very helpful in that regard.
4.40
Professor Deborah Terry, Deputy Chair for the UFIT, emphasised that it has taken steps to ensure foreign interference is known among international students to be illegal as well as reportable:
We've worked with our international student associations and our international student leaders on our campuses. We've made public statements, as have many of our institutions, that students should not be penalised for expressing their personal or political views. A number of different actions have been taken at individual universities in response to the issues that were raised through the Human Rights Watch report.
4.41
Ms Pearson stated that the ‘previous guidelines did not really deal with these types of threats to academic freedom’ but noted that ‘we have been reassured that … the task force is committed to ensuring that these issues will be addressed going forward.’
4.42
A number of witnesses, including Human Rights Watch, Dr Nguyen as a representative of Viet Tan, Mr Youhorn Chea, the President of the Cambodia Association of Victoria, Ms Sue Coffey and Dr Zoe Bedford from the Australia Tibet Council, called on the Australian Government to take legislative action to prevent such behaviour being carried out against Australians. Human Rights Watch stated:
The government should be taking steps to protect all diaspora communities from intimidation and harassment, and that includes calling out those governments that threaten, harass or intimidate people residing in Australia or their relatives abroad. This is also why we need a targeted sanctions law on human rights grounds like the US global Magnitsky act, something that the government has not yet taken action on but that I know this committee recommended last year.
4.43
Human Rights Watch made the following recommendations to the Committee:
[That the Australian Government] publish annually a report documenting incidents of harassment, intimidation and censorship affecting international students at Australian universities, and steps taken by the universities to counter those threats; and to establish a mechanism so students at Australian universities can report harassment, intimidation, pressures of censorship or self-censorship and acts of retaliation involving foreign governments; and
[That the University Foreign Interference Taskforce] examine as a priority the harassment, intimidation, censorship and self-censorship of students and academics from China or working on China; and to ensure that the new UFIT guidelines for universities on foreign interference take these issues into account.
Tertiary-led responses
4.44
Human Rights Watch welcomed initiatives from Australian universities in creating deterrents:
We've been really pleased to see leadership in the sector, to ensure that students know that they can come to them and that they do care, because we certainly think that laying down a firm line and providing some deterrents will go a long way towards stopping some of this behaviour. The problem has been that there haven't been any deterrents from many universities and that has allowed this behaviour to flourish in some circumstances.
4.45
Human Rights Watch highlighted that combatting this abusive behaviour is a collective responsibility:
…we do worry that if the universities think that it's the security agencies' remit, and the agencies don't think that it meets their threshold, then these issues will continue to fall through the cracks.
4.46
Human Rights Watch also recommended that Australian universities and vice-chancellors:
…speak out publicly when specific incidents of harassment or censorship occur, to encourage reporting of these incidents and educate students how to do so, and to encourage and implement practical best practices for teaching staff.
Committee comment
4.47
The Committee thanks all participants in the public hearing for raising these concerns and discussing possible initiatives to ensure that future action can be taken to address matters of foreign interference.
4.48
The Committee acknowledges the efforts of the Australian Government and university sector to combat foreign interference within diaspora communities and the tertiary sector.
4.49
The Committee remains concerned about the prevalence of this foreign interference, as well as the significant toll it takes on the mental health and wellbeing of members of diaspora communities.
4.50
The Committee welcomes the release in November 2021 of the updated UFIT guidelines, designed to secure universities from foreign interference while maintaining the openness needed for a robust university sector.
4.51
The Committee notes that there is awareness of the severity of the impacts on individuals and communities, and supports the continuing efforts of the Australian Government and tertiary institutions to address foreign interference in Australia.
4.52
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with Australian universities to apply the November 2021 University Foreign Interference Taskforce Guidelines and publish annually a report documenting incidents of harassment, intimidation and censorship affecting international students at Australian universities, and steps taken by the universities to counter those threats.
4.53
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with Australian universities under the November 2021 University Foreign Interference Taskforce Guidelines to establish a mechanism for students at Australian universities to safely report harassment, intimidation, pressures of censorship or self-censorship, and acts of retaliation involving foreign governments.