5. Space Environment

5.1
Access to space-based capabilities is critical to a broad range of Australian sectors including agriculture, telecommunications, financial services and meteorology. It also underpins the operational effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force.1 A consequence of this dependency is that Australia has a strong interest in maintaining a stable, secure, resilient and safe space environment.2
5.2
The Committee explored three key themes related to the space environment – Australia’s ability to access space and defend space assets, tracking and monitoring what is happening in space, and protecting the space environment more generally.

International regulation of the space environment

5.3
Exploration and use of the space environment is subject to a range of national and international regulations. As discussed in Chapter 4, launch and return activities are regulated under the Space Activities Act 1998 and the Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 and associated rules.3
5.4
Australia is a party to five international treaties related to the exploration and use of outer space, which are administered by the United Nations (UN). These include the:
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the ‘Outer Space Treaty’) (entered into force for Australia in 1967)
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the ‘Rescue Agreement’) (entered into force for Australia in 1986)
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the ‘Liability Convention’) (entered into force for Australia in 1975)
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the ‘Registration Convention’) (entered into force for Australia in 1986)
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the ‘Moon Agreement’) (entered into force for Australia in 1986).4
5.5
The Outer Space Treaty is the key treaty that outlines the ‘overarching conditions of how countries will operate in space’.5 This includes the principles that the exploration and use of space ‘shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries’ and that states ‘shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects’. It also prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies.6
5.6
Some evidence to the inquiry suggested that space is a relatively unregulated environment or that rules and regulations are not keeping pace with the reality that space is now accessible to more nations and, increasingly, private entities. For example, Air Vice-Marshal Catherine Roberts, Head of Air Force Capability at the Department of Defence, explained that:
Space doesn't have the same regulation system that we have for international airspace or the law of the sea. It has some treaties but they are not in detail. So we need to do some more ... in defining what is right and wrong in space.7
5.7
Air Commodore Nicholas Hogan, Director General Space Domain Review at the Department of Defence suggested that a ‘grey zone’ was emerging regarding the responsible use of space as a result of space becoming more accessible due to new and cheaper technologies.8
5.8
The emerging distance between the legal framework and the modern space environment was also raised by other submitters. The ASA explained that the international legal framework for space activities, which was established between the 1960s and the 1980s, ‘was built in a very different technological and strategic environment’.9 Northrop Grumman made a similar point:
A cooperative, rules-based international space governance regime is essential to realise all the benefits that space assets provide. However, the dated nature of existing treaties often leaves many new space activities unaccounted for or allows actors to operate under wide-ranging interpretations of existing agreements.10
5.9
International law plays an essential role in the regulation of outer space activities, placing downward pressure on nations to ensure their activities are conducted in a safe, responsible and lawful manner. 11 The SLCANZ argued that Australia should continue to participate in international forums to ‘clarify how international law impacts private activities in outer space, while also seeking to develop enforceable and internationally agreed norms of behaviour'.12 This theme resonates throughout the chapter.

Changing nature of the space environment

5.10
The space environment was characterised as becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive.13 In this context, ‘congested’ refers to the amount of space infrastructure and debris orbiting the earth; ‘contested’ refers to the range of potential threats—including deliberate disruption to space infrastructure and services such as satellites—posed by adversaries; and ‘competitive’ refers to the number of countries and commercial entities vying for access to and control of space and its resources.

Congestion and space debris

5.11
The Committee heard that low-earth orbits (LEO), which are generally defined as Earth-centred orbits with an altitude of 2,000 kilometres or less, are becoming congested due to the growing accessibility of space and the rapid increase in satellite launches. The SIAA noted that ‘ten per cent of the current 2,500 satellites in low earth orbit were launched in the past 12 months and there are plans to deploy more than 10,000 additional satellites in coming years’.14
5.12
Viasat, a communications company, said that over 1,000 satellites were launched into LEO in the past year and that this number was expected to increase in future years.15 In particular, it highlighted proposals for ‘mega-constellations consisting of many thousands of satellites’ and suggested that these constellations ‘threaten[ed] to preclude continued access to both finite orbits and spectrum for many types of satellite networks’.16 Potential environmental harms caused by mega-constellations - such as ozone depletion, light pollution and collusions - were highlighted.17
5.13
Viasat argued for national regulators to define and enforce policies to secure safe space environments. It noted that unless policymakers hold operators accountable there is a serious risk that LEO will be unusable for decades.
Mr Mark Dankberg, Executive Chairman, Viasat told the Committee:
These problems can be avoided with licensing conditions for access to each individual country and ensure shared, fair, competitive access. We don't have to accept those consequences. Innovative new systems can deliver better service, ensure space sustainability and allow all nations to compete and fairly earn their place in the new economy. National regulators have the power to ensure the systems they allow to serve their countries are not a threat to their own national interests or to space safety and that multiple actors can share critical spaces.18
5.14
Increasingly congested and contested orbits was one of six strategic risks identified by the SIAA which could ‘block or undermine’ the growth of Australia’s space industry. It explained that:
Space domain awareness, space weather prediction, space traffic management, and international spectrum management and licensing are becoming more complex and critical for Australia's space industry.19
5.15
In addition to congestion due to satellites, the Committee heard about a significant increase in the amount of debris—sometimes referred to as ‘space junk’ or ‘space pollution’—orbiting the earth. For example, Viasat said there are over 900,000 pieces of orbital debris greater than 1 centimetre in diameter in space.20 Similarly, Dr Muhammad Akbar Hussain, Founder of the Southern Cross Outreach Observatory Project (SCOOP), told the Committee:
As more and more countries and companies are getting into the space industry, with every launch and deployment of satellites there's going to be more junk in space, naturally, as part of the deployment. … It's estimated that the space debris of greater than 10 centimetres in size numbers over 50,000 or 60,000, maybe even more, and that space debris between one and 10 centimetres in size is close to a million.21
5.16
According to NASA, LEO is now viewed as the world’s largest garbage dump. This is because the problem of space junk – which is close to 6,000 tons of materials - is so extensive and so expensive to remove.22 Several submitters explained that space debris poses significant risks to the continued use of the space environment. Northrop Grumman observed that most space debris ‘moves fast and can reach speeds of over 25,000 kilometres per hour’.23 It noted that:
Due to the rate of speed and volume of debris in LEO, current and future space-based services, explorations and operations pose a safety risk to both people and important property and capabilities that we rely on in space and on Earth.24
5.17
While relatively small debris (1 to 10 centimetres in diameter) can not be detected or tracked easily, it can still ‘destroy a functioning satellite or even a human space mission’.25 The ASA noted that collisions between spacecraft and orbital debris could ‘pose a risk to assets and life’.26
5.18
Some submitters referred to a theory known as the ‘Kessler Syndrome’ to describe the effects of space debris. This theory holds that collisions between objects in space generate debris that increases the likelihood of future collisions, leading to a cascading effect which could threaten the continued use of the space environment.27 Viasat argued that:
Much like the climate crisis today on Earth, we face a mounting level of space junk that, unlike pollution on land, could become all but impossible to repair resulting in dramatic consequences for all space-faring nations limiting continued access to space for government, commercial, and human exploration purposes.28
5.19
Given the volume and threat posed by space debris, there were calls to address this compounding issue domestically and internationally. For example, Mr Henry Strong argued the ‘need for regulatory solutions to be adopted on the international level is mounting rapidly’.29

Box 5.1

Boeing Australia provided a profile of one of its employees to showcase achievements within the industry:
Sarah Mecklem, Autonomous Systems Research Engineer
Sarah started her career in space with a Bachelor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering focused on space-related content.30 She has been with Boeing since 2016, when she joined as an intern.31 Currently studying a PhD in scramjet technology (a key enabler for reusable space platforms), Sarah truly is a rocket scientist.32
Sarah has always dreamt of engineering a system that exits our atmosphere, acknowledging that it is the challenge to design something that can operate without human intervention for years that motivates and excites her.33 More broadly, Sarah is watching with interest as the Australian space industry starts to develop local low-earth orbit/small satellite capabilities.34 Sarah states that ‘Australia has a unique combination of innovative minds and geographic capability to catapult our domestic space capabilities, such as ground and LEO observation. [She] would love for Australia to be moving towards a domestic launch capacity.’35

Contest and competition in space

5.20
Australia’s defence is reliant on space-based capabilities.36 Northrop Grumman noted that the Australian Government’s 2020 Force Structure Plan recognises space as ‘a war-fighting domain in its own right, joining sea, land, air and cyber’.37
5.21
The Committee heard about the growing strategic contest between nations with space-based capabilities. In its submission, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) referred to space as a ‘warfighting domain’ and described the use of space by the military:
Space is contested. Although it is a global common, it is not a sanctuary that sits serene, distant, and untouched by intensifying geopolitical rivalry below. Space has been militarised since the 1960s with the deployment of satellites to support nuclear command and control and missile early warning. The growing sophistication of space capabilities in orbit, together with more advanced information-enabled military forces on and over the Earth have seen the role of space capabilities in supporting military forces proliferate vertically, as space systems provide new types of support, and horizontally, as more and more states can ‘plug and play’ with space capabilities. In doing so, space has become a ‘centre of gravity’ for military forces, against which an opponent can direct his military effort to deny us a decisive advantage.38
5.22
ASPI highlighted the risk posed by the deliberate use of ‘counter-space capabilities’ (anti-satellite weapons), noting that the development of these capabilities could challenge Australia’s ability to ensure access to vital space-based capabilities in a future crisis.39 The SIAA also noted the risk of counter-space technologies and the persistent threat of cyber interference to the growth of the space industry.40
5.23
The ASA argued that geostrategic competition in space is ‘intensifying’, and noted the development of capabilities to disrupt, degrade and exploit satellites and other space-dependent systems.41 Air Vice-Marshal Catherine Roberts, also indicated that defence has ‘got to be very aware’ of anti-satellite capabilities being developed by other nations and said that Australia has a role in calling out ‘unacceptable behaviour’:
We've got to call it out when [other nations] start doing things that we don't think are responsible in space. It's a bit like a global rules based order. That is our aim at the moment: to really call out any unacceptable behaviour.42
5.24
In light of the rapidly changing space environment, submitters and witnesses highlighted a range of opportunities for Australia to maintain and strengthen its access to important space-based capabilities. These included further developing Australia’s space domain awareness and space tracking capabilities, and strengthening international engagement to promote the responsible use of space.

Space domain awareness

5.25
A strong theme in evidence to the inquiry related to the opportunity for Australia to build on its existing capabilities in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Domain Awareness (SDA).
5.26
Situational space awareness is one of the seven national civil space priorities identified in the Australian Government’s Advancing Space: Australian Civil Space Strategy 2019-2028.43 The ASA explained that SSA ‘assists with the management of orbital resources, ensuring that orbits which are valuable for space-based services remain available for use’. Situational domain awareness was described as a ‘broader concept’ involving ‘the ability to identify, characterise and understand factors that affect the space domain’.44
5.27
The SmartSat CRC submitted that SDA was one of four key space capabilities. It explained that while SDA ‘has historically been the preserve of the military’:
... with increasing commercial interest in space, an element of SDA, namely Space Traffic Management, is emerging as a national/international capability to ensure space remains a global commons capable of continuing to deliver benefit to all as it becomes increasingly congested.45
5.28
The University of Tasmania also noted the importance of SDA for both civil and defence purposes.46
5.29
The Committee heard that Australia has a history and expertise in SDA, particularly space tracking. The Committee inspected some of these tracking facilities at its site visits throughout the inquiry and received evidence from station and program operators.
5.30
Australia hosts two deep-space tracking stations operated by the CSIRO on behalf of the European Space Agency and NASA, as well as other antennas capable of tracking space craft.47 Similarly, Lockheed Martin operates the Uralla satellite ground station near Armidale in New South Wales, which provides telemetry and tracking to support satellite launches. It also operates the FireOPAL ground-based sensor system to track space debris.48 Mr Rod Drury from Lockheed Martin explained that FireOPAL is:
... a sovereign space domain awareness technology that is Australian designed, built and operated. The system, jointly developed with Curtin University, cost-effectively tracks satellites and space debris, utilising a lot of commercial off-the-shelf hardware. We can observe and track satellites in all orbits, from low earth to geosynchronous.49
5.31
Other examples of Australia’s SDA capability were highlighted by EOS and ANU InSpace. EOS explained that its ‘autonomous space laser tracking system is the only one of its kind globally, providing 24/7 awareness and collision risk reduction.50
5.32
ANU InSpace hosts the Centre for Space Situational Awareness Research, which aims to incentivise responsible behaviour in space. It does this:
... through the establishment of the first open-source data system for tracking and identifying orbiting objects, tracking compliance with national and international space debris mitigation norms, freedom from interference, and sustainable space activities.51
5.33
The Committee was interested to hear about some local proposals related to space debris tracking including SCOOP and the Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club. The SCOOP is proposing to establish a network of mobile observatories for the purpose of detecting and tracking space debris. Dr Muhammad Akbar Hussain, Founder of SCOOP, explained that the network would be based on its existing mobile observatory:
Nearly five years ago we designed, constructed and executed the operation of Australia's first purpose-built mobile astronomical observatory for astronomy outreach in remote communities. Today we see the immense potential of this concept ... not just as an educational tool but also in its application in space situational awareness for tracking and cataloguing space debris with high accuracy.52
5.34
The key advantage of this proposal is that in overcast conditions, mobile observatories could be rapidly redeployed to locations with clear skies, thereby maintaining seamless operation of the network. Dr Hussain told the Committee:
Australia is perhaps the largest piece of land with flat topography, clear skies and low light pollution where such a network of mobile observatories could be established. That could make Australia a global leader in space situational awareness and in mitigating of the debris problem. ... These mobile observatories, of course, will be connected to each other in real time, actually turning the entire continent of Australia into a single giant instrument.53
5.35
Dr Hussain said his proposal aimed to detect and track space debris of between one and ten centimetres in size, which he described as ‘a dark area’ currently, and noted the potential for this information to assist space agencies and organisations with SDA more broadly.54
5.36
Dr Ray Hare from the Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club shared with the Committee the club’s citizen science project that involves investigating the viability of tracking objects in orbit using commercially available cameras, with observers in both the United Kingdom and Australia:
The experiment is designed to explore affordable options for space situational awareness, the process of tracking objects in orbit and predicting their future paths to mitigate the risks posed to UK and Australian satellites by collisions with debris.55

Box 5.2

The Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club (the Club) was formed in early 2016.56 As an incorporated association with charitable status, the Club has over 100 members, covering a wide range of skills, ages and interests.57 The Club aims to bring a greater appreciation of the sciences, in particular astronomy, to the community.58
The Club is working on a project which involves tracking both low-orbit satellites and geostationary satellites.59 The experiment explores affordable options for space situational awareness, the process of tracking objects in orbit and predicting their future paths to mitigate the risks posed to the UK and Australian satellites by collisions with debris.60
The Club is also involved in science education.61 Members have the opportunity to cooperate with other amateurs and professional astronomers, and school as well as university students can become involved in the Club’s activities.62
5.37
The Club would welcome some direct funding of regional science clubs and science centres to further support its work which is generally supported through donated or philanthropic means.
5.38
As noted above, stakeholders advocated for Australia to further develop its SDA capability as a priority. This follows the identified need to have sovereign capability in this area particularly to secure Australia’s space assets. For example, EOS argued that:
Developing a 24/7 tasking capability in this area ensures that Australia can directly monitor and protect the other crucial space facilities we rely on. Depending on foreign entities for these types of services poses the risk of limited or delayed access to SDA information, which can be highly damaging and costly in time-critical operations.63
5.39
Furthermore, EOS stated that SDA has the potential to be ‘a national differentiator for the Australian space industry’.64 Similarly, APSI stressed the need for Australia to have an effective ‘ground segment’, which would include ‘facilities for space tracking and communications, space domain awareness and the management and processing of data from satellites’. Specifically, it argued:
Greater attention needs to be given to ensuring the ground segment is secure and survivable in the face of adversary counterspace capabilities, which can be directed against the satellites in orbit, and against the ground facilities controlling those satellites, as well as against the data flowing to and from ground station to satellite.65
5.40
Several submitters suggested that Australia is well placed to build on its existing SDA capabilities, particularly given its unique geography and location compared to other nations. EOS stated that:
Geographically, Australia’s position in the southern and eastern hemispheres makes its SDA contribution highly valuable to its security partners in North America and Europe. Australia’s size also presents the opportunity to establish multiple SDA facilities covering vastly different geographical locations. This presents both significant coverage and contingency for adverse weather conditions.66
5.41
A similar point was made by the ASA:
Australia’s geographic position and clear skies makes Australia an ideal location for space traffic management activities, tracking space debris, monitoring space weather, scanning for potentially dangerous Near Earth Asteroids and satellite laser ranging.67
5.42
Tasmania and Western Australia were both highlighted as logical places to host additional SDA infrastructure.68
5.43
The ASA advised that the Australian Government is continuing to invest in sovereign SSA and SDA capability, including sensors and tracking systems, to support the operations of the Australian Defence Force.69 In particular, it noted that:
Through Joint Project 9360, Australia is investing in a diverse multi-technology sensing and command and control system that will provide a sovereign SDA capability while allowing for flexibility to adapt to emerging threats. This allows an iterative approach to capability management with a strong focus on industry partnerships.70
5.44
The SASIC recommended that civilian SDA be promoted as an ‘adjunct’ to Defence capabilities.71

Sustainable space practices

5.45
Much like efforts to protect and care for the physical environment, the space environment is no different. Not contributing to the growing issue of space debris was a consistent theme in evidence. Furthermore, the Committee heard that Australia has an opportunity to take the lead globally on undertaking space activities in a responsible and sustainable way, particularly as a developing space industry. Mr Henry Strong explained:
Australia should therefore seek to establish itself as a world-leader in space sustainability practices at all stages of the mission timeline and in all areas of law and policy. This will allow for longer-term economic growth trajectories, a position of international leadership, and an attractive market for international operators while other space industries undergo lengthy fundamental changes to meet future sustainability requirements. This strategy would act to insulate Australia from the turbulence of the structural shift that will soon be required of the global space industry.72
5.46
There was strong support for Australia to consider its domestic space regulations and international agreements to support a sustainable space industry. ANU InSpace argued:
Other governments with significantly more developed space programs have been allowed to evolve in unsustainable ways. They have proven unable to inject sustainable industry regulations or curb negative behaviours such as leaving defunct or aged satellites in orbit when their missions are complete.
Australian regulations should be nimble .... Unlike other nations, we should commit to not becoming too lax and ‘going backwards’ in terms of sustainability goals.73
5.47
Similar views were expressed by other stakeholders. Northrop Grumman submitted that Australia should ensure that its regulations position it as a responsible global space actor.74
5.48
Dr Matthew Tetlow from Inovor Technologies said that while orbits below 600 kilometres were ‘self-cleaning’ - in other words, debris burns up upon re-entry - there should be ‘strong international agreement’ about the management of objects launched into higher orbits:
When you start going into the higher orbits, that's when there really needs to be strong international agreement that these things can't be left up there because there will be a problem. … We don't want to be putting things up into orbit that never come back. That was the Wild West of the seventies and eighties. That's what was happening and we have to get away from that, in my opinion.75
5.49
Mr Mark Ramsey, General Manager, Sitael Australia, emphasized that space debris is an issue that ‘everyone in the sector’ is becoming conscious of:
It's an international issue, so it's not something Australia can address by itself, but it is something Australia needs to be a part of diplomatically, legally and politically. We can choose to take a political position of leadership in the domain, or we can sit back and wait for the sector to evolve. But the next decade is the time to start getting this right; otherwise, in a few years’ time, there will certainly be some orbits that become unusable to everyone... So it's a really hot topic that we need to get right in the next decade.76
5.50
To address the issue of space debris created by the domestic sector, Mr Henry Strong argued that ‘there is a duty for the Australian Space Agency and others to establish regulatory frameworks that rule out unsustainable missions on Australian soil’. In advocating for ‘debris-neutral’ strategies, Mr Strong suggested that ‘responsible disposal of space objects that either malfunction or reach the end of their operational lifetime should be a requirement of issuing a license to operators in Australia’.77
5.51
In his submission, Mr John Lee set out a proposal for the establishment of a specific body and program referred to as Care of the Outer Space Environment.78 While not restricted to space debris, Mr Lee submitted, there is a need for the space industry ‘to be seen by the general public to be exercising reasonable care of the outer space environment in all actions which contain elements of ‘ethical, social or legal responsibility’.79

International engagement

5.52
Several submitters highlighted the opportunity for Australia to strengthen its international engagement in order to promote the responsible use of space. The SIAA said that while Australia has an ‘excellent track record as a responsible citizen in the global space industry’, there is a ‘pressing need for more active diplomatic effort’.80
5.53
The Adelaide Law School encouraged the Australian Government to continue and enhance its participation in international forums to establish ‘norms of law and behaviour compatible with the increasing prevalence of private space activities’:
Continuing to work at the international level will provide the Australian space industry with a stable legal and political environment to invest and grow into.81
5.54
Northrop Grumman argued that Australia was well placed to have a ‘leading role’ in developing international regulatory and governance standards:
Australia should leverage its bilateral partnerships and standing in multinational forums to lead the development of space governance policies that focus on creating functionally specific and agile bilateral agreements between like-minded allies and partners that can advance emerging commercial space activities and ensure the preservation of the LEO space environment.82
5.55
King and Wood Mallesons, an international law firm, also expressed support for Australia to continue its international engagement:
While competition should continue to thrive, there should be a shared vision in relation to the ultimate aims of space exploration and activities.
... Australia has had a long track record in successful international policy engagement across multiple industries. Even where international treaties or regional agreements are not possible, there ... remains a strong opportunity to inform industry and regulatory development through thought leadership and collaboration via transnational fora.83
5.56
Similarly, Mr Henry Strong advocated for Australia to use clean space ‘as an area of diplomatic cooperation to leverage positive working relationships with both regional and strategic partners’.84
5.57
Several submitters specifically called on Australia to clarify its position on the exploitation of space resources by private entities with respect to the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement in order to provide clarity to an emerging and potentially lucrative space resources industry.85 For example, the SLCANZ stated:
The Australian Government should also consider its position on space resource exploitation by private entities as a matter of urgency. Such an action would follow in the footsteps of nations such as the United States, Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates who have confirmed the ability for private entities to exploit space resources. Specifically, the Australian Government should take steps to publicly clarify how it reconciles its obligations under Article II of the1969 Outer Space Treaty and Article 11 of the 1984 Moon Agreement and its adherence to the 2020 Artemis Accords.86
5.58
In its submission, the ASA said that the Australian Government is ‘committed to strengthening international rules and laws that apply to space, including military uses of space’, and that it is working with other nations to ‘strengthen norms of responsible behaviour’.87 Mr Anthony Murfett, Deputy Head of the ASA told the Committee that one of Australia’s priorities is ‘ensuring our values here on Earth are reflected in space’.88

Commercial opportunities

5.59
In addition to being a responsible global citizen, establishing sustainable space practices may also lead to commercial opportunities. The Committee heard about the potential for ‘green’ space technology designed to reduce the pollution and debris associated with rocket launches to be marketed overseas. Dr Michael Smart, Co-Founder and Head of Research and Development, Hypersonix Launch Systems, told the Committee that:
... Australian space technology needs to be green.... there's a lot of space junk up there, and there's also a lot of pollution created by rockets that are just one use—that is, a rocket system that's built and launched and then ends up in the ocean. We can't be seen to be adding to these problems. We need to be solving these problems, particularly when there are plans for launching constellations of tens of thousands of satellites.89
5.60
Dr Smart suggested that green technology could lead to significant opportunities in the international marketplace for Australian companies.90

Committee comment

5.61
Our use of space related technology and services on Earth is dependent on access to infrastructure in space. Traditionally, this access has involved regulation of government activity, here and internationally. Now, there is a need to consider regulation of private entities that are increasingly accessing the space environment, including to launch thousands of satellites that are contributing to the growing problem of space debris.
5.62
The responsible use of space means not leaving the space environment in a worse position than it was found. The Committee appreciates that many of the regulations and treaties that govern the use of space have failed to keep pace with a rapidly changing space environment. Many were also never designed to regulate the unexpected activities that are now occurring on the Moon and Mars and in low Earth orbits.
5.63
Australia has a real opportunity to be a global leader in space regulation and law to ensure that countries that engage with space do so in a safe, responsible and respectful way. The Committee supports Australia’s participation in international forums to this end.
5.64
With threats to space assets having significant consequences for the way we live, strengthening capability across situational space awareness and situational domain awareness is important. Continued investment in these areas is recommended.

Recommendation 25

5.65
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue its investment in sovereign situational space awareness and situational domain awareness capability including the infrastructure to support it.

Recommendation 26

5.66
The Committee recommends that the Australia Government take a lead role internationally in implementing the Long Term Sustainability Guidelines for the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Recommendation 27

5.67
The Committee recommends that Australian regulators prioritise post-mission disposal, debris-neutral missions plans, and organisational capacity in identifying viable space projects.

Recommendation 28

5.68
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to participate in international forums to:
clarify how international law impacts commercial activities in space
lead the development of enforceable and internationally agreed norms of behaviour in outer space.

Recommendation 29

5.69
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government examine the feasibility of more green technology in the Australian space sector, and ways to ensure that the industry is not contributing to an already congested environment.

  • 1
    For example, see: Australian Space Agency (ASA), Submission 55, pp. 5-6, 36; Bureau of Meteorology (BoM), Submission 74, pp. 2-3; New South Wales (NSW) Government, Submission 75, p. 12; Australian Strategy Policy Institute (ASPI), Submission 79, p. 2; Air Vice-Marshal Catherine Roberts, Head of Air Force Capability, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2021, pp. 1-2.
  • 2
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 43.
  • 3
    ASA, Submission 55, pp. 19-20.
  • 4
    ASA, Submission 55, pp. 20-21.
  • 5
    Mr Anthony Murfett, Deputy Head, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 February 2021, p. 3.
  • 6
    United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’, <http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/
    introouterspacetreaty.html>, accessed 22 July 2021.
  • 7
    Air Vice-Marshal Roberts, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2021, pp. 4-5.
  • 8
    Air Commodore Nicholas Hogan, Director General Space Domain Review, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2021, p. 5.
  • 9
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 43.
  • 10
    Northrop Grumman, Submission 27, p. 11.
  • 11
    Space Law Council Australia and New Zealand (SLCANZ), Submission 14, p. 9.
  • 12
    SLCANZ, Submission 14, p. 9.
  • 13
    For example, see: Mr Murfett, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 February 2021, p. 3.
  • 14
    Space Industry Association of Australia (SIAA), Submission 83, p. 4.
  • 15
    Viasat, Submission 64, p. 2.
  • 16
    Viasat, Submission 64, p. 2.
  • 17
    Viasat, Submission 64, pp. 2-5.
  • 18
    Mr Mark Dankberg, Chairman of the Board and Executive Chairman, Viasat, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 20 September 2021, p. 2.
  • 19
    SIAA, Submission 83, p. 4.
  • 20
    Viasat, Submission 64, pp. 2-3.
  • 21
    Dr Muhammad Akbar Hussain, Founder, Southern Cross Outreach Observatory Project (SCOOP), Committee Hansard, Adelaide, 10 March 2021, p. 52.
  • 22
    Northrop Grumman, Submission 27, p. 10.
  • 23
    Northrop Grumman, Submission 27, p. 10.
  • 24
    Northrop Grumman, Submission 27, p. 10.
  • 25
    Dr Hussain, SCOOP, Committee Hansard, Adelaide, 10 March 2021, p. 52.
  • 26
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 12. See also: Australian National University (ANU) Institute for Space (InSpace), Submission 18, p. 3; Air Vice-Marshal Roberts, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2021, pp. 5-6.
  • 27
    Northrop Grumman, Submission 27, p. 11; Viasat, Submission 64, pp. 2-3; Dr Hussain, SCOOP, Committee Hansard, Adelaide, 10 March 2021, p. 52.
  • 28
    Viasat, Submission 64, pp. 2-3.
  • 29
    Mr Henry Strong, Submission 8, p. 3.
  • 30
    Boeing Australia, Submission 80:1, p. [6].
  • 31
    Boeing Australia, Submission 80:1, p. [6].
  • 32
    Boeing Australia, Submission 80:1, p. [6].
  • 33
    Boeing Australia, Submission 80:1, p. [6].
  • 34
    Boeing Australia, Submission 80:1, p. [6].
  • 35
    Boeing Australia, Submission 80:1, p. [6].
  • 36
    For example, see: ASA, Submission 55, p. 36; ASPI, Submission 79, p. 2; Air Vice-Marshal Roberts, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2021, pp. 1-2.
  • 37
    Northrop Grumman, Submission 27, p. 6.
  • 38
    ASPI, Submission 79, p. 2.
  • 39
    ASPI, Submission 79, p. 3.
  • 40
    SIAA, Submission 83, p. 4.
  • 41
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 43.
  • 42
    Air Vice-Marshal Roberts, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2021, pp. 5-6.
  • 43
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 12.
  • 44
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 38.
  • 45
    SmartSat Cooperative Research Centre (CRC), Submission 29.1, p. 7.
  • 46
    University of Tasmania, Submission 52, p. [3].
  • 47
    Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Submission 11, pp. 4-7; University of Tasmania, Submission 52, pp. [2-3].
  • 48
    Mr Rod Drury, Vice President International, Lockheed Martin Space, Lockheed Martin Australia, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, pp. 22, 26-27.
  • 49
    Mr Drury, Lockheed Martin Australia, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, pp. 22, 26-27.
  • 50
    Electro Optic Systems (EOS), Submission 47, p. 8.
  • 51
    ANU InSpace, Submission 18, p. 3.
  • 52
    Dr Muhammad Akbar Hussain, Submission 6, p. [23]; Dr Hussain, SCOOP, Committee Hansard, Adelaide, 10 March 2021, p. 52.
  • 53
    Dr Hussain, SCOOP, Committee Hansard, Adelaide, 10 March 2021, pp. 53, 55-56.
  • 54
    Dr Hussain, SCOOP, Committee Hansard, Adelaide, 10 March 2021, pp. 53-54.
  • 55
    Dr Ray Hare, Committee Member, Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, p. 40.
  • 56
    Dr Ray Hare, Committee Member, Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, p. 39.
  • 57
    Dr Ray Hare, Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, p. 39.
  • 58
    Dr Ray Hare, Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, p. 39.
  • 59
    Dr Ray Hare, Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, p. 40.
  • 60
    Dr Ray Hare, Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, p. 40.
  • 61
    Dr Ray Hare, Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, p. 40.
  • 62
    Dr Ray Hare, Tamworth Regional Astronomy Club, Committee Hansard, Armidale, 20 April 2021, p. 39.
  • 63
    EOS, Submission 47, p. 6.
  • 64
    EOS, Submission 47, p. 9.
  • 65
    ASPI, Submission 79, p. 5.
  • 66
    EOS, Submission 47, p. 8.
  • 67
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 12. See also: ANU InSpace, Submission 18, p. 3.
  • 68
    University of Tasmania, Submission 52, p. [3]; Western Australian Government, Submission 61, pp. 1-2.
  • 69
    ASA, Submission 55, pp. 36, 38. See also: EOS, Submission 47, p. 17; Air Vice-Marshal Roberts, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2021, pp. 1-2.
  • 70
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 38.
  • 71
    South Australian Space Industry Centre (SASIC), Submission 56, p. 12.
  • 72
    Mr Henry Strong, Submission 8, p. 3.
  • 73
    ANU InSpace, Submission 18.1, pp. 3-4. See also: Mr Henry Strong, Submission 8, pp. 2-4; Mr John Lee, Submission 9, p. 14.
  • 74
    Northrop Grumman, Submission 27, pp. 9-10.
  • 75
    Dr Matthew Tetlow, Chief Executive Officer, Inovor Technologies, Committee Hansard, Adelaide, 10 March 2021, p. 13.
  • 76
    Mr Mark Ramsey, General Manager, Sitael Australia, Committee Hansard, Adelaide, 10 March 2021, p. 13.
  • 77
    Mr Henry Strong, Submission 8, p. 4
  • 78
    Mr John Lee, Submission 9.
  • 79
    Mr John Lee, Submission 9, p. 7.
  • 80
    SIAA, Submission 83, p. 10.
  • 81
    The Adelaide Law School (University of Adelaide), Submission 16, pp. [7-8]. See also: SASIC, Submission 56, p. 11.
  • 82
    Northrop Grumman, Submission 27, p. 11.
  • 83
    King and Wood Mallesons, Submission 54, p. 5.
  • 84
    Mr Henry Strong, Submission 8, p. 3.
  • 85
    SLCANZ, Submission 14, p. 9; The Adelaide Law School (University of Adelaide), Submission 16, p. [8]; Asia Pacific Aerospace Consultants (APAC), Submission 76, pp. 13-15.
  • 86
    SLCANZ, Submission 14, p. 9.
  • 87
    ASA, Submission 55, p. 44.
  • 88
    Mr Murfett, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 February 2021, p. 3.
  • 89
    Dr Michael Smart, Co-Founder and Head of Research and Development, Hypersonix Launch Systems, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 6 May 2021, p. 62.
  • 90
    Dr Smart, Hypersonix Launch Systems, Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 6 May 2021, p. 62.

 |  Contents  |