

SUBMISSION BY G4S AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
for the
Senate Committee Inquiry into the Events of
16 to 18 February 2014
At the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre

14 May 2014





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1. Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

G4S welcomes the opportunity to provide this submission to the inquiry by the Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee of the Senate into the *Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February 2014*. G4S is saddened by the events of 16 and 17 February which resulted in numerous injuries to transferees and Centre staff and the tragic death of Mr Reza Barati.

1.2 The Incident


There was significant unrest amongst transferees at the centre on 16 February which was the result of a number of factors outlined in this submission.

There is clear evidence that the violence that occurred on the night of 17 February occurred after locals and some Centre staff, led by the PNG police mobile squad, breached the fences of the transferee accommodation block at the Centre known as Mike compound, then entered that compound to exact violent retribution against the transferees, in retaliation for insults and violence against their country and the people of PNG.



1.3 Timeline of Key Events

The following chart, while not exhaustive, provides some context to how the profile and number of transferees at the Centre changed and how G4S was required to respond to those changes.



23 June 2013
G4S provides risk assessment to the Department highlighting inadequate security infrastructure

6 & 13 October 2013
G4S formally requests separate logistics hub and improved lighting & fencing

15 December 2013
G4S repeats request for logistics hub and improved lighting & fencing

2 January 2014
Further security risk assessment provided by G4S, recommending improved lighting, fencing and CCTV coverage

30 January & 1 February 2014
Additional guards requested by G4S to compensate for security infrastructure shortcomings

4, 6 & 7 February 2014
Letters sent by G4S to Immigration Minister and Department Secretary summarising concerns over security and lack of action by the Department



Summary Chronology of Events:

Date	Event
20 October 2012	Landowner protests in relation to perceived lack of benefits for Manus Island. PNG police mobile squad deployed.
April 2013	Concerns over contraband and conduct of local guards and PNG police mobile squad.
30 April 2013	Paper submitted to the Department requesting change of staffing profile. Provisional approval granted.
15 June 2013	Decision taken to move families out of Centre and make Centre all SAM facility.
23 June 2013	Revised Risk Assessment submitted by G4S requesting improved fencing and security lighting. Informed verbally by the Department that the requested is denied.
19 July 2013	PNG Solution announced. Existing Transferees flown out. Arrival of new SAMs commences shortly after 19 th July announcement.
26 July 2013	Contract Change Proposal submitted by G4S. Logistics hub requested.
5 August 2013	Approval received by the Department in principle for Contract Change, but logistics hub suggestion not actioned.
7 September 2013	Coalition wins election.
6 October 2013	Formal costed proposal for logistics hub submitted by G4S. No response received from the Department.
13 October 2013	Further formal proposal for improved security lighting and fencing submitted to the Department by G4S. No response received from the Department.
30 October 2013	Level of 1100 Transferees reached.
12 December 2013	G4S advised to Transition Out to Transfield Services on 28 March 2014.



15 December 2013	Further formal proposal for improved security lighting and fencing submitted to the Department by G4S. No action taken by the Department.
2 January 2014	Further Security Risk Assessment submitted advocating erection of more robust fencing, installation of CCTV and improved security lighting by G4S. No action taken by the Department.
26 January 2014	First Transferee protests start at the Centre.
30 January 2014	Email from Chris Manning of G4S to the Department requesting additional 30 guards. the Department approved request (Appendices 15 and 16).
1 February 2014	Email from Chris Manning of G4S to Simon Schiwy at the Department requesting further 100 guards (Appendix 17). The Department initially rejected request, however request agreed following further discussion.
2 February 2014	Email from John McCaffery of G4S urging the Department to open discussions with Transferees on Refugee Status Determination (RSD) (Appendix 12).
4 February 2014	Briefing Note from Sven Straub (acting Regional MD of G4S) submitted to Martin Bowles (Secretary of the Department) requesting urgent reinstatement of RSD (Appendix 8).
6/7 February 2014	Letters from Dan Ryan (Regional CEO, G4S AME) to Martin Bowles (Secretary of the Department) and to the Minister advising of various concerns (Appendices 19 and 20).
16/17 February 2014	Riots occur.
28 March 2014	G4S Transition Out complete.

Note: correspondence referred to in the table above is attached in the appendices to this submission



1.4 Contributing Factors

Inadequate infrastructure: the infrastructure including the fencing of the Centre was intended for use in a low risk facility consistent with the fencing used in on-shore immigration processing Centres housing families.

In June 2013 a decision was made by the Department to move all families out of the Centre to on-shore immigration Centres and Manus Island was established as a single adult males (**SAMs**) only facility.

This change was implemented early in July 2013 and as a result, this increased the risk profile of the Centre significantly due to the increased likelihood of tensions leading to violence amongst a SAMs only group.

As a result of the change of profile of transferees, G4S made several recommendations to improve fencing (and other infrastructure) between 23 June 2013 and 6 February 2014.

Between the start of August 2013 and the end of October 2013 there was a significant and rapid growth in numbers of transferees arriving at the Centre, growing from approximately 300 transferees to approximately 1100 transferees in a three month period. This large number of adult males housed within a Centre intended for family use posed additional security risks.

Change of policy regarding settlement of genuine refugees: during 2013, the policy of the Australian Government altered so as to offer no chance of any transferees located at the Centre being resettled in Australia. This change of policy increased unrest amongst the transferees and tension at the Centre.

Stalled processing of transferee determinations: one of the key factors which contributed to the protests and violent riot by the transferees was their growing frustration over the stalled processing of Refugee Status Determination (RSD). G4S's intelligence showed that the transferees expected their concerns to be addressed by 25 December 2013 (perhaps anticipating an amnesty because of the significance of the Christmas holiday). When this did not occur, tensions continued to rise which caused concern that a violent protest action was being planned. G4S consequently requested, and obtained, approval from the Department to deploy 130 additional security staff to the Centre, sourced from G4S's PNG business based in Port Moresby. The extra staff were requested due to the added volume of transferees, increased tensions and as an attempt to compensate for the inadequate fencing in the Centre.



Lack of search powers: another contributing factor to the events of 16 to 17 February was G4S's lack of "search powers" at the Centre. Despite considerable intelligence that transferees were planning significant and violent protest action and that they were manufacturing and stockpiling makeshift weapons for this purpose, G4S did not have the authority to search the transferees or their property. That authority belonged solely to the PNG Police and required the police to first obtain a search warrant. This obstacle to ensuring the discovery and removal of contraband items from the transferee accommodations allowed a group of transferees to stockpile sufficient makeshift weapons to enable a sustained and violent protest. They threatened other transferees who did not support them, as well as mounting a sustained and violent attack on the G4S Incident Response Team (*IRT*) and other Centre staff.

Cultural dynamic of local workforce: it was a requirement of the contract that 50% of the Centre's security staff be drawn from the local Manus Island population. Loda Securities PNG Ltd (*Loda*) was subcontracted by G4S for this purpose.

Although PNG nationals employed at the Centre received additional training to cope with the change to a SAMs only Centre, increasing animosity between transferees and PNG nationals on the night of 17 February contributed to the violent clashes which took place.

Presence of PNG police mobile squad: the PNG police mobile squad was deployed in October 2012 to deal with unrest from local land owners demanding greater economic benefits from the Centre for local people. These matters were settled through negotiation within 10 to 14 days, but the police mobile squad continued thereafter to maintain its presence in close proximity to the Centre. G4S raised concerns with the Department about the suitability of the police mobile squad given its propensity to use disproportionate force to maintain order. As it transpired, the violence which occurred on 17 February resulted from the entry of the police mobile squad into Mike compound followed by locals and some Centre staff.



1.5 Key Learning Points

G4S has taken the opportunity to reflect on the events of 16 and 17 February and to consider areas in which its performance could have been improved – these are summarised below:

- a) One area in which G4S may have been able to do more was in its efforts to coordinate with the PNG police prior to the events.

G4S worked closely with the PNG police, both the local constabulary and the police mobile squad, and were involved in numerous pre-planned search operations and other operations at the Centre in the months prior to the incident.

However, reflecting on the actions of the police mobile squad, and with the benefit of hindsight, G4S perhaps could have been more insistent on the agreement of clear incident management protocols with the police.

This might have persuaded the police to support de-escalation in response to transferee violence in line with G4S's operating procedures rather than forcible intervention. It should be noted that the police would have been under no obligation to agree to such an approach.

Moreover, the conduct of the police on the night of 17 February suggests that even had clear protocols been agreed and in place, there is no guarantee this would have prevented the unilateral actions of the police which occurred.

- b) Another key learning, with the benefit of hindsight, relates to the level of local staff required under the service contract with the Australian Government.

When the Centre changed in July 2013 into a SAMs only facility and the number of transferees dramatically increased, G4S could have requested a contract variation to reduce the local staff requirement thereby increasing the ratio of non-PNG to local staff. Non-PNG staff with extensive experience of managing complex situations (created by the SAM-only environment) might have been better able to cope with the violence directed at security staff and others by the SAM population within the Centre. It should be noted that other requests and recommendations to the Department were not approved and that the Department would have been under no obligation to vary the local employment requirement.



1.6 Key Recommendations

Although G4S is no longer contracted to provide services at the Centre, G4S believes the Departments adoption of the following recommendations would improve security and safety at the Centre in the future:

- a) The Department to install proper palisade fencing, of the nature conventionally used in Australian Immigration Detention Centres, to reduce the risks of protesting transferees threatening other transferees, the Centre's staff and critical assets and to protect them from external incursions;
- b) The Department to install CCTV and better quality security lighting;
- c) The Department and PNG Immigration to improve its communication with transferees which is carefully synchronised with political announcements and policy decisions;
- d) RSDs be conducted in a transparent, expeditious and orderly manner;
- e) Provision of clear authority and powers of search to the security provider, as is the case at Australian immigration processing Centres such as Christmas Island;
- f) The Department to increase the number of personal protective equipment (**PPE**) kits available so all staff and not just IRT members can be protected in the event of a major disturbance;
- g) A change of policy from the current requirement that 50% of Centre security staff be drawn from the Manus Island population to a better balance between non-PNG and PNG nationals; and
- h) Review and clarification of the role of the PNG police mobile squad with a view to removing their presence from the perimeter of the Centre.



2. G4S and Introduction

- 2.1. G4S Australia Pty Ltd (“G4S”) is part of the G4S group of companies, the world’s leading international security solutions group. The G4S group is active in more than 120 countries, and has more than 618,000 employees.
- 2.2. G4S has extensive experience in operating detention facilities and immigration processing facilities, which embodies an approach to treat transferees with dignity and respect and to be responsive to their personal and cultural situations. This is reflected in G4S’s management plans and policies and in the training given to security staff at the Centre.
- 2.3. The Site Safety and Security Management Plan for the operation of the Centre sets out the philosophy for the management of safety and security in the Centre:

“The goal is to provide a safe and secure environment for Transferees, Service Provider Personnel, Department Personnel, and all other people at the Site, ensuring that each individual’s human rights, dignity, and well-being are preserved.”

- 2.4. G4S has exemplary training standards derived from the group’s extensive experience in providing justice and immigration services in Australia and around the globe. The training given to security staff on Manus Island, including to the subcontracted PNG local staff, was appropriate to the circumstances. Details of this training are set out in **Appendix 3**.
- 2.5. Prior to the riots, G4S intelligence-gathering activities indicated the likelihood of violent unrest at the Centre arising from the increasing frustration of the transferees with the delays in processing their RSD claims, the level of information they were being given, and the policy decision that they would not be eligible for resettlement in Australia under any circumstances. This intelligence was shared with the Department and appropriate steps were then taken within the limitations of G4S’s authority and the circumstances at the Centre. These preparations included practicing evacuations and fire drills, regular IRT training (including practice deployments), removing files and valuable equipment from the facilities in the Centre, removing vehicles from the proximity of the Centre, ensuring IHMS (the medical services provider) had an alternative plan to dispense medical treatment offsite, and removing contraband from the Centre (to the extent possible without search powers).



3. The Centre and Policy Background

3.1. The Centre was established under arrangements set out in an MOU between the PNG and Australian governments, and operated as a PNG regional processing facility. This distinguished it from other mainland and offshore Australian facilities, with the exception of Nauru. The Australian Government provides funding and operational support for the Centre. The Department, on behalf of the Australian Government, contracted separately with various private service providers for the provision of different services to the Centre. Lead service providers included G4S (garrison support services), IHMS (medical support services) and The Salvation Army (welfare services to transferees). Both PNG and Australian government officials are present at the Centre. The ultimate responsibility for law and order at the Centre resides with the PNG police as it is subject to PNG law.

3.2. The garrison support services to be provided at the Centre by G4S were maintenance and operational services consisting of:

(a) security services; (b) receiving, inducting and discharging transferees; (c) managing and maintaining assets; (d) cleaning services; (e) environmental management services; (f) catering; (g) logistics; (h) transport and escorting of transferees; and (i) providing access to communication services for transferees.

3.3. In providing security services, G4S was contracted to maintain a secure environment and respond to security incidents in the Centre. G4S was not contracted to, and did not have legal power to, act as a police force, had limited ability to use force in the Centre, and no authority over transferees outside of the Centre environment (transferees were permitted to leave the centre environment, under escort, in certain circumstances).

It should be noted that G4S's security duties in response to transferee violence were to contain and de-escalate the violence and prevent damage to the Centre. This was to be achieved within the strict limitations contained within PNG law, and in particular, the limitations on search powers and use of force. This differs significantly from the powers afforded to security services providers at on-shore Australian Immigration Detention Centres under the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), which allows specific use of force and search powers.

3.4. G4S was awarded the contract and commenced delivery of garrison support services on Manus Island on 15 October 2012.



- 3.5. The services under (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) were sub-contracted by G4S to specialist service providers. The contractual requirement for local participation by Manus Island residents was met by subcontracting with Loda for the provision of security staff and this arrangement was approved by the Department.
- 3.6. On 19 July 2013, the “no advantage” policy of the Australian Government which had been in place since August 2012 changed such that all unauthorised maritime arrivals (as they were described) would be processed in Manus Island or Nauru and would not be resettled in Australia, even if they were found to be legitimate refugees.
- 3.7. By arrangement between the Governments of Australia and PNG, from 19 July 2013 the Government of PNG would process transferees and any transferees found to be legitimate refugees would be resettled in only PNG. Those who did not want to resettle in PNG, would be required to return to their country of origin, as would any transferees determined not to be legitimate refugees.
- 3.8. In addition to the above policy change known as the “PNG solution”, from July 2013 the function of the Centre also changed so that the number of transferees increased in a period of 3 months to more than 1,100. The demographics of the transferees at the Centre also changed as the Centre ceased accommodating families from June 2013 and from July 2013 only SAMs were housed at the Centre.
- 3.9. The new policy provided for the PNG Government to process refugee claims but this did not appear to progress beyond some small initial steps. This contributed greatly to anxiety amongst transferees, who had little or no clarity on the timeline for their applications being processed and no hope of being settled in Australia. Effectively, they were faced with the prospect of remaining on Manus Island for an indeterminate time. These concerns were highlighted in communications with the Department on a number of occasions. These are outlined in more detail in **Appendix 5**.



4. Fencing and Security

- 4.1. G4S's contract with the Australian Government for services at the Centre expressly provided that the Australian Government was responsible for accepting and commissioning all the infrastructure at the Centre including adequate fencing. Several requests were made by G4S to improve the fencing after the decision to change the Centre from a families Centre to one for SAMs, and in light of an expected rapid increase in the number of transferees, observing that the fencing at the time would be inadequate to restrain transferees in the event of a riot. These requests were not acted upon by the Department. It is understood that following the riots of 16 and 17 February steps are now being taken to ensure there is adequate security fencing at the Centre.
- 4.2. G4S also proposed the establishment of a logistics hub to ensure that critical infrastructure would be adequately segregated from the transferee accommodation areas to ensure continuity if these vulnerable resources were targeted by rioting transferees. The need for CCTV cameras at the Centre was also raised. Neither the logistics hub nor CCTV cameras were approved by the Department.
- 4.3. Further detail on the issues raised and recommendations made by G4S is attached in **Appendix 5**.



5. Police Mobile Squad and Locals

- 5.1. Two additional factors at Manus Island created additional security risks which are not present in onshore immigration facilities:

First, the local landowners at Manus Island had initially been hostile to the existence of the Centre. As a result the PNG government arranged for the PNG police mobile squad to be deployed to the island to deal with/address local landowners who were blocking the airport runway and blocking routes to the Centre. Although initial difficulties with local landowners decreased, the police mobile squad remained stationed on the outside perimeter of the Centre. G4S had no authority over this special police squad or the local police force. When issues arose within the Centre that were appropriate for investigation by law enforcement, these matters were referred to the local PNG police.

Second, some of the transferees were openly hostile to the local PNG population and insulted and racially vilified them. The transferees expressed the view that they did not want to be in PNG and therefore continued to make derogatory remarks towards PNG and the PNG people. There were a significant number of Manus Island locals working in the Centre, including 50% of the security staff. As transferee protests intensified from 26 January 2014, the tensions between locals and transferees also intensified.



6. Causes of the Riots and Injuries

- 6.1. It is submitted to the Committee that the following factors contributed to the causes of the riots:
- (1) the use of a Centre, originally designed as a low security facility, for an evolving and changing task that presented heightened security risks;
 - (2) the rapid growth in the number, and change in the demographics, of transferees;
 - (3) extreme processing delays of transferees coupled with a policy which offered no prospect of resettlement in Australia; and
 - (4) a large group of transferees (in excess of 400) acting with unlawful force to threaten and injure other transferees, locals and Centre staff.
- 6.2. It is submitted to the Committee that the following factors contributed to the causes of serious injuries (and one tragic death) suffered by transferees and Centre staff on the night of 17 February 2014:
- (a) Inappropriate and inadequate fencing within the Centre;
 - (b) Lack of any CCTV equipment and lack of reliable lighting at the Centre;
 - (c) The presence of the police mobile squad in close proximity to the Centre and the fact that G4S had no authority over the police;
 - (d) The actions of the police mobile squad in forcing their way into the Centre and engaging in violent conflict with transferees, including the use of firearms, without invitation;
 - (e) The obligation for G4S to have 50% of its security staff recruited from Manus Province, with a population of less than 50,000 and very few experienced security personnel;
 - (f) The actions of members of the local population joining the police mobile squad in entering the Centre and engaging in conflict with the transferees;
 - (g) Absence of legal authority for G4S to exercise search powers to ensure that transferees could not stockpile makeshift weapons and projectiles (unlike the position in Australian immigration detention facilities); and



- (h) Limited number of PPE kits available. Although G4S requested approval for the purchase of 200 kits, 72 kits were authorised by the Department and purchased. It should be noted that the Department required batons to be held on site but G4S policy and directive to staff on the Island was that the batons were not to be used as they could increase the risk of injury. However, additional PPE kits would have improved the ability of G4S to manage the large numbers of rioting transferees in circumstances where the fencing was inadequate.

More detail on the points outlined above and the steps taken to address them with the Department, are set out in **Appendix 5**.



7. Chronology of Events

7.1. **Appendix 4** sets out the official chronology of events compiled from a real time log kept on the evening of 17 February 2014. Key events are set out as follows:

Transferee protests

- 7.2. Transferees in the Centre commenced a series of protests on 26 January 2014.
- 7.3. The Department was advised that engagement with the transferees was urgently required to establish their areas of concern and to seek to address them. Specifically, G4S sent an email to the Department on 2 February 2014 and a letter to the Secretary of the Department on 4 February 2014, the latter of which was also provided to the Minister's office (**Appendices 7 and 8**).
- 7.4. G4S commenced preparing for violent unrest among the transferees and extensive precautionary steps were implemented at the Centre. G4S had considered the observations made by previous inquiries into the Christmas Island and Villawood riots, involving other security services providers.

5 February 2014 meeting

- 7.5. Transferee community leaders were invited by the Department to a meeting held in the Mike compound dining room on 5 February 2014. Representatives of both the Australian Department and the PNG Immigration and Citizenship Service Authority (**ICSA**) attended. They were provided with a series of questions from the community leaders regarding refugee status and processing policy. The transferees demanded answers within 12 days.
- 7.6. Following the meeting of 5 February, information was gathered and shared with appropriate constituencies including the Department indicating that there was likely to be significant transferee protests and violent unrest in the Centre during the period 16 to 18 February (coinciding with the 12 day deadline).



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- 7.7. The Department proposed holding another community leaders meeting on 16 February 2014 at 1430 hours in the Mike compound dining room, to deliver answers to the questions that had been raised by transferee community leaders at the initial meeting on 5 February 2014. The meeting was extremely important as tensions amongst the transferees were rising as a result of the lack of refugee settlement determination processing and concerns that they would not be resettled in Australia.
- 7.8. The transferee leaders at the meeting were extremely upset with the answers they were receiving from the PNG ICOSA spokesperson. In addition, the demeanour and manner of delivery by the PNG ICOSA spokesperson caused significant anger/anxiety amongst the transferees. A video of this meeting is attached to this submission. It shows the reaction of the transferees and the immediate increase in tensions.
- 7.9. Several hours after the meeting, approximately 35 transferees from Oscar compound exited the Centre when a gate was opened to allow in a food truck and were quickly rounded up and returned back inside the Centre by Centre staff. A group of 8 transferees who had departed from Oscar compound were removed by the police and detained overnight before being returned to the Centre.
- 7.10. A large group of transferees immediately commenced protesting within the Centre. This group, numbering more than 200, chanted obscene and racist comments at local cleaning staff as they were leaving the Centre after their shifts had ended. The chants were personally offensive, racist and obscene. This was seen and heard by the PNG mobile police squad who were positioned immediately outside the perimeter fence.
- 7.11. Foxtrot compound transferees broke down the internal fence but were prevented from entering Mike compound gate by the IRT. The IRT also completed a successful move into the Green Zone (the area between Mike and Foxtrot compounds) and pushed transferees back into Foxtrot compound. Tensions in Mike compound then escalated into stone throwing between transferees and local villagers and other PNG nationals who were positioned outside all 3 external perimeter fences.
- 7.12. G4S deployed extra security staff to remove locals and nationals from around the perimeter fence and order was restored.



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- 7.13. At about 2130 (after dinner was completed) increased numbers of transferees were sighted in Mike compound wearing running shoes. Based on past experience, this was a clear signal that protest action was imminent.
- 7.14. Shortly after this the power went out in Mike compound and masked transferees were seen in Mike compound carrying clubs and stones. Whilst the cause of the generator failure remains undetermined, G4S had previously suggested that there be a separate logistics hub which would protect the generator from risks of sabotage or outright destruction in a major incident.
- 7.15. At 2144, the police mobile squad with a dog team were deployed into the Green Zone. Department representatives had requested this as a “show of force” in an attempt to discourage Mike and Foxtrot transferees from breaching the fence line.
- 7.16. Sending the dog team into the Green Zone prompted a hail of missiles and rocks from the transferees. The dog team withdrew but a number of G4S staff had become trapped at the far end of the Green Zone. The IRT was deployed into the Green Zone to rescue them and, at approximately 2159, those staff members were safely extracted.
- 7.17. The protesting transferees continued to break down the fences between Mike and Foxtrot compounds in an attempt to link up with each other. The IRT successfully prevented/attempted to prevent this from happening. At 2200 the IRT withdrew from the Green Zone under heavy attack.
- 7.18. At 2205 the fences in the Green Zone were severely destroyed, allowing highly agitated transferees to enter Mike compound from Foxtrot compound.
- 7.19. At 2237, the IRT was extracted from Mike compound due to exhaustion after being repeatedly hit with rocks and projectiles and being beaten with metal poles for over an hour. They regrouped on Route Pugwash at the south-west corner of Mike compound and continued to come under attack from rocks and projectiles being thrown by transferees.
- 7.20. At 2248, the IRT requested and were granted permission by Kevin Pye, the G4S RGM, to withdraw down Route Pugwash West with other staff and to regroup at Gate G1 and await further instructions.



- 7.21. As the IRT departed down Route Pugwash West, under assault from incoming rocks and other projectiles, G4S's John McCaffery (Deputy RGM) informed the police mobile squad leader that G4S were clear of the area of Mike compound and should transferees breach the fence and come outside the perimeter fence of Mike compound and onto Route Pugwash it was their responsibility to deal with them.
- 7.22. The mobile squad police leader stated that this was understood.
- 7.23. At no point was any instruction or authorisation or indication given by G4S to the PNG police mobile squad that they were permitted to enter Mike compound. Any decision to do so was made solely by the police mobile squad.
- 7.24. Rioting was rapidly developing across several compounds inside the Centre. Numerous transferees were assaulting staff and non-protesting transferees with rocks, makeshift weapons and other objects which were being used as projectiles and weapons.
- 7.25. Non-protesting transferees seeking to escape the rioting from Oscar compound had been moved to Charlie and Bravo compounds (north-east corner of Centre) earlier in the evening by G4S staff.
- 7.26. There was panic among the large numbers of non-protesting transferees in Foxtrot compound and at about 2315, the IRT from Mike compound, after rest and water, moved inside Foxtrot compound and pushed hundreds of violent transferees back up towards Mike compound to provide protection to vulnerable transferees and staff and allow approximately 400 transferees to safely exit and evacuate to the oval.
- 7.27. At 2322 several shots were heard in Mike compound (G4S staff were not issued with, and did not have, weapons, least of all firearms), and the PNG police, along with PNG nationals and local villagers entered Mike compound and began fighting with the rioting transferees. The evidence shows that the perimeter fencing of the Mike Compound was pushed inwards in several places, which could only have been caused by parties outside the fences.
- 7.28. At 2326 the internal fencing in Oscar compound was also breached and over one hundred protesting armed transferees spilled onto Route Charlie intent on breaching the administration area. They were held back by non-IRT G4S staff using makeshift barricades and as a result no damage was sustained in the unprotected office areas.



- 7.29. Whilst this was taking place, G4S staff set up a protective cordon in order to safely extract transferees. Three hundred and six (306) transferees were removed safely to the dining room of Mike compound.
- 7.30. This action by G4S staff undoubtedly protected a large number of transferees from further injury. Many G4S officers acted with extraordinary bravery and at significant risk to their own personal safety to protect the transferees. In the days after the riots, several of these G4S staff members were approached and personally thanked by transferees who made comments such as “you protected us” and “you saved us”.
- 7.31. IHMS had evacuated to the Bibby Progress, and established a triage point there. This was part of the G4S contingency plan.
- 7.32. By shortly after 0100 on 18 February 2014, G4S had re-established control of the entire Centre. Of 1,334 transferees housed at the Centre on 17 February, G4S estimates that more than 400 participated in violent protests during the course of the evening.



8. G4S Performance

- 8.1 G4S's management of the Centre was professional and consistent with the company's values, and G4S took all possible action to improve the safety and security of the Centre within the constraints under which it was required to operate. In particular:
- (a) G4S raised numerous concerns about the sub-standard infrastructure at the Centre and particularly the inadequate fencing, the failure of which was ultimately a key factor that enabled the external incursion into Mike compound resulting in the severity of the injuries suffered on 17 February 2014 and the tragic death of Reza Barati;
 - (b) G4S also raised concerns about the need for prompt processing of RSDs to be undertaken and the need to improve communication with transferees. Delays in the processing of asylum applications and the lack of appropriate communications were undoubtedly catalysts for the riots;
 - (c) Prior to 16 February 2014, G4S provided detailed intelligence to the Department which identified at least two weeks in advance that tensions were rising and violent unrest was likely to take place in the period 16 to 18 February 2014, and that inadequate responses to the transferees' questions was likely to be the trigger for that unrest. Intelligence showed clearly that the rioting was a premeditated action by some transferees using weapons which had been accumulated and fashioned over a period of time and which, because of restrictions on the powers of search imposed upon G4S, could not be located or seized;
 - (d) At no stage did G4S sanction or invite the PNG police mobile squad to enter into Mike compound, where much of the violence on 17 February occurred. It is clear from eye witness accounts and from the condition of the fencing that the police and locals forced their way into the compound. G4S stated specifically to the police mobile squad that it was the responsibility of the police mobile squad to manage the situation if the transferees came out of Mike compound onto Route Pugwash which is beyond the perimeter of the Centre, and G4S staff were told by the police that they understood this; and



- (e) G4S believes that it performed the services under the Manus contract well and that it met and exceeded the requirements of the contract. In December 2013, the Secretary of the Department expressly stated that the decision to appoint a new service provider and offer no further extension to G4S's contract for services at the Centre was not related to any performance issues. This was repeated by Secretary Bowles in his comments before the Senate Estimates Committee on 25 February 2014 (**Appendix 9**). In any event, the role of G4S was to manage security and other services, including assessing and advising on security risks in relation to the Centre, not to establish fencing and other infrastructure. The change in the security provider could not have been related to deficiencies in critical security infrastructure at the Centre since this was the responsibility of the Department.

8.2 The disciplined and at times courageous actions of G4S staff prevented further serious injuries being sustained and averted attempts by some transferees to attack other transferees and to destroy the Centre. Particularly, G4S staff risked their own safety to:

- (a) Evacuate, during the peak of the rioting, more than 400 transferees who did not wish to participate in the riots; and
- (b) Form a protective cordon in Mike compound to facilitate the evacuation of further transferees numbering more than 300, after the police and locals entered the compound.

8.3 G4S is aware of allegations which have been made in the media that members of its staff may have been involved in the violence which took place in Mike compound on 17 February 2014. This remains under investigation by the PNG police. G4S has fully co-operated with this and all other investigations into this incident, including:

- Making staff members available for interview by the PNG police;
- Informing the PNG police when our staff members were due to leave Manus Island;
- Providing documents requested by the PNG police;
- Providing documents and requests for information from the Department;
- Providing documents to Mr Robert Cornall, in his Inquiry conducted on behalf of the Department;
- Providing a detailed submission to Mr Cornall; and
- Making key staff available for Mr Cornall to interview.



- 8.4 G4S takes these allegations extremely seriously and will continue to provide its full support to all investigations into the incident. As an organisation we will not tolerate any behaviour which is not in line with the company's standards and values. The serious injuries sustained by transferees, predominantly in Mike compound, on 17 February 2014, and the tragic death of Reza Barati, occurred after the PNG police mobile squad forced its way through the external fencing. The squad was followed into Mike compound by a number of locals and other Centre staff.



9. G4S Recommendation

- 9.1. G4S has recommended a number of changes to facilities and processes in relation to the Centre as set out in section 1.6 of this document.

G4S thanks the Committee for the opportunity to provide this submission and would be pleased to provide further information if requested.



List of Appendices

G4S Submission to Senate Committee Inquiry into the Events of 16 to 18 February at the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre

1.	Glossary of Terms
2.	Site Map of the Centre
3.	Summary of Training
4.	Official Chronology of Events on 17 February
5.	Factors that gave cause to incidents and injuries
6.	Not used
7.	2 February 2014 email from Chris Manning (MD Immigration Services for G4S) to the Department Secretary
8.	4 February 2014 letter from Sven Straub (G4S Finance Director for the Southern Pacific Region) to Martin Bowles (the Department Secretary)
9.	Extract of Evidence of Martin Bowles at Senate Estimates Hearing 25 February 2014
10.	Not used
11.	30 July 2013 G4S 'Excusable Performance Failure Submission' from Chris Manning
12.	2 February 2014 email from John McCaffery to the Department
13.	Not used
14.	Not used
15.	First 30 January 2014 email from Chris Manning to the Department
16.	Second 30 January 2014 email from Chris Manning to the Department
17.	1 February 2014 Request by Chris Manning to the Department
18.	15 June 2013 letter from Chris Manning to Mark Painting of the Department
19.	6 February 2014 letter from Dan Ryan to the Department Secretary
20.	7 February 2014 letter from Dan Ryan to the Department Minister
21.	Not used
22.	Not used