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Divisions Where Preferences Required |
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Election |
Total |
Three-Cornered Contests |
Divisions won from Behind |
|
1984 |
44 |
35 |
12 |
|
1987 |
54 |
41 |
4 |
|
1990 |
92 |
29 |
8 |
|
1993 |
63 |
30 |
12 |
|
1996 |
65 |
15 |
7 |
|
1998 |
98 |
16 |
7 |
|
2001 |
87 |
16 |
6 |
Direction of Preferences
Although it would appear that preferences were not significant in determining the election outcome in 2001, there is still nevertheless considerable interest in knowing which of the major parties benefited most from preferences.
Table 2 shows the difference between the first preference votes and the two-party preferred vote for the major parties at each House of Representatives since 1984.
Table 2 House of Representatives Elections 1984-2001
Per cent
|
Election |
First |
Two-Party Preferred |
Increase |
Aggregate Preference |
|
1984 |
||||
|
ALP |
47.5 |
51.8 |
4.3 |
57.3 |
|
Coalition |
45.0 |
48.2 |
3.2 |
42.7 |
|
1987 |
||||
|
ALP |
45.8 |
50.8 |
5.0 |
61.7 |
|
Coalition |
46.1 |
49.2 |
3.1 |
38.3 |
|
1990 |
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|
ALP |
39.4 |
49.9 |
10.5 |
61.0 |
|
Coalition |
43.4 |
50.1 |
6.7 |
39.0 |
|
1993 |
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|
ALP |
44.9 |
51.4 |
6.5 |
60.2 |
|
Coalition |
44.3 |
48.6 |
4.3 |
39.8 |
|
1996 |
||||
|
ALP |
38.8 |
46.4 |
7.6 |
54.3 |
|
Coalition |
47.2 |
53.6 |
6.4 |
45.7 |
|
1998 |
||||
|
ALP |
40.1 |
51.0 |
10.9 |
53.4 |
|
Coalition |
39.5 |
49.0 |
9.5 |
46.6 |
|
2001 |
||||
|
ALP |
37.8 |
49.0 |
11.2 |
58.3 |
|
Coalition |
43.0 |
51.0 |
8.0 |
41.7 |
(a) For Coalition, aggregate of Liberal and National Parties.
(b) Percentage share of total increase between first preference and two-party preferred votes.
In each election held in the period, the Labor Party was the clear beneficiary of the aggregate preferences of minor parties and independents. However, in the 1996 and 1998 elections the Coalition was able to reduce the advantage enjoyed by the Labor Party somewhat.
While it is clear from the above that the Labor Party has been the main beneficiary of minor party and independent preferences overall in recent elections, what has not been clear is the support the major parties received from individual minor parties and independents.
The question of preferences received prominence in the 2001 election due to the preference decisions of some parties. The Australian Democrats abandoned their 'split ticket' approach and decided to direct preferences in a significant way for the first time. The Greens directed preferences to the ALP in 110 divisions, including all marginal seats. One Nation decided to place sitting members last in most seats in Queensland while generally putting the Liberal Party before Labor elsewhere.
Table 3 shows, for each party contesting the 2001 House of Representatives election, the number of first preference votes the party received and the percentage of those votes that flowed to the Labor Party and to the Coalition when the party's preferences were distributed. All parties and independent candidates whose preferences were distributed are included in the table except for those in Divisions where there was not an ALP/Coalition final contest.
Table 3 Final Destination Preferences 2001 Election
|
Party |
Votes |
ALP |
LP/NP |
|
% |
% |
||
|
Liberal Party |
24 822 |
12.31 |
87.69 |
|
National Party |
50 207 |
12.65 |
87.35 |
|
Australian Democrats |
611 209 |
64.13 |
35.87 |
|
The Greens |
558 345 |
74.83 |
25.17 |
|
Pauline Hanson's One Nation |
478 220 |
44.13 |
55.87 |
|
Christian Democratic Party |
69 163 |
29.48 |
70.52 |
|
Unity |
24 633 |
68.24 |
31.76 |
|
Citizens Electoral Council |
17 801 |
42.85 |
57.15 |
|
liberals for forests |
16 034 |
20.91 |
79.09 |
|
No GST Party |
13 703 |
61.90 |
38.10 |
|
Australians Against Further Immigration |
11 961 |
41.51 |
58.49 |
|
Save the ADI Site Party |
6 029 |
59.94 |
40.06 |
|
Progressive Labour Party |
4 467 |
59.55 |
40.45 |
|
Lower Excise Fuel and Beer Party |
4 294 |
51.19 |
48.81 |
|
Help End Marijuana Prohibition |
3 277 |
67.59 |
32.41 |
|
Curtin Labor Alliance |
2 466 |
59.57 |
40.43 |
|
Non-Custodial Parents Party |
769 |
51.37 |
48.63 |
|
The Fishing Party |
720 |
58.89 |
41.11 |
|
Tasmania First Party |
615 |
56.75 |
43.25 |
|
Outdoor Recreation Party |
485 |
42.68 |
57.32 |
|
Others |
194 372 |
51.59 |
48.41 |
|
Total |
2 093 592 |
57.29 |
42.71 |
Note: Excludes votes in Calare, Farrer, Kennedy, New England and Warringah where there was no two-party (ALP Coalition) result.
While the data in the table generally confirms conventional wisdom regarding the direction of minor party preferences, some interesting trends emerge. Of note is the relatively high percentage of Australian Democrat preferences flowing to the ALP (64 per cent).
Directing Preferences
While parties may try to influence the preference decisions of their supporters, there is never any guarantee that the voters will follow the party's directions. The following analysis attempts to measure the success of the Australian Democrats and the Greens in directing preferences at the 2001 election. One Nation has been excluded as definitive information about their preference decisions is not available.
The Australian Democrats directed preferences to the ALP in 15 divisions and to the Coalition in 10 divisions. In divisions where preferences were directed to the ALP, its share of Democrat preferences was 6 percentage points higher than divisions where no direction was given, while in divisions where preferences were directed to the Coalition its share of Democrat preferences was 7.5 percentage points higher.
For the Greens, in divisions where preferences were directed to the ALP, its share of Green preferences was 3.5 percentage points higher than in divisions where no direction was given.
The above suggests that the Australian Democrats, and to a lesser extent the Greens, had a degree of success in directing preferences to the ALP. However, if the effect of the preference decisions of the Australian Democrats and the Greens was as estimated above, then it is worth noting that no results were affected by those decisions.