17 November 2023
PDF version [526 KB]
Dr Vu Lam
Foreign Affairs, Defence &
Security
Executive
summary
- President
Biden’s September visit and the US-Vietnam comprehensive strategic partnership
(CSP) represent a historic milestone in the bilateral relations between the 2
former foes.
- The
US-Vietnam CSP symbolises the deepening alignment of interests and trust
between the 2 nations, paving the way for further cooperation in multiple
aspects, including boosting technology transfer for Vietnam, fostering
investment and trade, expanding people-to-people connections, combating climate
change and advancing defence and security collaboration.
- It
is a significant foreign affairs achievement for Biden, and signals General
Secretary Trong’s firm grip on power in Vietnam.
- It
represents Vietnam’s hedging and balancing act in seeking a strategic
equilibrium by widening its net of top-tier strategic partners.
- The
CSP will possibly influence the dynamics within ASEAN and shape the strategic
landscape of Southeast Asia, with other CSPs to follow.
- It
will also likely contribute to a regional environment that is consistent with
Australia’s own interests in promoting a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific
region, and may offer Australia additional avenues for multilateral engagements
with both the US and Vietnam.
Introduction
US President Joe Biden visited Hanoi from
10 to 11 September 2023. This groundbreaking visit marked a new chapter in the
bilateral relations between the US and Vietnam, a rapidly growing economy and
middle power in Southeast Asia. It also signified the growing alignment of
strategic interests between the 2 former foes, representing a relationship instrumental
to maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in the region. History was
made in the less-than-24-hour visit.
History
made after a long journey
True to the pre-visit statement from the White
House, during his stay, President Biden engaged in discussions with General
Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Nguyen Phu Trong, Prime
Minister Pham Minh Chinh, State President Vo Van Thuong and National Assembly
Chairperson Vuong Dinh Hue – the top leadership of the CPV and the state, and
commonly referred to as the ‘four pillars’. The primary focus of these
discussions was to explore avenues to further the cooperation between the 2
nations, including fostering the growth of a technology-centric and
innovation-driven economy for Vietnam, expanding people-to-people connections,
and combating climate change. Both sides also touched upon ways to enhance
peace, prosperity, and stability in the Southeast Asian region.
Over the past couple of decades, the US-Vietnam relationship
has witnessed transformative moments. At the end of the Vietnam War in 1975,
diplomatic ties between the United States and Vietnam were severed, leaving a
period of estrangement between the 2 nations. In January 1977, shortly after
taking office, President Carter aimed to reorient American foreign policy by
making the normalisation of
relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam a key element. However,
Carter’s attempts faced considerable challenges. The US Congress and various
interest groups demanded a full accounting of Americans listed as Missing in
Action and the release of any remaining prisoners of war before lifting the
trade embargo against Vietnam. Despite these efforts, the Carter administration
ultimately retreated
from full normalisation.
However, geopolitical shifts and economic considerations in
the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a gradual warming of relations. The
United States lifted its trade embargo against Vietnam in 1994, a significant
step towards normalisation. The formal re-establishment of diplomatic relations
occurred in 1995, marked by the reopening of the US embassy in Hanoi and the
Vietnamese embassy in Washington DC. This transition from foes to diplomatic
partners set the stage for cooperation in various areas, including trade,
education, and regional security. As of 2023, the US is Vietnam’s second-largest
trading partner and largest export market. Vietnam is the US’s seventh largest trade
partner and the largest one in ASEAN. In essence, the US has for a long
time been a major partner to Vietnam. A partnership upgrade is a political
declaration that gives credence and legitimacy to the already strong ties.
Both presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton played
important roles, with Clinton heralding the normalisation of diplomatic
relations and Obama overseeing the establishment of a comprehensive partnership
in 2013 and revoking the arms sales embargo in 2016. But it would be a mistake
not to mention the ‘wingmen’
advocating for normalisation and, subsequently, the CSP. Despite differences
in political leanings, a group of Vietnam War veterans, most notably including John
Kerry, Chuck Hagel, Thomas
Vallely and the late John McCain, has pushed for normalisation
for decades, with then Senator
Biden supporting motions to help Vietnamese refugees and normalisation
processes. That Biden and Kerry ended the Vietnam trip by paying tribute to
John McCain at his memorial in Hanoi speaks to their unwavering contribution to
the bilateral relationship.
Against that backdrop, Biden’s visit was historic on its own
merit. He was the first US president to be invited by a CPV general secretary,
which is significant at both diplomatic and personal levels. While Vietnam’s
CPV-ruled political regime establishes the position of general secretary as the
first among equals in CPV’s collective leadership, and effectively the foremost
leader of the country, protocol constraints remain as to whether this position
is head of state or leader of a political party. In 2015, Trong was received by
Obama at the Oval Office as the first CPV chief to be accorded the diplomatic
protocol for a head of state. Yet, his invitation was not directly from
President Obama, but rather ‘the
Administration of President Barack Obama’, which shows a certain level of
procedural unease.
That Biden visited Vietnam at Trong’s invitation not only
symbolises the deepening alignment of interests and trust between the 2
nations, but also highlights the personal rapport Biden has cultivated with
Trong since the first time they met during Trong’s 2015 US visit, when Vice
President Biden hosted
Trong during a luncheon. In March 2023, Trong and Biden expressed their
commitment to strengthening
and expanding the bilateral relationship, giving the greenlight for an
upgrade to ties.
Internationally and domestically, Trong’s status as the top,
and most influential, leader of Vietnam has also been cemented with these
developments. Biden’s close contact with Trong serves as indirect recognition
of Trong as the de factor leader of Vietnam. And the highly circulated news
coverage around Trong’s involvement in the partnership upgrade discussion with
Biden also points to his broader and more hands-on management of Vietnam’s
foreign policy. That Trong himself hosted the state-level reception ceremony
for Biden at the Presidential Palace, while delegating State President Vo Van
Thuong to host the state banquet sent a clear message about who is actually in
charge in Vietnam at the moment.
The timing of Biden’s visit is far from coincidental. As
both nations commemorate the
10th anniversary of their comprehensive partnership, this visit offered a
timely diplomatic opportunity. Moreover, with domestic political commitments
looming large for both Biden (re-election campaign) and Trong (preparation for
the CPV’s 14th National Congress in 2025), this year presents a rare window of
opportunity for a significant
diplomatic gesture. Biden’s interactions and personal contact with top
leaders of Vietnam, including potential successors to Trong, may lay the
groundwork for future US-Vietnam relations. The upgrade may well be Trong’s
largest foreign affairs legacy. For context, Do Muoi, who was the CPV’s general
secretary from 1991 to 1997, oversaw the normalisation of Vietnam’s relations
with China, the US and ASEAN. However, he assumed a less hands-on and visible
role in those processes, as Vietnam at the time followed a stricter
model of collective leadership, with Do Muoi, State President Le Duc Anh
and Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet at the helm.
Even before the visit there were speculations that both
sides may skip
the ‘strategic partnership’ altogether and go straight to a ‘comprehensive
strategic partnership’ (CSP), the highest level in Vietnam’s diplomatic
hierarchy. On all counts, this swift upgrade to the highest level is
unprecedented and a breakthrough in their bilateral ties. Besides the US,
Vietnam has only established CSPs with China, India, Russia and South Korea.
This CSP not only underscores the depth of US-Vietnam ties,
but also reaffirms the US’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific. This is
particularly noteworthy given concerns
about the US’s commitment to ASEAN after Biden’s absence from the most
recent ASEAN summit. The
joint leaders’ statement says:
The two Leaders hailed a historic new phase of bilateral
cooperation and friendship by elevating their nations’ relationship to a
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the purposes of peace, cooperation, and
sustainable development. The United States supports a strong, independent,
prosperous, and resilient Vietnam.
… Both nations
intend to enhance coordination on regional and global issues of mutual concern
and interest, contributing to the joint efforts to maintain peace, stability,
cooperation, and development in the region and throughout the world.
Note that while China is an important factor, this upgrade
is primarily a continuation of Vietnam’s long-established omnidirectional foreign
policy. To navigate the complex geopolitical challenges in the region, Vietnam
has consistently adopted a ‘widening the net’ strategy. Recently coined as ‘bamboo
diplomacy’ by Trong, this strategy of independence, self-reliance,
flexibility, and diversification has been promoted as being central to
Vietnam’s contemporary foreign policy. This strategy is built on the
‘multilateralisation and diversification’ policy introduced at the 7th National
Congress of the CPV in 1991.
With regards to national defence and sovereignty, in 2003
the CPV Central Committee issued a
resolution highlighting a strategy of ‘cooperating and struggling’ with ‘partners
of cooperation’ (‘doi tac’ in Vietnamese) and ‘objects of struggling’ (‘doi
tuong’). This resolution acknowledged that while there may
be occasional tensions or disagreements with friendly nations, opportunities
for collaboration could also arise with countries traditionally viewed as
adversaries. In all such instances, Vietnam would make decisions based on its
national interests.
Guided by those principles, the upgrade is a natural and
rational choice. As previously mentioned, the US-Vietnam ties were comprehensive
and strategic without needing to be named as such. And the US was the only
permanent member of the UN Security Council with which Vietnam had not yet
established a ‘strategic partnership’. As Nguyen Hung Son, Vice President of
Vietnam’s Diplomatic Academy, points out, the US serves as a vital
partner for Vietnam in attracting high-quality investment, technology, and
educational opportunities, and for Vietnam’s further integration into the
global system.
By putting the US on a par with China, Russia and India, Vietnam
is responding to an increasingly polarised and fragmented international system.
Since starting to negotiate diplomatic partnerships in 2001, Vietnam has developed
13 comprehensive partnerships, 13 strategic partnerships and 5 CSPs, which signifies
the breadth and depth of Vietnam’s diplomatic network, as well as its cooperation
and strategic trust with those partners. This upgrade is an affirmation of Vietnam’s
growing role in regional and global affairs. It would also provide Vietnam with
a stronger platform to engage with other major and middle powers.
For the US, deepening ties with Vietnam aligns with its
strategy to strengthen its presence and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. The
upgraded partnership with Vietnam would bolster US efforts to ensure a free and
open Indo-Pacific, counterbalance China’s influence, and promote regional
stability. The joint leaders’ statement says:
... The two sides supported the promotion of multilateralism,
respect for international law, including the United Nations Charter, and the
promotion of an open, inclusive regional architecture in which ASEAN plays a
central role. Vietnam appreciates the United States’ strong support for ASEAN
centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
The way
forward
For both sides, the upgrade could lead to increased economic
cooperation, with potential benefits for US businesses and investors in the
rapidly growing Vietnamese market. At a high-level conference on investment and
innovation, Biden and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh agreed to make technology,
innovation, and investment a pillar of the CSP. Chairing the conference,
Vietnamese Minister of Planning and Investment, Nguyen Chi Dung, made specific
overtures to American enterprises. He advocated for heightened investment
and broader expansion in Vietnam, aiming to strengthen the integration of
domestic businesses into the global supply chain. Furthermore, he directly
appealed to leading firms such as Intel, Amkor, Marvell, Global Foundries, and
the American Semiconductor Association, urging them to establish chip and
semiconductor ecosystems within Vietnam. During Biden’s visit, major
enterprises from the US and Vietnam discussed and signed new
deals on aeroplanes and AI.
Just one week after the upgrade, Prime Minister Pham Minh
Chinh embarked on a one-week trip to the US, with a packed agenda aiming at
realising the CSP. On September 19, he met with US
Trade Representative Katherine Tai to discuss the newly formed CSP. He also
met with the
US Senate, and with US
Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo to discuss economic cooperation. On the
same day, he visited the headquarters of US tech firms Nvidia
and Synopsys to encourage further investment in Vietnam’s semiconductor
sector. During his visit, he also met with the US
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, advocating for greater US market access
for Vietnamese products.
The CSP could also pave the way for enhanced defence and security
collaboration, addressing shared concerns such as maritime security in the
South China Sea. With this upgrade, the
US will have frequent access to top-tier leaders of Vietnam, which will
facilitate high-level cooperation mechanisms. According to Jon Finer, Biden’s principal
deputy national security adviser, the US and its partners could offer to
reduce Vietnam’s reliance on Russian military supplies. According to recent news
reports, the
US and Vietnam are in talks over their largest arms deal ever, which may
include the sale of American F-16 fighter jets to Vietnam.
Noting that it is unlikely Vietnam will abandon its ‘four-no’s’
defence policy, which includes no military alliances or foreign military
bases, traditional security corporation will be limited to capacity-building
and defence technologies. The joint leaders’ statement says:
The United State [sic]
is committed to continuing to assist Vietnam to develop its self-reliant defence
capabilities in accordance with the needs of Vietnam and established mechanisms.
As per the statement, both sides will also foster extensive
cooperation in non-traditional security, such as environment protection, public
health and transnational crime.
Regional impact
In the broader regional context, the US-Vietnam upgraded
partnership could influence the dynamics within ASEAN and shape the strategic
landscape of Southeast Asia. Other countries in the region will likely take
note of the deepening US-Vietnam ties and potentially recalibrate their own
foreign policy strategies accordingly. After high-level discussions, Vietnam
and Australia are poised for a CSP upgrade later this year, especially after
the 2 prime ministers’ show of commitment at the 2023 ASEAN Summit. For
further details, see the Parliamentary Library’s blog post, The
evolving Australia-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. It has
been reported
that Japan, Malaysia, Singapore
and Indonesia
are discussing CSPs with Vietnam. Japan is likely to be the next country,
considering that its extensive
strategic partnership with Vietnam is, in effect, a CSP without the name.
For Australia, the US-Vietnam CSP will likely contribute to
a regional environment that Australia supports: one of collective security and
diversified partnerships, which is consistent with Australia’s own interests in
promoting a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. It may offer Australia
additional avenues for multilateral engagements with both the US and Vietnam,
particularly on several key sectors, such as freedom of navigation and maritime
security, clean energy, education, the digital economy, agriculture and tourism.
At the same time, the US-Vietnam CSP will potentially open
new avenues for American businesses in Vietnam, which could alter the
competitive landscape for Australian enterprises. With the US likely to gain
enhanced access to Vietnamese markets, Australia may need to innovate and
leverage its own competitive
advantages – such as agriculture, resources, education and Industry 4.0 –
to maintain its trade foothold. Long-standing close government-to-government
ties will create a favourable environment for 2-way business and investment.
As an example, Australia and the US, through their
respective partnerships with Vietnam, showcase distinct strengths in technology
exports and innovation. Australia’s focus under the Australia-Vietnam
Enhanced Economic Engagement Strategy (EEES) is on collaborative innovation
in sectors like clean energy, high-tech agriculture, and the digital economy,
offering sustainable development support to Vietnam. In contrast, the US, via
the new CSP, aims to position Vietnam as a key player in high-tech and
semiconductor fields within global supply chains, providing technology, capital
and market access.
It should be noted, however, that there is a big gap between
Australian and American foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Vietnam. As
of December 2022, Vietnam drew US$27.72 billion in FDI, with most
contributions from Singapore, South Korea, Japan and China. The US’s total
investment until 2022 was about US$11.5 billion, while Australia’s total
FDI was just nearly US$2 billion, ranking 20th among Vietnam’s foreign
investors. Given Australia’s longer-term relations and engagement with Vietnam,
it is particularly striking that Australian FDI in Vietnam has not reached its
full potential. In fact, Australia's FDI in Southeast Asia has
‘stagnated’ the past decade, while other countries, such
as the US, China and Japan, have significantly increased their investment.
On this, the Assistant
Minister for Foreign Affairs has stated, ‘We’ve been far too complacent. We
must do more’.
Concerns and criticisms
There have been concerns that the US-Vietnam partnership
upgrade may cause unease in China. Some observers thought that Vietnam
had initially shown caution over the upgrade due to concerns about China’s
reaction. China’s foreign ministry has called for the US not
to target a ‘third party’ when engaging with other countries in Asia, perhaps
indicating its apprehension about the strengthening US-Vietnam ties. To
possibly assuage Beijing, Vietnamese
and Chinese prime ministers have agreed to enhance regular all-level contacts.
Also, Trong
himself met with Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Department of
the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee only 5 days before Biden’s
visit. These moves indicate Vietnam’s efforts to maintain balanced relations
with both major powers.
China’s reaction will most likely be quite
restrained and measured, as long as it does not perceive any direct
confrontation and provocation. Xi Jinping is reportedly
planning a state visit to Vietnam, anticipated to occur in November 2023.
Previously Vietnam State President Vo Van Thuong met
with Xi Jinping while attending the Third Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation in Beijing.
Biden’s visit and the US-Vietnam CSP have faced criticisms
from human rights groups. In fact, human rights have always been a thorny issue
in bilateral relations, with the US Department of State’s annual human rights
reports frequently
criticising Vietnam’s human rights record. There have been concerns that
despite President Biden’s rhetoric about promoting a ‘rules-based international
order’ and defending freedom, he has forged closer ties with countries
with poor human rights records. Human Rights Watch, for instance,
highlights the importance of addressing the
rights of climate activists in Vietnam. As it turns out, in the statement,
the section about human rights is the shortest, without any direct mention of political
and civil rights or religious freedom:
They encouraged
further cooperation to ensure that everyone, including members of vulnerable
groups, regardless of their gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation, and
including persons with disabilities, fully enjoy their human rights. The United
States and Vietnam noted human rights, regional stability, global peace, and
sustainable development are mutually reinforcing. Both sides recognized the
contributions that social and religious organizations continue to make in such
fields as education, health care, and social services in both countries.
This shows, once again, that in international relations
strategic interests often take precedence over other matters.
Conclusion
The CSP upgrade
signifies the deepening ties between the US and Vietnam. It also showcases
Vietnam’s diplomatic balancing and hedging act in the region. The upgrade is
expected to have broad economic, defence and trade implications, benefiting
both nations and influencing the geopolitical environment for the wider region.
For copyright reasons some linked items are only available to members of Parliament.
© Commonwealth of Australia
Creative Commons
With the exception of the Commonwealth Coat of Arms, and to the extent that copyright subsists in a third party, this publication, its logo and front page design are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Australia licence.
In essence, you are free to copy and communicate this work in its current form for all non-commercial purposes, as long as you attribute the work to the author and abide by the other licence terms. The work cannot be adapted or modified in any way. Content from this publication should be attributed in the following way: Author(s), Title of publication, Series Name and No, Publisher, Date.
To the extent that copyright subsists in third party quotes it remains with the original owner and permission may be required to reuse the material.
Inquiries regarding the licence and any use of the publication are welcome to webmanager@aph.gov.au.
This work has been prepared to support the work of the Australian Parliament using information available at the time of production. The views expressed do not reflect an official position of the Parliamentary Library, nor do they constitute professional legal opinion.
Any concerns or complaints should be directed to the Parliamentary Librarian. Parliamentary Library staff are available to discuss the contents of publications with Senators and Members and their staff. To access this service, clients may contact the author or the Library‘s Central Entry Point for referral.