



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

# Official Committee Hansard

## SENATE

LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION COMMITTEE

**Reference: Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Interception and  
Other Measures) Bill 2005**

WEDNESDAY, 15 JUNE 2005

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**SENATE**  
**LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION COMMITTEE**  
**Wednesday, 15 June 2005**

**Members:** Senator Payne (*Chair*), Senator Bolkus (*Deputy Chair*), Senators Greig, Kirk, Mason and Scullion

**Participating members:** Senators Abetz, Barnett, Bartlett, Mark Bishop, Brandis, Brown, Buckland, George Campbell, Carr, Chapman, Colbeck, Conroy, Eggleston, Chris Evans, Faulkner, Ferguson, Ferris, Harradine, Hogg, Humphries, Knowles, Lightfoot, Ludwig, Lundy, Mackay, McGauran, McLucas, Nettle, Robert Ray, Ridgeway, Sherry, Stephens, Stott Despoja, Tchen and Watson

**Senators in attendance:** Senators Kirk, Ludwig, Mason and Scullion

**Terms of reference for the inquiry:**

Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Interception and Other Measures) Bill 2005

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**Committee met at 5.30 pm****BAKER, Mr Sean, Lawyer, Law Council of Australia****NORTH, Mr John, President, Law Council of Australia****WEBB, Mr Peter, Secretary-General, Law Council of Australia**

**ACTING CHAIR (Senator Scullion)**—This is the hearing for the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee's inquiry into the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Interception and Other Measures) Bill 2005. The inquiry was referred to the committee by the Senate on 11 May 2005 for report by report 14 June 2005. On 14 June 2005 the Senate agreed to extend the reporting date to 17 June 2005. The bill proposes to amend the Criminal Code Act 1995 to extend the defences to certain offences under part 10.6 of the Criminal Code Act to all agencies who may exercise power under the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979.

The bill also proposes to amend the Telecommunications (Interception) Act to, amongst other things, allow the interception without warrant of communications to and from certain declared emergency service facilities. The committee has received 10 submissions for this inquiry, all of which have been authorised for publication and are available on the committee web site.

Witnesses are reminded of the notes they have received relating to parliamentary privilege and to the protection of official witnesses. Further copies are available from the secretariat. Witnesses are also reminded that the giving of false or misleading evidence to the committee may constitute contempt of the Senate. The committee prefers all evidence to be given in public but under the Senate's resolutions witnesses have the right to request to be heard in private session. It is important that witnesses give the committee notice if they intend to ask to give evidence in camera. I would also ask the witnesses to remain behind for a few minutes at the conclusion of their evidence in case Hansard staff need to clarify any terms of references.

I now welcome Mr Peter Webb, Mr John North and Mr Sean Baker from the Law Council of Australia. You have lodged submission No. 5 with the committee. Do you wish to make any amendments or alterations to that submission?

**Mr North**—No, thank you.

**ACTING CHAIR**—I now invite you to make a short opening statement, at the conclusion of which I will invite members of the committee to ask questions.

**Mr North**—Mr Chair, Senators, thank you for inviting the Law Council of Australia to speak with you this afternoon. I would just like to take a few moments to outline the concerns of the Law Council and to amplify some of the matters that we have commented on in our submission. Before starting, I note the submission of the New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties. The Law Council agrees with many of their recommendations and commends them to you. The Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Interception and Other Measures) Bill is, in many respects, when you first look at it, an innocuous bill. It purports to make only minor changes to the telecommunications interception regime, and in many ways this may be correct. However, the bill contains several concerning elements that we believe should be amended or clarified.

The bill, in our view—and this is something we would like to stress—is simply one in a long list of bills brought before this parliament to increase the powers of law enforcement agencies, often at the expense of individual community members' rights and liberties. This was illustrated starkly for me last week when I spoke before a joint parliamentary committee looking into the questioning and detention powers that were set up to look at the sunset clause placed on those questioning and detention powers. It seems clear from talking to that committee that these powers may well continue in some form beyond the current sunset clause, and it may even be that the powers are restated without a further sunset clause.

At the time that this legislation was introduced, the Law Council expressed concern that it would not only mean individuals could be detained for excessive periods but it would also allow people to be detained even when they were not suspected of any criminal behaviour. Despite the fact that so far these laws have not been abused—in fact, there have been only eight instances where people have been arrested pursuant to those warrants—it leads us to our criticism of particular aspects of the present bill which is before you today, and that is that we have been unable to see any justification, in the setting out of the bills, for why law enforcement agencies require or need these expanded powers. It seems that the law enforcement agencies in this climate of fear have asked for and obtained from parliament very extensive powers, without anyone giving us concrete reasons as to why people's rights and liberties should be affected in this way.

We have not been given any statistics or examples as to why the powers need to be expanded, as they are in this act, and we have four particular matters that we bring to your attention that are set out in our submission, the first being the power to intercept communications from emergency service facilities, which includes mobile phones, as well as email in some instances. There appears to be no distinction made for personal calls being made to or from the facilities, or for the types of devices which can be intercepted.

The Law Council recommends that controls be placed on the types of communications and the instances in which these communications from a facility can be intercepted. There is no empirical justification given by those seeking these extra powers for what possible use can be made of listening in to these private conversations at these emergency service facilities.

The second point we talked about was the prescribing of emergency service facilities. This bill envisages that the Attorney-General can prescribe facilities and these will not be legislative instruments and therefore not open to your parliamentary scrutiny. This is justified by stating that these key facilities have locations that cannot be disclosed publicly. We believe that parliamentary scrutiny of these extra powers is absolutely essential and that it can be achieved by bringing it under the Legislative Instruments Act and therefore within proper parliamentary scrutiny, and a provision to remove information as to location can be easily implemented.

The third point is the power to regulate members of other agencies as law enforcement officers. This power is ill defined. 'Agency' is not specified in the Criminal Code Act 1995. A clearer distinction should be made as to what bodies could come under the regulatory power to make their employees, and possibly even contractors or agents, law enforcement officers for the purposes of this act. The council recommends that this regulatory power be amended to clearly specify which agencies can be prescribed.

The final point is the creation, we see, of a new offence for the purposes of intercepting the telecommunications of a person who has received or assisted someone who has committed a class 1 crime. The granting of a warrant for this offence is, in a sense, based on an assumption of the first crime, which then leads to this secondary crime. The fact that the person receiving or assisting must know that the other person is guilty of a class 1 crime is unprovable at the time of interception. This was one of the points we were making about the ASIO legislation that allowed people who had not committed a crime or even been properly suspected of having committed a crime to be arrested and held for periods of up to one week. It is when you add these bills, one on top of the other, that you begin to see the true infringement of our rights as citizens in a democratic nation.

I would recommend that this fourth matter, namely this offence, be removed from the bill. No evidence has been provided, that we can see, that this is necessary or that it will result in more convictions and therefore a safer country, and we do not see why we should reduce such individual liberties. We would be happy to answer any questions, thank you, Senators.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Thank you, Mr North.

**Senator LUDWIG**—I am interested in examining the issue of the people within the emergency facility. It seems to me that it is open that the exclusion would apply to personal communications—to both personal mobiles and emails—and, assuming there is some sort of control in terms of how internally they might regulate, there would still be personal traffic.

It would also cover non-emergency numbers if there were administration numbers within the establishment. There does not seem to be any ability to cut down or reduce that number of exempted communications that then could be potentially intercepted and then no reason as to why you would include those in that. It seems logical, in some respects, for the emergency numbers but it seems illogical for outside of that unless they are used as part of the network or could be incorporated into the network. That would hardly extend to personal mobiles people bring in unless they are excluded from those. Is that your understanding of how it would operate?

**Mr North**—Yes, it is. I should put on the record that we believe that the emergency numbers should be and need to be reported because there have been instances where dire results have occurred when an emergency number has been telephoned and appropriate action has not been taken. I am reminded of a case in New South Wales where an emergency number was rung when a woman was attacked in her home, tied up and left. For some reason the emergency services broke down and she remained in that state for 14 days and eventually died. We agree that there is a real need to listen in to communications in a proper and organised fashion but not to extend it, as this bill appears to do.

**Senator LUDWIG**—You raised the issue of how it should be then described. It seems that this provides for a process which is not transparent and is counter to the original Sherman report which provides a level of scrutiny, at least of TI warrants, particularly named warrants, and other mechanisms to ensure the Ombudsman has a review. There are a couple of others and I will go to those in a second. I was more interested in trying to examine an alternative process that you might have considered. Whilst maintaining the import of the bill, in what

manner could it be reported which would allow parliament to have some scrutiny of that whilst still maintaining the withholding of location specific details?

**Mr North**—First of all, parliament must maintain scrutiny of these prescribed emergency service facilities. Therefore, every single thing should fall under the Legislative Instruments Act but there is no need to say, when you are looking at the particular facility, where it actually is. There might be a proper form of scrutiny of each and every one of these that the Attorney-General so prescribes. Otherwise, we really are moving into an area where there is no parliamentary scrutiny of what the Attorney-General and the people that he delegates power to say are going to be the emergency service facilities. As I was saying before, we have a lot in the ASIO field where what we say are strong and excessive laws have only been used eight times. That was reliant upon Dennis Richardson, who was head of ASIO. Every time you bring in a bill like this it relies very much on the strength and integrity of the people who have this power.

**Mr Baker**—The details that go to parliament could have things such as a general area that the facility is operating in, or a description of what the facility does, without disclosing the specific location.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Or the emergency service provider.

**Mr Baker**—Yes.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Then the subcontracted provider, if there is one.

**Mr Baker**—Yes.

**Senator LUDWIG**—There may be a way of detailing without even providing an area. It could be by state.

**Mr Baker**—Yes, by state or region or something of that nature.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Do you think that would be sufficient?

**Mr Baker**—Obviously there is a tension here between ensuring the security and integrity of the facility—and a lot of these are very important base stations et cetera—and also making sure that parliament has an appropriate role in looking at that and looking at what the Attorney-General is prescribing. That tension can be dealt with under the legislation. At the moment it is not addressed at all. You could envisage drafting of a provision which would allow that to be dealt with using as much detail as possible but also protect the location of the facility.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Could you comment on this. Given that we now have a new Legislative Instruments Act, you would at least expect a bit better effort to ensure that you can come within it, rather than seek blanket exemption from it at first instance. Given that we have now moved to a new regime for legislative instruments, it would seem that you would at least make an attempt. Would you agree with that?

**Mr Baker**—I would agree with that. The Legislative Instruments Act has been specifically drafted to address issues like this. There is a capacity under its provisions to allow this kind of tension to be dealt with. It does allow greater public scrutiny of legislative instruments but that is a good thing.

**Senator LUDWIG**—There were two recommendations made by the Sherman report which dealt with TI legislation. They are recommendation Nos 5 and 6. I could not see anything about them in your submission, so I wonder if you could comment on them. I am happy for you to take them on notice. One is whether the TI Act should be amended to require the public version of ASIO's annual report to contain the total number of TI warrants and named person warrants applied for, refused and issued. That would at least provide for better reporting. As you can appreciate, the named person warrants are a later addition but the reporting seems to be not as good as it could be.

The second recommendation is whether there should be legislative amendment to implement recommendation No. 6 of the Sherman report and require the Commonwealth Ombudsman annual report to parliament to contain details of inspections of the AFP and ACC conducted during the year, particularly of deficiencies revealed and remedial action taken or proposed. Those two may go some way in addressing in part the scrutiny of this type of power that is proposed, but not perhaps to all the other issues. You may want to take that on notice but we do have a very short timetable. If you are able to, you can provide a comment.

**Mr North**—One of our criticisms has been that there is no evidence to back up why this request has been made, either by government or by law enforcement agencies, for these extended powers. You have just said there would be an absolutely necessary check to see how many of these interception warrants et cetera are being issued each year. If you look at the Civil Liberties paper, you will see that they say there is quite an extraordinary number when you compare Australia with somewhere like the United States. Working in the criminal law field, we are seeing ever-increasing loads of interceptions in many different criminal matters. One of the cases I have at the moment has 16,000 pages of telephone intercepts. We are not seeing a proper increase in terms of either convictions or in what we would all be hoping to achieve, which is a drop in the crime rate. We do need that, but we might take both points on notice and give you a slightly better response. What is your time limit? You said it was quite tight.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Therein lies the problem. Unfortunately, we were meant to have this about a week ago. Your overview touches on some of those matters, but I was interested in perhaps a more targeted view.

**Mr North**—It is absolutely essential that there be this type of scrutiny, otherwise we are departing from things that we have held dear in a democratic nation without any proper evidence for it.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Mr North, I think that it is reasonable to accept until midday tomorrow. It will be cutting it fine, but we would be happy to accept any questions on notice or further submission by midday tomorrow.

**Mr North**—Thank you.

**Senator LUDWIG**—The other area, before I move on, was the civil forfeiture orders. I know there are some differing views amongst the submitters about this. Your view, as I understand it, is that it conforms with the Sherman report and is a reasonable extension of the power. Is that a fair summary, if I put the caveat on it that it is subject, of course, to your four main points?

**Mr North**—Yes.

**Senator MASON**—Mr North, you alluded briefly to the lack of empirical evidence. I will speak in general terms if I can. Could you argue that the Telecommunications (Interception) Act is over 25 years old, that the technology has changed a lot, that the threat has changed a lot with the war on terror, that law enforcement procedures have changed a lot and that, in a sense, this is simply not so much an infringement on civil liberties but, in a way, making the act more contemporary and more utilitarian? What do you say to that?

**Mr North**—You could argue that, but the very purpose of the act is now being whittled away by these constant changes. The purpose of the act was to stop communications interception, except for very good reason and in a very narrow band. What we are saying is that there is a distinct lack of evidence that current law enforcement procedures, techniques, surveillance and everything else working within the act is going to achieve a clear-up of crimes without needing to infringe on people's rights and liberties by moving in such a wide way.

Although we have only identified a number of things, because this is a small piece of legislation, what we are seeing from parliament increasingly since 2001 is bill after bill that whittles away at these points, so we keep standing up and saying this and getting shot down, but we believe implicitly that you really should show the Australian people why the law enforcement agencies need to have these expanded powers.

**Senator MASON**—So the onus of proof is very much on them.

**Mr North**—Yes.

**Senator MASON**—And you cannot argue that they are doing this, in a sense, as a matter of insurance or security. You would say that they have to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, in effect.

**Mr North**—Yes. They should prove it, because they have become more sophisticated. The law enforcement agencies have moved with the times. They are relying a lot more on forensic evidence and on interception type evidence to solve a lot of serious, complicated crimes. We are just asking why they need to expand it so that the powers are being given to ever-wider groups of people without scrutiny by you, as senators of the Australian parliament, and for the reasons set out in our report. Utility does not work with us. We have fought too long and too hard to live in a country that we like so much without saying, 'Well, it makes things a bit easier for the law enforcement agencies.' That does not go down well.

**Senator MASON**—Is it the tyranny of incrementalism?

**Mr North**—That is right. Although we have only picked four or five points for you today, we have tried to make the point that it ties in with all the other legislation.

**Senator MASON**—I understand that. Thank you.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Thank you, Mr North, Mr Webb and Mr Baker.

**Proceedings suspended from 5.56 pm to 6.06 pm**

**BIBBY, Dr Richard Martin, Committee Member, New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties**

**MURPHY, Mr Cameron, President, New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties**

**ACTING CHAIR**—Thank you. You have lodged submission No. 8 with the committee. Do you wish to make any amendments or alterations to that submission?

**Mr Murphy**—Not at this stage.

**ACTING CHAIR**—I now invite you to make a short opening statement, at the conclusion of which I will invite members of the committee to answer questions. I also advise you, as you are on teleconference and it may not be evident to you, as the Senate is sitting tonight, witnesses should be aware that the committee may need to adjourn for a short period of time to respond to a division if necessary. I now invite you to make a short opening statement.

**Mr Murphy**—I would like to take the opportunity to thank the committee for giving us this opportunity to provide evidence on the bill. I will just say that the bill generally should be rejected or amended. It provides a severe reduction in the privacy of individuals without establishing good reasons for the interference with that privacy. It provides a massive increase in the scope of telecommunications interceptions.

It fails to adequately safeguard those increased powers and it does not adequately implement the reporting recommendations of the Sherman report, particularly in relation to ASIO interceptions. It allows the use of interceptions to assist in the seizure of assets which may be the proceeds of crime. In this sense, it is allowing a powerful criminal tool to be used to gain evidence that will ultimately be available in proceedings with a civil burden of proof. That is the general problem with the bill. I will hand over to my colleague Martin Bibby who will elaborate slightly on those points.

**Dr Bibby**—The prime purpose of the basic act is to outlaw interceptions of telecommunications, not to create a large class of permitted interceptions. The original Telecommunications (Interception) Act permitted interceptions on very few grounds but there are now many. There has also been an increase in the bodies that are permitted to conduct surveillance. This bill proposes not only to extend further the grounds for interception and to increase the bodies that may intercept, but in three of its clauses, it removes the power of parliament to control what further exceptions can be made. There is a slippery slope at work here and it is time for the parliament to draw a line.

**Mr Murphy**—That is all we would like to say in our opening statements.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Thank you.

**Senator KIRK**—Thank you, gentlemen, for your submissions. I wondered if you could perhaps expand a bit on some of the points that you made. I am interested in particular in the point you make about these amendments being contrary to the overall purpose of the act or at least the initial intention of the act. Perhaps you could explain for us why it is that you see that as problematic.

**Mr Murphy**—Certainly. In answer to that question, the original purpose of the act was clearly to confine or limit the scope of telecommunications interceptions. When someone intercepts a telecommunications phone line, a computer line or other device it affects the personal privacy of users of that service. Many people may use a phone. While law enforcement may intercept a telecommunications line for legitimate purposes to obtain evidence about that individual, they are also invading the privacy of the many other users of that telephone line or computer.

The problem with this bill is that it greatly enlarges the scope for law enforcement authorities to obtain interception warrants. It provides a number of ancillary purposes for which they can be obtained—for proceedings which generally are not criminal in their nature, such as the seizure of assets that are proceeds of crime, for example.

**Senator KIRK**—Are you able to comment on some of the definitions that changed in the bill, in particular the definition of ‘law enforcement officer’? Perhaps you could let us know what your views are about the expansion of that definition.

**Mr Murphy**—Yes. The definitions in the bill, as I understand it, changed to broaden the definition of a law enforcement officer. What the bill does is include a number of additional agencies that will be able to act to intercept communications. The primary problem with that section of the bill is that it allows people to intercept communications or to use communication services to transmit or intercept child pornography. While that in itself is desirable, the structure of the bill will allow investigative officers to use this legitimate goal as an excuse to trawl through people’s computers generally. It is undesirable, I think, for officers to be promoting and distributing child pornography in some attempt to snare offenders.

One only has to look at the findings reported in the New South Wales Ombudsman’s report into the misuse of police email to look at the way in which that can go wrong. The definition of ‘law enforcement officer’ is expanded so that other officers who intercept telecommunications may be covered, as is the manner in which they are protected, and they have a general defence if they believe they are acting legitimately in their interception.

**Senator KIRK**—Would some of the problems you have highlighted be overcome if the legislation were amended so as to specify more clearly the agencies that are intended to be caught—in other words, prescribing the agencies that the legislation will apply to?

**Mr Murphy**—I think that parliament needs to make very clear which agencies are able to access this. As I understand it, the bill will allow the government of the day, through the Attorney-General, by regulation, to allow other agencies to access these warrants. I think that it should be confined. Parliament should determine who is able to access these warrants by specifying both the agencies that are able to access them and the class or type of officer who is able to access a warrant and use a warrant in those agencies.

**Dr Bibby**—There is a further concern that the range of offences that state bodies are able to investigate is determined by state acts and not acts of the Commonwealth so that what the bill does is put in the hands of the states the powers to effectively allow people to increase the types of crimes for which interceptions are permitted, so the federal parliament loses its power over the extent to which interceptions are permitted.

**Senator KIRK**—But if it were amended so that those agencies were specified, at least then it would provide for better clarity, surely, wouldn't it, than if it were just permitting the minister by regulation to regulate this? Would you agree?

**Mr Murphy**—I think that is right. But, along with that, the bill should also be amended to specify and define the types of crimes for which these interceptions can be used. If that is done, it may well overcome this problem.

**Senator KIRK**—From what I have seen there is no specification at all as to the types of crimes that can be intercepted under this legislation. Am I right?

**Mr Murphy**—Sorry, I missed that.

**Senator KIRK**—Are you saying that it would be better if the types of crimes were specified? From my looking at it, there appears not to be any list of specific crimes or categories of crimes.

**Mr Murphy**—If there were some schedule that would provide the categories of crime, the types of crimes for which interceptions could be used, along with the agencies which could use them, that would assist in tightening up the application of the interception power and the warrants that can be obtained, and that would be desirable.

**Senator KIRK**—Can you expand on your views about the exemption for an emergency services facility and where you see the problems are in those provisions?

**Dr Bibby**—At present there is a provision for emergency services to use specified telephone numbers and to record interchanges on those numbers. We do not object to that because obviously it is useful when somebody calls in who may not be entirely coherent. It is useful if what they say is recorded. But what is proposed is an unlimited expansion of that to all the telephone numbers, emails or anything else which may be used within an emergency service. It also allows the Attorney-General to specify which agencies will be involved and which premises will be involved without parliament having any oversight at all. The first interferes or allows the interference with the privacy of employees at emergency services and it allows the numbers to be used for interception more or less without limit. The second, as I say, removes the powers of parliament to keep track of what is going on and, indeed, removes the power of anybody to keep track of who is being allowed to conduct interceptions. We think the bill should be amended in the way that we propose to avoid those problems.

**Mr Murphy**—The essential problem with this is that the Attorney can declare any facility to be an emergency services facility. It is conceivable that, for example, an entire police station and all the telecommunications lines in and out of that police station could be declared. I think what the bill should do is clearly indicate that it is only an emergency services phone line that is used for that purpose and not for any other purpose.

**Senator KIRK**—Would you also want to see it limited such that emails and other forms of communication are excluded?

**Mr Murphy**—Yes. It is not my experience that people will contact triple 0, for example, by text message or by email, so it is unclear whether this is going to have any benefit in that sense. I do not think people in an emergency go to the computer and send an email, or send a text message when they need assistance, and I think that this just enlarges the scope of

interceptions and will make it easier for it to be misused. For example, if an entire police station is declared an emergency services centre, then any of those facilities coming in and out—email, text messages and so on—may be covered by this and misused.

**Senator KIRK**—The explanatory memorandum says that the subsection that we are referring to, 7(3A), is not a legislative instrument. Of course, if it were a legislative instrument then a different regime would be in place. Do you think that the problems that you have identified could be overcome if this were to be declared a legislative instrument?

**Dr Bibby**—No, only in part. It would at least keep track on things so that parliament and the people could find out what extensions were being given, but it still means that all the communications that take place within a facility would be subject to interception. It would not protect the privacy of employees of, say, the police station and it would still allow the misuse of the section for the setting up of communications with people, and then recording them, which have nothing to do with the emergency purposes for this clause.

**Senator KIRK**—Yes, I understand.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Thank you very much, Mr Murphy and Dr Bibby.

[6.22 pm]

**CORBY, Superintendent Michael, New South Wales Police**

**LUCAS, Sergeant Karen Margaret, Australian Federal Police Representative, National Emergency Communications Working Group**

**LUTTRELL, Mr Denis Raymond, Chairman, National Emergency Communications Working Group, and Director, Information Management, Queensland Police Service**

**MAHONEY, Assistant Commissioner Reginald, National Emergency Communications Working Group**

**ACTING CHAIR**—I now welcome representatives from the National Emergency Communications Working Group to the table. Do you have any comments to make on the capacity in which you appear?

**Supt Corboy**—I am currently commander, public affairs. I was formerly with the communications branch for three years.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Thank you. You have lodged submission No. 1 with the committee. Do you wish to make any amendments or alterations to that statement?

**Mr Luttrell**—No.

**ACTING CHAIR**—I now invite you to make a short opening statement, at the conclusion of which I will invite members from the committee to ask questions.

**Mr Luttrell**—Thank you very much for the opportunity to address the committee. The National Emergency Communications Working Group is a group consisting of senior representatives of emergency services organisations—police, fire and ambulance—within Australia. It includes Telstra, the Australian Communications Exchange, which is the referral party for hearing- and speech-impaired people, the Australian Communications Authority and Emergency Management Australia, all working towards improving the quality of the service that operates around the Emergency Call Service, which is triple 0, 112, 106 and those sorts of numbers that provide assistance to the public.

There are 13,500,000 of these calls made annually to the Emergency Call Service. About 50 per cent of these calls are received by emergency services organisations and less than 10 per cent of them are genuine. Emergency services organisations communication centres exist to field calls from the public, directly or indirectly, as expeditiously as possible. Calls may be to the emergency call numbers, as I mentioned, or direct to ESOs and internally referred, although that does not happen often.

Real calls are time critical. Many can be life threatening. Communication centres are designated areas set up for the specific purpose to receive these calls and arrange for response action. As well as arrange for emergency services dispatch, it can involve a number of outgoing calls to other appropriate services, such as—in the case of police, for example—to ambulance, fire, health departments, local council et cetera, and even back to the caller, if need be, depending upon the circumstances and the nature of the issue.

Ideally, all communications should be recorded in and out so that a complete record is available for inquiry or follow up. Recording tapes are subject to very close control. These tapes are often called for to establish what occurred. For example, in Queensland not so long ago a claim was made that an ambulance did not turn up in response to a sick child. We were able to establish in subsequent investigations that no calls were received, as claimed in media statements. The need for recording is associated with high levels of accountability—internal or external investigations, coronial investigations, broader evidentiary inquiries, subpoenas, royal commissions, media statements and reviews in respect of incident follow up.

During emergency calls, emotions are often running high. At difficult times, claims made are often just recollections. Sometimes the content of calls needs to be played back to operators during the event, to be clear about what is being said. Complaints from the public are an increasingly common event. There is often a high expectation from the public and the legal community that ESOs be able to account for their actions and the level of service provided.

In an emergency, communications procedures are very closely controlled. Operators are trained for a considerable time before they are allowed to operate, which often involves a four- to six-week training period. Internal procedures and policies advise operators that recording is undertaken. They are advised that, if they wish to make a private call, they should go to a separate area, be that an administration area, rest or meal room, where calls are not recorded. The same is true for incoming calls. Operators are very aware and are reminded of recording occurring. The recent NECWG meeting of senior communications centre representatives affirmed that this is the case in all jurisdictions.

Calls to these areas are taken and made on fixed phone services on call taker and dispatch desks. NECWG confirmed that mobile calls come through the fixed network. That ensures that they get priority routing. Present legislation only allows recording without announcement of calls to specially designated call numbers and then only into such centres. Not all incoming calls requiring action are originally made to those numbers. No call out is presently allowed to be recorded without announcement. This makes it very difficult to conform with the legislation, because it makes procedures very difficult in what can be quite stressful circumstances.

Emergency services organisations fully support the legislative changes proposed, as they simplify procedures and provide for the complete recording of all activity. Procedures and policies operating in communication centres give full recognition of and capability for personal communications of ESO operators. New Zealand and the United Kingdom presently have a similar regime. Legislation and regulation permit it. Our understanding is that these operate very successfully. The proposed legislation meets all of the ESO concerns and provides suitable protection for the wider public interest, certainly as ESOs experience it. Thank you.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Thank you.

**Senator LUDWIG**—A couple of the submitters raised the issue of the need for this legislation. You have gone to some of those reasons. They are operational reasons, if I could

couch it in that way, and seem to be relevant to people in the course of their employment within emergency services and the like. Is that what you have responded to?

**Mr Mahoney**—That is part of it. In our recruitment processes we clearly set out in the job descriptions what the job is—working in an emergency call centre. They all know that calls are recorded. As Mr Luttrell said, there are very clear guidelines on where they can go if they want to make private calls. The essential nature of what we are talking about here, of course, is the increased accountability for all of us to be clear in regard to what is heard and what is not heard over the telephone lines. As Mr Luttrell indicated in the presentation, sometimes we replay all the time because of the people who ring us in an emergency, not only because of emotion and hysteria, but often they are also drug- and alcohol-affected. For a lot of the people calling triple 0 and the emergency lines, that is the case.

Since 9-11, our reflection as a national body is to look at how we can capture more information in our emergency centres. Because of the interdependency between emergency services centres now, we contact each other in a different way than we did before, particularly in response to critical incidents. We do not do that on emergency lines. We do it on lines attached to the communications centre. With the amendment we are trying to clarify what has changed operationally and also administratively in our response to critical incident management in Australia.

**Senator LUDWIG**—What do you envisage will be the lines that are captured by this legislation or that you require to be captured by this legislation?

**Mr Mahoney**—Incoming and external calls to the emergency call centre.

**Senator LUDWIG**—And those which you just mentioned, the ones which are effectively an adjunct to—

**Mr Mahoney**—Yes, that is covered in the amendment.

**Senator LUDWIG**—What about personal computers and emails, personal mobile phones and administrative phones that are not used or not designated as part of the network? Is it the intention to have those monitored as well?

**Mr Mahoney**—No. As I indicated in the opening remarks, the telephone lines that are designated to people we employ in our centres are not recorded.

**Senator LUDWIG**—I cannot recall that I have been into an emergency services facility, other than perhaps the fire brigade at some point, or a fire brigade control room. The type of place that you are outlining is like a call centre facility; there are lines which you can identify as incoming or outgoing, that you can then monitor, and those which you want exempt from the telecommunication legislation. Am I right about that?

**Mr Mahoney**—That is part of it. Also there is dispatch, where you have a telephony support person who is getting phone calls from police stations and phone calls from members of the public put through by other agencies to provide a more timely response to critical incidents. There is a whole range of telephones in there. With inquiries and investigations that occur as the nature of our business, we need to adequately ensure that it is not just what a person thought someone said; it is actually what someone said.

**Senator LUDWIG**—And then in terms of setting up a quick response, is there a facility where you then also want to check communications on CV or HF or other frequencies? Is that a facility that you have considered as part of this?

**Mr Mahoney**—You are talking about voice-over, IP and other new technologies coming on board?

**Senator LUDWIG**—Yes.

**Mr Mahoney**—I am on the Premier of New South Wales' task force on the channels and access strategy, but all around the nation we are encouraging members of the public to communicate with government. A lot of that is SMS and through digital means. All the teenage population I think are accessing their exam results by SMS rather than looking in the papers.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Yes.

**Mr Mahoney**—We are trying, as an emergency services facility, to ensure that the legislation will cover both current technology and emerging technology on a day to day basis. We are already taking reports of matters over the internet and through emails in regard to specific crimes. We are linking with other government departments about major crimes in schools, to better share information, get more timely lists of what has been stolen, and any possible modus operandi of offenders.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Do you have dedicated computers or computer terminals with particular IP addresses that you use for that facility? You can use mobile phones or access telecommunications through the internet for SMS as well for that type of traffic.

**Supt Corboy**—No, not at this stage.

**Senator LUDWIG**—It is only calls that you have at this point in time?

**Mr Luttrell**—The recording is essentially in the communications centres. The equipment there is provided for that purpose, so what comes into that centre is what is recorded. It is invariably limited to that sort of room, but the way technology is developing, there is increasing pressure on us to take SMS calls. We prefer not to do that at the moment, mainly because of the reliability of the service. We do not want to push people into SMS if there is no guarantee that that call is going to get through.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Sometimes, as you can appreciate, it can take two days to get an SMS.

**Mr Luttrell**—Indeed. In fact, we advise against it but I think the reality is that that sort of technology is going to improve. What the bill provides for is that capacity to do it if and when it gets to a point that we would be comfortable with it.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Some of the submitters also say, in terms of the definition of who is in and who is out, there does not appear to be a clear line between those lines which are covered and those lines which are not covered, including mobile phones and—

**Mr Luttrell**—It is not so much the lines; it is the facility which is actually taking the calls and dealing with the calls.

**Senator LUDWIG**—If you had a personal mobile phone inside the facility, that would then be captured by the legislation?

**Mr Luttrell**—No.

**Senator LUDWIG**—How would it not be?

**Mr Luttrell**—Because it is not linked to that network.

**Sgt Lucas**—None of us currently have the facility to intercept mobile phone calls in the air and it is not something that we are looking at instigating.

**Senator LUDWIG**—No, but you can go to the ISP with a telecommunications interception warrant or an exemption, as the case may be, and obtain the communication. It is not about intercepting it in the air; it is about intercepting it at the communications carrier.

**Mr Luttrell**—We are talking about recording, without announcement, the normal routine calls that are coming through. In the same way as this is being recorded, if your mobile went off now, it is not recorded as part of this facility. It works exactly the same way.

**Senator LUDWIG**—How would it not be covered?

**Mr Luttrell**—It is not connected to that mechanism and therefore—

**Senator LUDWIG**—Where does the legislation say that it has to be connected to your network?

**Mr Luttrell**—It does not, in that sense, but that is not what happens. That is the point I am making.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Unfortunately, I have only got the legislation to go on. I do not know what you do other than the submissions that I have received in terms of operations. How do you rule out the telecommunications interception warrant being excluded from a mobile phone or a computer email or an SMS from within that facility, be it personal or even from the tearoom, or from a line which is not part of the network as such? In other words, a phone in the tearoom for personal use would be covered, as I read it.

**Mr Mahoney**—I think I could talk for my colleagues there: (1), once you walk into the communication facility with a dispatch, you cannot have a mobile telephone on. That is the instruction to employees in regard to those facilities; (2), as indicated in the submission, the only mobile phones that are recorded are the ones that come through and then go onto the fixed line for us, which are recorded. The other question is in regard to the designation of the facility, which I think was raised previously about the numbers of police stations which would appear in the schedule. We have had to nominate what an emergency service facility is, and that is where our emergency centre is located in each of our states and territories for the point of this legislation.

**Supt Corboy**—I think you were describing the nature of the call rather than the technological aspects of the call.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Just to get this clear, you do have the capacity to prescribe a discrete area of a building or area. I think in some of the submissions there was an assumption that there was quite a large area or building simply to be prescribed, hence the normal activities that would take place outside of the needs of an emergency call centre would not be able to

take place. Can you give me some assurances that the prescribed area will also have the capacity to be controlled in terms of being able to be easily identified by the occupants and the staff of that area?

**Mr Luttrell**—Invariably it is an area that is secured and people just do not walk in and out. It requires particular access and egress.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Mr Luttrell, can you give me an example of the sorts of security measures you would have to go through to get in there? Is there some sort of identification pass?

**Mr Luttrell**—Could I ask Sergeant Lucas to describe what she does in the AFP.

**Sgt Lucas**—At our centre, the Winchester Police Centre, ACT Communications, to get into the building you come through the front door, where there is a guard; you are required to be signed in if you are not a member. Even as a member, you come in through that main door and you go down a corridor to a first entry door. You buzz, say who you are and why you are there. That is assessed by the communications sergeant. If he believes that you should be coming through that door, he lets you in. You walk down the corridor to a second door and that is the door into the facility itself.

**ACTING CHAIR**—There can be no mistake when you are inside that facility—

**Sgt Lucas**—You are coming into a secure area.

**ACTING CHAIR**—that the mobile phone in your pocket might not be protected by the normal mechanisms. Perhaps you could just give us a quick brief on specifically how you ensure that everybody who works within that facility or adjacent to that facility understands the nature of the calls that are made from within the facility itself, and the difference between the nature of those calls and calls that will be made in other areas of the building, rather than the facility.

**Sgt Lucas**—In our centre, members of communications have six weeks training when they first come in. One of the first things they are told is that all their phone calls, apart from those in the designated area like the meal room, will be recorded, and it is recorded for their benefit as well as for the benefit of the caller. The other members outside the communications centre who are contacting us backwards and forwards are also aware that all the calls are being recorded. It is common knowledge.

**ACTING CHAIR**—I can understand how that may be in the facility you describe, Ms Lucas, but there are a number of other facilities—for example, a fire station—that may not be used to the level of security amenity that you would be used to.

**Sgt Lucas**—I do not know about the other states, but I know that in the communications centre at Curtin Emergency Services Authority in the ACT again you have several levels of security to go through to get into their communications centre which handles fire and ambulance for the ACT.

**Supt Corboy**—Both the New South Wales Fire Brigades and the New South Wales Ambulance Service have equal levels of security in their comms centres to us. They are not seeking any telephony into their fire stations or ambulance stations, which are not public numbers anyway.

**Mr Luttrell**—Senator, it is not reasonable to describe these locations as fire stations. They really are emergency communications centres.

**ACTING CHAIR**—I am just dealing with the perceptions in some of the submissions.

**Senator KIRK**—We have just been talking about various facilities, the ones that obviously come to mind like fire, police et cetera, but my understanding under this legislation is that the definition of such a facility is going to be broadened considerably by the declaration of the minister, so whereas what you have said is quite reassuring as regards security, how can we be sure that these other facilities that this is going to extend to will have the same kind of security in place? You can see our concerns.

**Mr Luttrell**—I am not aware that that extension is anticipated in that sense. Each emergency service would be required to identify the location of their devices and those centres. I do not see any broadening of the issue, with respect, from the way it presently operates.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Do you have a manual that covers contracted-out call centres? Do you have contracted-out call centres or are they all dealt with by emergency services personnel?

**Mr Luttrell**—Contractors in the sense of?

**Senator LUDWIG**—The phone, receiving the phone calls and passing them on.

**Mr Luttrell**—No, they are invariably either sworn officers or members of the service, all covered by the rules and regulations that operate in those services. Contractors in the sense of telecommunications technicians and people who might come in to repair things?

**Senator LUDWIG**—No, I mean in terms of calls.

**Mr Luttrell**—There are no contracted call centres in Australia, none at all.

**Senator LUDWIG**—At the moment. Is there any intention to have them?

**Mr Mahoney**—I have not heard anything.

**Mr Luttrell**—I am aware of none. It certainly does not apply in any of the facilities in Queensland.

**Senator LUDWIG**—So all the facilities we are talking are all either uniformed or within a service?

**Mr Luttrell**—Yes.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Mr Luttrell, in your opening comments you made reference to a group that you consulted with that were voice challenged in some form. Perhaps you could think about that. In reference to Mr Murphy's submission when he said you do not usually use email or SMS messages to call an emergency centre, was that in reference to the potential for using SMSs to try to get in? Could you perhaps enlarge on why that was the case?

**Mr Luttrell**—We push the triple 0 number very hard. In fact, we prefer to have only one channel that is well known, reliable, the number that comes to mind when you have an emergency. We accept that technology is changing things. The difficulty is if you get an email and it is clear what it is about, then it has to be investigated. We have no option but to do that.

So that message has to get into the facility. It is not one we would anticipate, it is not one we would encourage. SMS is one such thing, exactly the same case. The Australian Communications Authority has issued an edict to discourage carriers and carriage service providers from talking about SMS in respect of emergency calls.

**ACTING CHAIR**—But because it is a possibility that people may use that amenity to contact an emergency centre, that is why it is being included in the purview of this, for information.

**Mr Luttrell**—Essentially, yes. We just do not know whether the technology is going, frankly.

**Sgt Lucas**—It has taken us three years to get to this point. Technology is changing so quickly these days that we do not want to be back to see you next year and the year after and the year after because technology is getting ahead of us.

**Senator LUDWIG**—It is highly likely you will be. This is about the fourth time we have the telecommunications interception legislation before us, so do not be disappointed if you are wrong.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Thank you very much for providing evidence today.

**Sgt Lucas**—Thank you, sir.

[6.47 pm]

**GEORGE, Mr Anthony, Manager, Compliance and Technical Services, Communications Operations and Service Group, Australian Communications Authority**

**THOMAS, Mr Donovan Harry, Team Member, Compliance and Technical Services Team, Communications Operations and Service Group, Australian Communications Authority**

**LAMMERS, Federal Agent Rudi, Manager, Technical Operations, Australian Federal Police**

**NEGUS, Federal Agent Tony, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Australian Federal Police**

**WHOWELL, Mr Peter Jon, Manager, Legislation Program, Australian Federal Police**

**GIFFORD, Mr Cameron, Senior Legal Officer, Security Law Branch, Attorney-General's Department**

**McDONALD, Mr Geoffrey, Assistant Secretary, Security Law Branch, Attorney-General's Department**

**SELLICK, Ms Suesan Maree, Principal Legal Officer, Security Law Branch, Attorney-General's Department**

**ACTING CHAIR**—The Australian Federal Police and the Australian Communications Authority have lodged submissions Nos 7 and 3 respectively with the committee. Do you wish to make any amendments or alterations to these submissions?

**Mr George**—Not for the ACA.

**Federal Agent Negus**—Not for the AFP.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Before we commence, can I remind senators that under the Senate procedures for the protection of witnesses, departmental representatives should not be asked for opinions or matters of policy. If necessary they must also be given the opportunity to refer these matters to the appropriate ministers. I now invite each of you to make a short opening statement, at the conclusion of which I invite members of the committee to ask questions.

**Mr McDonald**—Thank you. Those involved in organised crime activity and those who are most likely to subvert national security need to be able to communicate in order to get done what they want to do. Like any business of this nature, they like to use sophisticated techniques when it suits them and sometimes believe that communications are quite safe and foolproof; but every once in a while with these communications they make mistakes and give the game away. That is where telecommunication interception becomes a very effective tool in the fight against crime and enhancement of national security. Our current regime recognises that there is a need to guard against infringements of personal privacy in this process. That is why we have a strict accountability regime. We have warrants which are used as a last resort and there is extensive oversight by the parliament and the Ombudsman.

I mention all this because it is important when we look at these amendments that we do not just look at the specific amendment but think about what we are amending and the framework

that is in place which provides for accountability. These amendments are in many ways a refinement of the legislation and do not have the significance of the framework that we are attaching them to.

It is important that when we have legislation like this, it does not impede the operations of law enforcement agencies, particularly emergency services and the Australian Communications Authority work. These services amendments are very much about assisting law enforcement and ensuring that we can provide adequate emergency services coverage. There is another amendment, which is essentially a fix-up amendment to the Criminal Code, which is totally unrelated to telecommunications interception but we found it convenient to use this bill as a vehicle. You might recall last year when I was in the criminal law branch we put through some updated telecommunication offences. Some of those offences were to do with the use of child pornography on the net and issues like that.

In that legislation there were exemptions for law enforcement agencies. There were some agencies which we should have exempted. Although we had consultation on the bill, these agencies were not specified, so that amendment is included in this bill and is a Criminal Code amendment. It is to do with allowing lawful law enforcement related activity.

The committee has indicated it is particularly interested in the proposed amendments that will enable interception of communications made to and from the declared emergency service facilities. Currently, listening to or recording calls made on an emergency service number is not to be an interception for the purposes of the interception act. Such numbers are those on which assistance in emergencies may be sought from the police, fire or ambulance services. The primary emergency service number, triple 0, and the mobile and teletype equivalents, 112 and 106, have been designated in the regulations for this purpose.

It was intended that the list of prescribed numbers could be extended to accommodate the needs of emergency service organisations. However, state and territory ministers have indicated that the prescriptions mechanism is not practical in the following ways. The exception only allowed recording of incoming calls, not those calls subsequently made by emergency services organisations that deliver emergency services. Obviously there is an incoming call and there is a delivery side. The prescription method was also proven to be administratively cumbersome as it required identification of potentially thousands of numbers at which emergency assistance calls are received within communications centres. It would therefore require endless regulatory amendments.

Finally, the publication of emergency service numbers presents a significant threat to this very important part of our critical infrastructure. The numbers could be used in a malicious manner to shut down a communications centre by engaging all the lines in a centre simultaneously.

We only have to look at how this city has been disrupted over the last few weeks to see how there are more than enough people around who might be motivated to do this, let alone those who might have something else more serious in mind. Clearly, we do not want to be facilitating any problems of that nature.

In response to these concerns the amendments will move away from prescribing emergency service numbers and move to the concept of declaring emergency service facilities, therefore

allowing the interception of communications made to and from those facilities. This will enable the interception of all forms of communication, including email and text messages. While communication is usually in the form of voice calls, it is essential that the act remain technologically neutral and recognise just how much text communication is used. Recently we texted the wording of some proposed amendments on a phone because we could not contact anyone except in that way. Text messaging is getting to the point where—

**Senator LUDWIG**—Another island in paradise.

**Mr McDonald**—It was Cambodia. It is very well served with mobile phone service. It shows just how strongly that is used. Obviously it can be used in that way, particularly with younger people using it all the time. Sure, it will enable the interception of private communications. We have a situation here where professional people are running the emergency services line and they are fully aware that they are private calls. Of course there is awareness that in these circumstances it will be recorded. However, the details of the facilities to be declared will be kept as tight as possible, even down to declaring a particular part of a particular floor, depending on the structure of the facility. Staff will be aware that in all other areas communications are not being intercepted. In law enforcement type of facilities there is quite strong control over the areas in which people can go.

Finally, it is also true that there are details of those facilities that we do not intend to make public. That is reflecting the need to protect our critical infrastructure. If the emergency services system cannot work because of sabotage, then the problems are potentially pretty horrible. I think I have already mentioned the Criminal Code amendment and explained the situation with it. From some of the submissions it seems that people are getting confused that these amendments are really about the interception regime. In fact that is not the case. It is focused on the telecommunication offences.

Those offences deal with everything including threatening to kill people, threatening to cause people harm, hoaxes, the child porn side of things which I mentioned earlier—all of which are issues where law enforcement needs to be investigating whether the organisation that we have listed clearly have some need to be involved in some of the activities. One was to do with mobile handsets and the rebirthing of those. Sometimes you might need to be involved in doing something like that to try and deal with people who are doing that sort of thing. In certain circumstances law enforcement agencies may be legitimately engaged in conduct that does fall foul of one of these offences. In the event that this involves surveillance, then the Surveillance Devices Act, which we had passed last year, would apply. It is quite strict in its procedures. The consequences of not complying with that act are not only that we will have admissibility problems but also there are sanctions underpinning it.

These amendments are, in the scheme of things, not earth-shattering. I would like to suggest that fundamental aspects of it are totally within the spirit of the foundation legislation which I outlined in the first place.

There was some criticism that we were proposing to list additional bodies that might be created over time by regulations and there was some concern about that. Of course, if it is done by regulation—and there are many important things listed by regulation—then it can be disallowed in that situation if there is a problem. Clearly we have in mind that they are often

reconstituting and renaming organisations or creating new ones and it is obviously much more practical to do it by regulation. Thank you for giving us an opportunity to appear here tonight. I look forward to any questions you might want to ask.

**ACTING CHAIR**—I am glad you are looking forward to questions, Mr McDonald.

**Mr McDonald**—We always look forward to questions.

**Senator LUDWIG**—In terms of the odd one out, which is the first one, it does not seem to be limited by the number you can include within the regulation you make. It seems to be open-ended in the number of agencies you could include by regulation. What was the purpose of making it open-ended?

**Ms Sellick**—As Mr McDonald just mentioned, these agencies we currently prescribe often have restructures. The Crime and Misconduct Commission in Queensland is the most recent one. By prescribing them in the primary legislation we immediately run the risk that once there is a change in the name of the body, the primary legislation no longer covers them. Yes, it is an open-ended regulation-making power, but must take into account any of the agencies that may be engaged in this conduct, those that are generally permitted under surveillance device legislation. Should a new body come on board, they would like to be able to give them the advantage of the defence that is available to other law enforcement officers.

**Mr McDonald**—In a sense it would require a recommendation of the relevant state government to the Attorney-General before we would be looking at listing these additional organisations.

**Senator LUDWIG**—When you look at the definition of ‘emergency services facility’ there is now no longer a requirement for the emergency services interception to occur in the course of a person’s duties. That seems to have been removed. Why is that no longer necessary?

**Ms Sellick**—That was an unintended drafting consequence. We thank the submissions that brought this to our attention. It is something the government certainly is going to be looking at.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Does that mean you might have a favourable view to an amendment?

**Ms Sellick**—I cannot answer for what the government might do, Senator.

**Senator LUDWIG**—So you say it is a drafting oversight and it should not have been deleted?

**Ms Sellick**—There is a possibility that we should have stuck to the words in the legislation and not tried to be fancy and reinvent the wheel.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Do not tell parliamentary counsel that one. In terms of the definition of ‘emergency services facility’ it has the ability to include at (d) a service for dispatch of, or referring matters to the attention of a force. Is there any subcontract about emergency services facilities at the moment, or dispatching centres?

**Ms Sellick**—Not that I am aware of. I am aware that in Victoria they did have a relay service at one point.

**Senator LUDWIG**—The ambulance, wasn’t it? It was subject to adverse press, if I recollect correctly.

**Ms Sellick**—It is something for the emergency services to address; whether they bring it back within the coverage of their own jurisdictions or whether they stick to a centre that takes all the calls. Telstra is at the moment the owner of the triple 0 calls. In fact, they are part of the services we would need to declare for the purposes of this provision. They are not police, ambulance or fire, but they are certainly the first point of contact for the triple 0 calls.

**Senator LUDWIG**—There do not seem to be any others. Telstra then is the organisation that would be included at the moment.

**Ms Sellick**—Not that we are aware at this stage, but of course it is a fracturing market up there.

**Senator LUDWIG**—It seems that (c) is to enable that force or service or another force or service to deal with a request for assistance in an emergency. Does that limit the stretch of (3AB)?

**Ms Sellick**—It certainly is not allowing the prescription of any facility. It does have to be tied back to the fire, police or ambulance services.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Is that also tied to deal with the request for assistance in an emergency? There are a number of elements to that: it is ‘deal with’ a request, so it has to be a request and then it has to be an assistance in an emergency.

**Ms Sellick**—Yes.

**Senator LUDWIG**—They are words of limitation.

**Ms Sellick**—Yes.

**Senator LUDWIG**—So unless it was an emergency—

**Ms Sellick**—All calls coming in are going to be. The people who are intercepting the calls cannot declare at one particular moment or not whether a call is an emergency call, which is why we need to be able to intercept all calls coming into these facilities.

**Mr McDonald**—But it is a clearly marked emergency line.

**Ms Sellick**—Yes.

**Senator LUDWIG**—But people make wrong calls.

**Mr McDonald**—It would be pretty hard to make a mistake with triple 0, though.

**Senator LUDWIG**—You are braver than I to say that.

**Mr McDonald**—It is probably unlikely, I would say.

**Ms Sellick**—Basically the Attorney must be satisfied that the facility, before he declares it, is a facility that will enable the force or service to deal with a request for assistance in an emergency. That is the reason the facility is established; to be able to deal with a request for assistance in an emergency. It might receive a call that is not, in hindsight, an emergency call but it has in fact been established to receive and deal with calls in an emergency.

**Senator LUDWIG**—So far as the retrospective operation of triple 0, 106 and 112 numbers, it seems that only goes back to March.

**Ms Sellick**—We have not sought retrospective commencement of these provisions. They will commence on royal assent.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Who would not be protected then? Was there any consideration as to whether retrospective protection should be given to workers in emergency facilities who may have listened to or recorded emergency calls or numbers other than triple 0, 106 and 112?

**Ms Sellick**—It was something that came up very early. Because emergency services are professional organisations—we are not quite sure of the legal standing of it—we have formed a view that people should know when they call these services they are recorded, and certainly the people operating in the services know they are recorded. It probably is not an interception anyway, because everyone is aware that it will be recorded. It is a grey land again. We have certainly taken note of the submission that brought this to our attention.

**Senator LUDWIG**—The area of the recommendations by Mr Sherman under the TI Act, particularly 5 and 6, seems to be that there is no sufficient reporting to parliament in terms of the number of TI warrants, named-person warrants applied for, refused and issued during each reporting year in an annual report, or to parliament through ASIO's annual report or some other annual report, or through the TI reporting mechanism itself. That seems to be a recommendation Mr Sherman sees as a modest step towards greater disclosure and accountability. Why has that not been included in the legislation?

**Ms Sellick**—We have, Senator, in part 4, the provision dealing with civil forfeiture proceedings in named-person warrants. We certainly pick up Mr Sherman's recommendation about the statistics the agencies are required to provide to the Attorney-General, for him to include in the annual report to parliament on named-person warrants.

**Senator LUDWIG**—So you will be including those applied for, refused and issued during each reporting year.

**Ms Sellick**—Yes. In fact, those statistics were included in the annual report for 2003-04.

**Senator LUDWIG**—In respect of recommendation 6, the Commonwealth Ombudsman's annual report to parliament contained details of inspections of the AFP and ACC during the year, particularly of deficiencies revealed and remedial action taken or proposed.

**Ms Sellick**—Yes. Item 10 in part 4 gives effect to that recommendation. The provision will require the Ombudsman to include in the annual report to the Attorney-General a summary of the inspections, deficiencies and particulars of remedial action taken.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Yes, but that is to the Attorney-General. Mine is to parliament.

**Ms Sellick**—It is our intention that the Attorney-General will include in his annual report to parliament the statistics that will—

**Senator LUDWIG**—But he does not have to.

**Ms Sellick**—Not at this stage, no. We have made it clear in a supplementary explanatory memorandum that that was the intention, to give full effect to the spirit of Mr Sherman's recommendation in this regard. There is an issue about the detail which the Ombudsman can include in his annual report. At the moment he is restricted in what he can, in fact, report in his annual report on TI information.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Why wouldn't you amend the legislation rather than put it in an EM which makes it inconsistent with the legislation, in my view?

**Ms Sellick**—We can certainly specify, if the government so wishes, that this is to be included in the annual report. My understanding is that it was the government's intention to give effect to Mr Sherman's recommendation No. 6.

**Senator LUDWIG**—In terms of the more general proposition raised by the Law Council about the ancillary offences—it seems that they regard them as a legislative creep—is there a justification that you can provide, or an example, of where that power would assist in prosecuting a particular case?

**Ms Sellick**—I might defer to my law enforcement agency friends, but I can say that in any situation where crimes are conducted it is only after the event that you are starting the process of identifying who the person is or where the person is. Nine times out of 10, they are going to have some sort of assistance after the fact. It is going to be an essential tool for law enforcement agencies to be able to obtain an interception warrant for the investigation of an accessory after the fact to assist with the apprehension and investigation of the primary offender.

**Mr McDonald**—It is quite usual right through the legislation to cover the ancillary offences. Obviously, they go hand in glove with each other.

**Federal Agent Negus**—Obviously, these are class 1 offences and very serious offences, like murder, kidnapping and terrorism. Certainly, from the AFP's perspective, if there was an accessory after the fact it would be something of an inhibitor if we were unable to apply for a proper telephone interception warrant in that circumstance. It is a shortfall in the current environment and, as I said, only for very serious offences.

**Mr McDonald**—The other point is that the penalties for ancillary offences are quite significant. They are serious penalties.

**Ms Sellick**—They are not secondary offences, they are offences in their own right.

**Senator LUDWIG**—What is your answer, though, to the claim that they can be abused to intercept and record communications of a person who is only suspected of aiding and abetting after the fact and would cause a breach of privacy? This was an issue raised by the council.

**Mr McDonald**—Ancillary offences contain their own fault elements; contain elements of a serious offence in their right. It is an area of criminality that has been identified by the parliament anyway. It is not really correct to say that they are of no substance. If the parliament decides that ancillary conduct is to be criminal and prescribes a significant penalty, then it should be treated like other offences.

**Senator LUDWIG**—But only in relation to class 1 offences.

**Ms Sellick**—Yes. We have not extended the definition of 'ancillary offence' for class 2 offences. This is only for class 1 offences.

**Federal Agent Negus**—The same checks and balances exist for the ancillary offences as exist for the primary offences, so there is still a very rigorous regime: the issuing of the

warrant, the sufficient standard of proof being met at that particular time and then the regulation around that of how the documents and other things are handled as a consequence.

**Senator LUDWIG**—So you are not going to come back to class 2 offences for the application of ancillary offences in the foreseeable future?

**Ms Sellick**—Senator, if I had a crystal ball in relation to the Telecommunications (Interception) Act and amendments that were required—

**Senator LUDWIG**—We would not be here for the fourth or fifth time, would we?

**Ms Sellick**—The year is but young!

**Senator LUDWIG**—There is a review as well going on in relation to this legislation. Can you tell me where that is up to?

**Mr McDonald**—The review has engaged around quite extensive consultation. There have been written submissions and also Mr Blunn has visited many different organisations and locations in a consultative capacity. They are at the point where they are writing aspects of the report and developing the report. That is going along fairly well, and I expect that the review is still pretty well on track for August.

**Senator LUDWIG**—The extension to where it can cover emails, SMSs and information not connected with emergencies: it seems to be that the legislative reach of this is—and we have had a couple of examples provided to us—stretches to where you have a computer within the facility and it might have private emails. I do not know. People cannot always say who is going to send them an email. Then you have mobile phones that people may have, for a range of reasons. Although you say it may not exist now, if you couple it with a service or with a dispatch and they then are contracted out into the future—because this legislation seems to also have a future content to cover a range of circumstances that may not exist now—you have those covered as well, which could include private conversations and private communications.

**Ms Sellick**—The intention is to cover anything occurring within the facility. It is not limited to particular forms of communication or particular styles of communication. I think the National Emergency Communications Working Group has addressed the issue of the need to ensure that the legislation moves forward should there be a change in the way people communicate. It is not looking at designated numbers. That became too prohibitive in the way that we could prescribe them. It is looking at changing the focus to being what is actually in the emergency service facility.

**Mr McDonald**—People working in a facility will be very much aware of the circumstances of their particular workplace. They will no doubt have some faith in their colleagues to the effect that they probably will not be too concerned about that issue anyway.

**Federal Agent Negus**—My experience over 23-odd years now is that people who work in those areas understand the environment that they are in. It is very important after the event to make sure that you have the details right and if you can replay a phone call or even reconstruct things several days later to make sure that you have the right sequence of events, in the case of bushfires and other things, it becomes an absolutely important mechanism for us to do that. The way that the structure is now, that is limited to a certain number of phones. In

an emergency situation, you may well have everyone in a centre on a different phone looking at different communications with different agencies. It is very instructive to be able to put that back together again at a later time.

**Mr Gifford**—The term ‘facility’ was quite purposely chosen because it is defined in section 5 of the interception act to have the same meaning as it has for the telecommunication act. It is defined in that act to mean a building, a vessel—I will stay with ‘building’ because that is the part I need—‘or any part of that building’. That gives the Attorney-General the ability to declare only one part of the building. If we use the example of this room, he could declare this room to be a facility, thereby allowing emergency services organisations to ensure that, perhaps where the Hansard operators are this evening, they are not recorded lines. It is making sure that those privacy concerns can be met by ensuring that what is outside of that facility will not be recorded.

**Senator LUDWIG**—How can they be met when nobody knows whether a part or the whole of the building has been designated, if it is a report to the Attorney-General which is not a legislative instrument and cannot be reviewed by parliament?

**Mr Gifford**—As the representative from the National Emergency Communications Working Group has said, all personnel within the particular facility would be made aware of which part of the particular facility is a declared facility and that things outside of that facility, including things such as a mess room, would not be recorded and that those particular lines would be available for personal communications and administrative communications.

**Senator LUDWIG**—Where is the legislative requirement for that?

**Mr Gifford**—There is no legislative requirement for that.

**Senator LUDWIG**—No.

**Mr McDonald**—The situation is that surely it is not necessary to go to that sort of level of detail in the legislation. It is a workplace and a workplace which has all of the usual workplace relations issues that any workplace would have, in the sense of making sure that people are aware of what the situation is and having other areas where that would not be the case. Is there any advantage in perhaps outlining what these facilities are like?

**Federal Agent Negus**—From the AFP’s perspective, we would not intend to designate buildings as such. It would be specific areas within buildings. I think communications centres and elements like that would be the general areas that we are talking about here. There is certainly no intention to widen that out to areas where investigators might be sitting, just because there might be the odd call come into those people. From our perspective, it is very much a closed environment now. We would certainly be looking at supplying or providing other telephones for people. We acknowledge that people need to make personal calls during work time and there is a tolerance for that, as long as that is reasonable. We would certainly have no issue with providing that sort of service.

I think Sergeant Lucas outlined, from the AFP’s perspective, that these are very much contained units, very secure units, and people do not just wander in and out of them willy-nilly. If you are in there, you are in there to do a specific task. From my experience in these particular places, people look to have some sort of reassurance that they have not missed an

important call and there is an ability to recapture that at a later time. As far as intruding on people's privacy, as has been said a couple of times before, these are very professional people who work in a high-pressure environment where they might have numerous calls coming in in a very short space of time and, for most of them, I think they would appreciate this, as long as they had an opportunity to use communications devices outside of that environment which we would certainly look to provide.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Mr McDonald, I had a fairly high degree of certainty a moment ago that the staff adjacent to these facilities would be (a) very clear where the facility was and areas outside. I have to say, from the contribution of Mr Gifford, he perhaps suggested we would be proscribing those areas not that were the facility but in fact proscribing areas within a building that were outside that facility. I would like some clarification that it is the intention—because we do not have any other opportunity to clarify that since it is outside of the parliamentary purview—that these areas will in fact be proscribed; will be an area within a building quite clearly proscribed. Perhaps you can clarify that.

**Ms Sellick**—The declaration that the Attorney makes will certainly be declaring facilities. It could be part of a building, it could be a particular floor within a particular building, depending where the call centre—commonly called—is situated within a building. That particular thing will be declared to be the emergency service facility. It is within the normal then standing operation procedures of the professional services that that area is then made known to the staff within those areas—that that area that has been declared by the Attorney is the area within which telecommunications will be intercepted.

In the same way that there is no requirement for security clearances to be identified as to where you go within a particular area, there is no legislation that says you need to have a top secret or a secret clearance before you can go within an area. It is a standard operation procedure of all Commonwealth government departments, and even private contractors, that you need to have a particular clearance to go somewhere. That is what we are looking for here. We are not overproscribing. We are simply saying that, once it has been declared by the Attorney, the staff will be made known through the normal operation procedures of those organisations. That was our intention.

**Senator LUDWIG**—But the legislation does not preclude the Attorney-General from being satisfied of other facilities outside of what you have described being proscribed. That is the case, isn't it?

**Mr McDonald**—We are still limited by the purpose of the legislation, which is about the emergency services functions. It is not a question of there being a capacity to proscribe buildings willy-nilly. It is tied to that function.

**Ms Sellick**—We come back to the point that you raised at the beginning, Senator: the premises themselves have to have been established for the purpose of dealing with emergency service facilities. If, in the end, that is a caravan out in operational field for whatever crisis takes place, if the Attorney is satisfied that that particular premises for that particular time is, in fact, the emergency call centre, that is what will be proscribed. But before he declares it to be such, we have to be satisfied that it was in fact established for dealing with requests for assistance in an emergency.

**Senator LUDWIG**—There is no review of that, once the decision is made.

**Ms Sellick**—Correct.

**Senator LUDWIG**—There is then no subsequent check whether or not you can then override that, expand it, once the (3AB) test is applied. You can then come back and alter it as many times as you like. That is true, isn't it?

**Mr McDonald**—Yes, I think so. But you would need to have that sort of flexibility, I would have thought, where you have adjustments in the facilities. I do not think you have had any difficulties in terms of expectations about how staff would react to it. We are not aware of any concerns of that nature.

**Federal Agent Negus**—No, that is right. Since the submission has gone in, there has certainly been no contact from the Federal Police Association or any other body or any member of staff, as far as we are aware.

**Ms Sellick**—Ultimately, Senator, if the evidence came down to be used and they challenged the validity of the interception on the basis that it was not a declared facility, then any attempt to use the evidence would be thrown out. Once again, it comes back to the integrity of the situation. There is that final call that maybe you get a situation where the lawyers or the defence is arguing that a warrant should have been obtained because the situation was not a facility established for the reception of an emergency. Ultimately, it is challenged in that way.

**Mr McDonald**—Yes. It has to be work within its purpose; the purpose of the legislation. It would be pretty easy to establish what the purpose of the facility was.

**Senator LUDWIG**—I think we have just about run out of time. But I am interested in the evidentiary basis where you have decided that you require this power, in the sense of the need, the mischief it is solving. We have heard some from, I think, the emergency services people themselves, but from the way that the legislation is structured and the need for the Attorney-General to have that facility which does not have parliamentary scrutiny, it seems to me that there is a lack, at least from the submitters, of reasons that have been put forward by the Attorney-General to substantiate why these powers are required. But given the nature of the time, I am happy to take that on notice, if you are wanting to.

**Mr McDonald**—Yes. As we said in the opening, the rationale for designating a facility all goes down to the practicality of trying to do it by numbers. Given that these facilities are all government facilities with ministerial involvement, it is one of these areas where legislative proscription of every detail is simply not as necessary as it would be if we were trying to regulate the private sector.

**Senator LUDWIG**—You could limit the legislation to government agencies only?

**Mr McDonald**—The legislation is such that we have been given administration of this by the Attorney-General in terms of declaring the areas. It would be a little difficult for us to absolutely rule out some private aspect to it, even though it would appear that these are predominantly government facilities.

**Senator LUDWIG**—But they are not all government? You changed it to 'predominantly'.

**Mr McDonald**—My understanding is they are, but we would not want to have a situation where we were ruling it out. Of course Telstra is involved—

**Senator LUDWIG**—I did not want to go there!

**Mr McDonald**—What I was driving at is that the emergency services are administered by responsible government officials. Consequently, we cannot equate this with trying to regulate masses of small businesses. That is a totally different kettle of fish.

**ACTING CHAIR**—Mr McDonald, you may have taken a question on notice there.

**Mr McDonald**—I am sure we have that option.

**ACTING CHAIR**—You will have to provide that by 1200 hours tomorrow.

**Mr McDonald**—I think that can be done pretty easily.

**Senator KIRK**—That is noon in layman's terms.

**Mr McDonald**—Yes.

**ACTING CHAIR**—I thank the witnesses who have given evidence to the committee today. I now declare the meeting of the Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee adjourned.

**Committee adjourned at 7.34 pm**