Research Note 14 2001-02

Walking Away: The US Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

Gary Brown
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
12 February 2002

Introduction

On 13 December 2001 the United States gave formal notice to the Russian Federation that it was withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with effect 13 May 2002. This action, intended to remove an obstacle to the US ballistic Missile Defense effort, has been anticipated ever since President George W. Bush took office. Nevertheless, it was greeted with considerable criticism when announced. Australia is one of the few US friends or allies to support the American decision, though the Labor Opposition has expressed its regret.⁽¹⁾

What is the ABM Treaty?

The ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, during a brief era of 'détente' between the Cold War superpowers. It imposes very tight restrictions on the development and deployment of systems designed to defend against incoming Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) warheads. When the former Soviet Union collapsed, its ABM Treaty obligations were inherited by the Russian Federation.

The purpose of the treaty was to secure the ability of each superpower to inflict massive destruction on the other, even after a surprise attack. This was the famous MAD (Mutual Assured Deterrence, or Destruction).

How Withdrawal was Accomplished

The ABM Treaty is of indefinite duration, but either party can withdraw on six months notice under Article XV:

The formal instrument by which the US advised the Russian Government of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty has not been published. It would have been interesting to see what the US gave as the 'extraordinary events ... having jeopardized its supreme interests' to justify its use of Article XV.

Why the US has Withdrawn from the Treaty

Essentially the US withdrew from the Treaty because it posed an insurmountable barrier to its development of a Missile Defense system.⁽²⁾ Ever since President Reagan announced his 'Strategic Defense Initiative' (SDI, or 'star wars') in 1983, the US has been pursuing a technology-based solution to the threat of attack by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivered by ballistic missiles. The Reagan scheme, to defend against thousands of Soviet missiles, proved impracticable, and post Cold War the objectives were progressively reduced to the point where the present US intent is to deploy a defence capable of simultaneously knocking out no more than about twenty missiles.

The ABM Treaty as written does not permit this kind of deployment. Washington tried hard to convince Russia to consent to permissive treaty amendments but, when Moscow declined, decided that withdrawal was its only course.

Issues

This is the first time a superpower has unilaterally withdrawn from a major arms control agreement and, because that agreement has to do with matters of nuclear weaponry and warfare, the action has attracted widespread attention and comment.

Supporters of the US decision usually argue inter alia that:

• The ABM Treaty was a Cold War treaty. Its utility died, at the latest, at the end of the Cold War, and its demise has no real impact.
• The US is morally obliged, as a duty of government, to protect itself from the threat of missile delivered WMD. If this requires the end of the ABM Treaty, so be it.
• Failure to deploy Missile Defense will leave the US open to blackmail by 'rogue' states that develop missiles capable of attacking the US mainland. This is simply intolerable for the world's only superpower.
• The proposed Missile Defense is very limited in scope - defence against a few tens of warheads-and poses no threat to the credibility of the Russian or Chinese strategic forces. Therefore, the objections of these two countries should be seen as politically rather than strategically based, and treated accordingly.
• The US has consulted widely with allies, the Russians and Chinese, in a bid to explain its position and the need to pursue Missile Defense. This is no capricious act; the world has long been aware of the American position.

Opponents of the US action usually suggest that:

• It sets a poor precedent for the world's leading power to unilaterally withdraw from a key arms control agreement. If the US can do this, other states may withdraw from inconvenient arms control agreements, thus undermining the global arms control regime. For example, Russia could withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty which limits its deployment of troops on its western and southern borders, or China might choose to leave the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which seeks to restrain the spread of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
• It still represents a fundamental element in the global strategic scene. By preventing development of missile defences, it reduces pressure on nuclear states to increase their capabilities. This leads directly to the next point, that:
• In reaction, or 'knock-on' reaction, to the US decision, some or all of Russia, China, India and Pakistan are likely to upgrade or expand their own nuclear weapons missile delivery capabilities. Thus it could trigger a new era of nuclear arms proliferation just when we have escaped the Cold War problems.
• Because the driving force behind the US withdrawal is its Missile Defense effort, opponents argue that Missile Defence:
  • will not work (there is exensive unresolved debate on this point)
  • is designed against threats which do not really exist
  • can be bypassed (e.g. by so-called 'suitcase bombs')
  • is really a politically-driven exercise having little to do with real US security interests.

The Issue in Australia

As noted, the Government has supported the US decision to withdraw while the Opposition expressed regret. The principal follow-on issue in Australia will probably be the extent to which Australia is asked to actively support the US effort via, for instance, joint facilities here.

The relevant facility is at Pine Gap, near Alice Springs. This acts as one of several ground stations for the US Defense Support Program (DSP) surveillance satellites. The DSP data, and in time, data from DSP's planned successor SBIRS (Space Based Infra Red System), is essential in giving the US early warning of ballistic missile tests and launches. Data from the satellites goes through the ground stations to the US. There has already been some discussion of the Australian role in the US ballistic Missile Defence effort and, given the ongoing international controversy, this will probably continue.

1. Lincoln Wright, 'Howard in support of Bush on Missiles', Canberra Times, 15 December 2001. Kevin Rudd, MP, United States Withdrawal from ABM Treaty, Media Release, 14 December 2001.
2. US Missile Defense is fully discussed in Gary Brown and Gary Klintworth, The US National Missile Defense Program, Research Paper no. 16, 2000-2001.

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