MRH-90 Taipan helicopter: a quick guide

20 December 2021

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David Watt and Nicole Brangwin
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security section

 

Introduction

The intent of the MRH-90 Taipan helicopter project (AIR 9000), as outlined in the Defence Capability Plan 2004–2014 was to ‘rationalise the helicopter fleets over time, reduce the number of platform types operated [by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Australian Army] and encourage investment in Australian industry to help build a sustainable aerospace industrial base…’ (p. 53). A key component under three of the six project phases was the acquisition of 46 multi-role helicopters.

The MRH-90 Taipan multi-role helicopter was acquired to replace the RAN’s Sea King helicopters and the Army’s Black Hawk helicopters and was expected to remain in service until 2037. However, persistent technical difficulties, rising costs and delays resulted in the MRH-90 helicopter project being placed on the ‘Projects of Concern’ list in November 2011. As at 30 June 2021 it was the only major project still on the list (p. 90).

With the Taipans beleaguered by problems for more than a decade the Government announced on 10 December 2021 that it was scoping the acquisition of 40 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to replace the Australian Army’s 40 MRH-90 Taipan helicopters. The Minister for Defence, Peter Dutton, deemed the aircraft inefficient, expensive and unreliable asserting ‘they haven’t lived up to expectation’. According to Minister Dutton, since the aircraft entered service there have been nine occasions when flying operations ceased due to ongoing problems.

Prior to the Army helicopter announcement, the RAN had commenced the process of replacing its six MRH-90 helicopters with 12 MH-60R Seahawk multi-mission helicopters after receiving approval in October 2021 from the United States Government for a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS).

Project AIR 9000

The genesis of AIR 9000 was the 2000 Defence White Paper, which stated Defence would acquire an additional squadron of troop lift helicopters (about 12 aircraft) to ‘provide extra mobility for forces on operations’ and operate from major RAN amphibious ships. These helicopters were expected to begin entering service around 2007.

Designed and built by NATO Helicopter Industries (NH Industries)—a consortium of European companies involving Airbus Helicopters, Leonardo Helicopters, and Fokker—the MRH-90 is based on the NH90 Troop Transport Helicopter variant. The NH90 program suffered from various problems, many of which are similar to those experienced in Australia.

Phase 1 of AIR 9000 involved the Australian Defence Force (ADF) Helicopter Strategic Master Plan study and development. Phase 2 involved the acquisition of 12 additional troop lift helicopters. Phase 4 would have replaced the Army’s 36 S-70A-9 Black Hawk helicopter fleet through the acquisition of 28 helicopters and Phase 6 replaced the RAN’s Sea King helicopters (which left service in December 2011) with six MRH-90 Taipans. Phases 3 and 5 involved upgrades to the RAN’s Seahawk and the Army’s Chinook helicopters.

Initial approval to buy the first batch of 12 MRH-90 helicopters (Phase 2) was announced by the Government on 31 August 2004. The purchase of an additional 34 helicopters (Phases 4 and 6 combined) was announced on 19 June 2006.

According to the 2014 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report into the MRH-90 project, the Phase 2 initial in-service date of December 2007 was met, but aircraft were accepted in a form that was non-compliant with the contracted specifications. In February 2011 and September 2011 AIR 9000 underwent high-level comprehensive diagnostic reviews (also known as Gate Reviews) in the lead-up to contractual negotiations with the prime contractor. In November 2011 the project was included on the Projects of Concern list. Variations to the contract were made in 2013 (the so-called Deed 2), which sought to address the outstanding issues and re-baseline the project. It also included the addition of a 47th helicopter as part of a negotiated settlement with prime contractor Australian Aerospace, now Airbus Australia Pacific (Airbus AP—a subsidiary of French based Airbus Helicopters).[1]

All 47 aircraft were accepted into service by July 2017 but the last milestone, Final Operational Capability (FOC), was rescheduled to June 2022.

Issues

According to the ANAO some of the problems with the MRH-90 included engine failure; transmission oil cooler fan failures; poor availability of spares; problems with the cargo hook on the RAN aircraft; and problems with door gun mounts and the fast roping and rappelling device (FRRD) on the Army helicopters. These led to a slow rate of acceptance into service and reliability and Rate of Effort being below contracted levels. The ANAO reported that these problems were a ‘consequence of program development deficiencies and acquisition decisions during the period 2002 to 2006’ (p. 22).

The most recent budget figure for the MRH-90 helicopters, as shown in the ANAO’s Major Projects Report 2020–21, was $3.7 billion as at June 2021. The budget at second pass approval was $3.5 billion. The high cost and limited availability of the aircraft continued to be a problem. As the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) calculated in its Cost of Defence 2021–22 publication, the helicopter’s estimated operating costs were $30,000 to $40,000 per hour, which is ‘higher than those combat aircraft with sophisticated weapons and sensor systems’ (p. 72). More recently the cost has blown out to $50,000 per hour. Overall, says ASPI, the MRH-90 helicopter ‘has provided far too few flying hours for far too much money for far too long’ (p. 72).

One of the main problems with the Army’s MRH-90 Taipan helicopter is the door is not wide enough to allow its self-defence gun to fire while personnel exit the aircraft. The door problem has been an issue since the aircraft was purchased in 2005. Since then, three different gun mounts have been unsuccessfully installed. The 2014 ANAO report into the MRH-90 project highlighted the lack of design maturity and in particular the function and performance specifications for the gun mounts:

… the MRH90 aircraft shall be able to be fitted with a Self Defence Gun Mount in each of the cabin doorways. However, the installation of door mounted guns interferes with a range of helicopter cabin workflow requirements. Troops need to move around the guns as they enter and leave the aircraft, the doors need to be open when the guns are in use, and the FRRD [Fast Roping and Rappelling Device] cannot be safely used in the same doorway as the gun [p. 41]. 

The report goes on to say that the Australian Army considered the ‘cabin and role equipment are not fit for purpose’ as the seat size and harness cannot accommodate personnel wearing combat gear (p. 72). Additionally the Army stated:

… the gun mounted in the side door may be unacceptable. The current configuration impedes ingress/egress, as well as the ability to defend the aircraft with the gun during embarkation and disembarkation. As a result, Army representatives have stated that the MRH-90 may be unable to meet certain Airmobile support to Special Operations roles ...

The design changes to fix these issues are outside the scope of the current contract. [Australian Aerospace—now Airbus AP] has proposed a number of improvements, but these represent significant design changes with potentially high cost and technical risk. In addition, the time that would be required to make the changes could seriously impact availability of the aircraft [p. 72].

In answer to a series of Questions on Notice during Senate Estimates in March 2020, Defence stated that Airbus AP had been contracted to design and produce a new gun mount. The work for this was being carried out in Australia at the department’s expense. This mount would be able to be stowed more quickly, allowing for quicker egress from the aircraft, but would not allow firing of the gun at the same time (see questions 81–85). (The Army’s Black Hawks fire the gun through a separate window). In the Estimates hearing on 27 October 2020, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Rick Burr, stated that ‘tactical workarounds’ were allowing the aircraft to complete its duties in the meantime.

While the RAN and Army use the MRH-90 Taipan helicopters in different modes (the RAN uses the aircraft as a maritime support helicopter and the Army uses it as a tactical troop transport platform) both services have experienced significant problems. The RAN had ongoing problems with the enhanced cargo hook system, among other things, which delayed the aircraft reaching FOC. This matter was eventually resolved at the end of 2020. Nevertheless the RAN decided to replace its six MRH-90 helicopters prior to achieving FOC in 2022.

On October 2021 the United States Government approved a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Australia of 12 MH-60R multi-mission helicopters for the RAN. This would be an expansion of the RAN’s existing fleet of 24 MH-60R Seahawk helicopters.

The ongoing delays resulted in the need to extend the service life of the Australian Army’s Black Hawk helicopters to 2022 (all of which had originally been scheduled for retirement by the end of 2013). Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Richard Burr, warned in March 2021 that any further delays with the MRH-90 would be a problem as the Army would not be able to use the current fleet of Black Hawk helicopters beyond the end of 2022.

The 10 December 2021 announcement was unambiguous about the failings of the MRH-90 project and the Government’s intention to promptly source an alternative helicopter for Army. However, the fate of the 47 MRH-90 helicopters currently in service with the RAN and Army is yet to be announced.


[1].   On 2 January 2014 Eurocopter was renamed Airbus Helicopters and Australian Aerospace became Airbus Australia Pacific.

 

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