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Current Issues Brief 4 1996-97

Labour Market Programs in 1995: Overview and Assessment

Steve O'Neill
Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group

Contents

Introduction

Description of programs in 1995

Budget costs and placements

Working Nation Evaluation of the Employment, Education and Training Elements (DEETYA, July 1996)

Assessments of effectiveness of labour market programs

Endnotes

Introduction

This Current Issues Brief provides information on labour market programs (LMP) operating in 1995. The key programs are described under the headings of employment programs, or training and assistance programs. Issues addressed in this Brief include the titles and descriptions of the program, the numbers using the program, budget costs including administration costs and the net 'unit' costs of placing an applicant under each of the programs. Also a summary of the main findings of Working Nation: Evaluation of the Employment, Education and Training Elements (DEETYA 1996) is provided in this Brief. A commentary on the effectiveness of labour market program spending concludes the Brief.

The first section provides descriptions of programs available in 1995. The next section provides data and statistics on placements and Budget costs. Then the main findings of the DEETYA review are summarised and the last section evaluates the effectiveness of LMP.

The labour market programs (LMP) reviewed in this paper are those which are identified in Program 4 of the (now) Department of Employment, Education and Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA).

Description of programs in 1995

Employment programs

These programs pay an allowance to the jobseeker, or a subsidy to an employer. When a jobseeker is placed under an employment program, the allowance/subsidy replaces the individual's benefit received from the Department of Social Security (DSS)(1). Thus DEETYA bears the cost of employment program placements.

JobStart is the principal wage subsidy program paid to employers, allowing them to employ a jobseeker under a subsidy (commencing at $100 pw for an adult) and generally available for 13 weeks.

NTW, National Training Wage, is also a subsidy scheme available to employers, but the employer and jobseeker need to sign a training agreement to be eligible for this subsidy.

NWO, New Work Opportunities, is the twin of JobStart. It allows public funding of projects in situations/regions where it is unlikely that a private employer would be able to offer a placement (under a wage subsidy).

LEAP, Landcare and Environment Action Plan, provides training and experience to people, aged 15 to 20 years, in environmental projects.

JobSkills Provides adults with training and work experience through community organisations, whom DEETYA terms brokers. Brokers submit a costed project (including the numbers of trainees to be employed) to DEETYA for funding.

NEIS, New Enterprise Incentive Scheme is a program which provides financial assistance for an unemployed person to start a small business.

Training and Assistance Programs

In most cases, these programs allow the jobseeker to retain payment of an unemployment benefit paid by DSS while the individual undertakes training under a DEETYA program.

JOBTRAIN allows jobseekers to receive a benefit (the Formal Training Allowance) while participating in training courses, usually of 8 to 10 weeks duration.

Special Intervention provides for professional assessment of individual jobseekers.

ATY, Accredited Training for Youth, provides young jobseekers with special access to training places in courses such as TAFE courses.

Job Clubs are support and personal development programs allowing jobseekers to access skills and facilities (fax, telephones) in order to approach employers.

SkillShare allows community organisations to receive funding to run training programs, but they must secure 15% of costs from the local community. Services include personal referral and enterprise activities. There were 402 SkillShare projects in 1995.

MAS, Mobility Assistance Scheme, provides relocation assistance to jobseekers.

CAP, Community Activity Program, allows jobseekers and spouses to undertake voluntary work. DEETYA advises that CAP is to be replaced by the NWO program.

TAPS, Training for Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islanders Program, is designed to provide broad ranging employment assistance to indigenous peoples, both employed through career development and to the unemployed through public and private employment providers. TAPS is not the same program as the CDEP, Community Development Employment Program, which also provides employment placements. It was decided in 1992 that the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Commission would administer the CDEP program.

OLMA, Office of Labour Market Adjustment, allows retrenched workers and those threatened with retrenchment access to information on alternative employment opportunities as well as financial assistance to seek new work.

Table 1: Labour Market Programs: Data for 1995, except for Unit Costs

Table 1: Labour Market Programs: Data for 1995, except for Unit Costs

    NOTES TO TABLE

    Commencements and Program Costs: House of Representatives Hansard 29 August 1995: p.760. The table cites 'other programs' as Contracted Placement, Post Placement Support, Post Placement Support for People with Disabilities and Work Experience for People with Disabilities.

    Positive Outcome: DEET's Annual Report 1995 p.175. The success of placing a jobseeker in subsidised employment is assessed if the jobseeker retains employment (or moves into further education), 3 months after the support finished. Information was not available for each program.

    Unit Costs: This data is based on 1993-94 costs. Net unit cost is derived from the total costs of the placement and its duration under the relevant DEETYA program less savings accruing to the Department of Social Security as income support measures (JobSearch and Newstart allowances) need not be paid while the individual derives a benefit from the DEETYA program. The former Minister in the Hansard cited on 29 August 1995, p.757-758, referred to a complex formula for making this calculation. Again, information was not available for each program.

Programs/services not included in Table 1 because they are not strictly comparable with the mainstream programs include, eg apprenticeship subsidies which are designed to apply over the four year life of the apprenticeship, whereas other mainstream subsidy and training programs are of approximately three to six month duration. Yet other schemes are a much more short term, immediate assistance variety (which may last for a month or less). Schemes not included in the table are: Jobs, Education and Training (directed towards sole parents), the Disability Reform Package, Migrant Service Improvement Strategy, External Disability Assessment, Interpreter Services, Advanced English for Migrants Program, Disability Access Support Units, Mature Workers Centres, Group Employment Program, Support for Apprentices, Support for Traineeships, and Employment Assistance Australia (which provides case management services).

Budget costs and placements

The DEET Annual Report (1995 p.159) notes that the program costs for its Program 4 was $1.621 billion, up marginally from its 1993-94 budget outcome of $1.501 million. The difference between $1.621 billion and the total of $1.458 billion shown in Table 1 can largely be accounted for by the subsidies for apprenticeships and traineeships of sub-program 4.3.2 under the Apprentice Training Incentive and similar schemes. These are not included in the table. The cost of the apprenticeship programs in 1995 was around $115 million.

Administration costs (running costs) for the Program were $514.5 million in 1994-95 compared to $536 million for the previous year. Thus total costs (program costs plus running costs) were $2.036 billion in 1993-94 and $2.135.3 billion in 1994-95 ($1.71 billion 1992-93).

The costs of the operation of the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) and some other services are included in the running costs (indeed CES operations make up almost half the department's running costs budget), but not reflected in Table 1, ie the costs of individual programs.

A review of LMP was commissioned by the then Minister in late 1994. The Report of the Commonwealth Employment Service Advisory Group (CESAC) recommended streamlining the programs into four categories to make access to the programs simpler for employers and jobseekers(2).

Working Nation Evaluation of the Employment, Education and Training Elements (DEETYA, July 1996)

This report notes that when Working Nation was established the former government 'required an interim evaluation for consideration in the 1996-97 Budget'(3). This report satisfies that requirement.

Summary of main findings:

  • the level of unemployment has decreased significantly since late 1993. The decrease commenced prior to Working Nation. The fall was based on strong employment growth and slower than expected increase in the labour force (p.vi).

  • the reduction in long term unemployment exceeded what could have been expected on the basis of 1980s experience (p.vii).

  • early evidence indicates that many of the long term unemployed (LTU) are unemployed after completing program placements. For Job Compact placements (ie those unemployed for 18 months or more), unsubsidised outcomes three months after the subsidy finished range from 22% for NWO, 33% for JOBTRAIN, 37% for Job Clubs to 52% for JobStart. (p.vii and p.110).

  • there is evidence that employment programs (as well as other programs) increase the employment prospects of participants compared to those not assisted, however, these improvements vary between programs (p.vii).

  • Working Nation only led to a small increase in placements, but there was a significant change in the mix of programs with a decrease of those placed under wage subsidy programs and increase in those placed under brokered schemes such as NWO and JobSkills (p.vii).

  • those unemployed for three years or more increased their share of program assistance while the 12 to 18 months unemployed category lost their share. Those in the category of 12 months or less unemployed initially lost share then increased it (p.vii).

  • there was a problem of administrators not recognising poor work skills (education, literacy and numeracy) of a proportion of the 'at risk of LTU' (ie those whose unemployment duration might exceed 12 months) (p.viii).

Case Management

  • case management provided more personalised assistance to disadvantaged jobseekers and is supported by clients and CES staff. However, the report finds case management of limited success due to pressures to seek short term targets and does not find that case management is significant in leading to unsubsidised employment outcomes.

  • those assessed as unable to benefit from case management (the 'hard-core' unemployed) should not be referred in the first place. The role of case managers in localities which have extremely poor employment opportunities needs to be reviewed (p.ix).

  • there was confusion about the role of 'competition' in the supply of case management between contracted case manager organisations (CCMOs), the CES and the public sector case management supplier Employment Assistance Australia (EAA). The outcome measure is also important to the fee structure for CCMOs. In a competitive environment, rewards need to be restructured so that the focus of those providing assistance is on getting clients into employment, rather than into an employment program (p.ix).

The Job Compact

  • the Job Compact targeted those unemployed for 18 months or more and aimed to give these clients a job offer or training placement - the refusal of which would lead to cancellation of allowances (p.x).

  • Working Nation forecast a decline in the Job Compact group by 47% over the period June 1994 to December 1995. The group declined by less than 20% over the period. The lower than expected fall in the size of the group has made it very difficult to honour the Job Compact, ie placing all in the group in a job by July 1998.

  • the lower than expected fall in the size of the group was in part due to a higher than expected inflow into the targeted group and related also to the fall in the level of assistance going to the 12 month to 18 month unemployed group (p.x).

  • under Job Compact arrangements, JobStart (the wage subsidy to employers) was enhanced to make a placement more attractive to employers. However employers value jobseeker quality more highly than other considerations, including the opportunity to give an unemployed person a go and the level and duration of subsidies offered (p.x).

  • other factors which mitigated against the success of the Job Compact were the unfair dismissal laws, the decision of DEET to holdback JobStart in preference to the National Training Wage (which is also a subsidy to employers) nine month placements which employers considered too long and the introduction of brokered programs in the private sector. Thus, most Job Compact placements occurred under NWO which DEET considered too expensive compared to subsidies (p.xi).

  • the report recommends that a guarantee of employment not be made to all LTU clients. Given the higher cost and lower effectiveness of brokered programs, access to the brokered schemes should be reserved for the most hard to place clients. Assistance should be redirected to short term unemployed (p.xi).

Youth Training Initiative

  • the aim of YTI was to prevent young people (<18 years) becoming long term unemployed. Those on an allowance for 13 weeks were provided with intensive case management so that they would either return to school, pursue vocational training or find employment (p.xi).

  • educational objectives rather than employment targets were the aim of YTI and this was consistent with the Finn Report (1991) to raise the proportion of school leavers completing high school to 95% of school leavers.

  • YTI has not succeeded in returning clients to school due to a combination of their attitudes to formal schooling, the absence of educational alternatives to formal schooling and reliance on LMP rather than on developing strategies specifically for early school leavers.

  • YTI has been successful in steering these young people into case management, but more emphasis needs to be given to educational outcomes (p.xi).

Entry Level Training

  • ELT sought to create a flexible, nationally consistent training system through traineeships. The evaluation found that these were received well by employers, and they were introduced to new industries (p.xii).

  • some weaknesses of the scheme include a perception that while the trainee wage is seen as acceptable by those under it, the training received may not have been at a quality level. If the training is perceived as deficient, trainees will leave. Monitoring needs to ensure that the quality of training was at a sufficient standard.

  • ELT was slow to start but has generally met its target, although many employers are still unaware of the ELT program (p.xii).

Employer Servicing

  • Working Nation sought to expand the CES industry coverage and vacancy share and to encourage employers to take on more LTU and improve the links between the CES and local employers. It appears to have been generally successful in achieving these goals although it is not known if there has been an increase in the share of vacancies going to the CES (p.xii).

  • employers were generally satisfied with those referred (about 46%), although a significant minority of employers were dissatisfied (41%).

  • employers who hade never used the CES wanted more information on its services and programs.

  • for job ready jobseekers, the CES could offer employers a choice of self referrals or screened referrals. Self referrals resulted in a quicker filling of a vacancy. Screened referrals usually resulted in a better match of qualities desired by the employer to those possessed by the applicant, but the process was slower, although a quick match did not appear to be a high priority of most employers (p.xiii).

The report concluded that many of those who participated in an employment program returned to unemployment after leaving assistance and were likely to have their ABS unemployment duration shortened. Greater use of the brokered programs would have 'increased the extent of reclassification of job-seekers from long-term unemployed to short-term unemployed'(4).

Assessments of effectiveness of labour market programs

  • The 1995 CESAC review of LMP canvassed the potential confusion to employers, brokers and clients of the array of programs, the fact that each program has its own guidelines and that these are known only to the most experienced officials. Another report of the pending changes to LMP referred to the notion that 'a sophisticated range of labour market programs should be provided to assist unemployed people finding a job'(5). The CESAC review recommended that the programs be streamed into four broad groupings although many of the functions and purposes of the existing programs would continue. However the Government now appears to favour retention of four of the nine core programs(6).

    The OECD generally accepts the need for the range of LMP currently operating in its member states. In its Employment Outlook, it observed that LMP could be classified into the following standardised categories:

      1. Public employment services and administration

      2. Labour Market Training

        a) Training for unemployed adults and those at risk

        b) Training for employed adults

      3. Youth measures

        - Measures for unemployed and disadvantaged youth

        - Support for apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training

      4. Subsidised employment

        - Subsidies to regular employment in the private sector

        - Support for unemployed persons starting enterprises

        - Direct job creation (public or non-profit)

      5. Measures for the disabled

        - Vocational rehabilitation

        - Work for the disabled

      6. Unemployment compensation

      7. Early retirement for labour market reasons(7).

    Thus, while there were many individual labour market programs operated by DEET in 1995, they would all fall into one or another of the OECD standardised categories and sub-categories. In other words by OECD standards, the variety of programs offered in 1995 was not unique.

    LMP have particular macro economic effects by making the labour market more efficient by helping to ensure that the market clears. As well, LMP can have positive budgetary effects by (ultimately) reducing social security payments and increasing tax receipts, a point made by Ross Gittins(8) recently, but also by John Piggott(9) earlier. The OECD claims of LMP that:

      Active policies can improve macroeconomic performance while at the same time meeting equity objectives. They can reduce structural unemployment by facilitating the matching of workers to jobs and keeping the unemployed in contact with the labour market while at the same time improving their skills ... However, active policies are not without costs, and they need to be effective in order to justify the large public spending on them(10).

    The DEETYA report Working Nation: Evaluation of the Employment, Education and Training Elements has found that certain programs have not realised the outcomes expected of them in 1994 and urged that LMP targets and achievements be 'realistic'. However it might be useful to recall an earlier report which pointed to the benefits of LMP, in terms of budgetary, employability and employment outcomes. The Committee which made the report Restoring Full Employment (1993) the precursor to Working Nation argued:

      A fairly crude estimate is that some 45 000 new jobs were directly created by labour market programs of the Commonwealth Government during 1992-93. The current level of spending (then about $1.5 billion excluding CES operations) would be hard to justify if it depended on this criterion alone ... active programs have the advantage that they can be clearly targeted to long-term unemployed people and reduce their dependence on income support(11).

      (But) for every dollar spent, the ... estimates suggest that the Government gets back between 37 and 64 cents in savings, depending on the program. This illustrates that the net additional cost of making passive assistance, active for unemployed people, is considerably less than the program budget alone suggests(12).

    In addition, the bulk of evidence on the budgetary impacts of LMP spending, both local and international, suggest a need to consider LMP benefits beyond the individual program costs. The value of these programs as perceived by labour market economists is that they are able to provide opportunities to access employment for individuals who would otherwise miss out. Even if a high proportion of such individuals fall into unemployment again upon completion of programs, the work experience gained under LMP is likely to enhance their potential to be re-employed over the longer term.

Endnotes

  1. The DEET publication Programs 1995-96 (AGPS 1995) is recommended for a more detailed explanation of these programs.

  2. Report of the Commonwealth Employment Service Advisory Committee on Labour Market Programs (AGPS 1995).

  3. Working Nation: Evaluation of the Employment, Education and Training Elements Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (July 1996): v.

  4. Ibid: 110.

  5. 'Jobs-for-all may go with Budget cuts', The Australian Financial Review 21 May 1996.

  6. 'Job schemes face $1.3 billion cut' The Australian 2 August 1996.

  7. Employment Outlook 1993 OECD: 71-72.

  8. 'How to screw the unemployed', Sydney Morning Herald 5 August 1996.

  9. Costing the Job Compact paper presented to the Conference of Economists by Professor John Piggott in 1994. He concluded that it would be possible for the Job Compact to make a return to the Budget of over $300 million.

  10. Employment Outlook 1993, OECD 1993: 67.

  11. Restoring Full Employment A Discussion Paper, Committee on Employment Opportunities (AGPS 1993): 107.

  12. Ibid: 102.

 

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