RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, 2021–22   23 March 2022

South China Sea chronology

Introduction

The South China Sea is both a resource exploited by littoral states, and a strategic zone which regional powers are vying to control. Around one-third of the worlds shipping passes through the Strait of Malacca into the South China Sea,¹ and it is home to plentiful fish and fossil fuel reserves at a time when both resources are becoming increasingly scarce. Over these regional conflicts, the shadow of great power contest has emerged with increasingly confrontational policies of the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China.²

The two main areas of contestation are the Paracel and the Spratly islands groups, in the North-West and Southeast parts of the South China Sea respectively. The Peoples Republic of China is the most ambitious claimant, asserting that over 80 per cent of the South China Sea is its sovereign territory,³ which encompasses both the Paracel and Spratly islands, as well as Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal. The notorious ‘nine-dash line’, which the PRC cites to demonstrate the historic nature of its claim, also cuts through the internationally recognised territory of several Southeast Asian nations, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

However, before the twentieth century the islands and features of the South China Sea were little more than maritime hazards for Imperial China and its neighbours to avoid, and the sea was used as a communal waterway.⁴ The chronology below demonstrates how this scene fundamentally changed throughout the twentieth century; developments that carried into the 21st century and up to the present.

Several of the key states involved have experienced revolutions or partitioning, complicating the terminology used in this chronology.

The following terms are used:

Qing Dynasty: the Chinese government ruling Mainland China until 1912.

Republic of China (ROC): the government of Mainland China between 1912 and 1949, formed in 1912 following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, and after 1949, the government of Taiwan.

People’s Republic of China (PRC): the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government of China from 1949 to the present day.

Vietnam, reflecting its partition between 1954 and 1975, is referred to as either ‘North Vietnam’ or ‘South Vietnam’ for that period.

As the literature on the South China Sea is vast, and the author has been limited to English language sources, this chronology is not exhaustive. Events have been chosen on the basis that they relate to claims or occupation of territory in the South China Sea, represent a change in the state of affairs in the region, or provide relevant information about the actions of claimant countries and other states/organisations operating in the region.

The timeline has been colour coded so that events that did not happen in the South China Sea, or are only peripherally related to it, are highlighted in orange. These events provide background regarding the major countries and organisations involved in South China Sea affairs.

Map of South China Sea and territorial claims

Image source: Voice of America, ‘Challenging Beijing in the South China Sea’, State of Affairs, 31 July 2012.

1 Timeline

Milestones

Details

Source documents

1909

In March, China discovered ongoing Japanese guano mining operations on Pratas Island. By November, Qing Dynasty officials negotiated a settlement with the Japanese government for recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Pratas Island. Under the settlement, China provided financial compensation to the Japanese guano miners.

Pratas Island is located between the Philippines and Taiwan in the northernmost part of the South China Sea. It is not a part of any island group.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 51.

1909

In April 1909, with the Pratas Island episode ongoing, the Governor of Guandong sent Admiral Li Zhun on an official mission to survey the Paracel Islands for incorporation into China’s territory.

The Paracels lie near the coasts of Hainan and Vietnam.

Francois -Xavier Bonnet, ‘Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal’, Irasec’s Discussion Papers, 14, November 2012, p. 14.

January 1935

After the annexation of Manchuria by Japan and attempts by the French government to claim the Paracels and Spratlys as part of France’s colonial holdings in Vietnam, the Republican Chinese Government’s geographical committee published a map of Chinese territory which included the Paracels and Spratlys.

The Spratlys, lying near Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia, became the southernmost part of China’s territorial claims.

Francois -Xavier Bonnet, ‘Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal’, Irasec’s Discussion Papers, 14, November 2012, p. 17-18.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 55.

1936

Bai Meichu, a nationalist Chinese geographer, published a map featuring a ‘U shaped line’ which represented most of the islands and features in the South China Sea as China’s sovereign territory. The line extended as far south as James Shoal, around 80 km off the Borneo coast of Malaysia.

L Jinming & L Dexia, ‘The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note’, Ocean Development and International Law, 34, January 2003, p. 289.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 56.

1938

Faced with Imperial Japanese expansion into the South China Sea, Philippine President Manuel Quezon requested that the American State Department research the ownership status of Scarborough Shoal. This research was intended to support an official Philippine claim for the Scarborough Shoal, though ultimately no such official claim was made.

Francois -Xavier Bonnet, ‘Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal’, Irasec’s Discussion Papers, 14, November 2012, p. 11.

February 1939 – March 1939

After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan established effective control over Hainan, then the Paracels and finally annexed the Spratlys. Imperial Japan's strategy for expansion in the Pacific involved controlling the South China Sea.

L Peng Er, ‘Japan and the Spratlys Dispute: Aspirations and Limitations’, Asian Survey, 36(10), 1996, p. 997.

1947

Settlements following Japanese defeat in the Second World War required Japan to relinquish its territorial holdings in the South China Sea, which triggered competition between China, the Philippines, and the French colonial government in Vietnam for ownership of South China Sea features. In pursuit of such ownership, the Republic of China (ROC) drew up a map of the South China Sea featuring an eleven-dash line, based on the ‘U shape line’ drawn by nationalist geographer Bai Meichu ten years earlier.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 57-59.

October 1949

Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic of China following the victory of Chinese Communist forces over the Nationalists. The ROC government retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan, and withdrew from Woody Island in the Paracel Islands and Itu Aba in the Spratly Islands.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, pp. 63-64.

The Guardian Special Correspondent, ‘Mao Zedong proclaims the establishment of the People’s Republic of China’, The Guardian (online archive), October 2019.

May 1950

Philippines President Elpido Quirino asserted his nation’s sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. He had previously claimed the Spratlys were essential to the security of the Philippines, based on Imperial Japan’s use of the Spratlys during the Second World War. PRC authorities denounced Quirino’s statements as ‘preposterous propaganda’ and asserted that the PRC ‘will never allow the Nansha (Spratly) Islands or any other land which belongs to China, to be encroached upon by any foreign power’.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, pp. 138–139.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 66.

September 1951

Zhou Enlai, the PRC’s Foreign Minister, released a statement regarding the South China Sea during the development of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, which Japan signed with forty-eight countries to conclude war with the Allied Powers and to end American occupation of the Japanese mainland. It criticised the draft treaty for ‘deliberately mak[ing] no mention of restoring sovereignty’ over the Spratly and Paracel Islands to the PRC, which, among other islands within the eleven-dash line, he claimed ‘have always been China’s territory’. The Vietnamese delegation to the conference made a similar claim to sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, pp. 27-28.

Treaty of Peace with Japan, United Nations, New York, (136, p. 45)

1953

Without any public or explicit explanation, maps published by the PRC began to show a nine-dash line rather than an eleven-dash line, differing from territorial claims on maps published by the former ROC government of mainland China and from maps published in 1949 by the PRC government. The Gulf of Tonkin was inside the eleven-dash line, but outside of the nine-dash line.

T Ikeshima, ‘China’s Dashed Line in the South China Sea: Legal Limits and Future Prospects’, Waseda Global Forum, 10, 2013, p. 26.

1955

PRC established a troop presence on Woody Island, the largest of the Paracel Islands.

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘Woody Island‘, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website, n.d.

1956      

The ROC government, following its relocation to Taiwan, reoccupied Itu Aba. Also known as Taiping Island, Itu Aba is the largest island in the Spratlys, and had been used as a submarine base by the Japanese during World War II. The ROC occupies the island to this day.

CY Lin, ‘Taiwan’s Spratly Initiative in the South China Sea’, China Brief, 8(4), 29 February 2008.

1956

South Vietnamese naval units landed on several of the Spratly Islands and erected landmarks and flags.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, pp. 29-30.

May 1956

Philippines Foreign Minister, Carlos Garcia, stated that some of the Spratly Islands should be recognised as Philippines sovereign territory due to their proximity. This prompted counter claims from both the PRC and South Vietnamese Governments.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, p. 29.

May 1956

After his brother took possession of several of the Spratly Islands, and having issued his ‘Notice to the Whole World’, Philippine fishing magnate Tomás Cloma declared the establishment of the ‘Free Territory of Freedomland’ off the coast of Palawan, Philippines. This drew protests from the PRC media and Government. ROC navy vessels proceeded to confront Cloma’s vessels and dismantled the structures they had built on the islands of the claimed region.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, pp. 66-67.

December 1957

Under the anonymous pseudonym ‘Commentator’, a PRC official published a defence in a Communist Party Publication of the Indonesian Government’s decision to extend its territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles, and to apply the archipelagic principle when delimiting its territorial sea.

H Chiu, ‘China and the Law of the Sea Conference’, Contemporary Asian Studies, 41(4), 1981, p. 2.

1958 September

The PRC’s Parliament passed its ‘Declaration of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea’, which asserted the PRC’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and claimed that its territorial sea extended to 12 nautical miles from baselines ‘composed of the straight lines connecting base-points on the mainland coast and on the outermost coastal islands.’ The United States denounced the move, describing it as an ‘attempt to cloak aggressive purposes.’

Declaration of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea, 4 September 1958.

H Chiu, ‘China and the Law of the Sea Conference’, Contemporary Asian Studies, 41(4), 1981, p. 3.

March 1959

After 82 Chinese fishermen were arrested by South Vietnamese troops in the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands, the PRC protested that ‘the South Vietnam Navy has openly violated China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.’

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, pp. 32-33.

1956-1966

Following Khrushchev’s On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences speech, and several diplomatic and geostrategic spats, a split opened between the PRC and Soviet Union. This transformed the global geostrategic and diplomatic landscape, putting the PRC on a defensive footing in its region, and leading them to suspect that the USSR would use North Vietnam as a base of operations in the South China Sea.

P Roberts, P Vamos, D Kaple. ‘Forum: Mao, Khrushchev, and China’s Split with the USSR: Perspectives on The Sino-Soviet Split’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 2010, pp. 149-150 & 152-158.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, pp. 104-105.

1965

A PRC official published an article protesting the creation by the United States of a ‘combat zone’ off the coast of Vietnam which extended to 9 nautical miles from Triton Island in the Paracel Islands. It described the zone as a ‘menace to China’s security’ as it extended to a ‘part of Chinese territorial waters in the vicinity of China’s Hsisha (Paracel) islands’.

H Chiu, ‘China and the Law of the Sea Conference’, Contemporary Asian Studies, 41(4), 1981, p. 4.

August 1967

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established, with Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines constituting its founding members. The PRC labelled it an ‘alliance of US stooges.’

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, p. 63.

1968

Almost a year after the creation of its ‘Seabed’ Committee, the United Nations sponsored a survey of natural resources in the South China Sea which revealed the presence of a continental shelf and the possibility of oil reserves throughout the region.

C Snyder, ‘The implications of hydrocarbon development in the South China Sea’, International Journal, 52(1), 1996-7, p. 143.

1971

The PRC began construction of a harbour and concrete wharf on Woody Island, a feature in the Paracel Islands.

J Garver, ‘China’s Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests’, The China Quarterly, 132, 1992, p. 1001.

July 1971

Henry Kissinger secretly visited China, leading to a rapprochement between the PRC and the US. It also contributed to a terminal decline in relations between the PRC and North Vietnam in light of the parties’ involvement in the Vietnam War.

W Burr, ‘The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow’, The New York Times (online archive), 1999.

March 1972

The PRC representative on the UN Seabed Committee argued in favour of a 200-mile territorial sea, over which the claimant nation would exercise ‘complete sovereignty’.

H Chiu, ‘China and the Law of the Sea Conference’, Contemporary Asian Studies, 41(4), 1981, pp. 6-7.

1973

The PRC presented its contemporary views on maritime territorial law through a submission to the UN Seabed Committee which stated that ‘an Archipelago or an island chain consisting of islands close to each other may be taken as an integral whole in defining the limits of the territorial sea around it’, presumably in reference to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Outside of the ambiguity of the nine-dash line, the PRC had previously restricted its statements on the international stage to claims to sovereignty over islands, rather than substantial territorial claims over the South China Sea itself.

H Chiu, ‘China and the Law of the Sea Conference’, Contemporary Asian Studies, 41(4), 1981, p. 9.

July 1973

South Vietnam granted several oil concessions off its coast to various international oil companies and consortia.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, p. 55.

September 1973

In line with a recommendation of its petroleum board, South Vietnam occupied ten of the Spratly Islands and incorporated them into the Phước Tuy Province. Which state held sovereignty over the Spratly Islands had been disputed since the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Hundreds of South Vietnamese troops were deployed to protect the oil concessions South Vietnam had granted.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 71.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, p. 55.

January 1974

South Vietnamese forces were decisively driven from the Paracel Islands by People's Liberation Army (PLA) naval vessels and soldiers. Over 100 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed or wounded, and 48 taken prisoner. The remaining Vietnamese troops fled south and, alongside reinforcements from the mainland, established the first permanent Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands, drawing further ire from the PRC.

T Yoshihara, ‘The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle: A Campaign Appraisal’, U.S. Naval War College Review, 69(2), 2016, p. 50.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, pp. 55-58.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, pp. 78-79.

January – February 1974

South Vietnam sent diplomatic notes to the ROC and the Philippines rejecting their claims to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands.

R Pedrozo, China Versus Vietnam: An Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea, CNA Occasional Paper, CNA Corporation, August 2014, p. 58.

October 1974

The Philippine Government coerced Tomás Cloma into giving them control of Freedomland and renames it the Kalyaan islands.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, pp. 69-70.

April 1975

In the weeks before the fall of Saigon, North Vietnamese forces occupied six of the Spratly Islands previously under South Vietnamese control. The state news agency described the action as the return of ‘six beloved islands to the fatherland’.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, p. 92.

April 1975

Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) fell to North Vietnamese Forces, beginning the process of reunification.

G Esper, ‘Communists Take Over Saigon; ‘Ho Chi Minh City’’, The New York Times (online archive), 1 May 1975.

March 1976

Notwithstanding the protests of the PRC, a Philippine-Swedish consortium conducted a resources survey in the Reed Bank area of the Spratlys and discovered a rich oil field off the coast of Palawan Island.

M Muscolino, ‘Past and Present Resource Disputes in the South China Sea: The Case of Reed Bank’, Cross-Currents East Asian History and Culture Review, 2(2), September 2013, p. 85.

May 1977

Vietnam released a statement claiming sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, as well as the territorial sea and resources surrounding them.

Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, May 1977.

June 1977

The Vietnamese Defence Minister ordered a 29-vessel taskforce to conduct a combined sea-air exercise near the Paracel Islands the day before he was to visit China.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, p. 101.

1978

At the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping is established as paramount leader. During Deng’s time as leader, China’s diplomatic relations with the West improved, and Chinese ties with ASEAN members grew closer, with the exception of Vietnam.

B Naughton, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Economist’, The China Quarterly, 135, September 1993, p. 500.

W Heaton, ‘China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy’ Asian Survey, 22(8), August 1982, pp. 779-781.

1978

The PRC completed construction of a runway on Woody Island and enlarged its harbour.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 79.

1978

As part of its efforts to increase its military presence in the Spratlys, the Philippines occupied Panata Island.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, p. 150.

June 1978

President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, signed a Presidential decree claiming sovereignty over the Kalayaan island group. The PRC Foreign Ministry later denounced the move as ‘illegal and impermissible’.

Presidential Decree No. 1596, s. 1978, 11 June 1978.

February 1979

Following Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, and allegations that Chinese people living in the nation had been mistreated or killed, the PRC launched a punitive expedition against Vietnam, which sparked a war between the two nations which killed tens of thousands.

J Copper, The Sino-Vietnam War’s Thirtieth Anniversary, American Journal of Chinese Studies, 16(1), 2009.

September 1979

During bilateral talks between China and Vietnam, the Vietnamese Government published ‘Vietnam’s Sovereignty Over Hoàng Sa (Paracel) and Trường Sa (Spratly) Archipelagos’. This represented a definitive departure from the previous North Vietnamese position that the PRC held sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, p. 113.

December 1979

Malaysia published a map of its continental shelf, marking several islands and reefs in the Spratly Islands as its territory.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, p. 156.

1979 – 1980

The PRC established temporary and permanent navigation beacons and lighthouses in the Paracel islands. It also built its first airstrip in the island group, establishing an air route to Hainan Island, and expanded the harbours on Woody Island and Triton Island.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 115 & 118.

January 1980

The PRC foreign Ministry published ‘China’s Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha (Spratly) Islands’, a document which stated that the islands have been ‘China’s territory since ancient times’ and denounced the allegedly ‘hegemonist and aggressor expansionist ambitions’ of Vietnam in the South China Sea.

PRC Foreign Ministry, ‘China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands (PRC)’, Beijing Review, 7, 18 February 1980, pp. 15 & 24.

1981

The PRC announced that ‘quite abundant’ offshore oil reserves have been discovered following extensive surveys in the Pearl River Estuary, the Yingge Sea, and the Northern part of the Tonkin Gulf, all regions which are part of or directly adjacent to the South China Sea.    

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, p. 126.

1982

After the PRC advertised oil concessions in the South China, the Vietnamese Government released a statement asserting that it will ‘not tolerate any encroachment on the resources held in its territorial waters and continental shelf’.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, p. 130.

1982 December

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was opened for signatures. This treaty lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It also contradicted China’s 1973 working paper by limiting the application of the archipelagic principle to archipelago states.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982.

L Chi-Kin, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 40-41.

1983

Malaysia occupied and established a base on Swallow Reef, which is located in the southern part of the Spratly Islands.

Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘Swallow Reef’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website.

1984

As it became an independent country, Brunei formally laid claim to its continental shelf and EEZ, which extends 200 miles from its coastline. This encompassed several features in the Southern Spratly islands, including Louisa Reef, Owen Shoal and Rifleman Bank.

Exclusive Economic Zone Proclaimation, Brunei Darussalam, 1984.

Editorial Board, ‘Brunei Maintains a Low Profile in Pressing its South China Sea Claims’, World Politics Review (online), 28 January 2016.

1984

Following years of build-up of the country’s naval capacity, PRC ships conducted their own surveys of Spratly Islands which covered most of the region.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 80.

May 1984

Philippines ratified UNCLOS.

United Nations (UN), ‘Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements’, UN Oceans & Law of the Sea website.

1986

Malaysia constructed a runway and civilian resort on Swallow Reef.

Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘Airpower in the South China Sea’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website.

February 1986

Indonesia ratified UNCLOS.

United Nations (UN), ‘Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements’, UN Oceans & Law of the Sea website.

January - March 1988

The PRC permanently occupied Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands after dredging to create a feature measuring approximately 8000m² on the previously intermittently submerged feature. It also occupied Cuarteron Reef, which was claimed by the Vietnamese. Previously, Vietnam was the only country occupying islands in this part of the Spratlys.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 82.

B Hayton, ‘Why China Built its New Islands’ in A Corr, ed, Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, pp. 48-49.

March 1988

A skirmish between Vietnamese and Chinese forces over control of Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands resulted in the deaths of 64 Vietnamese sailors.

KSL Collin, NM Tri, ‘Learning From the Battle of the Spratly Islands’, The Diplomat (online edition), March 20 2018.

April 1988

The PRC occupied the Hughes, North and South Gavan, and Subi reefs near Fiery Cross Reef and Johnson Reef.

B Hayton, ‘Why China Built its New Islands’, in A Corr, ed, Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, pp. 48-49.

September 1991

The Philippine Government evicted United States forces from United States bases in the Philippines.

D Sanger, ‘Philippines Orders U.S. to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay’, The New York Times (online edition), 28 December 1991.

1992

Through a declaration by its Foreign Ministry, Brunei formally laid claim to Louisa Reef.

The Maritime Awareness Project, ‘Brunei Country Profile’, The National Bureau of Asian Research, accessed 1 July 2021.

February 1992

The PRC passed its Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, laying claim to almost the entire South China Sea based on its purported historical rights.

Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, February 1992

July 1994

Vietnam ratified UNCLOS.

United Nations (UN), ‘Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements’, UN Oceans & Law of the Sea website.

1995

PRC forces permanently occupied Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. The reef was at this time a rock formation which was submerged at high tide. The Philippines and other ASEAN members united to protest the action.

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘Mischief Reef’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative website.

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, pp. 85-86.

Anon, ‘Scraply Islands’, The Economist, 343(8018), 24 May 1997, pp. 39-40.

January 1996

PRC naval vessels fought a battle with a Philippine navy gunboat near Capones Island in Mischief Reef, which was claimed by both the Philippines and the PRC. This was the first time the PRC engaged in military confrontation with an ASEAN member other than Vietnam.

A Rustandi, The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to enhance its policies in order to achieve resolution, Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, April 2016, p. 5.

March 1996

The US and the Philippines carried out joint military exercises on Palawan Island. Both countries denied that the operation was a reaction to the PRC’s seizure of Mischief Reef.

R De Castro, ‘The US-Philippine Alliance: An Evolving Hedge Against an Emerging China Challenge’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(3), 2009, p. 405.

June 1996

The PRC ratified UNCLOS. However, the PRC continued to oppose treaty’s requirement that parties undergo mandatory arbitration where there are disputes, and otherwise rejected third party involvement in such matters.

I Kardon, ‘China Can Say ‘No’: Analysing China’s Rejection of the South China Sea Arbitration’, Asian Law Review, 13(2), 2018, pp. 10-11.

United Nations (UN), ‘Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements’, UN Oceans & Law of the Sea website.

October 1996

Malaysia ratified UNCLOS.

United Nations (UN), ‘Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements’, UN Oceans & Law of the Sea website.

September 1996

Indonesia held its largest naval manoeuvres to date around the Natuna Islands, to which the PRC had made claims.

M Richardson, ‘Indonesia Plans War Games to Caution China’, The New York Times, 16 August 1996.

November 1996

Brunei ratified UNCLOS.

United Nations (UN), ‘Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements’, UN Oceans & Law of the Sea website.

October 1998

The Philippines Government produced photographs of PRC vessels unloading construction materials onto Mischief Reef, and Chinese workers building a large structure.

I Storey, ‘Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21(1), April 1999, p. 98.

1999

The PRC summer fishing moratoria which had previously been applied to the East Sea and Yellow Sea were extended to the South China Sea. The moratoria applied to the area north of 12 parallel north, which overlapped with traditional Vietnamese and Philippines fisheries. Fishermen in violation of the restrictions would have their vessels and catch confiscated and faced a 50,000 fine. While Vietnam has explicitly and repeatedly rejected the ban, the Philippines have passed fishing regulations that largely mirror those imposed by the PRC.

S Huang & Yuru He, ‘Management of China’s capture fisheries: Review and prospect’, Aquaculture and Fisheries, 4, 2019, p. 178.

V Macikenaite, ‘The Implications of China’s Fisheries Industry Regulation and Development for the South China Sea Dispute’, Keio University, 2014, pp. 221-223.

2000

The PRC and Vietnam signed a bilateral treaty which formally delimited the boundary between the two countries’ territory, EEZs and continental shelves in the northern part of the Tonkin Gulf, and concluded a joint fishing agreement which applied to the area. The preceding negotiations had begun before either party had ratified UNCLOS, but were nonetheless guided by its provisions.

I Kardon, ‘The Other Gulf of Tonkin Incident: China’s Forgotten Maritime Compromise’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website, 21 October 2015.

April 2001

A US EP-3E spy plane was intercepted by a Chinese F-8 fighter over the South China Sea, 50 miles southeast of Hainan Island, resulting in a collision which killed the Chinese pilot and forced the US plane to make an emergency landing on the island.

E Rosenthal and D Sanger, ‘U.S. Plane in China After it Collides With Chinese Jet’, The New York Times, 2 April 2001.

November 2002

The PRC and the member states of ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The non-binding document affirmed the intention of the parties to draft and ratify a formal Code of Conduct.

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, opened for signature 4 November 2002.

May 2007

The first iteration of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising Japan, India, the United States of America, and Australia, met for the first time at the suggestion of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan at the ASEAN Regional Forum.

P Buchan and B Rimland, Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, CSIS Brief, CSIS, March 2020.

September 2007

The first Quad held its only joint military exercise, an expanded ‘MALABAR’ exercise in the Bay of Bengal. The navies of the Quad countries were joined by the Singaporean Navy. The PRC filed official protests with each of the participating countries.

J Cherian, ‘The battle is on’, Frontline, 21 September 2007.

K Kaushik, ‘Explained: The purpose, participants of the Malabar Navy Exercise’, The Indian Express, 3 November 2020.

January – February 2008

ROC completed construction of an airfield on Itu Aba (Taiping Island), and the first visit to the island by an ROC President took place.

CY Lin, ‘Taiwan’s Spratly Initiative in the South China Sea’, China Brief, 8(4), 29 February 2008.

2008

Following disagreements over what role the Quad should play, the resignation of Shinzo Abe after his first stint as PM, and the Rudd Government’s decision to withdraw from the group, the first Quad disbanded.

D Flitton, ‘Who Really Killed the Quad 1.0?’, The Interpreter, 2 June 2020.

2009

Vietnam established a ‘fishing militia’ as an answer to the maritime militia used by the PRC to back up territorial claims. Like the PRC militia, it consists of fishing vessels which swarm claimed territory, or engage foreign vessels. Its mission, according to Hanoi, is to win the ongoing ‘people’s war at sea’.

N Khac Giang, ‘Vietnam’s Response to China’s Militarised Fishing Fleet’, East Asia Forum, 4 August 2018.

D Grossman and N Nhat Anh, ‘Deciphering Vietnam’s Evolving Military Doctrine in the South China Sea’, The Rand Blog, 11 May 2018.

May 2009

Malaysia and Vietnam filed a joint submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend their continental shelves beyond the standard 200 nautical miles from their coastlines.

Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, submissions, 3 May 2011.

July 2010

United States of America Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated Washington’s neutrality regarding claims to sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea in a speech at an Asian regional security meeting. However, she affirmed the United States’s interest in maintaining ‘open access to Asia’s maritime commons’.

M Lander, ‘Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands’, New York Times, 23 July 2010.

May 2011

Philippines President Benigno Aquino III lodged a formal protest at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, alleging that Chinese patrol boats harassed a Philippine oil surveying vessel in waters claimed by both nations.

I Storey, ‘China and the Philippines: Implications of the Reed Bank Incident’, China Brief, 11(8), 6 May 2011.

November 2011

In his speech to the Australian Parliament, President Barack Obama announced that the US will pivot geo-strategically to the Asia Pacific. He also announced troop and equipment deployments to Australia, as well as Singapore.

Commonwealth of Australia. House of Representatives. (2011). Address by the President of the United States of America. (Official Hansard).

February 2012

PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei stated that ‘no country including China has claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea’.

M Fravel, ‘Clarification of China’s Claim?’, The Diplomat, March 2012.

April – June 2012

After a Philippines reconnaissance plane identified Chinese fishing boats at Scarborough Reef, the Philippine Navy sent its warship BRP Gregorio del Pilar to detain or expel them. The PRC sent two unarmed vessels in response, leading to a standoff. After a series of naval and diplomatic manoeuvres, both sides withdrew.

M Green, K Hicks, Z Cooper, J Schaus and J Douglas, ‘Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff‘, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website.

June 2012

Vietnam’s National Assembly approved a new maritime law claiming sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The PRC Foreign Ministry denounced the law, asserting that the Paracel and Spratly Islands are the ‘indisputable’ territory of the PRC.

Law of the Sea of Vietnam, (Vietnam)

J Perlez, ‘Vietnam Law on Contested Islands Draws China’s Ire’, New York Times, 21 June 2012.

July 2012

ASEAN failed to issue a communique for the first time in its 45-year history, due to a disagreement between member states over whether to include the territorial issue in the joint statement. The Philippines accused Cambodia of obstructing the forum to aid the PRC.

BBC, ‘ASEAN nations fail to reach agreement on South China Sea’, BBC News (online article), 13 July 2012.

July 2012

The PRC established Sansha City as part of the Hainan province. The city is centred on Woody Island, where there is a significant civilian presence, and its jurisdiction extends over most of the islands and features within the nine-dash line.

Z Haver, ‘Sansha and the Expansion of China’s South China Sea Administration’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website, 12 May 2020.

November 2012

The Chinese province of Hainan, which is directly to the North of the South China Sea, received permission to stop and search vessels that enter waters claimed by the PRC at its discretion.

B Blanchard and M Mogato, ‘Update 2 – Chinese police plan to board vessels in disputed seas’, Reuters, 29 November 2012.

2013

The Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance (VFRS) was established to supplement the capabilities of the Vietnamese Coast Guard. The organisation is armed and authorised to use force.

N Khac Giang, ‘Vietnam’s Response to China’s Militarised Fishing Fleet’, East Asia Forum, 4 August 2018.

January 2013

The Philippines filed for formal arbitration of the PRC’s maritime claims in the SCS under UNCLOS at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The PRC rejected the process.

The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), (2013-2019).

March 2013

A PRC gunboat forced an Indonesian fisheries protection craft to release PRC vessels found fishing near the Natuna Islands. The waters around the Natuna Islands are internationally recognised as Indonesia’s EEZ. However, they also lie within the nine-dash line, and therefore are claimed by the PRC.

S Bentley, ‘Mapping the nine-dash line: recent incidents involving Indonesia in the South China Sea’, ASPI The Strategist, 29 October 2013.

May 2013

The PRC sent over thirty fishing and patrol vessels to Second Thomas Shoal, which is occupied by the Philippines. The Philippines Government asserted that this was done to intimidate their sailors and marines operating in the area.

T Quismundo, ‘Withdraw ships, Philippines tells China’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28 May 2013.

2014

Throughout the year, PRC vessels harassed Vietnamese fishermen in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands, and Philippines ships near Scarborough Shoal and Thomas Shoal. Similar altercations continued into 2015.

I Forsyth, ‘Old Game Plan, New Game’, in A Corr, ed, Great Powers, Grand Strategies, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, p. 87.

May 2014

A Vietnamese fishing vessel sank near a Chinese oil rig anchored off Vietnam’s coast, within its EEZ. Vietnamese media claimed that a Chinese vessel rammed the boat, while Chinese state news agency Xinhua claimed that it capsized while ‘interfering with and ramming’ a Chinese fishing vessel.

J Perlez, ‘China and Vietnam Point Fingers After Clash in South China Sea’, New York Times, 27 May 2014.

August 2014

A PRC fighter jet intercepted a US Navy P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine and reconnaissance plane about 135 miles east of the Chinese island of Hainan. US defence officials claim other close intercepts occurred in March, April and May.

Amaani Lyle, ‘DoD Registers Concern to China for Dangerous Intercept’, US Department of Defence Website, 22 August 2014.

November 2014

PRC President Xi Jinping addressed the Australian Parliament. He asserted that ‘China remains committed to building friendly relations and partnerships with its neighbours’ and seeks to ‘jointly maintain freedom of navigation and safety of maritime routs and ensure a maritime order of peace, tranquillity and win-win cooperation’.

Commonwealth of Australia. House of Representatives. (2014). Address by the President of the People’s Republic of China. (Official Hansard).

2015

Vietnam finished artificially doubling the size of its island base at Sand Cay and constructing 65,000m2 of artificial land at West London Reef.

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Vietnam Island Building, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website, May 7 2015.

June 2015

The PRC completed construction of seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands on reefs they occupy and announced that they would commence construction of military and civilian structures on them.

M Liddy & B Spraggon, ‘Before and After: China Builds Artificial Islands in South China Sea’, ABC, 22 September 2015.

September 2015

The PRC completed a 3000m runway on Fiery Cross Reef, which can land most PRC military aircraft. Runway construction was also spotted on artificially reclaimed land on Mischief and Subi Reefs.

G Poling, ‘Spratly Airstrip Update: Is Mischief Reef Next’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 15 September 2015.

September 2015

In response to concerns voiced by US President Barack Obama about China’s construction activities in the Spratly Islands, President Xi Jinping asserted that the PRC has ‘no intention to militarize’ the islands.

D Brunnstrom and M Martina, ‘China denies China turning artificial islands into military bases’, Reuters, 26 September 2015.

February 2016

According to US and ROC sources, the PRC deployed surface to air missiles on Woody Island.

M Forsythe, ‘China Deployed Missiles on Disputed Island, U.S. Says’, New York Times, 16 February 2016.

June 2016

ASEAN foreign ministers meeting at Phnom Penh failed to issue a communique for the second time. While the Philippines and Vietnam pushed for a statement which would cite the South China Sea arbitration lodged by the Philippines under UNCLOS, which was soon to announce its findings, Cambodia opposed any statements which would challenge the PRC’s claims over the South China Sea.

M Mogato, M Martina, B Blanchard, ‘ASEAN Deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia Blocks Statement’, Reuters, 25 July 2016.

July 2016

The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favour of the Philippines, finding that the PRC's historic claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction over the relevant waters or features within nine-dash line were contrary to UNCLOS, and therefore unlawful to the extent that they exceed their entitlements under UNCLOS. The PRC responded by stating that it ‘neither accepts nor recognises’ the court's ruling. The ROC also rejected the Court’s findings.

The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, (2013-2019).

K Allen, ‘Beijing Engineers Coverage of South China Sea Ruling’, BBC, 12 July 2016.

May 2017

The PRC announced a three-month moratorium on fishing north of the 12th Parallel, a month longer than previous moratoria.

R Jennings, ‘Countries Defy China’s Extra-Strict Fishing Moratorium in South China Sea’, VOA News, 9 June 2017.

November 2017

Following talks between representatives of the original Quad countries at the ASEAN Conference in Manila, a second iteration of the Quad was formed.

P Buchan & B Rimland, Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, CSIS Brief, 16 March 2020.

March 2018

The PRC placed its Coast Guard under the control of the People’s Armed Police, which is itself directly commanded by the Central Military Commission.

L Zhen, ‘China’s Military Police Given Control of Coast guard as Beijing Boosts Maritime Security’, South China Morning Post, 21 March 2018.

October 2018

The navies of the PRC and ASEAN countries held their first ever maritime exercise together off the coast of China’s Guangdong Province amid negotiations over a draft negotiating text for a South China Sea Code of Conduct. This was the first time ASEAN had held such an exercise with another country.

A Liang, ‘South Asian Navies to Hold 1st Joint Drills with China’, Associated Press, 19 October 2018.

F Chiang, ‘Uncertain Prospects: South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiations’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 6 October 2020.

September 2018

A US warship on a freedom of navigation mission almost collided with a PRC ship, which sparked a diplomatic incident.

S Myers, ‘American and Chinese Warships Narrowly Avoid High-Seas Collision’, The New York Times, 2 October 2018.

November 2018

President Xi Jinping visited Manila, the first state visit by a Chinese head of state to the Philippines in 13 years. Beijing and Manila agreed to maintain ‘freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the SCS’, and Duterte announced the establishment of a no fishing zone and marine sanctuary at a lagoon in the contested Scarborough Shoal.

H Beech & J Gutierrez, ‘Xi Visited Philippines to Celebrate ‘Rainbow After the Rain’ With Duterte’, The New York Times, 19 November 2018.

Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, 21 November 2018.

M Ives, ‘Philippines to Declare Marine Sanctuary in South China Sea’, The New York Times, 21 November 2016.

July 2019

Vietnamese and PRC vessels engaged in a weeks-long standoff near an offshore oil block in waters that fall within both Vietnam’s EEZ and the Nine-Dash Line.

Reuters, ‘Vietnam, China embroiled in South China Sea Standoff’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 July 2019.

September 2019

The reformed Quad held its first meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York. Australia affirmed that the grouping is committed to an ‘open, prosperous, rules-based and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, in which international law and the rights of all states are respected’.

E Fowler, ‘India Ramps Up Involvement in ‘Quad’ Talks’, Financial Review, 27 September 2019.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-India-Japan-United States ‘Quad’ Consultations, media release, 4 November 2019.

January 2020

Chinese fishing vessels were escorted by the PRC Coast Guard into Indonesia’s EEZ in the North Natuna Sea. In response, Indonesia sent military patrols to the region. The PRC vessels eventually retreated, an action which may have been prompted by President Joko Widodo’s visit to the Natuna Regency. The PRC had previously recognised Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands.

A Darmawan, ‘China’s Claim to Traditional Fishing Rights in the North Natuna Sea Does Not Hold Up’, East Asia Forum, 22 April 2020.

Fadli, ‘Chinese Vessels Retreat to Border of Indonesia’s EEZ in North Natuna Sea’, The Jakarta Post, 12 January 2020.

M Yu, ‘Et Tu, Jakarta’, The Washington Times, 19 November 2015.

April 2020

The PRC announced the creation of two new administrative districts under the authority of Sansha city: Xisha, which covers the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal, and Nansha, which covers the Spratly Islands. The move was denounced by Vietnam and the Philippines.

Huong Le Thu, ‘Fishing While the Water is Muddy: China’s Newly Announced Administrative Districts in the South China Sea’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website, 6 May 2020.

Z Haver, ‘Sansha and the Expansion of China’s South China Sea Administration’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website, 12 May 2020.

May 2020

A months-long standoff between Chinese, Malaysian, and Vietnamese ships within Malaysia’s EEZ ended after a Malaysian drillship which had been exploring oil and gas fields claimed by both Vietnam and Malaysia left the area.

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘Update: Chinese Survey Ship Escalates Three-Way Standoff’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Website, 18 June 2020.

R Latiff, ‘Chinese Ship Leaves Malaysian Waters After Month-Long South China Sea Standoff’, Reuters, 15 May 2020.

July 2020

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the PRC’s claims to sovereignty across the entire South China Sea were ‘completely unlawful’.

E Wong & M Crowley, ‘U.S. Says Most of China’s Claims in the South China Sea are Illegal’, The New York Times, 13 July 2020.

November 2020

For the first time, all four members of the Quad participate in the MALABAR naval exercises.

Australia joins Exercise MALABAR 2020, Department of Defence, 3 November 2020

January 2021

The PRC passed a law authorising Chinese Coast Guard vessels to ‘take all necessary measures, including the use of weapons, when national sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction are being illegally infringed upon by foreign organizations or individuals at sea’.

S Luo, ‘China’s Coast Guard Law: Destabilizing or Reassuring’, The Diplomat, 29 January 2021.

M Yamaguchi, ‘Japan Expresses Concern to UK Over New Chinese Coast Guard Law’, The Diplomat, 4 February 2021.

January 2021

Newly appointed US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reaffirmed that the US ‘rejects China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea to the extent that they exceed the maritime zones that China is permitted to claim under international law’ and stated that he will ‘stand with Southeast Asian claimants in the face of PRC pressure’.

Reuters Staff, ‘U.S. Stands with SE Asian Countries Against China Pressure’, Blinken Says’, Reuters, 28 January 2021.

February 2021

The Biden administration’s first FONOP begins, with a US warship sailing past the Paracel Islands.

A Panda, The US Navy’s First Trump-Era South China Sea FONOP Just Happened: First Takeaways and Analysis, The Diplomat, May 25 2017

March 2021

The Philippine defence chief demanded that approximately 200 Chinese vessels leave Whitsun Reef, which both the PRC and the Philippines claim. While a PRC spokesperson asserted that the vessels carry Chinese fishermen who have been ‘fishing in the waters near the reef all along’, the National Task Force–West Philippines, an agency of the Philippines government, alleged they are part of the PRC’s maritime militia.

J Gomez, ‘Philippine defence chief asks Chinese flotilla to leave reef’, Associated Press, 22 March 2021.

S Myers & J Gutierrez, ‘With Swarms of Ships, Beijing Tightens Its Grip on South China Sea’, New York Times, 5 April 2021.

March 2021

The first Quad Leaders’ Summit is held virtually due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

S Morrison, Opening remarks, Virtual Quad Leaders' Meeting, 13 March 2021

April 2021

All 27 EU member states issued a joint statement calling on all parties in the South China Sea to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling.

South China Sea: Statement by the Spokesperson on challenges to peace and stability, European Union External Action Service, 24 April 2021

June 2021

The USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier strike group sailed into the disputed territory of the South China Sea.

US Navy aircraft carrier USS Reagan enters South China Sea, Al Jazeera, 15 June 2021

July 2021

UK Carrier Strike Group, including the carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, sailed through the South China Sea on its way to Japan, with a program that included exercises with the Singaporean navy and a FONOP exercise through the South China Sea.

China warns UK as carrier strike group approaches, BBC News, 30 July 2021

August 2021

A German frigate is dispatched to the South China Sea for the first time, as part of a German effort to expand its Indo-Pacific presence.

Indo-Pacific Deployment 2021, Bundeswehr, 2 August 2021

September 2021

AUKUS, an enhanced trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, is formed. AUKUS’s first initiative is the development of nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy, beginning with an 18-month review period to determine how to achieve this goal. Australia cancelled the Attack-class conventional submarine acquisition program.

Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS, White House Briefing Room, September 15 2021

S Morrison, Australia to pursue nuclear-powered submarines through new trilateral enhanced security partnership, Prime Minister, 16 September 2021

September 2021

The first in-person Quad Leaders’ Summit was held at the White House in Washington.

S Morrison, Quad Leaders' Summit Communique, Prime Minister of Australia, 24 September 2021

October 2021

The pace of Chinese air sorties into ROC airspace escalated, with 93 sorties conducted within three days.

L Lin and J T Areddy, Record Chinese Aircraft Sorties Near Taiwan Prompt US Warning, Wall Street Journal, 3 October 2021

November 2021

The Philippines claimed Chinese vessels fired water cannons on Philippine vessels attempting to resupply the Sierra Madre grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal.

Philippines Tells China to Back Off After South China Sea Clash, Al Jazeera, 18 November 2021

February 2022

Australia hosted fourth Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Melbourne.

Australia to host fourth Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 10 February 2022

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Notes

[←1]

CSIS, ‘How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea’, China Power, updated January 2021.

[←2]

K Leigh, P Martin, and A Leung, ‘Troubled Waters: Where the U.S. and China Could Clash in the South China Sea’, Bloomberg, 17 December 2020.

[←3]

K Leigh, P Martin, and A Leung, ‘Troubled Waters: Where the U.S. and China Could Clash in the South China Sea’, Bloomberg, 17 December 2020.

[←4]

B Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, p. 27-28.