Bills Digest no. 175 2007–08
Corporations (Fees) Amendment Bill 2007
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as introduced
and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest does not have
any official legal status. Other sources should be consulted to determine
the subsequent official status of the Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage history
Purpose
Background
Financial Services Regulation – Background and Main
Provisions
Company reporting requirements – Background and Main
Provisions
Auditor Independence – Background and Main Provisions
Corporate Governance - Background and Main Provisions
Fundraising: Background and main provisions
Takeovers – Background and Main Provisions
General Compliance - Background and Main Provisions
Concluding comments
Endnotes
Contact officer & copyright details
Passage history
Corporations
Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Bill 2007
Corporations (Fees) Amendment Bill 2007
Corporations (Review Fees) Amendment Bill 2007
Date introduced:
24 May 2007
House:
House of Representatives
Portfolio:
Treasury
Commencement: A range of commencement dates.
The purpose of this Bill is to make
a series of amendments to the Corporations Act 2001 that
relate to financial services regulation, company reporting obligations,
auditor independence, corporate governance, fundraising, takeovers and
compliance.
As noted above, the Bill deals with a range of amendments
to the Corporations Act relating to financial services regulation, company
reporting obligations, auditor independence, corporate governance, fundraising,
takeovers and compliance. The discussion in this Digest is divided into
these seven specific subject areas.
The changes proposed in the Bill draw on recommendations
made in a range of Government discussion papers including:
- Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review – Consultation
Paper(1) (consultation paper)
- Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review – Proposals Paper(2)
(proposal paper)
- Australian Auditor Independence
Requirements: A Comparative Review(3)
- Rethinking Regulation, Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory
Burdens on Business(4)
The provisions in the Bill are to be supplemented by
regulations. At the time of writing this Digest, the regulations had not
been tabled in Parliament.
In 2001, The Federal Parliament passed the Financial
Services Reform Act 2001 (FSRA) which put in place a comprehensive
regime to regulate the financial services industry including insurance,
superannuation, banking, and financial markets. The regime contained a
suite of measures covering licensing, conduct, disclosure and educational
requirements for participants in the financial services industry. FSRA
was augmented by a large volume of regulations which were designed to
tailor elements of the regime to the needs of particular industry participants.
Since its implementation, the FSRA and associated regulations
have been changed to refine the operation of the legislative scheme. Without
doubt this was in part due to the fact that the FSRA put in place a uniform
regulatory regime for the entire financial services sector and has needed
to be tailored to meet the specific needs of particular parts of the sector.
The changes that are proposed in the Bill were originally
flagged in the Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review –
Consultation Paper and were the subject of further public consultation
in the Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposals
Paper. The amendments to the financial services regime which have
been picked up by the Bill appear to be largely uncontroversial in nature.
The Bill puts in place legislative arrangements so that
the regulations can set monetary thresholds below which a statement of
advice (SOA) is not required for certain types of financial product. In
its place the providing entity will be required to prepare a record of
advice that will include the information as set out in the regulations
and must provide a copy of this record of advice to the client (item
117).
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill suggests that the
monetary threshold will be $15,000.(5) The regulations giving
effect to this monetary limit have not, as yet, been tabled in Parliament.
In its proposal paper, Treasury suggested that this proposal
was sound because:
There is evidence that the cost of producing an SOA is
not economic for an adviser where a client is seeking a minor piece
of advice and/or has a small amount of money to invest. Many advisers
are choosing not to provide personal advice to such clients, with the
result that in these circumstances often small-scale consumers cannot
access advice that may benefit them.(6)
The proposal paper went on to state that:
It is anticipated that this would result in increased
access to, and affordability of, financial advisory services for these
consumers.(7)
A statement of advice must include key consumer protection
information that would be of interest to clients receiving financial services
advice such as the amount of remuneration that the provider of the advice
will receive and information about any other potential conflicts of interest.(8)
In its submission to the proposal paper, Choice criticised this proposal
on the following grounds:
We are sympathetic to the fact that consumers with smaller
sums of money to invest tend not to get personal advice due to the costs
of the SOA. However, the proposal will mean that consumers with less
money to invest – and presumably less capacity to invest larger amounts
– will not be subject to any consumer protection regime. A record of
advice is not sufficient to provide ASIC with the ability to examine
the appropriateness of that advice.
It would appear that Choice made these comments before the
final draft of the legislation was developed. Under the proposed regime
as set out in the Bill, clients who do not receive a statement of advice
will still be required to receive a record of advice. Part of the record
of advice will contain key information such as the amount of remuneration
paid and other potential conflicts of interest. (9)
Item 118 also adds an additional circumstance
to this list of situations set out in section 946B where a statement of
advice is not required; namely where advice does not recommend the purchase
or sale of products and remuneration is not received by the provider of
the advice (proposed subsections 946B(7)-(9)).
The Bill makes amendments to the rules relating to supervision
of securities markets where entities have self listed and competitors
have also listed on the market. This addresses possible conflict of issue
problems that arise as a result of the Australian Securities Exchange
(ASX) self listing and being the primary market regulator of the exchange.
The issue of the effectiveness of market supervisory arrangements
for the ASX was explored by the Senate Economics References Committee
(SERC). In its February 2002 report the SERC noted that:
3.57 While competing with
these other service providers, the ASX nonetheless has a continuing
responsibility to supervise its competitors, giving rise to perceptions
that conflicts of interest may arise…
3.58 Computershare Ltd’s
submission was one of the more prominent that raised the issue of conflicts
of interest arising from the ASX’s moves into new spheres of activity.
However, a number of other submissions also commented about the same
matter. Boardroom Partners also considered that the potential for conflict
of interest was an inevitable consequence of a demutualised ASX diversifying
into new commercial activities. They questioned whether the supervisor
of the listing rules could monitor its own activities.
3.59 Computershare explained
that it considered the ASX’s power to set and apply trading rules could
give it the opportunity to use this power to further its own interests
at the expense of competitors, creating a major and untenable conflict
of interest. Computershare illustrated its point in the following terms(10):
We are now in a situation where a publicly listed company,
the ASX, is able to make rules that may well supplement the law but
are potentially capable of being anti-competitive in nature. By having
the power to make and implement business rules and prescribe technical
processes, the ASX have the potential to create actual commercial
benefits for the ASX and rules that could favour the technical platforms
of their commercial adjacent businesses, such as APRL – which is the
share registration service – Orient Capital and Bridge.[31]
The report went on to note that:(11)
3.65 The ASX defended itself
vigorously against Computershare’s assertions. While acknowledging that
diversification can create the potential for conflicts of interest,
the ASX reminded the Committee that it is subject to legislative requirements
(for example, s46 of the Trade Practices Act) that prevent abuse of
market power. Further, it has introduced new measures (in particular
ASXSR) to address the issue.
3.66 The exchange told
the Committee that the concerns about conflicts of interest were based
on perceptions and fears, not reality:
Commentators who are critical of ASX tend to talk in
generalities about perceptions and fears – tangible examples of actual
conflict having compromised ASX’s supervisory effort are not cited.
That is because ASX’s supervisory conduct is and continues to be diligent,
professional and even-handed.[35]
The Computershare submission does not present a single
example of misuse of ASX supervisory power in this area. Nor could
it. The Computershare submission, as conceded in evidence [at page
E59-60] is motivated by self-interest.[36]
The SERC report concluded that:(12)
Against this background, the Committee has come to the
view that no major change to Australia’s
market supervision framework should be contemplated at this point. While
ASIC has found, and the ASX has investigated, instances of market misconduct,
little evidence was presented that the supervisory framework was inadequate
in performing that task. Evidence was presented of a potential
for conflicts to occur which may impinge on ASX’s supervisory responsibilities,
but there is also clear evidence that the ASX and regulators are conscious
of the potential problems associated with the current model and are
acting to address them. However, should there be a significant material
change in ASX operations or should the ASX merge with another exchange,
or enter into an alliance which differs significantly from the ASX-SGX
[Singapore Stock Exchange] link, the Committee should again review the
market supervision framework
The Bill amends the Act to address potential conflict
of interest situations. The Bill addresses two aspects of the conflict
of interest situation namely, the ASX as a self listed entity, and supervising
companies that are direct competitors of the ASX.
The Bill amends to Corporations Act so that it will expressly
provide that ASIC, rather than the market licensee, must supervise the
operation of the market when the market licensee, a related body corporate
of the market licensee or a partnership where a partner is a related entity
of the market licensee, participates on the market. (item 101).
Currently a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between
the ASX and ASIC is in place which in effect gives ASIC responsibility
for regulating the ASX as a self listed entity. The amendments contained
in the Bill will supersede the aspects of this MOU that deal with supervision
of ASX as a self listed entity.
The Bill proposes that ASIC will have the following powers
in relation to this supervisory function:
- Admission of listed entity onto the market’s official list
- Removal of the listed entity form the market’s official list
- Allowing, stopping and suspending trading on the market of the listed
entity’s financial products
The Bill also provides that ASIC must perform a supervisory
function if an entity that is in direct competition with the market licensee
or a related body of the market licensee participates on the market and
requests ASIC operate as the supervisor of the market in relation to that
entities affairs (item 106).
The Bill proposes to give ASIC the following supervisory
functions in relation to such participants:
- The admission of participants to the market
- The expulsion and suspension of participants from the market
- The disciplining of the participant
- Compliance with the operating rules of the market or the Corporations
Act.
ASIC’s powers do not extend to making the operating rules.
This power continues to be held by the ASX.
As a result of this change in powers, ASIC will need
to charge fees to pay for this particular role. The Corporations (Fees)
Amendment Bill 2007, facilitates the payment of these fees.
The Bill makes the other following amendments that relate
to financial services reform:
- Alters the public forum exemption for financial services guides to
circumstances where general advice is being provided to a ‘section of
the public’ (item 219).
- Makes the definition of wholesale client more flexible by giving
people the option to elect to be treated as sophisticated clients, thereby
reducing the regulatory burden on providers of financial products or
financial services (items 95-100).
- Changes the rules regarding joint and severable liability where there
has been a cross-endorsement of authorised representatives of licensees
(item 281)
- Relaxing the rules so that registered managed investment schemes
can invest in unregistered managed investment schemes (item 66).
The proposals relating to company reporting were discussed
in the Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review – Consultation
Paper and the Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review
– Proposals Paper.
Currently under the Corporations Act, all listed companies
must prepare a directors report which contains a ‘remuneration report’.(13)
The remuneration report must contain the information mandated under section
300A of the Corporations Act and the associated regulations. Entities
that are required by the Corporations Act to prepare financial reports
must prepare the reports in accordance with Accounting Standards. New
Accounting Standard AASB 124 deals with executive remuneration disclosure.
As a result of the requirements in this Accounting Standard, financial
reports must also disclose information relating to executive remuneration.
Therefore, listed entities must comply with two sets of laws relating
to disclosure of executive remuneration. Currently there are inconsistencies
and overlaps between the disclosure requirements under the Corporations
Act and those mandated in the Accounting Standards. The Bill proposes
to amalgamate all of the requirements into the Corporations Act and associated
regulations and remove these overlaps and inconsistencies.
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill explains that the
Bill will ‘establish a disclosure framework that will allow the accounting
standards requirements for executive and director remuneration to be incorporated
into Corporations Act’(14) The explanatory memorandum goes
on to state that:(15)
The objective of the amendments is to consolidate the
remuneration disclosure requirements currently contained in the accounting
standards into the Corporations Act and Corporations Regulations. Following
on from the amendments to the Corporations Act in this Bill, the remaining
remuneration disclosure requirements in the accounting standards will
be incorporated into the Corporations Regulations. This will simplify
the requirements as companies will no longer be required to refer to
both the accounting standards and the Corporations Act to determine
their remuneration disclosure requirements.
One of the key ways of achieving this amalgamation will
be to repeal the accounting standard that deals with executive remuneration.
The Bill also makes some amendments to the Corporations Act to give effect
to this policy change (see items 24-37).
One of the important consequences of this change in policy
is that all information relating to executive remuneration will be contained
within the director’s report. Since the accounting standard that deals
with executive remuneration will be repealed, the financial statements
will not need to include information relating to executive remuneration.
To ensure that the remuneration report is properly audited,
the Bill, in item 36, states that the auditor must report to members
on whether the auditor is of the opinion that the remuneration report
complies with section 300A of the Corporations Act.
Currently under the Corporations Act, shareholders have
the right to make a non-binding vote and ask questions about the remuneration
report. One of the consequences of this consolidation of executive remuneration
reporting will be therefore that shareholders will have greater information
and hence increased scrutiny of the executive remuneration.
- Changes to the definition of small and large proprietary company,
by increasing the monetary thresholds (items 11-19).
- Minor changes to the administration of company details.
- Distribution of annual reports to be done electronically rather than
in hardcopy (items 38 – 40).
Auditor Independence
– Background and Main Provisions
The CLERP 9 reforms introduced a comprehensive legislative
regime to regulate the independence of company auditors. Independence
of company auditors came under scrutiny globally following the collapse
of companies such as Enron and at a domestic level following the demise
of HIH insurance. The CLERP 9 reforms drew on recommendations made in
the Ramsay Report and the HIH Royal Commission Report.
A key part of the required regulatory response included
a tightening of the auditor independence measures in the Corporations
Act. As a result, the CLERP 9 reforms introduced a general requirement
that auditors must not operate in a conflict of interest situation. It
also listed specific circumstances which could be regarded as conflict
of interest situations.
The explanatory memorandum to the CLERP 9 bills explained
that:(16)
The sound operation of Australia’s
financial market is dependent upon parties such as auditors providing
information or services to investors free from any bias, undue influence
or conflict of interest. Auditor independence is concerned with the
auditor’s capacity, including the perception of that capacity, to exercise
objective and impartial judgement in relation to the conduct of an audit.
Over recent years there have been a number of corporate
collapses which have called into question the degree of independence
of auditors. These cases have demonstrated that while a company’s actual
financial position may have been poor, the financial statements and
audit report did not reflect the true condition of the company. This
has impaired the ability of shareholders and the market more generally
to adequately asses the financial health of their investment. The proposals
to promote independence will improve the reliability of information
provided to the market.
Since the commencement of the CLERP 9 reforms, it has
been found that there have been small problems with the operation of some
of the provisions. ASIC has issued Class Orders and regulations have been
made to remove these problems. This Bill looks to make amendments to the
Act and hence will remove the need for these Class Orders and regulations.
These amendments are contained in items 34, 35, 45, 46, 49, 56, 67,
63, 64.
The Bill also makes some policy changes to the current
auditor independence requirements although these changes are not major
in nature.
Currently the Corporations Act places a prohibition on
any more than one former partner of an audit firm or director of an audit
company being an officer of an audited body or related entity.(17)
There are no time restrictions on this prohibition. This has the potential
to create inflexible working arrangements for former members and directors
of audit firms. The explanatory memorandum states that ‘former partners
of an audit firm and former directors of an authorised audit firm who
had departed from the firm or audit company for five or more years should
be excluded from the restriction.’(18) The Bill in item
62, gives effect to this five year restriction.
Section 324CI prevents a member of an audit firm or audit
company from becoming an officer of an entity for two years if that entity
was audited by the auditor’s firm and the auditor was a professional member
of the team conducting the audit. The explanatory memorandum to the Bill
states that this ‘requirement applies regardless as to how far back the
partner’s participation on the audit team took place’.(19)
This does seem to be too restrictive and is inconsistent with overseas
requirements. The Bill amends the Act so that the two year time period
will start from the date that the auditors report was made in respect
of the latest audit that the partner/director participated (items 60
and 61).
The Bill also proposes to change the financial relationship
restrictions currently between and audit firm and the audit client.
The Bill proposes some straightforward changes to some
of the corporate governance arrangements in the Corporations Act.
Where a public company or an entity that it controls,
gives a financial benefit to a ‘related party’, the approval of the members
of the company is required. Currently under the Corporations Act, if this
financial benefit in any given financial year is less that $2,000 and
it is given to a director, or director’s spouse or de facto spouse, member
approval is not required. The Bill proposes to remove the current $2,000
threshold and set the monetary limit in regulations (item 190).
The explanatory memorandum states that the initial amount to be prescribed
in regulations will be $5,000.(20) Regulations giving effect
to this proposal have not, to date, been tabled in Parliament.
All companies must have a company name. A name must not
be used if it is identical or unacceptable under the Corporations Regulations,
unless Ministerial approval is given for this. The Minister can delegate
this approval function to the officer of the Department. The Bill proposes
to expand this delegation function to include a member of ASIC or a staff
member of ASIC (item 188).
The Government is concerned that rights issues have become
a neglected avenue for a fundraising due to the current requirement for
them to be accompanied by a prospectus or Product Disclosure Statement.
The Government view is that this has led to the use of alternate fundraising
methods such as placements to institutional shareholders, with the consequence
that smaller investors may be disadvantaged.(21)
Item 78 of Schedule 1 inserts new section 708AA
titled ‘Rights issues that do not need disclosure’. The section relieves
rights issuers from the usual disclosure obligations under Part 6D.2,
provided certain conditions are met. ASIC is given power, effectively,
to disallow the disclosure relief if satisfied that the issuer has contravened
specified provisions of the Corporations Act in the previous 12 months.
Item 137 inserts new section 1012DAA. This
new section contains similar provisions to new section 708AA, but
operates in respect of rights issues that relate to managed investment
schemes.
Subsection 709(4) currently allows an offeror of securities
to use an ‘offer information statement’ rather than a (more complex) prospectus,
where the amount sought to be raised, when added to amounts previously
raised, is less than $5 million. Item 84 of Schedule 1 removes
‘$5 million’ from subsection 709(4) of the Corporations Act and substitutes
‘$10 million’, thereby expanding the circumstances in which the similar
document may be used.
Item 9 of Schedule 1 inserts a new definition
into section 9 of the Corporations Act for the term ‘eligible employee
share scheme’. Item 86 adds to subsection 709(5), a proviso excluding
amounts raised under an eligible employee share scheme from calculations
in respect of amounts that trigger the requirements relating to disclosure
under section 709. Other provisions relieve companies offering employee
share schemes from the prohibition on ‘hawking’ and giving such companies
limited exemptions from licensing requirements. According to the Explanatory
Memorandum this includes:
...relief for the following activities: the provision
of general advice relating to the scheme; dealing in a financial product
where the purchase or disposal of the products occurs through a licensed
broker in or outside Australia; the operation of a custodial or depository
service in connection with the scheme; and dealing in an interest in
a contribution plan.(22)
The advertising requirements for offers of securities
that require a prospectus are more onerous than those for other financial
products. The Government is of the view that there is no justification
for the differences.(23) Items 210 and 212 amend parts
of section 734 so as to bring the requirements for advertising securities
into line with those for advertising of other financial products (Part
7.9 of the Corporations Act).
Some amendments are made to ASIC’s power to prevent publication
of advertisements in certain circumstances. Item 213 amends subsection
739(1) to ensure that ASIC’s power extends to advertisements of the kind
mentioned in section 734 (for securities offers), where it considers such
advertisements to be ‘defective’.
Item 215 adds new subsections 739 (6), (7)
and (8), to clarify the meaning of the term ‘defective’ as
it is used in the new subsection 739(1), mentioned above. Such an advertisement
will be defective if it contains a misleading or deceptive statement,
of if there is an omission of something it is required to contain.
Stapled securities consist of two classes of interest
‘stapled’ together. In some instances offers for stapled securities will
require both a Product Disclosure Statement and a prospectus. Stapled
security issues might therefore prepare a combined Product Disclosure
Statement/prospectus. A difficulty that has been identified with this
is that, although Chapter 6D of the Corporations Act allows for replacement
prospectuses to be lodged, there are no equivalent provisions relating
to Product Disclosure Statements. Amending errors in the latter can be
cumbersome. Items 94 and 146 introduce amendments addressed at
this situation. Item 146 inserts proposed subdivision DA into Division
2 of Part 7.9, titled ‘Replacement Product Disclosure Statements’, which
provides a regime for the lodgement of replacement disclosure documents
relating to stapled securities.
The Bill proposes to remove the telephone monitoring
during takeover bids provisions in the Corporations Act (item 68).
This proposal is strongly endorsed by many parties making submissions
to the proposal paper.
The Bill also proposes to remove the 85% rule relating
to compulsory acquisitions of shares (item 69). Sections 665D and
665E of the Corporations Act place an obligation on a person who holds
85% of the beneficial interest of a class of securities, to notify the
company that they hold 85% of the securities and the company must in turn
notify the remaining security holders of this.
In relation to the current requirements in section 665D
and 665E, Ford’s principles of corporations law explains that:
...it is questionable whether they achieve any useful
purpose. ASIC has modified these requirements by class order, to relieve
the 85% holder of the obligation to give notice if it has already given
each member a compulsory acquisition or but-out notice, and to modify
the company’s obligations correspondingly.(24)
The provisions dealing with return of particulars was
a proposal under CLERP 7. It, in conjunction with the extract of particulars,
was put into the Corporations Act in place of the requirement for lodging
an annual return. Background to these amendments can be found in the Bills
Digest dealing with the Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 2002.(25)
ASIC can issue a return of particulars to a company or
a responsible entity of a registered scheme where there has been:
- non payment of the review fee, or
- ASIC suspects or believes the particulars recorded in relation to
a company or scheme in a register maintained by ASIC under subsection
1274(1) are not correct, or
- no documents have been lodged with ASIC in relation to the company
or scheme for at least one year.
The Bill proposes to amend the Corporations Act so that
a return of particulars can only be issued where ASIC suspects that the
information on its subsection 1274(1) register is not correct (item
208).
This is a back flip on the legislation that was passed
by parliament only three years ago. The proposal paper argues that there
is inconsistency between this legislative provision and the policy intent
behind the CLERP 7 reforms that drove the inclusion of this legislative
provision: (26)
It is arguably inconsistent with the policy intent of
the CLERP 7 reforms that a ROP could be issued simply because a company
has not lodged documents for a year.
The proposals paper document does not however explain
what this inconsistency is. It does go on to state that:
There are alternate mechanisms for actioning non-payment
of a review fee, such as the imposition of late fees and deregistration
of a company.(27)
There is no doubt that the return of particulars can
add an additional layer of paperwork for company compliance. That being
said, it is also arguable that the additional return of particulars provisions
give ASIC additional enforcement powers where there has been non-compliance
with the requirements relating to an extract of particulars.
The Bill puts in place arrangements for the electronic
registration of company charges (items 191-196).
The Corporations (Review Fees) Amendment Bill 2007 puts
in place arrangements that will give companies the option of paying their
review fees up front in one lump sum for up to ten years.
Concluding comments
This Bill makes changes to a number of different areas
of the Corporations Act 2001. Many of the changes are small technical
amendments. There are some significant changes of note however including
those relating to the supervision of securities markets, changes to executive
remuneration arrangements and auditor independence. The Bill puts in place
regulation making powers in a number of places so that a number of the
changes will in fact be given effect to by regulations rather than in
the overarching legislation. Once these regulations have been tabled in
Parliament, it will be important to check them to ensure that they do
in fact give effect to the policy changes as set out in the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Bill.
- The Treasury, Corporate
and Financial Services Regulation Review Consultation Paper, April 2006.
- The Treasury, Corporate
and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposal Paper, November 2006.
- The Treasury, Australian
Auditor Independence Requirements:
A Comparative Review, November 2006.
- Rethinking Regulation,
Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business,
April 2006.
- Explanatory Memorandum
Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Bill
2007, p. 21.
- The Treasury, Corporate
and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposal Paper, November 2006,
p. 26.
- The Treasury, Corporate
and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposal Paper, November 2006,
p 27.
- Sub-sections 947(2)(d)
and (e).
- Explanatory Memorandum
Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Bill
2007, p. 28.
- Senate Economic References
Committee, February 2002, p. 25
- ibid, p. 26.
- ibid, p. xvi.
- Section 300A of the
Corporations Act.
- Explanatory Memorandum,
Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Bill
Explanatory Memorandum, op cit, p. 38.
- ibid, p. 41.
- Corporate Law Economic
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2007, p.9.
- Section 324CK Corporations
Act.
- Corporations Legislation
Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Bill Explanatory
Memorandum, p. 65.
- ibid, p. 65.
- ibid, p. 65.
- ibid, par. 5.6.
- ibid, par. 5.27.
- ibid, par. 5.25.
- HAJ Ford RP Austin and
IM Ramsay, Fords Principles of Corporations
Law, Loose leaf service, Sydney, 2000, p 24184.
- Corporations Legislation
Amendment Bill 2002, Bills
Digest.
- The Treasury, Corporate
and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposal Paper, November 2006,
p.77.
- ibid
Susan Dudley
Law and Bills Digest Section
7 June 2007
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